COMMUNIST VIOLATION OF THE VIETNAM AND LAOS SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS*

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T02095R000700080018-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 31
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 21, 2009
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: February 25, 1973
• Content Type: REPORT

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NSA review completed
25 February 1973
COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS OF
THE VIETNAM AND LAOS SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS*
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1. The following paragraphs contain a comprehensive listing of
Communist actions since 28 January which we consider to be clear viola-
tions of the Vietnam and Laos settlement agreements. Three principal
types of Communist activity are discussed: (a) the movement of sub-
stantial numbers of new North Vietnamese troops toward and into South
Vietnam; (b) the large and continuing flow of military equipment and
supplies from North Vietnam to the south;
and (c) instigated by Communist forces in both South Vietnam and Laos afterythe
respective deadlines (28 January and 22 February) by which combat was
to end in the two countries.
* This report has. been prepared jointly by the Central Intelligence Agency
and the Department of Defense. y
DIA Review Completed.
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A. Continued Infiltration of North Vietnamese Troops in Violation of
the Agreement
3.
(North Vietnamese
troops have continued to move into South Vietnam since the ceasefire
became effective on 28 January. A number of infiltration groups of the
North Vietnamese Army have been observed moving through southern Laos
toward South Vietnam since that date. All together, they total about 13,000
troops, and we know that several thousand of these troops had not even
left North Vietnam as of 28 January, so it cannot be argued'that Hanoi is
merely allowing those troops already in the pipeline as of the 28th to
finish their journey. Many of these 13,000 troops are still in southern
Laos and have not yet crossed into South Vietnam, but we already know
the areas to which they have been assigned.
'_ S I.LJ C.J. LL VUjJ: I
anoi is trying to infiltrate, in clandestine fashion, many hundreds of
civilian and military specialists into South Vietnam and nearby border areas
of southern Laos.
5.. Finally, North Vietnam has recently moved a complete regiment
of engineer troops into southern Laos, and is preparing to move two battal-
ions of this regiment into the southern half of South Vietnam and assign
the third battalion to the central highlands. In South Vietnam's northern-
most province of Quang Tri, another clear-cut violation has occurred:
a North Vietnamese radar company has moved from Laos into the Khe Sanh
area of Quang Tri in the weeks since the ceasefire.
B. Movement of Military Equipment and Supplies by the North Vietnamese
in Violation of the Agreement
6. Since 28 January the North Vietnamese have continued to move
large quantities of military equipment and supplies out of North Vietnam
and into Laos and South Vietnam. The rate at which these supplies and
equipment are being moved is at least equal to and ma be neater than
that of the pre-ceasefire period.
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LOA"(
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categorically that North Vietnamese war materiel has moved into South
Vietnam in violation of the settlement agreement.
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7. The following shipments of equipment and supplies have been
definitely identified as having crossed the border into South Vietnam since
28 January. (None of these shipments has gone through authorized entry
points.)
(a)
(b) five North Vietnamese trucks and
(c)
(d)
(e) Three new equipped, occupied, and operational
SA-2 missile sites have been set up in the Khe Sanh
area by the North Vietnamese since the ceasefire.
The equipment for these sites was almost certainly
brought in after the ceasefire, and hence was brought
in in violation of the agreement.
a steady flow of North Vietnamese traffic, averaging
six trucks per day, was observed moving east from
southern Laos into Qi ang Tri Province of South
Vietnam on Route 9.
two tanks were observed moving east on Route 9
about to cross the border into Quang Tri Province.
33 North. Vietnamese cargo trucks 25X1
were observed inside South Vietnam, on Route 9 to
the west of Khe Sanh in Quang Tri Province.
were observed on Route 9, to the west of Khe Sanh.
in Quang Tri Province.
six North Vietnamese cargo trucks
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8. The following shipments of North Vietnamese equipment and
supplies within southern Laos and eastern Cambodia are clearly earmarked
for South Vietnam, though they have not yet been observed crossing the
South Vietnamese border.
(a)
a total of 1,252 North
Vietnamese vehicles were observed in Laos near
the point where Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam
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meet (the tri-border area). At least 255 of these
vehicles were observed moving toward the central
highlands of South Vietnam. At least 281 were
moving toward the southern half of South Vietnam.
(b)
a North Vietnamese transportation
battalion in the tri-border area of Laos was observed
turning over 30 vehicles to Communist military offi-
cers from the southern provinces of South Vietnam,
and ten vehicles to Communist officers from the
central highlands of South Vietnam.
(c) a North Vietnamese logistics unit
in southern Laos just west of the DMZ was observed
preparing large vehicle formations to transport
cargo to the coastal regions of central South Vietnam.
(d) thirteen vehicles carrying ordnance
were observed headed toward the southern half of
South Vietnam from a major North Vietnamese logistic
unit located near Tchepone in southern Laos.
(e)
six vehicles hauling 85mm artillery
were observed headed toward the southern half of
South Vietnam from a major North Vietnamese logistic
unit in the tri-border area of Laos.
(f)
the North Vientamese have
moved or are in the process of moving some 400 tanks
down through southern Laos and northeastern Cambodia
These tanks are all clearly to be assigned to Communist
units in the southern three-quarters of South V;ptri rn
or Cambodia. Similarly
large amounts of artillery are moving through the Lao
panhandle at this time, and that most of it is also des-
tined for the southern three-quarters of South Vietnam.
(g)
supply units in South Vietnam's IMIR 4 were told
on 8 February of a plan to relocate all war
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materiel presently stockpiled in Cambodia to
South Vietnam. Each Viet Cong village supply
unit in South Vietnam was ordered to prepare
storage facilities for 100 to 150 tons of supplies.
9. In addition to the cases above,
shipments in southern Laos clearly earmarked for South Vietnam i ola-
tion of the settlement agreement, on
other North Vietnamese logistics activity throughout the Lao Panhandle.
Historical patterns indicate that much of this activity also involves supplies
destined for South Vietnam.
(a) About 1,100 trucks moved through the Ban Karai
Pass from North V;ptnam into southern Laos
This pass is one of the major
entry points from North Vietnam to the Ho Chi Minh
trail system. We know that cargo on these trucks
included more than 2,000 tons of food and more than
1,000 tons of ordnance. There were smaller quantities
of communications gear, tank accessories, and other
commodities.
at least 38
trucks per day moved south through the Ban Karai
Pass.
(c)
of eastern Laos between the DMZ and the Ashau Valley.
In the same area a total of 194 North Vietnamese vehicles
was observed transporting ammunition in the area -.7
sixteen North Vietnamese
vehicles were observed transporting 57 tons of ord-
nance to a maior 7 area near Tchepone, southern
T _ _
carrying cargo to the same storage area. All the
cargo was ordnance.
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(d) 52 North Vietnamese vehicles
area of southern Laos.
10. In the DMZ area, we have the following additional evidence
of heavy supply activity in support of North Vietnamese military forces.
unit near the DMZ reportedly formed a special
"vehicle command" to facilitate the southward
movement of supplies to the' Quang Tri area.
were observed on Route 561A northwest of Quang
Tri City.
were o served on Route 1033A inside the bye t
er
trucks were observed on Route 102B near its inter-
section with Route 1032A hi the western DMZ.
were o served moving south on Route 1033A in the western DMZ.
(e)
large numbers of North Vietnamese
cargo trucks were seen transporting supplies on various
rout
i
es
n the western DMZ area. On Route 608 north
of Kh
S
e
anh, 22 trucks were observed
On Route 1032A ten tru
e were seen.
Sixty-two trucks were observed on Route 102B on
and 59 trucks were observed there on
. seen on Route' i jj.
16 trucks were
11. Inside North Vietnam north of the DMZ
h
t
ere is
North Vietnamese intent to violate the ceasefire agreement.
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(a)
(b)
supplies were unloaded at a location in the
central panhandle of North Vietnam. Included
in the supplies were 26 tons of munitions
specifically earmarked for South Vietnam.
two rail cars of military
eight tons of grenades were being shipped
through the central panhandle of North Vietnam
to South Vietnam.
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12. Finally, there has been one confirmed instance of North Vietnam
shipping supplies into South Vietnam by sea in violation of the agreement.
large stocks of supplies were observed on a beach in southern25X1
Quang Ngai Province, and a small cargo vessel -- probably a North Vietnamese
infiltration trawler. -- was observed a few miles off shore with its hold open
and possible cargo still on deck. A small boat was along side. 25X1
Communist forces had destroyed a South Vietnamese coastal radar 25X1
site in the area.
C. Combat Activity Instigated by Communist Forces in South Vietnam Since
the Ceasefire
13. In South Vietnam, the total number of Communist-initiated cease-
fire violations reported by the South Vietnamese Armed Forces from 28 January
through 24 February is shown below:
Military Total Since Ceasefire Last Week (18-24 Feb)
Region Level of Action Level of Action
Major I/ Minor I/ Major Minor
MR 1 352 1, 447 75 327
MR 2 87 551 20 125
MR 3 76 835 10 147
MR 4 151 1, 562 41 349
TOTALS 666 4,395 146 (193) 2/ 948 (1,012) 2/
1/ DOD Definitions of major and minor violations are contained in the Annex.
2/ Denotes totals of previous week.
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14.. Immediately before the ceasefire, major combat erupted
in two areas of South Vietnam. These were along the banks of the Cua
Viet River in northern Military Region (MR) I and in the vicinity. of Tay
Ninh City in MR 3. In northern MR 1, the South Vietnamese marines
launched an 11th-hour attack to establish a salient 'at the mouth of the
Cua Viet River. The North Vietnamese Army (NVA) launched counter-
attacks after the commencement of the ceasefire against the marines.
Within three days the marines were forces to return. to their former posi-
tions north of Quang Tri City. In MR 3, the' Communists attempted a major
gain unacceptable to the' GVN. In this confrontation the Communists
attempted to seize and hold portions of Tay Ninh City, reportedly to estab-
lish a post-ceasefire capital. Heavy fighting continued well after the
ceasefire in that area until the Communists were defeated and forced to
withdraw.
15. Concurrently with these'major military operations, a contest
developed for the control of a large number of hamlets countrywide where
the Communists considered themselves sufficiently strong to hazard an
overt military effort to wrest control from the GVN.
16 In addition, the enemy launched an effort throughout the
Republic of Vietnam (RVN) to interdict lines of communication (LOCs)
in an attempt to isolate population centers and to separate the military
region commands of RVNAF. The enemy was successful in blocking --
for a period of some days -- major inter-provincial routes in MR 1 and
MR 2, but farther south government forces prevented Communist units
from blocking any major routes in MRs 3 or 4 for more than a brief period.
The only major highway where there are presently difficulties is Route 14
between Pleiku and Kontum cities in the central highlands. This road was
officially declared open on 21 February and remains officially open now.
Enemy forces in the Kontum Pass area, however, pose a continuing threat
to road security.
17. Since the signing of the truce, the enemy has employed attacks
by fire as one of his principal tactics. These artillery, rocket and mortar
attacks vary in magnitude from a single round to a significant barrage of
fire. While attacks-by-fire in some instances may have a specific. military
purpose, ordinarily they are not employed in this manner. Instead, the
enemy uses this form of activity as an economical means to demonstrate his
presence and continued military capability. In brief, it is a technique used
to terrorize the populace and to raise doubts in their minds concerning the
GVN's ability to protect them,
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18. The following is it cAronological listing of the most sig-
nificant "major" Communist violations of the ceasefire in South Vietnam that
were reported by the South Vietnamese Armed Forces during the past week
(18-24 February):
MILITARY ' REGION 1:
(a) On 18 February, in the ARVN airborne zone south
and southwest of Quang Tri City, the enemy directed
13 attacks-by-fire totaling 650 rounds of mixed ord-
nance at airborne units.
(b) On 19 February, 23 miles west-northwest of Tam
Ky, elements of an ARVN infantry battalion received
an attack-by-fire of 37 rounds of 82mm mortar.
(c) On 19 February, 31 miles southeast of Quang Ngai,
elements of an ARVN infantry battalion received a
ground attack by an enemy force.
(d) On 19 February, in the ARVN Airborne Division zone,
southwest of Quang Tri City, the enemy launched 16
attacks-by-fire totaling 555 mixed mortar rounds
against airborne forces.
(e) On 19 February, eight miles northwest of Hue, elements
of an ARVN infantry battalion received an attack-by-fire
of 40 rounds of 82mm mortar.
(f) On 19 February, 13 miles southwest of Hue, elements of
an ARVN infantry battalion received an attack-by-fire
of 40 rounds of 82mm mortar.
(g) On 19 February, 31 miles south-southeast of Quang Ngai,
elements of an ARVN ranger battalion received an enemy
ground attack.
(h) On 20 February, elements of the airborne division,
southwest of Quang Tri City received three attacks-by-
fire totaling 89 rounds of mixed ordnance. .
(i) On 20 February, 14 miles southwest of Hue, elements of
an ARVN infantry battalion received 40 rounds of 82mm
mortar during an attack-by-fire.
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(k) On 20 February, elements of a reconnaissance company
received an attack-by-fire of 70 rounds of 60mm mortar.
(1) Three miles southwest of Quang Tri City on 22 February
elements of an airborne battalion received an attack-by-
fire consisting of 41 rounds of 82mm mortar fire.
(m) Thirteen miles southwest of Hue on 22 February elements
of an infantry battalion received two separate attacks-
by-fire totaling 70 rounds of mixed mortar and B-40
rocket fire.
(a) On 20 February, 19 miles northwest of Qui Nhon, elements
of a reconnaissance company were attacked by an unknown-
size enemy force.
(b) On 20 February, three miles northwest of Phan Thiet,
elements of an RF battalion received an attack-by-fire
of 40 rounds of 82mm mortar.
(c) Approximately 10 miles north-northeast of Bonh Son on
21 February, elements of two infantry battalions and a
subsector headquarters received three separate attacks-
by-fire totaling 73 rounds of 60- and 82mm mortar and
107mm rocket fire.
(d) Ten miles southwest of Kontum City on 22 February, ele-
ments of an ARVN ranger battalion received a ground
attack.
(e) Fourteen miles northeast of Ban Me Thuot on 23 February
elements of an infantry battalion received a ground attack.
(a) On 18 February, six miles south of Tay Ninh, elements of
a PF platoon received an attack-by-fire of 50 rounds of
60mm mortar.
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(b) On 19 February, 11 miles southeast of Song Be,
elements of an RF company received an attack-by-
fire of 50 rounds of 82mm mortar.
(c) On 19 February, 29 miles south of Dau Tieng, elements
of an RF battalion and an ARVN tank company were
attacked by an enemy force.
(d) Five miles west of Song Be on 21 February, elements of
a Regional Force Battalion received an attack-by-fire
consisting of 20 rounds of 60mm mortar fire.
(e) Thirteen miles south-southwest of Song Be on 23
February, elements of a regional force company received
an attack-by-fire, consisting of 40 rounds of 60mm mortar
fire.
(f) On 24 February, the village chief of Loc Khae, about 20
miles south of Tri Tam, was assassinated.
to-air fire by a SA-7 missile.
US UH-IH helicopter with ICCS markings received ground-
(g) On 24 February, about 15 miles north of Truc Giang, a
MILITARY REGION 4:
(a) On 18 February, 24 miles northeast of Ca Mau, a district
town was struck with five rounds of 82mm mortar fire.
(b) On 19 February, two miles west of My Tho, elements of
an RF battalion received an enemy ground attack.
(c) On 19 February, 22 miles east-northeast of Chau Doc,
elements of an armored cavalry squadron and a recon-
naissance company were attacked by an unknown-size
enemy force .
(d) On 20 February, six miles west of Vi Thanh, a PF outpost
received an attack-by-fire of 50 rounds of 82mm mortar.
(e) Five miles northwest of Tri Ton on 21 February, elements
of a ranger battalion received two separate attacks-by-fire
totaling 70 rounds of mixed 60- and 82mm mortar fire.
(f) Fourteen miles southwest of Vi Thanh on 21 February,
elements of a regional force battalion and the Vinh Tuy
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base received two separate attacks-by-fire totaling 57
rounds of mixed 60- and 82mm mortar and .B-40 rocket fire.
(g) Twelve miles south of My Tho on 21 February, an enemy
force entered a hamlet and assassinated the hamlet chief.
(h) Four miles north of Vi Thanh on 22 February, elements
of a regional force battalion received a ground attack.
D. Combat Activity Instigated by Communist Forces in Laos Since. the
Settlement Agreement on Laos Went into Effect
19. Enemy-initiated ground contacts .and attacks by fire have
continued throughout Laos since the cease-fire agreement went into effect
at 1200 hours local (0500Z), 22 February 1973. The most notable violation
was an intense attack that resulted in'the rout of irregular forces from
Paksong. This attack began before the truce deadline, but continued after
the deadline had passed. The enemy has continued to shell and probe
positions west of Pak-song, where the government troops are regrouping.
North of the Bolovens Plateau, enemy military activity in northern Laos
intensified.on the 22nd, when a government battalion northwest of Saravane
was dispersed by an enemy attack. A small government unit northwest of
Khong Sedone was also hard hit by an enemy attack on the 23rd.
20. In the Panhandle to the north of Paksong two irregular battal-
ions operating along Route 13 northwest of Thakhek were dispersed. on
24 February by a sharp NVA attack. Scattered contacts also occurred to the
east of Thakhek since the ceasefire began.
21. In northern Laos, friendly irregulars at Sala Phou Khoun were
attacked by Pathet Lao and dissident neutralist forces, reportedly supported
by two tanks, on 23 February. These government forces continued, as of
24 February, to receive small ground probes and heavy attacks by fire.
22. Several enemy attacks by fire and ground contacts also continued
in the Plaine des Jarres area through 23 and 24 February. Friendly forces
west of the Plaine were hit by over 600 rounds of indirect fire from NVA units
on the 23rd. Another heavy attack by fire of some 400 rounds was directed
against friendly positions northeast of Long Tieng on the same day. Other
Communist-initiated clashes occurred near Xieng Khouangville after the
ceasefire was signed.
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2. Definition of "major" and "minor" ceasefire violations:
Paragraph 13 of this memorandum contains a table listing the total number of
Communist-inspired ceasefire violations since 28 January. The determination
of whether a violation is "major" or "minor" is based upon the following
criteria, which have been established by the U.S. Department of Defense.
Major Violation: One in which US/friendly forces, facilities, or
population centers:
- Receive numerous rounds of enemy mortar, artillery, or
rocket fire within a short period of time or sporadically
over a period of hours.
- Receive a multi-company (150-400 men) ground attack with
or without supporting fire.
- Are subjected to one or more acts of terrorism involving
extensive use of mines and demolitions.
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. Minor Violation: One in which US/friendly forces, facilities, or
population centers:
- Receive one or a very few rounds of enemy mortar, artillery,
rocket, or small arms fire following an extended period
during which no stand-off attacks-by-fire were received.
- Receive' a smalY ground probe, ' unsupported. by significant
mortar, artillery, or rocket fire, following an extended
period during which-n.o attacks of this type were received.
- Are subjected to one or a very few small terrorist attacks
involving use of mines and demolitions following an
extended period during which no attacks of this type were
received.
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I- t
CEN T RAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, U.C. 20505
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR
MEMORANDUM FOR: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Assistant to the President for
,\ National Security Affairs
4 March 1973
SUBJECT : Communist Violations of Vietnam and Laos
Settlement Agreements
1. Attached are five copies. of the second weekly report on Communist
violations of the Vietnam and Laos settlement agreements which you requested
at the 23 February meeting of the WSAG. This report covers the period from
25 February through 3 March 1973. We plan to send the next report on this
subject to you on Friday,,9 March, and subsequent reports on each Friday
thereafter.
2. This report has been prepared jointly by the Central Intelligence
Agency and the Department of Defense. Both agencies are in full agreement
with the conclusions and with all specifics of the report.
3. I am sending copies of this report to all members of the WSAG, to
Secretary Rogers, Secretary Richardson, and to the Directors of DIA and INR.
James R. Schlesinger
Director
Attachment
F lk
Cipy 2 S
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Second Report
COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS OF
THE VIETNAM AND LAOS SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS*
(This report covers the week from 25 February
through 3 March 1973)
The Key Points
- North Vietnamese troops, military equipment and supplies continued
to move southward toward and into South Vietnam during the week, in a
clear violation of the Vietnam settlement agreement.
- Although the agreement has now been in effect for over a month, there
is good evidence that the southward flow of equipment and supplies has in-
creased to levels above those of one year ago.
- The southward flow of North Vietnamese manpower is slightly below
but is approaching last year's level for the period since the beginning of the
dry season (I October to l March).
- The number of combat incidents initiated by the Communists in
violation of the ceasefire terms has declined slightly in South Vietnam, and
markedly in Laos, during the week.
* This report has been prepared jointly by the Central Intelligence Agency
and the Department of Defense.
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(NOTE: This is the second in a series of weekly reports detailing recent
Communist actions which we believe to be violations of the Vietnam and Laos
settlement agreements.
A. Continuing Infiltration and Redeployment of North Vietnamese
Personnel in Violation of the Agreement
1. During the past week we continued to receive incontrovertible
evidence that Hanoi is still infiltrating personnel toward South Vietnam in
violation of the settlement agreement. The latest evidence indicates that
several hundred additional military and civilian specialists began moving
south from North Vietnam last week, and that other groups of infiltrators
continued to move southward in the Laos panhandle during'the week. All
together, ther-e are now about 30,000 North Vietnamese infiltrators moving
through the pipeline. Of these, at least 6,000 personnel, including both
regular combat troops and civilian and military specialists, probably have
left their starting point in North Vietnam since 28 January. While the combat
personnel included in this number appear to have begun their trip in the first
ten days or so after the ceasefire, some of the specialists did not start their
trip southward until 26 February.
2. During the past week , no major integral Communist units (i.e. ,
as distinct from infiltration groups containing replacement fillers for existing
units) were detected moving into or out of South Vietnam. One minor unit,
however -- an NVA armored battalion -- was observed on 28 February on the
border between southern GVN MR 1 and Laos. We do not know precisely when
the unit first arrived at the border, but it probably arrived recently. The
battalion is almost certainly part of the large amount of armor previously noted
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deploying, south in the infiltration system since late October 1972. Most
Communist main-force units now within South Vietnam are resting and refit-
ting in what is basically a standdown posture, and are engaged in establishing
more permanent base areas.
B. Movement of Military Equipment and Supplies by the North Vietnamese
in Violation of the Agreement
3. The information contained in the following paragraphs covers the
movement of military equipment and supplies out of North Vietnam and into
Laos and South Vietnam during the past week. Taken as a whole, our evidence
indicates that large amounts of supplies continued to move, especially through-
out southern Laos. Within South Vietnam, pervasive reports of vehicles on
the move -- many of them transporting weapons and ammunition -- clearly
indicate that Communist supply activities are also continuing there at sub-
stantial levels.
4. The following indications of Communist logistic activity have been
observed on roads within South Vietnam in the areas of the Laos border since
24 February and probably reflect supplies which have entered South Vietnam
during that time.
(a) On Route 608 north of Khe Sanh, there were
- 32 North Vietnamese cargo trucks observed
There were 20 cargo trucks
and 6 unidentified vehicles seen on this route
(b) Thirty North Vietnamese cargo vehicles were
seen moving on Route Q9D west of Khe Sanh on
There were 7 trucks observed on'
(c)
an average of 4 trucks per day observed moving
eastward probably carrying supplies on Routes
9 and 548 in northern Quang Tri Province.
there was
as of mid-February,
military supplies were continuing to enter Thua
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Thien Province from Laos, and that base
areas where the supplies were to be stored
were being established in the mountains about
25 miles southwest of Hue.
(e) the North Vietnamese
may now be deploying 130mm artillery field guns
into GVN MR 3.
5. In addition to the above supply activity observed within South
Vietnam, we are receiving further evidence of increasing. North Vietnamese
logistic movements throughout the Lao panhandle and northeastern Cambodia.
Historical precedent would suggest that much of this activity probably in-
volves supplies destined for South Vietnam.
(a)
southbound truck movements through the Ban
Karai Pass and Ban Raving Pass between North
Vietnam and southern Laos increased significantly.
southbound
trucks observed in the Ban Karai Pass averaged 69
per day during this period as compared with 52 per
day the previous week, while the average number of
southbound trucks moving through the Ban Raving
Pass rose to 27 daily during the current reporting
period, compared with 17 during the previous week.
(b)
I over
5,160 enemy trucks were observed in southern
Laos. Of the total; at least 330 were specifically
headed toward South Vietnam -- and primarily for
the southern half of South 'Vietnam.
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(c) During the same period
lover 60 trucks
on roads leading into northern South Vietnam from
Laos, More than half of these trucks were heading
east toward the South Vietnamese border. In
addition, an 18-truck
convoy loaded with supplies moving south along the
Lao-South Vietnamese border just west of Quang
Tri Province on 24 February,
(d)
about 50 North Vietnamese vehicles
were observed moving cargo on Route 922 in the
eastern Lao panhandle.
(e)
a total of 16 North Vietnamese
vehicles -- probably cargo trucks -- were observed
moving south from the Ban Bac area in southern
Laos.
(f) 4 North Vietnamese. cargo trucks
were seen on Route 912B in Laos immediately west
of the Ban Karai Pass.
(g) A substantial number of vehicles (the exact number
is unknown but is less than fifty) were observed
returning from northeastern Cambodia to the tri-
in logistic activity in the latter area. y
(h) a North Vietnamese logistic unit in
the tri-border area of Laos was observed while
receiving 15 vehicles loaded with supplies. Thirteen
of the vehicles were carrying some kind of machinery.
6. Inside North Vietnam, additional evidence continued to accumulate
during the week on the movement of military supplies within North Vietnam
toward northern Laos, southern Laos, or South Vietnam.
(a) A North Vietnamese Army logistics unit to the south
of Vinh was observed receiving nine barges loaded
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(b)
mediately before
over 100
tons of supplies per day had been transiting
through this logistics unit in the period im-
munitions were observed moving from the Vinh
area of North Vietnam westward along Route 7
toward northern Laos,
18 cargo trucks transporting
the destination of nese munitions was in
(c)
fact northern Laos.
Vietnamese trucks was observed moving on
Route 7 inside North Vietnam toward northern
Laos.
another convoy of 10 North
7. In the immediate DMZ area, there was the following additional
evidence of resupply activity in support of North Vietnamese military forces.
hers of trucks were continuing to move southward
through the DMZ a On that date,
about 30 trucks were observed entering a North
Vietnamese truck park located in the western DMZ
near the Lao border in a one-hour period. In
addition, southbound trucks were observed crossing
a pontoon bridge in the'eastern DMZ. Also on the
22nd, truck parks observed south of the DMZ in
eastern Quang Tri Province contained many more
trucks than when the same truck parks had been
observed several weeks earlier.
(h) A convoy of 18 North Vietnamese cargo trucks was
seen moving on Route 102B in the western DMZ on
(c) Ten North Vietnamese cargo trucks were observed
rnovinc7 s~ward on Route 103 in the DMZ area on
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( r' n T 1 1 r' T.`
U. ' OiUL) L saLLLV1Ly nisi zited by L.ormzluliis' Forces ili SOutii Vietnaiii
Since the Ceasefire
8. In South Vietnam, the total numbers of Communist initiated ceasefire
violations reported by the South Vietnamese Armed Forces since 28 January
and for last week (25 February through 3 March) are shown below:
Military Total Since Ceasefire Last Week (25 Feb-3 Mar)
Region Level of Action Level of Action
Major 1/ Minor 1/ Major Minor
MR 1 420 1, 683 68 236
MR 2 105 643 18 92
MR. 3 102 931 26
MR 4 178 1,853 27
96
Totals 805 5, 110 139 (146) 2/ 715 (948) 2/
1/ DOD definitions of major and minor violations are contained in ANNEX III.
2/ Denotes totals of previous week.
9. During the past week, the number of major violations decreased
slightly from 146 to 139. The greatest reduction occurred in MR 4 which
reported 27 major violations as opposed to 41 the previous week. The num-
ber of reported minor violations also decreased from 948 to 715, and the
largest decrease (from 327 to 236) took place in MR 1.
10. The following is a chronological listing of the most significant
"major" Communist violations of the ceasefire in South Vietnam that were
reported by the South Vietnamese Armed Forces during the past week
(25 February - 3 March):
MILITARY REGION 1:
(a) On 24 February, in two separate attacks three
miles southwest of Quang Tri City, enemy elements
fired a total of thirty-five 82mm mortar rounds in the
vicinity of a GVN airborne battalion.
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TOTAL MAJOR AND MINOR CEASE-FIRE VIOLATIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
IA I
49 31 26 23 15 16 11 16 16 16 18 29 24 37 22 24 31 18 26 28 44 34 27 21 13 22 17 25 10 12 24
U'
X=Cease-fire date - 28 January 1973 (GMT)
(All days thereafter are referred to as X-F 1, X+2, etc.)
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(b) On 25 February, 14 miles south-southwest of
Da Nang on Route 537, enemy sappers destroyed
one span of a bridge, closing the road.
(c) On 26 and 27 February, in the Airborne Division
sector southwest of Quang Tri City, enemy units
fired a total of 7. , 030 mixed artillery, mortar and
recoilless rifle rounds in 21 attacks-by-fire . One of
the attacks-by-fire was followed by a ground attack.
(d) On 28 February and 1 March,.in the Airborne
Division sector southwest of Quang Tri City, the
enemy directed seven attacks-by-fire of 270 mixed
mortar and artillery rounds against airborne units.
One of the attacks-by-fire was followed by a ground
attack.
(e) On 28 February, 12 miles south-southeast of Da Nang,
a US U11-1H helicopter displaying ICCS markings and
carrying two ICCS passengers (one Canadian and one
Indonesian) received ground fire while landing.
(f)
(g)
On 1 March southwest of Quang Tri City, elements
of two ARVN airborne battalions received five separate
attacks-by-fire (ABFs) totaling 158 mixed 60mm/82mm
mortar rounds.
On 2 March, 10 miles northwest of Tam Ky, an element
of an RF battalion received an ABF of 50 rounds of
82mm mortar and 30 rounds of B-40 rackets followed
by a ground attack.
(h) On 2 March, 18 miles west of Tam Ky, an element of
an ARVN infantry battalion received an ABF of 20
rounds of 82mm mortar and four AT-3 missiles fol-
lowed by a ground attack.
(i) On 2 March, southwest of (uang Tri City, elements of
three ARVN airborne battalions received four separate
attacks-by-fire totaling 115 82mm mortar :rounds.
(j) On 2 March, nine miles west of Hue, enemy forces
attacked elements of two infantry battalions on five
separate occasions with a total of 472 rounds of mixed
60mm/82mm mortar fire. One of the attacks-by-fire was
followed by a ground attack.
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A4TT VPAT?V PEGTc1\T 7?
(a) On 25 February, 11 miles south-southwest of
Kontum City, enemy forces attacked elements of
an ARVN ranger battalion.
(b) On 27 February, 14 miles north-northwest of
Kontum City, a US UI-I--1 helicopter displaying
ICCS markings and carrying representatives of
all ICCS member nations received ground fire.
(c) On 27 February, 15 miles north of Qui Nhon,
elements of an ARVN infantry battalion received
an enemy ground attack.
MILITARY REGION 3:
(a) On 24 February, seven miles south-southwest of
Dau Tieng, enemy gunners shot down a VNAF UH-1
helicopter.
(b) On 26 February, six miles northeast of Tay Ninh,
enemy forces fired 90 rounds of mixed 82mm mortar
and 107mm rockets in the vicinity of an RF battalion.
(c) On 1 March, two miles southwest of Lai Thieu, enemy
forces assassinated the hamlet chief of Dan Bri hamlet.
MILITARY REGION 4:
(a) On 24 February, 12 miles northeast of Vinh Long,
enemy forces attacked elements of an infantry
battalion.
(b) On 26 February, 10 miles north-northwest of Vinh
Long, enemy forces fired 70 rounds of 60mm mortar
into a Popular Force outpost.
(c) On 26 February, 10 miles south-southeast of Vi
Thanh, enemy forces attacked elements of an infantry
battalion.
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(d) On 27 February, 10 miles northeast of Chau Duc,
enemy forces attacked elements of an ARVN infantry
battalion.
(e) On 28 February, seven miles south-southeast of Sa
Dec, the hamlet chief of Tara Thuan hamlet was
assassinated.
(f) On 1 March, six miles southeast of Tan Phu; the
hamlet chief of Tan An hamlet was assassinated.
D. Combat Activity Instigated by Commtnist'Forces in Laos During the
Past Week
11. The fighting in Laos has diminished considerably during the
past week. Following is a brief account of significant combat incidents
which occurred on each day of the past week and which were clearly
initiated by Communist forces in violation of the ceasefire agreement on Laos.
On 26 February, one major incident occurred in
MR IV of Laos, where enemy forces attacked a
government position near Thateng on the northern
edge of the Bolovens Plateau. A 120-man friendly
unit was dispersed with eleven men killed and six
wounded. Elsewhere, activity was sporadic and
light. General quiet prevailed in the previously
active Plaine des Jarres and Paksong areas.
On 27 February, activity continued to decline through-
out the country. Two incidents were reported in
northwest MR I of Laos, where heavy shelling drove
friendly forces from Muong Moung. Elsewhere, enemy
units on the Bolovens Plateau followed up the previous
day's attacks in the Thateng area.
-- On 28 February, the level of fighting further decreased.
Enemy forces continued to harass friendly troops to
the south of Thateng on the Bolovens. Elsewhere, the
only significant enemy-initiated action was a shelling
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1 1
at,-acj,, and subsequent ground attack which drove
friendly forces from forward positions west of
Bouam Long in Lao MR II.
On 1 March, scattered small incidents which were
initiated by the Communists occurred in MR III and
MR IV of Laos, but there was no other significant
activity.
- On 2 March, only scattered small incidents were
reported.
- On 3 March, activity was also at a very low level.
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ANNEX 111.
Definition ' of "major" and "minor" ceasefire violations:
Paragraph 8 of this memorandum contains a table listing the total
number of Communist-inspired ceasefire violations reported by the GVN,
both for the past week and for the whole period since the ceasefire became
effective on 28 January. The determination of whether a violation is "major"
or "minor" is based on the following criteria, which have been established
by the U.S. Department of Defense.
Major Violation: One in which US/friendly forces, facilities
or population centers:
- Receive numerous rounds of enemy mortar, artillery, or
rocket fire within a short period of time or sporadically
over a period of hours.
- Receive a multi-company (150-400 men) ground attack with
or without supporting fire.
- Are subjected to one or more acts of terrorism involving
extensive use of mines and demolitions.
Minor Violation: One in which US/friendly forces, facilities
or population centers:
- Receive one or a very few rounds of enemy mortar, artillery,
rocket, or small arms fire following an extended period
during which no stand-off attacks-by-fire were received.
- Receive a small ground probe, unsupported by significant
mortar, artillery, or rocket fire, following an extended
period during which no attacks of this type were received.
- Are subjected to one or a very few small terrorist attacks
involving use of mines and demolitions following an
extended period during which no attacks of this type were
received.
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