COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS OF THE VIETNAM AND LAOS SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T02095R000700080019-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 21, 2009
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: March 9, 1973
• Content Type: REPORT

25X1 Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000700080019-8 t; 25X1
Secret
NSA review completed
Third Report
COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS OF
THE VIETNAM AND LAOS SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS
(This report covers the period from
4 March through 8 March 1973)
This memorandum has been prepared jointly by the
Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense
Secret
25X1 25 25X1
9 March 1973
DIA Review
Completed.
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000700080019-8
 25X1 Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000700080019-8
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000700080019-8
 Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000700080019-8
Third Report
COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS OF
THE VIETNAM AND LAOS SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS*
(This report covers the period from
4 March through 8 March 1973)
The Key Points
There is still no sign of a slowdown in the
infiltration of North Vietnamese troops, mili-
tary equipment and supplies toward and into
South Vietnam in clear violation of the Viet-
nam settlement agreement.
The number of combat incidents initiated by
the Communists in violation of the ceasefire
terms remains at a moderate level in South
Vietnam and at a low level in Laos.
* This report has been prepared jointly by the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency and the Department of
Defense.
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000700080019-8
 Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000700080019-8
The Details
(NOTE: This is the third in a series of reports de-
tailing recent Communist actions which we believe
to be violations of the Vietnam and Laos settlement
agreements.
A. Continuing Infiltration and Redeployment of North
Vietnamese Personnel in Violation of the Agreement
1. We continued to receive conclusive evidence
during the reporting period that Hanoi is still infil-
trating military personnel toward and into South Viet-
nam in violation of the settlement agreement. There
are still some 30,000 North Vietnamese infiltrators
moving through the pipeline, and of these at least
8,000 almost certainly started their tri south from
North Vietnam after 28 January.
2. Beyond this infiltration of replacement fillers
for existing Communist units in South Vietnam, other
information received in the past few days indicates
that Hanoi has deployed a new integral unit--an anti-
aircraft artillery regiment--from North Vietnam to
Quang Tri Province, probably after 28 January. If
true, this is the first case in which a complete North
Vietnamese unit of regimental size has moved into South
Vietnam since the ceasefire. (The move is probably
part of the broader Communist activity which has oc-
curred recently around Khe Sanh airfield in Quang Tri
Province. See paragraph 4 (cO, below, for additional
information on this activity.)
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000700080019-8
 Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000700080019-8
B. Movement of Military Equipment and Supplied
the North Vietnamese in Violation of the
Agreements
3. The following paragraphs outline the detected
movement of military equipment and supplies out of
North Vietnam into Laos and South Vietnam since 3
March. Some activity which occurred prior to 3 March
but has only recently come to our attention is also
included. The evidence indicates that large quanti-
ties of supplies continue to move in the supply net-
work and will soon be available to NVA units in Laos
and South Vietnam. The very high tonnages observed
on the move in the North Vietnam Panhandle, although
lacking a specific destination, are undoubtedly pro-
grammed for movement to the south, and the large num-
ber of vehicles observed in the tri-border area (where
Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam meet) almost certainly
reflects an intention to move supplies into
and southern South Vietnam in the future.
4. The following instances of Communist logistic
activity were observed on roads within South Vietnam
in the areas of the Laos border and in the DMZ during
the period under review. Although detected within
South Vietnam, they probably reflect supplies which
have recently entered South Vietnam.
(a) Eleven cargo trucks were observed
entering South Vietnam on Route 9
northwest of Khe Sanh during the
period
(b) 36 cargo trucks were seen halted
on Route Q9D between Khe Sanh and
the Laos border
(c) In the DMZ itself, 17 cargo vehi-
cles were detected moving south on
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000700080019-8
 Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000700080019-8
(d) North Vietnamese efforts to im-
prove the airfield at Khe Sanh in
Quang Tri Province have continued
during the reporting period. On
work was observed in prog-
(e)
There is no evidence, however, that
the North Vietnamese have with-
drawn the SA-2 equipment to North
Vietnam.
were observed to be unoccupie .
erational as recently
the three SA-2 sites near the Khe
Sanh airfield (which had been op-
at the airfield.
ress on upgrading a second runway
_--_Jthe North Vietnamese are con-
tinuing to construct a road from
Route 165/966 in southern Laos
into Quang Tin and Quang Ngai Prov-
inces of South Vietnam. This cross
border route is not close to any of
the "legal" border entry points
which the Communists have requested,
and its only logical use would be
as a supply route into the central
coastal regions of South Vietnam.
(North Vietnamese logistic activity
in the Laos Panhandle and northeastern Cambodia.
Historical precedent would suggest that much of
this activity probably involves supplies destined
for South Vietnam.
(a)
observed moving southward through
285 vehicles were
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000700080019-8
 Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000700080019-8
the Lao Panhandle to southern
South Vietnam for logistical sup-
port there.
(b) Four NVA logistic units in the
tri-border area--one of them in
southern Laos and the other three
in nor hea tern Cambodia--were ob-
served with a combined
total of 205 cargo vehicles avail-
able for use.
(c)
(d)
a major North Viet-
namese logistic unit in the tri-
border area was observed sending
16 trucks in the direction of
central South Vietnam.
57 North. Vietnamese
cargo trucks were observed moving
southward on Route 1201 through the
Mu Gia Pass from North Vietnam into
Laos.
(e) 380 cargo trucks were seen traveling
south on Route 912 through the Ban
Karai,Pass into southern Laos be-
tween
(f) Directly west of the DMZ in Laos
there were 58 cargo trucks observed
moving south on Route 1033 during
the period
6. There is additional evidence of the continuing
movement within North Vietnam of military and other
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000700080019-8
 Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000700080019-8
supplies which are probably moving to southern Laos
or South Vietnam.
(a)
X65 cargo
trucks were observed halted along
Route 137 on the North Vietnam
side of the Laos/North Vietnam
border.
(b) L
25 cargo trucks
were observed on Route 1036
(north of the western DMZ) in
North Vietnam
The trucks were halted, and the
direction of intended movement
could not be determined.
(c) Large quantities of cargo were
observed moving between two NVA
logistic units in southern. North
Vietnam
Although the spe-
cific destination and the types of
cargo involved are unknown, about
2,500 tons of supplies were ob-
served moving between these units
during this period.
C. Combat Activity Insti ated b Communist Forces
in South Vietnam Since the Ceasefire
7. In South Vietnam, the total numbers of Com-
munist initiated ceasefire violations reported by
the South Vietnamese Armed Forces since 28 January
and for the last five days (4 Mar - 8 Mar) are shown
below:
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000700080019-8
 Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000700080019-8
Military
Total Since Cease-Fire
Last Five Days
(4-8 Mar)
Region
Level of Action
Level of Action
Major 1/
Minor 1/
Major
Minor
MR 1
465
1,840
42
157
MR 2
115
694
9
51
MR 3
113
1,002
11
71
MR 4
200
2,054
21
101
Totals
893
5,590
83(109)2/
380(550)2/
1/ DOD definitions of major and minor violations are con-
tained in ANNEX III.
2/ Denotes totals of previous five days.
8. During the past five days, the number of
major violations decreased from 109 to 83. The
largest decline occurred in MR 1 where the total de-
clined from 59 to 42. The number of minor violations
decreased from 550 to 380. The greatest reduction oc-
curred in MR 4 which reported 101 minor violations as
opposed to 236 during the preceding five days.
9. The following is a chronological listing of
the most significant "major" Communist violations of
the ceasefire in South Vietnam that were reported by
the South Vietnamese Armed Forces during the past five
days (4 through 8 March 1973). We have carefully ex-
amined all the evidence on the combat incidents listed
in this paragraph, and have excluded from the listing
any incidents where the evidence of Communist instiga-
tion was not clear-cut.
MILITARY REGION ONE
(a) On 4 March, nine miles north-northeast
of Quang Tri City, a Vietnam naval
patrol craft received an enemy at-
tack-by-fire of an unknown number
and type of rounds.
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000700080019-8
 Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000700080019-8
CEASE-FIRE VIOLATIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM AS REPORTED BY RVNAF
(28 JANUARY 1973 TO THE PRESENT)
FEB MAR
28 1 2 3
MAR
8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000700080019-8
 Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000700080019-8
(b) On 4 March, in the ARVN Airborne
Division zone, the enemy directed
three attacks-by-fire, totaling
130 mortar rounds, at airborne
forces.
(c) On 5 and 6 March, southwest of
Quang Tri City, the enemy launched
10 attacks-by-fire totaling about
500 mortar rounds against elements
of five ARVN airborne battalions.
One of the attacks was followed by
a ground assault.
(d) On 6 and 7 March, southwest of
Quang Tri City, the enemy directed
eight attacks-by-fire totaling
over 2,100 rounds of mixed ordnance
at elements of three ARVN airborne
battalions. Three of the attacks
were followed by ground assaults.
(e) On 6 March, nine miles west of Hue,
elements of two ARVN infantry bat-
talions received two separate enemy
attacks-by-fire totaling 140 mortar
rounds. One of the attacks was fol-
lowed by a ground assault.
(f) Southwest of Quang Tri City, on 7
and 8 March, the enemy launched
eleven attacks-by-fire totaling
960 rounds of mixed ordnance against
elements of four ARVN airborne bat-
talions.
(g) On 7 March, 17 miles west of Tam Ky,
elements of an ARVN infantry bat-
talion received an enemy attack-by-
fire of 80 mortar rounds followed
by a ground assault.
MILITARY REGION TWO
None to report.
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000700080019-8
 Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000700080019-8
MILITARY REGION THREE
(a) On 6 March, 12 miles southeast
of Tay Ninh City, a PF platoon
received an enemy attack-by-fire
of 20 mortar rounds followed by
a ground assault.
(b) On 7 March, 2 miles north-north-
west of Saigon, a USAF C-130 air-
craft in its final approach. to
Tan Son Nhut airport was struck
by small-arms fire.
MILITARY REGION FOUR
(a) On 4 March, at Tri Ton, the ICCS
compound received one mortar
round and intermittent long-
range machine gun fire.
(b) On 5 March, eight miles south-
southwest of Soc Trang, elements
of a RF battalion received a
ground attack by an enemy force.
(c) On 7 and 8 March, nine separate
enemy attacks-by-fire totaling
439 rounds of mixed ordnance were
directed at RVNAF elements through-
out the region. One of the at-
tacks was followed by a ground
assault.
(d) On 8 March, 9 miles northwest of
Kien Thien an RF unit received an
ABF of 65 rounds of mixed mortar
rocket and recoilless rifle fire.
D. Combat Activity Instigated by Communist Forces
4 March through
During
the Period from
8 March
10. The overall pace of fighting in Laos con-
tinued to diminish during the reporting period. Major
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000700080019-8
 Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000700080019-8
Communist violations of the ceasefire did occur, how-
ever, in Military Region II of Laos.
11. Following is a brief account of significant
combat incidents which occurred between 4 and 8 March
and which were clearly initiated by Communist forces
in violation of the Laos ceasefire agreement:
(a) On 4 March, activity throughout
Laos was light, although Commu-
nist forces continued to main-
tain steady pressure on friendly
irregular units operating be-
tween Tha Vieng and Xieng Khou-
angville southeast of the Plain
of Jars.
(b) On 5 March military activity again
was light throughout Laos.
(c) On 6 March two friendly irregular
battalions deployed north of Muong
Soui in Lao MR II came under heavy
shelling attack (approximately
200 rounds) followed by a ground
attack by an estimated 200 enemy
troops. The irregulars were
forced to withdraw. Irregular
casualties were placed at three
killed and 18 wounded. A ground
attack by an estimated two enemy
companies was also reported by a
royal Lao army unit east of Kengkok
in Lao MR III. The rest of Laos
was generally quiet.
(d) On 7 March enemy forces which the
previous day had routed irregulars
north of Muong Soui in Lao MR II
continued to pursue and harass the
retreating irregulars. Enemy-
initiated activity elsewhere in
Laos remained light.
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000700080019-8
 25X1 Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000700080019-8
Next 2 Page(s) In Document Denied
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000700080019-8
 Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000700080019-8
Paragraph 7 'of this memorandum contains a table
listing the total number of Communist-inspired cease-
fire violations reported by the GVN, both for the past
week and for the whole period since the ceasefire be-
came effective on 28 January. The determination of
whether a violation is "major" or "minor" is based on
the following criteria, which have been established
by the U.S. Department of Defense.
Major Violation: One in which US/friendly
forces, facilities or population centers:
-Receive numerous rounds of enemy mortar,
artillery, or rocket fire within a short
period of time or sporadically over a
period of hours.
-Receive a multi-company (150-400 men) ground
attack with or without supporting fire.
-Are subjected to one or more acts of ter-
rorism involving extensive use of mines
and demolitions.
Minor Violation: One in which US/friendly
forces, aca ties or population centers:
-Receive one or a very few rounds of enemy
mortar, artillery, rocket, or small arms
fire following an extended period during
which no stand-off attacks-by-fire were
received.
-Receive a small ground probe, unsupported
by significant mortar, artillery, or
rocket fire, following an extended pe-
riod during which no attacks of this type
were received.
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000700080019-8
 Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000700080019-8
-Are subjected to one or a very few small
terrorist attacks involving use of mines
and demolitions following an extended pe-
riod during which no attacks of this type
were received,
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000700080019-8
 Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000700080019-8
Secret
Secret
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000700080019-8