THE DEPENDENCE OF NORTH VIETNAM ON EXTERNAL SOURCES OF SUPPLY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T02095R000600250001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 19, 2006
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 4, 1967
• Content Type: REPORT

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The Dependence of North Vietnam on
External Sources of Supply
4 Aug 67
(Rostow Request)
4 Aug 67 Blind Memo re The Dependence of North Vietnam on External
Sources of Supply, S-2428 (distribution attached)
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4 August 1967
S-2+28
r toreigp Assistance
The economy of North Vietnam is essentially agrarian with only
rudimtsay modern industry. Both the economic and military
capabilities of the country are nurtured almost exclusively by
h Vietnam produces virtually none of its
. Its armed forces are equipped with Soviet weapons
copies of Soviet veapons. Foreign trade is also oriented
to other Ct unist countries. Although Free World
countries were the source of almost 20 percent of North Viet 's
Imports during 1964 and 1965 (about $23 million in each year), the
Fri World provided only six percent ($13 mil ion) of Worth Vietnam's
Imports during 1966.
the dependence of Forth. Vietnam on foreign aid has undergone
and continuing rise since the start of the Bolling Thunder
program and the rapid build-up of U.S. forces in South Vietnam in
5. Without this aid North Vietnam would be hard pressed to wage
its sAgressive war in the South. Other than manpower and leader-
ship, Worth Vietnam provides little direct input to the war. The
uniat aid to North Vietnam are shown in the follow-
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70
R
Jan-June 195t_
1266
_
200 360 220 850
70 45
85
60
neg.
955..E
In addition
and increasing inputs of material
and Cc 2unist China have provided technical
.d personnel to North Vietnam. There are an estiaeeted
n North Vietne, and Cc unist Chi
units v .ting to 25,000
140
245
!a
369
85
150
N.A.
60
5T
50
T5
B.A.
582
15
50
N.A.
}
m
N.A.
1
1
lop
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plete dependence of North Vietnam on external
0 support virtually every facet of its economic and mill-
t&ry e relo went has made the country a yard of the Comunist world.
The USSR and Ctxconunist China together since 19514 have accounted for
Vietnam's imports, more than 80 percent of total
econic aid and almost 100 percent of the military aid offered to
North Vietnw.
reins Assistance to North Viet ram
gl~.I~F I~.l.~s.. ?r 1.rer.r~M ~n
China has been the traditional supplier of military
Vie
equipment since the beginning of 1965 has been four times
made the greater contribution to North
ilitary establishment. The value of Soviet deliveries of
that provided by Cos unist China, principally because the 'SM has
more sophisticated venponsj, especially air defense systems.
The UM has provided most of the aid for developing North Vietnam's
ucture such as airfields and naval bases.
Ed of economic assistance, haver, the Soviet and
contributions have been almost equal -- *6o4 million for
million for Communist China through 1966.
aid programs -- economic and military --
1 established lines which reflect the capa-
bilities of the donors. In the eco is field, the UDR has tended
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rate on heavy industry, principally mining, manu eturing,
Projects, with some notable exceptions such
ad steel cc lex at That %guyea and mxme projects in
chemical industries, have focused on light industry
h as since-to
fte role
North Viet:
toward specialization is observed in military
has provided the more advanced equt t
missiles, antiaircraft guns, radar, tanks,
ve been the main suppliers of trucks
ition, and ground forces equipment.
3st.
contributions in the form of economic aid he
provided almost no military aid (excluding
ist states in providing aid to
h less prominent. The countries of
major provider of military equipment, particu-
sticated its such as N[O-21 jet fighters and
le s tens (See Tbles 3. and 2). In an aunt
ce-to-air missile system with 30 firing battalions,
Since the beginning of 1965, the 111
or program, the Soviet military aid
Viet mm focused on the rapid developeent of an
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a raftr network, 145 aircraft (including 8 21-28 jet light b
.2 )21 , and 7 0-15/170). Soviet deliveries during this period
also included approximately 5#500 antiaircraft gnus, as well as scram
pound forces equipment. The USSR has also assd the training of
North Viet=se pilots, a task previously performed by the Chine.
Although the Chinese have fallen behind the Soviets as the major
nese contribution has been significant. The
vided only ar li numbers of aircraft, naval craft
Chinese deliveries of military equipment
em sized logistics support and small arms and ammunition.
Vietnam.. Chinese aid is directly related to the fighting
s of the NVA and. VC forces in South Vietnam.
of ecotic assistance to North Vietnam in reflected
es. The Communist countries have provided sub-
titi+es of equipment for transportation, construction,
p r and maintenance programs. machinery and equipment is also
ble for nev and continuing aid projects which
itary associated.
of these goods varies widely. The USSR, for example,
1, and o
orth Vietnam's petroleu Imports 200,000
50 percent . - 118,000 tons -- of its fertilizer
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China, on the other hand, is the major
wit
of to ecc uunications equipment, and coking coal. The Eastern
Viet
Vietnam
vehicles, construction equip-
its ? transport equipment and foodstuffs --
tiled origin of many of earth Vietnam's imports.
)r vhich firm estimates are possible,
r 3.,5W trucks, of which about 2,000 were
forces.. The i supplied only 20 percent of total
u 1965; C+a unLtat China and the East Ibropean Communist
diveret i+
nt,
in recent months, also follow a
China about 38 percent, and the lost
w ry-June 1967, the USSR provided
than 10 percent.
from Fie World suppliers are diversified.
sd about 40 percent. Imports of foodstuffs,
aut z obile spare parts and wire. Japan ex-
er, machinery, chemicals and pharmaceuticals.
rice and wood products to North Vietnam. Wince
of a cessation of Soviet and last European
th Vietnam would be slight, if cessation were con-
ed on stopping
of North Vietnam. Soviet military
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aid is over lmingly oriented to air defense, and the need for an
air defense system would be practically negated by a cessa
tiou of bing? Soviet military aid is only modestly relevant to
Yetrw'e ability to w&ge war in the South, although in
re cent months there has been an increase in rocket attacks using
Probably the most important Soviet aid camao-
d to air defense, is petroleum.. Some petroleum
could be reduced by rationing. The essential require-
would be reduced in the
d could probably be satisfied by Caeuriist
it across the USSR were denied, petroleum could,
k
be shipped fr t ,nia by sea, directly to North
exported on Chinese account and then transshipped to
forth Vietnam.
etnam would be able to find alternative
r most of its other imports f the and
absence of bombing, requirements for truck
other transport equipment would fall drastically and could be
d by exports from China which has been satisfying a lar~
Abu* of North Vietnam's unusually high level of truck imports.
ftwroue cotmtries, on hunaniterian grounds alone, would be willing
rtli Vietnamese requirements for food imports.
T'In P"917T "
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