COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS OF THE VIETNAM AND LAOS SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T02095R000700080024-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 26, 2009
• Sequence Number: 24
• Publication Date: April 13, 1973
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000700080024-2
Secret
NSA review completed
Eighth Report
COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS OF
THE VIETNAM AND LAOS SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS
DIA Review
Completed.
(This report covers the week from
6 April through 12 April 1973)
This memorandum has been prepared jointly by the
Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense
Secret
25
13 April 1973
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000700080024-2
 25X1 Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000700080024-2
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000700080024-2
 Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000700080024-2
13 April 1973
Eighth Report
COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS OF
THE VIETNAM AND LAOS SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS*
(This report covers the week from
6 April through 12 April 1973)
The Key Points
Only two small groups of specialists started
the infiltration trip south from North Vietnam
during the week.
Tenuous evidence suggests that elements of two
NVA divisions in northern MR 1 may be returning
to North Vietnam. If all elements of these
divisions leave South Vietnam, the NVA would
still have a force structure in MR 1 similar
to that which existed on the eve of the Com-
munist 1972 spring offensive.
A high level of North Vietnamese logistic ac-
tivity continued throughout the week. Once
again, NVA logistic movements were particularly
heavy in Quang Tri Province.
The number of combat incidents initiated by
the Communists remained at a moderate level in
South Vietnam, but rose significantly in Laos.
* This report has been prepared jointly by the
Central Intelligence Agency and the Department
of Defense.
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000700080024-2
 Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000700080024-2
The Details
NOTE: This is the eighth in a series of reports de-
tailing recently received evidence of (a) Communist
efforts to infiltrate new manpower and military ma-
teriel toward and into South Vietnam, and (b) Commu-
nist-instigated combat activity in violation of the
Vietnam and Laos settlement agreements.
A. Infiltration and Redeployments of North Viet-
namese Personnel
1. During the reporting period two new spe-
cial-purpose groups started south from North Vietnam.
Farther down in the infiltration pipeline we also de-
tected for the first time two additional small groups
of specialists who had left North Vietnam sometime
in March. The combined strength of the newly de-
tected special-purpose groups, however, does not
significantly affect our total estimate of 35,000
North Vietnamese personnel who were.either in the infil-
tration system as of 28 January or who started their
journey south since that date. Almost all of these
infiltrators have now reached their destinations.
2. No new information is available on the
diversion northward of the one regular infiltration
group noted in the Special Note attached to our mem-
orandum of last week. The group, initially identi-
fied on 5 April in the Dong Hoi area of North Vietnam,
was traveling northward--away from its original des-
tination in northern South Vietnam.
3. A month has elapsed since the last infil-
tration group of combat replacement personnel entered
the pipeline in North Vietnam, and it appears that
this dry season's infiltration of regular combat
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000700080024-2
 Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000700080024-2
troops has ended. In addition, fewer special-pur-
pose groups have been detected entering the system
during the past several weeks, indicating that the
infiltration of civilian and military specialists
also may be drawing to a close for this dry season.
(Annex II contains a more detailed discussion, for
US eyes only, of the information on North Vietnamese
troop infiltration which we have received during the
reporting period.)
4. Newly received evidence suggests that two
NVA infantry divisions may be in the process of
leaving Quang Tri Province, South Vietnam, and re-
turning to southern North Vietnam. The evidence is
tenuous, and we are as yet unable to determine whether
the change in status of the two divisions reflects a
permanent relocation or a temporary move to rest and
refit before rotating back into South Vietnam. (This
development and the evidence relevant to it are dis-
cussed in detail, in Annex III.)
5. Elsewhere in MR 1, recent evidence indi-
cates that two NVA antiaircraft regiments are in
the process of moving from Quang Tri Province into
the Laos Panhandle. At least one of these units
is scheduled to replace a newly formed antiaircraft
regiment in southern Laos, which is now moving to-
ward northeastern Cambodia. The destination of the
other regiment moving out of Quang Tri Province is
unclear, but there have been continuing indications
of a Communist buildup of anitaircraft defense in
southern Laos and extending into Cambodia. In other
air defense developments, an additional North Viet-
namese SA-2 site has been established near Khe Sanh
during the past week. There are now a total of 10
SA-2 sites in the Khe Sanh area which have been con-
structed since the beginning of this year. Four of
these were observed to be occupied as of 9 April.
6. Farther south, evidence received during
the week suggests that a headquarters element of a
North Vietnamese armor regiment may have moved from
the Hanoi area of North Vietnam to a point on the
Cambodian border with South Vietnam, north of Loch
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000700080024-2
 Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000700080024-2
Ninh town in GVN MR 3. The headquarters element
probably will serve as the controlling authority for
the large number of tanks noted moving to the COSVN
area during this dry season.
B. Movement of Military Equipment and Supplies by
the North Vietnamese in Violation of the
Agreements
7. Heavy Communist .logistic movements con-
tinued during the week in northern South Vietnam and
throughout most of the Laos Panhandle. NVA vehicle
activity in Quang Tri Province was even heavier than
in the preceding several weeks, as the North Viet-
namese continued to move supplies into forward areas.
(Annex IV, contains newly received
evidence of efforts by Communist forces in Quang Tri
Province to move war materiel in ways which will avoid
detection by the ICCS.) The most significant observa-
tions of NVA truck traffic in southern Laos were in
the areas adjacent to Quang Tri Province and the A
Shau Valley, but sizeable traffic flows were also
noted in the Chavane area. Traffic moving south-
ward through the Passes out of North Vietnam was
slightly above the average weekly level in March.
Heavy logistic activity was also observed during
the week in the southern North Vietnam Panhandle.
8. The following instances of Communist lo-
gistic activity were observed inside South Vietnam
during the reporting period. Activity observed in
South Vietnam probably reflects supplies which have
recently entered the country. (The map on the fol-
lowing page shows the roads and route numbers which
appear below.)
(a) NVA vehicle activity was observed
each day on Route 9 in northern
Quang Tri Province, as follows:
(1)
29 cargo trucks were
observed moving on the route be-
tween Dong Ha and the Laos/South
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000700080024-2
 \ x Hon Nieu
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000700080024-2 fi' '\,Vlnh Linh
~~. North Vietnam os (lift ~1, fern
loss r.
1Ha Tinh
1A
ai t)u(Tho
Phurn Sdo~C
Ash Romeo
/ ,Can Thi
y1~..TPanh. -(
Names end boundary representation
ere not necessarily authoritetive
4 Tam Ky
Pleiku
VLng Tau
CAFI'T'AL ." PEC#AL ZONE
South Vietnam
and
North Vietnam Panhandle
.-^-- - Province boundary
ON 00 Military region
International Commission
of Control and Supervision
region boundary
--------- Railroad
Road
POL pipeline
0 25 50 75 Milos
25
0 25 50 75 Kilom el ers
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000700080024-2
 Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000700080024-2
(b)
(c)
(d)
(2)
(3)
(4
(5)
Vietnam border (.7 eastbound, 15
westbound, 7 parked).
59 cargo vehicles
were noted on Route 9 in the
immediate vicinity of the Sanh
(24 eastbound, 19 westbound, 16
parked).
85 cargo trucks were
moving on the segment between
Dong Ha and Khe Sanh (19 east-
bound, 31 westbound, 35 parked).
98 cargo vehicles
were noted between Dong Ha and
the border (43 eastbound, 39
westbound, 16 parked).
were observe d on the segment
west of Dong Ha (20 westbound,
14 eastbound, 29 parked).
63 cargo trucks
in the A Shau Valley re-
on Route 548 southeast of Khe Sanh
(9 southbound, 6 parked). There were
also 11 trucks noted on this route on
8 April (7 southbound, 4 northbound).
gion, 15 cargo trucks were observed
21 cargo vehicles were ob-
served on Route 6089 southeast of Khe
Sanh (11 northbound, 6 southbound, 4
parked).
16 cargo vehicles
the road.
were detected moving on Route 616
southeast of Khe Sanh. Two of the
vehicles were southbound, 3 were north-
bound, and 11 were parked. Also on
Route 616 in the same area, 11 cargo
trucks and 31 57-mm AAA pieces were
observed parked along
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000700080024-2
 Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000700080024-2
(e)
(f)
on Route 1 in northeastern
Quang Tri, Province, 16 cargo vehicles
and 41 buses were observed parked along
the road north of Quang Tri City. In
the same area, 9 cargo trucks (4 north-
bound, 1 southbound, 4 parked)were ob-
served with 4 buses parked
along the road.
16 cargo trucks, 5 tanks,
were seen parked along Route 547 south-
west of Hue.
1 APC and field artillery pieces
(g) 21 cargo vehicles were
seen on Route 922 traveling on the
segment immediately inside the South
Vietnam/Laos border. Sixteen of the
vehicles were moving south, six of
them towing light artillery pieces.
(h) In the period 6 through 12 April, 130
southbound cargo vehicles were ob-
served on Route 1033 in the western
DMZ.
(i)
vehicles were observed on Route 1000
in the eastern DMZ.
rune southbound cargo
9. During the reporting period the following
indications of North Vietnamese logistic activity in
southern Laos and northeastern Cambodia were noted.
Historical precedent would suggest that much of the
activity in the area probably involved supplies des-
tined for South Vietnam.
(a) The following activity was observed
on Route 99 in the central portion of
the Laos Panhandle during the re-
porting period:
(1) I I50 cargo trucks were
observed parked between Muong
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000700080024-2
 Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000700080024-2
Nong and the intersection of
Route 96.
(2)
186 cargo vehicles
were detected on the segment
between Muong Nong and the Route
96 intersection (33 northbound,
50 southbound, 103 parked).
(3) ~ o=. ~24 cargo trucks were
traveling the route in the vi-
cinity of Muong Nong (12 north-
bound, 6 southbound, 6 parked).
(4)
48 cargo trucks were
on the highway between Muong
Nong and the Route 96 intersec-
tion (25 northbound, 15 south-
bound, 8 parked).
(5)
21 cargo trucks (9
south, 2 north, 10 parked) and
1 bulldozer were observed moving
north on Route 99 just south of
Muong Nong. In addition, one
APC was observed parked along
the road in the same area.
25X1 (b)
(c)
observed on Route 9222A near the Laos/
South Vietnam border. Six of the
vehicles were traveling south and
were towing three 37-mm AAA weapons.
20 NVA cargo trucks were
near the South Vietnam border (9 west-
bound, 11 eastbound, 8 parked). On
served on Route 966 east of Chavane,
28 cargo trucks were ob-
served in the same area (34 eastbound,
9 parked).
43 cargo vehicles were ob-
25X1 (d) I I on Route 9 west of the
Laos/South Vietnam border, 9 cargo
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000700080024-2
 Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000700080024-2
seen in the same area
5 eastbound and 1 par
bound trucks and 1 eastbound were
trucks were seen parked. Ten west-
(e) 18 cargo trucks were ob
servec on moute 9211 southeast of
Saravane, 11 moving south, 4 north,
and 3 parked. 25 more
trucks were observed (17 moving south,
6 north, and 2 parked).
(f) On 8 April, a North Vietnamese logistic
unit in northeastern Cambodia reportedly
transported 77 tons of petroleum and
diesel fuel, 88 tons of rice, and over
50 tons of food supplies to an NVA
Engineer Regiment operating in the
area.
(g)
bound, 17 parked). During the period
were detected on Route 912 (10 north-
southwest of the
Ban Karai Pass, 27 cargo vehicles
322 vehicles
were detected moving south and 323
traveling north through the Ban Karai
Pass.
10. The following evidence was received during
the week of military supply movements within North
Vietnam. The goods involved are probably moving to-
ward South Vietnam and southern Laos.
(a) On 6 and 7 April, nearly 200 cargo
vehicles passed through the opera-
tional area of an NVA logistic unit
south of Dong Hoi. The total in-
cluded at least 85 southbound vehi-
cles. The type and amount of sup-
plies being carried by the vehicles
could not be determined. The same
unit reportedly had 146 vehicles (74
northbound, 72 southbound) pass
through its area on 10 April.
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000700080024-2
 Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000700080024-2
C. Combat Activity Initiated by Communist Forces
in South Vietnam Since the Ceasefire
11. In South Vietnam, the total number of Com-
munist-initiated ceasefire violations reported by
the South Vietnamese Armed Forces since 28 January
and for the last week (6-12 April) are shown below:
Military Total Since Ceasefire Last Week (6-12 Apr)
Region Level of Action Level of Action
Major Minor Major Minor
MR 1 721 2,546 34 91
MR 2 180 1,129 7 91
MR 3 252 1,610 24 121
MR 4 373 3,472 23 349
Totals 1,526 8,757 88(121)1/ 652(597)1/
1/ Denotes totals of previous week.
12. Some of these violations may have been in-
itiated by GVN forces rather than Communist forces,
and it is impossible in all cases to determine the
actual instigator. The table above and the chart
on the following page, however, do show fairly ac-
curately the trend in the amount of combat that has
occurred in South Vietnam since the ceasefire. The
fact that a combat incident occurred at a particular
time and place is generally reported accurately by
the South Vietnamese, even though the question of
who started it may not always be treated in objective
fashion. In some cases, the Joint Military Commission
(GVN/PRG) also reports violations of the ceasefire.
13. The following is a chronological listing
of only the most significant "major" Communist vi-
olations of the ceasefire in South Vietnam that were
reported by the South Vietnamese Armed Forces during
the past week.
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000700080024-2
 Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000700080024-2
JAN-FEB
4UU
300
200
L VIOL
CEASE-FIRE VIOLATIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM AS REPORTED BY RVNAF
(28 JANUARY 1913 TO THE PRESENT)
WONE
~0 N?
-
1IiJ L i t I N
MAR
4UU
300
200
APR
4UU
300
200
MAY
41 7F I I 770r
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000700080024-2
 Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000700080024-2
MILITARY REGION 1
(a.) On 6 April, two Air America helicopters
with ICCS markings were downed in the
vicinity of Khe Sanh, at least one
due to enemy ground fire.
MILITARY REGION 2
(a) On 3 April, 15 miles southwest of
Pleiku City, elements of an ARVN
ranger border defense battalion re-
ceived an enemy ground attack.
(b) On 4 April, four miles south of Bong
Son, elements of an ARVN ranger bat-
talion received a ground attack by
an enemy force.
(c) On 8 April, an ARVN position 10 miles
southwest of Kontum City was subjected
to a ground attack.
(d) On 9 April, four miles south of Bong
Son, ARVN elements were subjected to
an enemy ground attack.
MILITARY REGION 3
(a) Nothing of significance to report.
MILITARY REGION 4
(a) On 4 April, 15 miles northeast of Chau
Doc, elements of an ARVN infantry bat-
talion received a ground attack by an
enemy force.
(b) On 5 April, 11 miles northeast of Chau
Doc, elements of an ARVN infantry bat-
talion received a ground attack by an
enemy force.
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000700080024-2
 Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000700080024-2
(c) On 8 April, three miles northwest
of Vi Thanh, a VNAF helicopter was
struck by enemy ground fire. The
aircraft was forced to crash land
and sustained heavy damage.
D. Combat Activity Initiated by Communist Forces
in Laos During the Week from 6 through 13 April
14. North Vietnamese Army forces launched heavy,
sustained attacks during the week against Royal Lao
Government units defending the Route 4 corridor south-
east of the Plain of Jars in Laos Military Region II,
forcing several Government units to begin withdrawing
from the area. One NVA infantry regiment and sup-
porting artillery and sapper units have been identified
near Route 4 north of the village of Tha Vieng. There
continues to be strong evidence that this NVA force
is determined to eliminate the RLG presence in the
area, thereby securing southeastern Xieng Khouang
Province as Communist-held territory. A general
lull in military activity prevailed throughout South
Laos during the week.
15. Following is a brief account of significant
combat incidents which occurred between 6 and 13 April,
and which were clearly initiated by Communist forces
in violation of the Laos ceasefire agreement:
(a) On 6 April, no significant military
activity occurred throughout Laos.
(b) On 7 April, activity again was light
throughout Laos, although there was
an attack by an estimated two NVA
companies against a Government de-
fensive position south of Thakhek in
MR III.
(c) On 8 April, Communist forces launched
coordinated attacks against six RLG
positions near Route 4 southeast of
the Plain of Jars. Defenders were
driven from three of the positions.
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000700080024-2
 Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000700080024-2
Elsewhere in Laos, activity remained
light and scattered.
(d) On 9 April, Government troops were
driven from another position south-
east of the Plain.
(e) On 10 April, Communist forces con-
tinued the ground shelling attacks
against Government elements along
Route 4.
(f) On 11 April, Communist pressure in-
tensified southeast of the PDJ. Over
1,000 rounds of artillery and mortar
fire fell on Government positions
along Route 4 north of Tha Vieng
village, and several Government units
began withdrawing southward.
(g) On 12 April, the NVA introduced tanks
into the fighting along Route 4. Fire
from two such vehicles near Tha Vieng
prevented medical evacuation of
friendly wounded, as the dislodged
Government elements continued to
withdraw slowly southward. The rest
of the country remained generally
quiet.
(h) On 13 April, three government posi-
tions 16 to 18 km. northwest of Bouam
Long were lost following an attack. by
an enemy force of unknown size sup-
ported by recoilles rifle fire.
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000700080024-2
 25X1 Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000700080024-2
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000700080024-2
 Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000700080024-2
Post-Ceasefire Infiltration
North Vietnamese
Personnel to the
1. Two new special-purpose groups--with a
combined strength of less than 80 personnel--were
initially detected in Binh Tram 26's area of re-
sponsibility near Dong Hoi, North Vietnam.during
the past week. This is the first time since 27
March that special-purpose infiltration groups have
been observed entering the pipeline in North Viet-
nam. In addition, two other special-purpose groups
with undetermined strengths were detected for the
first time farther south in southern Laos and Cam-
bodia.
2. Since 11 March, there have been no de-
tections of regular combat troops entering the pipe-
line in North Vietnam. Moreover, we have received
no additional evidence regarding the northward-
moving Group 7005, which was initially identified
in the Dong Hoi area of North Vietnam on 5 April.
Although this group originally was destined for MR
Tri-Thien Hue in northern South Vietnam, it was
sent back north when at least elements of the unit
for which it was destined apparently withdrew from
South Vietnam to North Vietnam.
3. The table on the following page lists
those infiltration groups which were detected in
the pipeline during the past week.
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000700080024-2
 Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000700080024-2
Infiltration Groups initially Reported
During the Past Week
Group. Date of
Designator Strength Location Detection
A214 Unk Cambodia 10 Apr
A428 Unk South Laos 7 Apr
Y272 32 North Vietnam 5 Apr
Y772 42 North Vietnam 5 Apr
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000700080024-2
 Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000700080024-2
1. A limited amount of evidence from communi-
cations intelligence suggests that two NVA infantry
divisions--the 304th and 312th--are possibly in the
process of returning to the north from Quang Tri
Province, South Vietnam. According to North Viet-
namese civil communications some elements of all
three of the subordinate regiments of the. 304th
Division have been identified in southern North Viet-
nam since late January. In addition, around the
beginning of April these regiments ceased communi-
cating with the senior NVA tactical authority for
northern South Vietnam. Other COMINT, as well as
collateral evidence, however, indicates that at
least some elements of the 304th Division were still
in Quang Tri Province as of the first week of April.
2. In the case of the 312th Division, recent
changes in the communications patterns of the divi-
sion could indicate that it also is in the process
of leaving northern South Vietnam. Not only has
there been no reflection in COMINT of tactical ac-
tivity in Quang Tri Province by subordinate ele-
ments of the division since early March, there also
has been a noticeable lack of communications of the
subordinate regiments with the division headquarters
and that of the senior tactical authority for the
area since late March. Moreover, between 14 and
29 March, the division headquarters relocated from
southwest of Quang Tri City to just north of the
DMZ in North Vietnam.
3. If the 304th and 312th Divisions are in
fact leaving South Vietnam, they would be the second
and third such units to do so in recent months. The
NVA 308th Infantry Division returned north to Ha
Tinh Province of North Vietnam from Quang Tri Prov-
ince earlier this year. The withdrawal of the three
divisions would reduce Communist combat forces in
MR 1 by a combined total of some 20,000 troops, but
would still leave an NVA combat structure in MR 1
similar to that which existed at the beginning of
the 1972 Communist spring offensive.
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000700080024-2
 Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000700080024-2
New Evidence of Surreptitious Su
bar NVA Logistic Units
A communications compromise by the North Viet-
namese during the reporting period has provided new
information concerning the covert movement of war-
related equipment in Quang Tri Province, South Viet-
nam. A 10 April intercepted message from Binh Tram
12, the major NVA logistic entity operating in north-
ern South Vietnam, contains instructions to two of
the Binh Tram's subordinate transportation battalions
concerning the anticipated movement of weapons and
other cargo. The cargo movement cited is apparently
across the DMZ since, according to the instructions,
vehicles will be dispatched from Dong Ha in northern
South Vietnam to pick up cargo at. Dong Hoi (southern
North Vietnam), for movement to Huong Hoa, located
in South Vietnam near Khe Sanh,
The pertinent section of this message reads
as follows:
"...the International Committee will be inspect-
ing our roads for three more days, therefore we
haven't been able to implement our plan to transport
the weapons. The supply point at Dong Ha has been
cleaned out on the morning of 1.1 April., all of the
vehicles of the two battalions will. go out to Dong
Hoi to pick up the cargo and transport it to Huong
Hoa. When we are able to transport the weapons, I
will let you know. From 1.1 April, our tankers will
pick up gasoline at A-19 and no longer pick up gaso-
line at A-17."
2/PT/2997-73 (VCJ)
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000700080024-2
 Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000700080024-2
Secret
Secret
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000700080024-2