S-3111 ADEQUACY OF NORTH VIETNAM'S STOCKPILES OF MILITARY AND WAR-RELATED SUPPLIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T02095R000600270001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 24, 2006
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 1, 1969
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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S-3111
Adequacy of North Vietnam's Stockpiles
of Military and War-Related Supplies
22 Sep 69 Typescript IM, Adequacy of North Vietnam's-Stockpiles
of Militar and War-Related Supplies
25X1 23 Sep 69
I memo commending OER's
Y Y on a equacy of NVN's stockpiles and attaching
a suggested expansion of the conclusion paragraph
to include in basic paper for review by Special Actions
Group
25X1 23 Sep 69 lemo re Requested Changes to OER
,, acy of North Vietnam's Stockpiles
25X1 War-Related Supplies(responding to
bove)
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S-3111
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23 September 1969
(OER)
1. The Working Group of the Washington Special
Actions Group working on the Sino-Soviet problem was
grateful for your paper on the adequacy of North Vietnam's
stockpiles. They particularly appreciated the fact that
your paper was prepared during the weekend.
2. As a result of the Working Group's deliberations
yesterday, it was decided to take the conclusion paragraph
of your paper, expanded as you see it in the attached, and
include it in the basic paper for review by the Special
Actions Group. The Intelligence Memorandum itself, less the
conclusion section, is to be included as an annex with only
one minor proposed change. The change is on page 3, first
sentence paragraph 3, which would read "A cessation in food
imports at this time (virtually all of which come from China)
would not -- ".
3. Would you please let me have your concurrence on
the above change plus on the attached paper as soon as pos-
sible. The Working Group wishes to have the whole paper
ready for submission to the SAG today (23 September).
4. The classification of the SAG paper is Top Secret
and distribution of it is highly restricted. They wish,
however, to avoid all use of code word classifications.
Would you please let me know what changes need to be made
in order to avoid the code word classification of your paper.
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 Approved For Release 2007SECRETI
CENTRAL I11TELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
22 September 1969
Adequacy of North Vietnam's Stockpiles
of Military and War-Related Supplies
Introduction
North Vietnam's military capabilities rest almost entirely
on imported equipment and supplies furnished by its Chinese and
Soviet allies. If the flow of these supplies were interrupted
or discontinued, Hanoi's war-sustaining capabilities would be
almost completely a function of the size of its stockpiles of
military and war-supporting supplies. This memorandum examines
the current state of North Vietnam's stockpiles in order to
estimate tbair adequacy over time for a continuance of Hanoi's
military activities in both South Vietnam and Laos.
SECRET
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Reserves and Stockpiles
Essential Economic Goods
1. Although no precise quantification of North Vietnam's
reserves of essential economic goods is available, there is a
great deal of evidence that supports the general conclusion that
with but few exceptions stockpiles are maintained at relatively
high levels.
2. Petroleum stockpiles are currently estimated at
about 100,400 tons, equal to about 100 days of supply at the
estimated 1968 consumption rate. A portion of this reserve
is maintained at more than 150 dispersed storage sites with an
estimated total capacity of at least 60,000 tons. In addition,
some 440,000 petroleum drums are now dispersed through North
Vietnam, resenting a substantial additional stockpile.
Imports of petroleum during 1969 have been at levels sufficient
to preclude any drawdown of these stockpiles.
SFCRF~
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,wool
3. A cessation in food imports at this time would not
be critical until next spring, although it would result in some
belt-tightening. Estimated stockpiles of food at the end of the
May-June harvest were equal to 4-5 months consumption and will be
at a peak in December after the October-November harvest. The
overall agricultural situation has deteriorated enough, however,
that if food imports were cat off this month and remained stopped
throughout the winter, North Vietnam, would be confronted by severe
food shortages by early spring, before the May-June rice crop
would be ready for harvest. But since rice supplies and freely
available on the world market the supply of foodstuffs is unlikely
to be a meaningful restraint on Hanoi's war-sustaining capabilities.
4. The adequacy of stockpiles of transport equipment --
trucks, railroad rolling stock, and watercraft -- depends largely
on the effectiveness of the air war in Laos. For example, enemy
truck losses in Laos have been very high during the past two dry
seasons (October-May) and the truck inventory could fall to an
unsatisfactory level in a few months if the North Vietnamese
attempted to mount the same level of logistical effort this coming
dry season as in the past and the US continued the air war in Laos.
Military Supplies
5. Military stocks in North Vietnam aoear to be maintained
at very high levels
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1 of these data indicate that the North Vietnamese have
successfully implemented a logistics doctrine that provides them
a deep cushion of military supplies.
addition, the North Vietnamese maintain so-called strategic
reserves which are massive and diversified stockpiles located in
safe areas in Laos and North Vietnam.
7. There are mwW indications that large military
stockpiles have indeed been adcumulsted in North Vietnam and
Laos. Although our estimates of imports of amminition are subject
to a wide margin of error, the data that are available indicate
that during 1968 these imports were on the order of dour time
greater than the amounts expended or lost by enemy forces in both
Laos and South Vietnam. Even though aamanition imports fell
sharply following the cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam.,
the stockpiles of the types of military goods used in Laos and
South Vietnam are apparently being maintained at high levels.
SECAET
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Conclusion
8. Hard intelligence is lacking on the stockpiles of
military and essential economic goods maintained by North Vietnam.
The evidence that is available, however, makes it clear that these
stockpiles are being maintained at high levels. Even if all
foreign military aid to North Vietnam were cut-off, the existing
stockpiles of weapons and ammsuiition would be adequate to sustain
military activities in Laos and South Vietnam for a period of at
least 6 months at the 1968 level of combat. By adopting tactics
in South Vietnam or Laos that would enable it to conserve its
supplies, Hanoi could make its military presence in South Vietnam
felt for a considerably longer period of time. The major
logistical constraint to North Vietnam would be its supply of
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NWIOI *4w
trucks, particularly if the air war in Laos were carried on at
the high levels of 1968. Trucks, however, represent one of the
essential war-related goods that Hanoi could procure from Free
World sources.
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