THE EFFECTS OF THE IMPOSITION OF A QUARANTINE ON NORTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T02095R000600160001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 54
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 1, 2006
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 16, 1969
• Content Type: REPORT

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The Effects of the Imposition of
a Quarantine on North Vietnam
July 1969
16 Jul 69 Report, The Effects of the Imposition of a Quarantine
on North Vietnam, 16 Jul 69, no copy number
16 Jul 69 Marked up copy of the above with note attached, "The
only distribution of this memorandum was one copy
to Dr. Henry A.. Kissinger. Distribution of 16
July version made by George Carver. OER rec'd 3
copies from OCI -- 2 in this file, 1 Eyes Only to
Ch & Dep. Ch. D/I, with instructions not to
disseminate further. All but 1 copy destroyed
30 Nov 70."
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The Effects of the Imposition
of a Quarantine on North Vietnam
Secret
16 July 1969
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SUBJECT: The Effects of the Imposition of a Quaran-
tine on North Vietnam
I. Scope of Our Analysis, Working Assumptions
and General Considerations
II. North Vietnam's Dependence on Imports
III. North Vietnamese Reserves and Stockpiles
IV. Logistical Alternatives to Seaborne Imports
V. Possible North Vietnamese Countermeasures
VI. The Potential Burden to China and Costs to
North Vietnam
VII. Probable Political Reactions
a. Communist Chinese
b. Soviet
c. North Vietnamese
d. South Vietnamese
e. Other East Asian Countries
f. Western European Reactions
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I. SCOPE, WORKING ASSUMPTIONS, AND GENERAL CONSID-
ERATIONS
.1. This memorandum constitutes our reply to the
request that we assess the probable effects of im-
posing a quarantine on North Vietnam. In the pre-
paration of this memorandum, a "quarantine" was con-
strued to mean closing the port of Haiphong by mining
and/or blockade. In preparing this reply, we have.
made the working assumption that whatever the means
employed, access to the port is denied to both ocean-
going and coastal shipping. We have also made the
work ng assumption that this quaranEine is carried
out without any effort to inter ict -the key land
lines of communication connecting North Vietnam and
Communist China, i.e., the roads, air routes and
two major rail lines.
2. This memorandum analyzes the probable impact
of such a quarantine on North Vietnam and the prob-
able reactions to its imposition on the part of the
North Vietnamese, the Chinese Communists, the Soviets,
the South Vietnamese, other Asians, the British and
other West Europeans. As indicated in the outline
above, the analysis begins with an examination of
North Vietnam's dependence on imports, its current
reserves and its present stockpiles of goods not do-
mestically manufactured. We then examine the logis-
tical alternatives to seaborne imports open to North
Vietnam and countermeasures it would be physically
possible for Hanoi to initiate to offset the impact
of a quarantine. Since the major logistical alter-
natives to seaborne imports require extensive Chinese
Communist assistance and support, we analyze in some
detail the potential burden to China and the poten-
tial economic costs a quarantine would impose on
North Vietnam.
3. After examining what might be called the
physical impact and consequences of the imposition
of a quarantine, the memorandum attempts to assess
the probable political reactions of the North Viet-
namese, the Soviets, the Chinese Communists, the
South Vietnamese, other Asians, and non-bloc Western
Europeans.
4. Given the many complexities and interacting
elements of the problem we were asked to address, it
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is hard to set forth any summary conclusions that
do not have the ring of ex cathedra judgments. Our
data and evidence make it quite clear that a closure
of the port of Haiphong would disrupt North Vietnam's
seaborne trade and force an extensive revamping of
normal transport arrangements. The evidence avail-
able also demonstrates that the disruption to North
Vietnam's import patterns would be severe. Nonethe-
less, as explained in detail in the body of this mem-
orandum, the evidence also indicates that if the Chi-
nese Communists provide the necessary cooperation and
support--at levels well within China's present physical
capabilities--North Vietnam could make the adjustments
necessary to sustain its war-making potential within
two or three months. The maintenance of necessary
import levels without the current seaborne routes
would be more costly than are present arrangements,
but the evidence shows that the necessary added ef-
fort would, of itself, not be likely to become a ma-
jor burden to Hanoi or its Communist allies.
5. As outlined in detail in section III below,
North Vietnam's reserves of vital economic and mili-
tary goods appear more than adequate to weather the
necessary readjustment period. Enough transport
equipment seems available so that by utilizing alter-
nate railroad and water connections with Communist
China, Hanoi has a capacity to handle import traffic
levels almost three times greater than current re-
quirements. In short--to compress a lot of detailed
evidence and analysis into one summary sentence--the
closing of Haiphong would not be likely to have a
major impact on Hanoi's material capabilities to
carry on the war unless China decided to deny its
overland routes to supplies destined for North Viet-
nam, including supplies from Eastern Europe and the
USSR.
6. The political reactions of the various par-
ties that would be affected by, involved in or con-
cerned with the imposition'of a quarantine are even
more complex and difficult to analyze than the quar-
antine's physical impact. To avoid the distortion
inherent in conclusions divorced from their support-
ing evidence and analysis, we will not attempt'to set
forth summary judgments on these questions of probable
reactions but, instead, refer the reader to the full
discussion set forth in this memorandum's Section VII.
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II. North Vietnamese Dependence on Imports
7. The limited size of its modern economy and
the fact that it has always been a food-deficit
country have made North Vietnam highly dependent
on imports. This dependence has increased greatly
during the war because North Vietnam has had to
rely almost completely on external sources for
combat materiel and has had to divert large amounts
of manpower to nonproductive, war-related activi-
ties.
Level of Imports
8. North Vietnamese imports during the 12
months ending in June 1969 totaled 2.2 million
tons. Most of this traffic -- about 85 percent
of total imports -- was brought in through the
port of Haiphong. Although rail imports amounted
to only a small share of the total, rail transport
is of particular significance as the principal
channel for the import of combat materiel.
9. Estimated seaborne imports for the period
1 July 1968 - 30 June 1969 are shown in the
following tabulation:
10. Estimates of rail imports by North Vietnam
are much more tenuous than those for seaborne
imports. On the basis of rather limited evidence,
we estimate that rail imports for
1 Jul 9 8 - 30 June 1969 were on the order
~f tons, of which only about 59-080 `, eo' 7)
tons were combat materiel. The information
that is available indicates that rail imports,
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particularly of military goods, have declined
since April 1968. The decline is due in part to
the reduced requirements for military aid after
the US bombing program was restricted in March
1968 and finally halted in October. More recently
we have also seen indications that some goods pre-
viously shipped from the USSR by rail are now being
shipped by sea.
11. More than 97 percent of North Vietnam's
imports are from Communist countries. The USSR
provides the greater share -- 44 percent -- of
these imports. The Soviets provide about one-third
of North Vietnam's imports of foodstuffs, almost
all of its imports of petroleum, and about one-half
.of its imports of fertilizers. The USSR also pro-
vided about 40 percent of North Vietnam's imports of
general cargoes such as construction materials,
industrial machinery, metal products, and trans-
portation equipment. Communist China accounts for
almost 40 percent of North Vietnam's imports.
China's trade with North Vietnam is dominated by
foodstuffs which accounted for almost three-fourths
of the volume of seaborne imports from China.
China also provides substantial imports of indus-
trial machinery, construction materials, and
transport equipment. North Vietnamese economic
imports from Free World countries are dominated by
fertilizer imports -- mostly from Japan -- and by
timber imports from Cambodia.
12. North Vietnamese seaborne imports have
reached record totals because of sharp increases
in imports of foodstuffs and petroleum. During
the past 12 months, for example, imports of petro-
leum were about 2.5 times their 1965 level.
Imports of foodstuffs show an even greater in-
crease, being some seven times greater than they
were in 1965.
Foodstuffs
13. North Vietnam's domestic output of rice
has declined steadily from 3.0 million tons of
polished rice in 1965 to 2.5 million tons in 1968.
Output in 1969 should be somewhat higher, barring
unforeseen circumstances, but a dramatic increase
is not expected. Although an effort has been made
to increase the production of subsidiary foodstuffs,
it is doubtful that a significant increase was
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achieved, because many of the same factors that
adversely affected rice production would have
affected subsidiary crops.
14. While domestic rice production has fallen
since 1965 by about 15 percent, the North Viet-
namese population has increased by about 5 percent.
In addition, the war effort has required more and
harder work -- thus requiring a greater intake of
calories. To fill the widening gap, North Vietnam
has been forced to increase imports of foodstuffs
substantially. Imports of foodstuffs by sea
increased from about 120,000 tons and 80,000 tons
in 1965 and 1966, respectively, to about 460,000
tons in 1967 and to more than 890,000 tons for the
year ending June 1969. Imported foodstuffs now
supply one-fifth of the estimated total calories
consumed by the North Vietnamese. With per capita
food consumption at close to minimum levels, the
continued accessibility to food imports is essential
for the maintenance of the population's health and
productive capacity.
15. Seaborne imports of petroleum during the
past year totaled about 333,000 tons. Almost
85 percent of the petroleum imports originated in
the USSR and 95 percent were delivered by sea. The
high level of consumption of petroleum during the
past year reflects the intensity of military
activity and the greater use of trucks, construction
equipment, and marine craft.
Military Imports
16. There is little hard evidence with which
to quantify precisely the current level of North
Vietnam's imports of military goods. Historically,
hnwpupr. there has been sufficient information[ 7
to permit estimates of
the volume of military imports, and these estimates
have proved to be compatible with other intelli-
gence occasionally obtained from collateral sources.
In addition, the intelligence community estimates
that all of North Vietnam's imports of combat
materiel and major items of military hardware are
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delivered by rail rather than by sea. Large amounts
of war-supporting materiel such as trucks and petro-
leum do, however, enter North Vietnam through the
port of Haiphong.
17. Imports of combat materiel, ammunition, and
missiles during the past twelve months have de-
creased from previous levels because of the reduced
requirements for military goods needed for defense
of North Vietnam against US bombing attacks.
18. By the end of 1968, adjustments to the
cessation of the US bombing of North Vietnam had
probably been completed, and imports of military
equipment are now estimated to be at relatively
,constant levels, although well below the level of
the first half of 1968. The high level of attacks
flown by US aircraft in the Panhandle of North Viet-
nam between 1 April and 31 October and the continued
attacks against Laos after the 1 November bombing
halt indicate a relatively constant North Vietnamese
requirement, so that imports of military goods such as
ammunition have probably remained fairly stable
during 1969. With the limited evidence on hand we
estimate that in volume terms deliveries of military
goods have probably leveled off at an annual rate of
some 50,000 tons.
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III. Reserves and Stockpiles
19. There is little direct intelligence to
permit any precise quantification of North Vietnam's
reserves of essential economic goods or its stock-
piles of military goods. The information that is
available, however] supports a general conclusion
that [with but few exceptions-]the supplies of eco-
nomic and military goods are adequate to satisfy
requirements for a period of at least several
months.
Economic Goods
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of Haiphong and replaced by incoming construction
materials. Turnover of foodstuffs since November
1968 has been high, and turnover of most of the
other cargo has been at a rela-
tively higher pace than e ore the 1 November
bombing cessation.
a variety of industrial equipment and
22. With the principal exception of construc-
tion materials, we estimate that North Vietnam
has adequate stockpiles of economic goods. Food
supplies are currently at a high level because of
the recent harvest of the fifth-month rice crop.
The industrial equipment needed for restoring
and/or maintaining industrial output has been
imported during 1969 in increasing amounts, and
in May 1969
materials on hand. A high level of petroleum
imports and a well developed dispersed storage
system also point to the availability of adequate
supplies of petroleum.
Supplies of Foodstuffs
23. There is no direct intelligence on the
stockpiles of foodstuffs in North Vietnam. It is
apparent, however, that supplies of rice are
usually abundant immediately after the two rice
harvests in May-June and October-November. More-
over, some subsidiary crops that are harvested
between the rice harvests help to take up the
slack as rice supplies are depleted. With no
measurable carryover of foodstuffs before the 1968
tenth-month rice harvest, a food balance, based on
estimated production, imports, and consumption, shows
the following changes in food reserves during 1969:
Carried over
Production
Imports
Available
Consumption
Balance
Dec
1968
Jan
Feb
Mar Apr M
Jun
1,900
1,640
1,355
1,065
795
505
225
--
--
--
--
--
--
1,600 a/
100
75
70
90
70
80
90
2,000
1,715
1,425
1,155
865
585
1,915
360
360
360
360
360
360
360
1,640
1,355
1,065
795
505
225
1,555
a. Including both rice and subsidiary food crops.
-8-
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24. Although the levels of any reserve supplies
based on this estimated balance are subject to a
considerable margin of err he trend indicate
would appear to be valid.
support the estimate
that rood supplies were low before the rice harvest
in May 1969. Before the harvests, food supplies are
at low levels -- possibly as little as one month's
supply. Between harvests the import of foodstuffs
offsets to some extent the rate of the drawdown of
total stocks. If the import of food were cut off,
the stocks on hand would be more quickly drawn down
and supplies could reach dangerously low levels a
few months before the harvest. The denial of food
imports would be more critical during the first
half of the year because of the longer growing
season required by the fifth-month rice crop
because of less favorable weather conditions.
25. North Vietnam has consistently been an
importer of foodstuffs, the amount varying annually
depending primarily on the fortunes of the rice
harvest. Thus, good or normal harvests in 1965
permitted a reduction of imports in 1966, and
subsequent poor crops called for heavy increases
in import levels, as shown in the following tabula-
tion:
Jan-May
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969
Imports (foods) 120 80 460 790 385
Production
(milled rice) 3,000 2,800 2,700 2,500 800
26. Estimates of rice production are admittedly
tenuous. North Vietnam has not published production
data on food crops since 1963. Although much of the
discussion on agriculture in official publications
and in periodicals refers to yields and goals for
crop output, there are no published data concerning
the acreage under cultivation to specific food
crops. Therefore, the two annual rice crops are
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estimated relative to an average and relative to
the crop of the previous year from statements by
representatives of the regime concerning the
progress of the crops and of the harvest as well
as relative to weather conditions as we know them
to have been. These estimates have generally
been confirmed subsequently by levels of food
imports.
27. Consumption of foodstuffs in North Vietnam
has been closely rationed since the Communists
took over. The basic ration for rice has remained
relatively constant over the years, but the amount
of rice available has varied and the percentage of
substitutes has increased since 1965. Any short-
fall in annual production of food and in the volume
of imports therefore becomes rather critical
within a few months because relatively little
further belt-tightening can be done.
Supplies of Petroleum
28. On the basis of North Vietnam's imports of
petroleum during the past year and estimates of
consumption patterns, we estimate that the stocks
of petroleum currently on hand total about
100,000 tons, equal to about 100 days of supply
at the estimated 1968 consumption rate.
29. To keep stockpiles at these levels the
North Vietnamese have maintained a highly diver-
sified system of dispersed storage sites. This
system includes more than 150 storage sites with
an estimated capacity of at least 60,000 tons. In
addition, an estimated 400,000 petroleum drums are
now dispersed throughout North Vietnam. Finally,
the North Vietnamese have recently begun to restore
some of these bulk petroleum storage tanks in Hanoi
and Haiphong. By June 1969 these restored facili-
ties had an estimated storage capacity of 37,000
tons.
Industrial Supplies and Equipment
30. Scattered references to stockpiling of
industrial equipment and supplies indicate that
sufficient levels are on hand to meet North Vietnam's
requirements for several months. Although current
consumption requirements are difficult to gauge, the
large amount of such goods in known storage and
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distribution areas and the North Vietnamese ability
to adapt quickly to local shortages caused by the
distribution system indicate sufficient stockpiling
throughout the country.
There has
been no appreciable change in the amount of goods
known to be stored during 1969.
Construction Supplies and Equipment
31. Most supplies for use in construction
appear to be inadequate, although stockpiles of
construction equipment and structural steel appear
sufficient. Numerous articles critical of the
progress of the construction industry have appeared
in the North Vietnamese press since the beginning
of the year. Domestic production of building
materials such as bricks, tiles, and cement has
not kept up with increased construction requirements
resulting from the bombing years. Cement production,
for example, is estimated to have been only about
100,000 tons for the first five months of 1969, and
observed seaborne imports have added only 10,000 tons.
Consumption of cement for a comparable period in
1965 and 1966 was equal to about 230,000 tons.
32. The shortage of construction materials may
account, in part, for the slow pace in reconstruc-
tion activity since the bombing halt. Large amounts
of construction equipment, such as cranes, bulldozers,
graders, rollers, and compressors, however, have been
consistently noted at Haiphong and other major
storage areas. Some of this equipment has remained
in the areas up to six months before being dis-
tributed. A rallier also reported seeing large
amounts of structural steel in areas between Hanoi
and Phu Ly in late 1968, much of which had lain un-
protected for a sufficient time to become badly
rusted.
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Military Goods
33. Since the bombing halt, the Communists
have undertaken a major supply movement into the
Southern Panhandle of North Vietnam using avail-
able rail lines, truck routes, waterways, and
coastal shipping. This has produced a substantial
ildu
we feel
certain that stocks available are more than
adequate to support the war in South Vietnam
without further imports into North Vietnam for
several months.
34. Large volumes of supplies are stored in
the open throughout the Southern Panhandle of
North Vietnam, reflecting an apparent confidence
that there will be no resumption of the bombing.
At the same time, there is evidence that the North
Vietnamese continue to disperse supplies and to
build revetments around storage areas as insurance
against any resumption of the air war. The in-
creased volume of supplies moved into the southern
part of North Vietnam has been accompanied by a
substantial increase in throughput into southern
Laos. An estimated 220 tons a day were moved into
southern Laos during the past dry season (October
1968 - May 1969) compared with some 180 tons a day
during the 1967-68 dry season.
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IV. Alternatives + 4 JwtfC4
47. A quarantine of the port of Haiphong and
the minor ports of Hon Gai and Cam Pha would force
the North Vietnamese to depend primarily on the
overland routes from China for the continued import
of vital war-supporting materiel and economic goods.
The North Vietnamese would not, however, have to
depend entirely on the rail, road, and waterway
connections with China. There are several other
potential countermeasures that could be rapidly
improvised by the North Vietnamese -- the use of
lighters, the transshipment of goods in small craft
from ports in South China, and/or the use of air
transport for high-priority goods. These counter-
-
measures are well within-the capabilities of.the
Iforth Vietnamese as long as, they have__the cooper-
ation otthe Chinese or unless the terms of the
quarantine permitted US naval or air farce to
interdict the countermeasures.
48. Enemy countermeasures to new weapons and
tactics introduced by the US during the more than
three years of the air war over North Vietnam
showed the North Vietnamese to be shrewd improvisors
with a frequent ability to anticipate US actions.
In view of the numerous press reports since 1965
of discussions within the US Government of the
possibility of closing the port of Haiphong, it must
be assumed that the North Vietnamese have prepared
contingency plans to insure against such a possi-
bility. It is probable that the North Vietnamese
would not depend on any single countermeasure but
would employ a number of alternatives. It would be
difficult, for example, to move heavy machinery in
small craft from ports in South China and lighter
it over the beaches into North Vietnam. However,
bulk food and fertilizer imports could be handled
in this manner with relative ease.
49. At this time the major unknown in estimating
North Vietnam's ability to counter a quarantine of
normal seaborne imports is the degree of cooperation
that would exist between the USSR and China in
countering the quarantine. With the same limited
cooperation as has existed in recent years, even
a long-term closing of the ports would have little
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impact on the viability of the North Vietnamese
economy or the ability of the North Vietnamese to
continue the war in the South or maintain a strong
air defense and military posture in the North.
50. At this particular juncture in Sino-Soviet
relations it can not be assumed, however, that the
Chinese would permit the required amounts of POL,
trucks, machinery, and other imports that North
Vietnam normally imports by sea from the USSR to
transit Chinese territory. For this reason, this
report considers a "worst-case" -- one in which
Soviet military and economic aid to North Vietnam
is cut off and China picks up the tab for also
supplying the equivalent Soviet military and eco-
nomic aid as well as the aid China has supplied in
the past. Thus Peking would have to supply not
only the logistical support for alternative move-
ments of goods to North Vietnam, which it would
have to do even if greatly increased volumes of
Soviet goods were allowed to transit China, but
China would also have to supply the POL, trucks,
food, and other supplies from indigenous sources
or imports.
North Vietnamese Logistical System
51. North Vietnam's total rail and seaborne
imports during the most recent 12-month period
amounted to an average of about 6,000 tons a day.
This volume of goods is equivalent to what can be
carried by about 200 standard-gauge freight cars
or about 1,800 trucks a day.
52. Even if the total volume of seaborne imports
were shifted to the overland route with no belt-
tightening with respect to food or reduction in
fertilizer imports and no lightering across the
beaches, the diversion of imports would not severely
tax the capacity of the overland routes. In con-
trast to the total input of 6,000 tons a day, the
combined capacity of the railroad, road, and water
routes from China to the Hanoi area of North Vietnam
totals almost 16,000 tons per day during the dry
season and 13,000 tons per day during the wet season.
As shown in the tabulation below, the capacity of
North Vietnam's rail connections with China are alone
one-third greater than the volume of goods that must
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be imported. The roads and waterways provide an
additional cushion that can be used to avoid bottle-
necks and to establish additional routes for moving
goods from various areas of South China into North
Vietnam.
Tons per Day
Daily average
Route capacities
6,000
Railroads
9,000
Roads
5,400
(2,300)
a/
Red River
1,500
Total surface
15,900
(12,800)
a/
a. The capacity of the roads declines
during the wet season, which extends
from June through September in the
northern areas of North Vietnam.
the main lines of communication with China, there
is no doubt that the capacity of these lines could
be rapidly expanded.
abor force'was mobilized to maintain and improve
plovees were engaged in?air defense or oml
c er. If even a small fraction of this
of North Vietnam, u to 600 000 -_ti -
to repair road segments that got washed out during
the rainy season. Furthermore, during the bomlin
53. The capacities given above are conservative
estimates based on a wide variety of factors in-
cluding the extent and conditions of facilities,
the availability of equipment, and the employment of
a normal labor force. Improvisation can enable
theoretical rail system capacities to be temporarily
exceeded for considerable periods of time when the
demand is great or the regime assigns a high priority
to moving supplies over the system. Furthermore,
the permanent capacities could be expanded by rela-
tively simple additional construction and quickly
installed expedients such as the construction of
passing tracks at more frequent intervals. The
capacities of the roads could be increased by im-
proved grading or the more intensive use of manpower
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54. The North Vietnamese railroad system between
China and Hanoi consists of the Hanoi-Dong Dang line
and its alternate route, the Kep-Thai Nguyen-Yen Vien
line and the Hanoi-Lao Cai line. The Dong Dang line
is dual gauged, 111 miles long, with an estimated
capacity of 5,400 tons each way per day (EWPD).*
The Communists are engaged in a major realignment
of about 15 miles of this line south of Lang Son.
The new rail segment will upgrade the line's capa-
bilities by removing several sharp turns and a long
steep grade. It is by far the most important route
for overland imports via China. Its alternate corri-
dor via Kep-Thai Nguyen-Yen Vien is 71 miles long
and has an estimated capacity of 4,300 tons EWPD.
The Lao Cai line currently is of minor importance
for overland imports but it does provide access to
the northwestern regions and China's Yunnan Province
and would assume increased importance if the port of
Haiphong were closed. This line is 170 miles long
and has an estimated capacity of 3,400 tons EWPD.
55. Soon after the 31 March 1968 bombing re-
striction north of the 19th Parallel, the North
Vietnamese took full advantage of the standdown to
restore the rail system to its original status and
in some cases actually to increase the capability
of the system. The North Vietnamese have also
increased their overall tractive inventory in the
last few months by importing about 20 small diesel
locomotives from the Soviet Union.
56. In late 1968 the North Vietnamese acceler-
ated their construction efforts on the 57-mile Kep-
Hon Gai meter-gauge rail line. By June 1969 the
Communists had laid track on all but 19 miles of
this line and had prepared the rail bed on most of
the remaining alignment. There were only a few
small bridges and culverts to be completed. Work
has continued on the largest bridge on the line, a
major one 340 to 400 feet long over the Song Nhat
Duc.
* The term dual-gauge refers to the use of three
or four rails on the same roadbed, making possible
the use of both meter-gauge and standard-gauge
rolling stock. It is not to be confused with
"double tracking" -- two separate tracks on two
roadbeds with a total of four rails.
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57. Since October the eastern half of the line
has been in service from the mining areas around
Nhue Ho to the vicinity of the ferry slips under
construction across the bay from Hon Gai. It will
probably take no more than two to three months to
complete the bridge over the Song Nhat Duc and
permit through traffic from the Hanoi-Dong Dang
rail line to Hon Gai.
Highways
58. There are five major and several secondary
transborder roads connecting the Hanoi-Haiphong
area with the South China provinces of Kwangsi and
Yunnan. Together, this roadnet has an estimated
minimum capacity of about 5,400 tons EWPD during
the dry season (October-May), decreasing to approx-
imately 2,300 tons EWPD during the rainy season.
From one-half to two-thirds of this total cross-
border capacity is associated with the northeastern
routes leading from the large storage depots of
Nanning and P'ing-hsiang.
Inventory of Railroad Rolling Stock,
and Motor Vehicles
59. North Vietnam's inventory of railroad rolling
stock currently is estimated at 115-130 locomotives
and 2,000-2,300 meter-gauge freight cars. The coun-
try's railroad system consists of dual, standard,
and meter-gauge lines. The main rail link between
China and Hanoi -- the dual-gauged Dong Dang line
could be operated by drawing from China's inventory
of standard-gauge rolling stock which is estimated
(end of 1968) at 6,000 locomotives and 160,300 freight
cars. An alternate route from the border to Hanoi
via Kep and Thai Nguyen also could use Chinese
standard-gauge equipment.
60. As of mid-1969 the estimated North Vietnamese
motor vehicle inventory ranged between 6,500 and
11,500. The wide range stems mainly from a lack of
import data, particularly overland shipments, and
the uncertainties associated with confirming the
large number of vehicles reportedly destroyed by air-
strikes.in Laos.
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I North
v-Lemicaft suggests tha a firm vehicle inventory prob-
ably would tend toward the upper limits of the esti-
mated r,Znge.
China's Logistical Capabilities
Introduction
61. In the event of a cessation of normal sea-
borne imports, North Vietnam's most serious problem
would be to establish an alternative flow of about
30,000 tons a month of POL from China. Stockpiles
of POL in North Vietnam are presently estimated to
be equivalent to about 100 days of supply at current
consumption rates. The probable increased use of
trucks to haul supplies from China would increase
consumption rates, and shortages of gasoline or
diesel fuels would probably occur in the northeast
areas of North Vietnam in less than 60 days if
overland imports were not greatly increased. We
would expect, therefore, that the North Vietnamese
and Chinese would give priority to establishing an
overland POL artery. The dimensions of the problem
in terms of distance, tank cars, and locomotives is
discussed below. Next, it is assumed that all
normal seaborne imports are shifted to the Chinese
transport system to determine the magnitude of this
additional burden on China's transportation system.
POL by Rail from China
62. POL supplied from within China would come
from one or a combination of three major refineries
at Shanghai, Lan-chou, or Ta-ching. The Chinese
railroad authorities would probably have to institute
a shuttle system by which a given number of tank
cars and locomotives would be assigned to this move-
ment and would not engage in any other operation.
Such a shuttle would operate from the refineries to
Hanoi via P'ing-hsiang, which is across the border
from the Hanoi-Dong Dang rail line.
63. The extreme case would require that all
30,000 tons a month move from Ta-ching in Manchuria
to P'ing-hsiang, a distance of about 2,500 miles, or
5,000 miles a round trip. At 350 miles a day, about
15 days travel time would be required. One day for
loading and one day for unloading at each end of
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the haul would result in a turnaround time of 17
days. Thus, at an average load of 50 tons per tank
car, about 350 cars would be required. This number
of cars represents slightly more than 1 percent of
the estimated 28,500 tank cars in China's inventory.
About 25 locomotives would be needed, less than
0.5 percent of the estimated 6,000 locomotives in
China's total inventory. The burden on China's rail
system would be even less if these shipments were to
originate entirely or in part from Shanghai and/or
Lan-chou.
64. The rail line capacity from any of the
refineries in China is more than adequate to handle
this traffic in addition to the traffic currently
moving over these routes. In terms of logistic
capability alone -- holding the question of the
availability of POL until later -- the Chinese could
have a regular flow of POL moving toward North Viet-
nam well before any shortages would develop because
of a cessation of seaborne shipments.*
Logistical Impact of all Supplies Coming
from China
65. If all remaining Soviet, East European,
and Chinese seaborne imports of food, fertilizer,
machinery, and equipment were to come from North
China and Manchuria, the average length of haul
would be at a maximum about 4,800 miles per round
trip.** At an average daily haul of 350 miles a
day and allowing two days for loading and unloading,
the turnaround time would be 16 days. Thus, with
an average load per freight car of 40 metric tons,
The following example shows how the logistical
problem of moving POL to North Vietnam would be
greatly eased if Soviet, Romanian, or other foreign
tankers unloaded POL for North Vietnam at Fort
Bayard. China would probably organize the same
shuttle service but the round trip distance would
be only about 570 miles and the turnaround time would
be four days. Only 80 freight cars and 6 locomotives
would be able to carry the monthly requirements of
30,000 tons.
** Again, an extreme case because imported food-
stuffs which averaged almost 75,000 tons a month
during the past 12 months would not have to come
from North China or Manchuria.
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about 1,700 freight cars would be required in con-
stant operation to carry the monthly shipments of
130.,000 tons. This number of cars represents only
about 1 percent of the freight cars in China's
inventory.*
X In addition, China would have to continue to
transport the estimated monthly 25,000 tons of mili-
tary and economic goods that presently enter North
Vietnam by rail.
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V. Other Countermeasures
Introduction
66. In the event that oceangoing shipping is
denied access to the ports of Haiphong, Hon Gai,
and Cam Pha, a number of other measures could be
introduced to counter the effects of the quarantine.
The North Vietnamese could employ offshore lighter-
ing operations and use various shallow-water
approaches to the ports and inland waterways or
engage in over-the-beach operations. In addition
to the use of the overland routes discussed above,
diverted cargo could be transshipped in Chinese Com-
munist ports into small craft for movement to North
Vietnam, or funnelled through Chinese ports for
shipment on the Chinese railroad system to North
Vietnam. An airlift operated by the USSR with
Chinese cooperation could also move a large volume
of imports. An airlift operated exclusively by
the Chinese and North Vietnamese, however, would be
able to make only a small contribution without com-
pletely disrupting air transport operations in China.
The capabilities of all of these additional alterna-
tives, nevertheless, provide the North Vietnamese
with a flexible system with which to continue the
receipt of imports.
Lightering
67. If oceangoing ships were denied access to
Haiphong, Hon Gai, and Cam Pha, they could still be
offloaded in offshore areas by using the ships'
gear and lighters.
68. We estimate that North Vietnam has more than
30,000 watercraft of all types. This inventory con-
sists largely of junks and sampans although many
modern lightering craft (obtained from other Com-
munist countries) have been added in recent years,
including 60 Chinese steel-hulled coastal vessels
and 30 Soviet-built 35-40 ton capacity mechanized
landing craft which are ideally suited for over-
the-beach operations,
In addition to lightering craft, North Vietnam
has nine merchant coastal ships with the largest
having a capacity of 4,000 tons. Assuming normal
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conditions, we estimate approximately sixty 100-ton
lighters would be required to offload the 5,200 tons
of seaborne imports North Vietnam receives daily.
69. Adverse weather conditions and the likeli-
hood that port facilities with cranes would be
denied to lighters could both pose difficulties for
the Communists. Most bulky supply items requiring
cranes probably would move into North Vietnam by
rail. Bulk POL could be lightered from tankers
offshore. In fact, this is the normal way in which
POL is unloaded in Haiphong harbor. Also, calm seas
normally prevail in the northern section of the
Gulf of Tonkin some 60-70 percent of the time through-,
out the year except for October when it is calm only
about 50 percent of the time.
70. The waterway network in the delta (princi-
pally the Red River, the Song Thai Binh, and two"
connecting canals) provides a flexible system for
the movement of lightered goods inland. There are'
ten entrances to the network from the Gulf and,
although several are very shallow at low water, the
depth over the bar increases to five to eight feet
during high water in nearly all cases. If this network
was denied to the enemy by mining, the lightering
would be forced to the use of an over-the-beach
operation which could be highly inefficient, par-
ticularly if suitable cranes were not available.
71. Oceangoing ships could anchor off the
southern coast and offload into lighters which
could then move to southern ports (including Ben
Thuy, Quang Khe, and Dong Hoi), estuaries, and
beaches. Anchorages in this area are less protect-
ed,
but
landing areas for lighters along the coast
are
more
numerous than further north near Haiphong.
Much
of
the cargo offloaded here, however, would
have
to
be moved overland north some 100 miles to
the
major consuming areas.
72. Ports in South China such as Fort Bayard
and Canton could also be used to transship from
oceangoing ships to small craft for movement close
in-shore along the coast south to North Vietnam.
There are ample small craft available in China and
North Vietnam for such an operation.
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Air Transport
73. A sustained airlift could be organized to
maintain a flow of high-priority goods to North
Vietnam. There are 16 airfields in South China and
six in North Vietnam (five in the Hanoi-Haiphong area
and one at Kep) which could be used. All are near
rail lines, major roads, or seaports. The short
distance between the Chinese airfields and those
in North Vietnam requires little flying time and
makes this alternative reasonably economical in the
requirement for aircraft. For example, airfields
at Ning-ming and Nan-ping in China (which probably
would be the fields most extensively used) both
have runways of over 6,000 feet and are less than
30 minutes by air from Hanoi.
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[- - 7
VI. Burden to China and Costs to North Vietnam
Economic Goods
76. During the past 12 months the Communist
countries have supplied about 96 percent of North
Vietnam's seaborne imports; about 44 percent came
from the USSR, 36 percent from China, and 16 per-
cent from the East European countries, North
Korea, and Cuba. If China were also to assume the
Soviet aid burden it would have to provide an addi-
tional 900,000 tons of goods, including large amounts
of petroleum, foodstuffs, transport equipment, and
industrial products.
77. In the event that a quarantine of ports
prevented the USSR from supplying North Vietnam's
POL requirements and China refused to permit Soviet
POL to transit Chinese territory, the evidence
clearly suggests that the great bulk of North Viet-
nam's requirements could be supplied from China.
North Vietnam's imports of POL during the past
12 months totaled about one-third of a million tons,
less than 3 percent of China's domestic produc-
tion. However, China would have difficulty in
supplying specific products such as aviation fuel
and special lubricants that are in short supply in
China. These and other products, if not available
in Communist China, would have to be supplied by
the East European countries or from non-Communist
countries and transshipped to North Vietnam. The
total cost of North Vietnam's imports of POL in
1968 was less than $15 million. Thus the foreign
exchange costs to China for petroleum products not
domestically available would be minor.
78. During the past year, North Vietnam received
about 47 percent of its total imports of about 110,000
tons of chemical fertilizer from the USSR, about 20
percent from North Korea, and about 24 percent from
Japan. China is not known to have shipped any fer-
tilizer to North Vietnam by sea.
79. China produced about 5 million tons of
chemical fertilizer in 1968, but this output does
not satisfy domestic requirements, and another 2 million
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tons of fertilizer were imported from Japan. In
the event Soviet shipments of fertilizer were cut
off the Chinese would be faced with the following
alternatives: (1) ship to North Vietnam domes-
tically produced fertilizer at the expense of
China's agricultural production, (2) increase
imports from either North Korea or Japan and
transship these imports to North Vietnam, or
(3) substitute increased shipments of food for
fertilizer. About $4 million of foreign exchange
would be the cost to China to replace Soviet fer-
tilizer shipments to North Vietnam if purchased
abroad. Furthermore, while North Vietnam's agri-
cultural output has been lagging there is no reason
to believe that even a total ban on fertilizer
imports would result in an immediate deterioration
in North Vietnam's agricultural output.
80. North Vietnam's imports of foodstuffs have
been almost evenly divided between the USSR and
Communist China, with the USSR supplying mostly
wheat flour. Communist China could easily increase
exports of foodstuffs -- either rice or wheat
flour -- to North Vietnam with only minor internal
adjustments. Total grain production in China during
1968 was estimated at 185-195 million tons, while
total foodstuffs imported by North Vietnam during
the past 12 months amounted to less than 900,000 tons
of which the USSR provided some 300,000 tons. Wheat
is imported by Communist China, and the export of
wheat flour to North Vietnam in place of that from
the USSR would cost China the foreign exchange paid
for such imports, approximately $15 million. On
the other hand, Communist China could replace
Soviet supplies of wheat flour with rice or corn
at no direct foreign exchange costs, but an indirect
cost represented by the loss of potential earnings
from rice exports to Free World consumers.
81. The data on the number of trucks imported
by North Vietnam are incomplete because trucks
arrive both by sea and overland by rail and there is
little firm information on the extent of overland
deliveries. The USSR, East European countries,
and China have all been major suppliers of trucks
to North Vietnam. China, currently producing at an
annual rate of roughly 60,000 trucks a year, would
be hard pressed to supply all of North Vietnam's
requirements. China would find it especially diffi-
cult to supply large numbers of four-ton cross-
country trucks.
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82. On balance, if China were to prevent Soviet
trucks from moving by rail overland across China
the North Vietnamese would have to solicit addi-
tional trucks from the East European countries
or from China. China in the short run could draw
on its inventory of about 350,000 trucks or cut
into its current production to meet North Vietnam's
needs. Under any circumstances there would be no
immediate shortage of trucks in North Vietnam.
The present rainy season in Laos reduces North
Vietnam's truck losses due to air attacks. Further-
Foreign Exchange Implications
83. For China to supply North Vietnam with the
economic goods presently being imported from the
USSR would probably involve some expenditure of
foreign exchange, as noted above. However, the
most important foreign exchange implication for
China would be the presumed loss of potential hard
currency earnings as a result of increased shipments
to North Vietnam of food and textiles. The direct
foreign exchange cost for Communist China to re-
place North Vietnam's supplies of wheat flour would
be approximately $15 million at the levels supplied
in 1968. This would be in addition to the present
cost of the possible forgone sales of 225,000 tons
(1968 levels) of rice on the world market that would
have brought China an estimated $37 million.
84. Amounts of textiles shipped by China in 1968
were not significant. However, if China were to
supply the amounts that came from the USSR in 1968,
the loss in potential foreign exchange earnings might
reach an estimated $10 million.
Military Goods
85. In itself a quarantine of North Vietnam's
ports would have no effect on the volume of either
Soviet or Chinese munitions being shipped to North
Vietnam. Although war-supporting goods -- trucks
and bulldozers and occasionally helicopters --
arrive by sea, an analysis of all available evidence
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suggests strongly that the great bulk of munitions
have entered North Vietnam by rail. However, it is
possible that the Chinese might use the quarantine
of North Vietnam's ports as a pretext for cutting
off all Soviet military aid to North Vietnam. The
Chinese might seek to embarrass the USSR and force
a Soviet-US confrontation.
86. However, at the current level of hostilities,
a cutoff of Soviet military aid would have little
immediate impact on North Vietnam's military capa-
bilities. Communist China continues to be the
principal supplier of infantry weapons to Communist
forces in both North and South Vietnam. Moreover,
China could provide substitutes for every item of
equipment in North Vietnam's military inventories,
although many of these, particularly technical
equipment for air defense, would be of lower
quality or less advanced design. Over a period of
time some of North Vietnam's military capabilities
would be eroded. China's capacity to supply equip-
ment for air defense systems probably is limited
.to the extent that for many types of air defense
weapons only spare parts for maintenance and re-
placements for normal attrition could be supplied.
87. Deliveries of equipment for North Vietnam's
surface-to-air missile and antiaircraft artillery
defenses have declined markedly since mid-1968 to
little more than that necessary for repair and
replacement -- a level of requirements that Com-
munist China probably could meet adequately. China
could provide spare parts necessary to keep North
Vietnam's MIG-19s and MIG-15/17s -- numbering
about 40 and 115, respectively -- in combat-ready
condition, but the effectiveness of the approximate
65 MIG-21s undoubtedly would deteriorate if the
supply of spare parts from the USSR were cut off.
The period of time for such deterioration would
depend on the supply of spare parts on hand and the
rates of use of the aircraft. Replacements for
early warning and ground controlled intercept radar
probably could be supplied by China, but limited
productive capacity would preclude China's meeting
any more than a minimum external demand for fire
control and missile control radars.
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88. As North Vietnam's Soviet equipment wears
out or is destroyed in combat, many of the re-
placements provided by China as substitutes would
be of poorer quality and less advanced technical
design. For example, as North Vietnam's MIG-21s
became non-operational for lack of spare parts,
China could substitute the less advanced MIG-19.
China's production of MIG-19s, would be adequate
to permit the total replacement of North Vietnam's
MIG-21 inventory. Much of China's radar production
consists of copies of earlier, less efficient Soviet
designs, and the eventual resupply with such equip-
ment might degrade somewhat the effectiveness of
antiaircraft artillery and of the air warning system.
Types of air defense equipment and probable Chinese
replacements are given in the attached table.
89. In the event the US bombing of North Viet-
nam were resumed and North Vietnam's requirements
reached the levels of 1967 or early 1968, Communist
China undoubtedly would not be able to meet North
Vietnam's requirements for surface-to-air missiles
and antiaircraft artillery ammunition. Production
of SA-2 missiles by China is believed to be little
more than enough to meet the basic load require-
ments for China' s SAM battalions, only a
fraction of the near y 4,000 SA-2s fired by North
Vietnam in 1967. No firm estimate of capacity for
artillery ammunition production is available, but
it is believed that China would have great diffi-
culty supplying antiaircraft artillery ammunition at
the high 1967 expenditure rate in North Vietnam.
90. A halt in Soviet munitions shipments to
North Vietnam would not diminish the Viet Cong and
North Vietnamese army military capability in South
Vietnam or produce a significant change in the
character of the ground war. A halt in Soviet
munitions shipments would require the Communists to
substitute Chinese Communist 107-mm rockets and the
RPG-2 antitank grenade launcher for Soviet 122-mm
And 140-mm rockets and the more advanced Soviet
RPG-7. China would also be required to increase its
shipments of antiaircraft artillery up to 57-mm and
howitzer and field gun munitions, most of which have
been supplied by the USSR. Although the Soviet
conventional field guns and antiaircraft guns have
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predominated in South Vietnam, their Chinese
counterparts are similar in design and performance
and could be used without reducing firepower.
91. The Communists would not be forced to
change their battlefield tactics in South Vietnam
which currently emphasize standoff attacks by fire.
The acquisition of more Chinese Communist 107-mm
rockets, in addition to the large number of heavy
weapons currently in use and in stockpiles, would
enable the Communists to continue to use economy
of force tactics and would provide them with added
mobility at a small cost in firepower. The Soviet
122-mm rocket and RPG-7 antitank grenade launchers
have greater range and destructive power than the
Chinese 107-mm rocket and RPG-2, but the Chinese
weapons have the advantage of being lighter and
easier to transport.
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Additional Working Assumption
92. The political reactions of all parties af-
fected by, concerned with or interested in the im-
position of a quarantine on North Vietnam would be
materially influenced by the general situation pre-
vailing at the time the quarantine was imposed. One
set of reactions would be produced if, for example,
the postulated quarantine was imposed soon after
(and in apparent retaliation for) some blatantly
provocative Communist military and/or terrorist
action--e.g.,.a frontal, multi-divisional assault
across the DMZ, the public execution of a large num-
ber of American prisoners in North Vietnam, wide-
spread attacks on South Vietnamese cities and civil-
ian population centers, or systematic, coordinated
attacks on American and Vietnamese hospitals through-
out South Vietnam. Quite a different set of reac-
tions would almost certainly be produced if the im-
position of the quarantine closely followed, and
appeared to be the US response to, some major, super-
ficially sincere and forthcoming North Vietnamese
peace initiative--e.g., an unconditional acceptance
of President Thieu's election proposals. Ringing
the changes on all possible permutations of prior
circumstances would require a memorandum of inordi-
nate length. To simplify the analysis and assess-
ment of probable reactions, we have therefore made
the additional working assumption that the quaran-
tine is imposed under circumstances essentially
similar to those now prevailing, i.e., that North
Vietnam's propaganda, political, military and nego-
tiating posture remains essentially what it is in
mid-July 1969.
93. The primary object of the reaction analy-
s3is'portion of this memorandum is to assess Hanoi's
probable response to the imposition of a quarantine.
Hanoi's range of options will be so heavily affected,
however, by the responses of Peking and, to a
slightly lesser extent, Moscow that the probable
view from Hanoi can be seen in considerably clearer
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perspective if we first look at the probable reactions
of the Chinese Communists and the Soviets.
94. As outlined above, the evidence available
shows that China has the physical resources and ca-
pabilities to provide North Vietnam with the assist-
ance necessary to overcome the physical impact of a
quarantine imposed under the conditions assumed in
this memorandum's opening section. Since physical
constraints would not appear to inhibit or limit its
policy choices, Peking's political options would
range from shutting off virtually all of North Viet-
nam's imports to providing Hanoi with all assistance
possible. For a time, at. least, Peking would be very
much in the driver's seat; for all bulk, war-essen-
tial supplies reaching North Vietnam--including arms,
ammunition, POL, trucks and some foodstuffs--would
have to come overland via Chinese territory.* With-
out overland imports from China, once North Viet-
nam's reserves and stockpiles were depleted, Hanoi
could no longer wage war; for the contribution of
her own industrial plant to North Vietnam's war mak-
ing potential is negligible.**
If the quarantine involved only mining Haiphong and
not a complete naval blockade some goods and supplies
might be lightered ashore from Soviet vessels at
minor ports such as Camphu. Such action would par-
tiaZZy attenuate Hanoi's near-total dependence on
Chinese assistance, but unless the quarantine were
of very short duration, the basic picture would be
essentially that just described in the text above.
**A Soviet support effort effected by sea lift through
Cambodia might perhaps provide enough war materiel
for Communist forces in South Vietnam to continue the
military struggle at present levels, but the evolution
of such a support system would require Sihanouk's open
assistance (or replacement of. his regime with a Com-
munist-dominated Cambodian government). Even under
such circumstances, without overland imports from China,
North Vietnam would have severe and mounting internal
economic problems. Our memorandum hence does not fur-
ther address the theoretical alternative of a "Cam-
bodian solution" to the problems that would be created
by the imposition of a quarantine of North Vietnam.
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95._ Despite her current dispute and border
problems with the Soviet union and despite the fact
that the situation here postulated would afford Pe-
king a tempting opportunity to impale Moscow on the
horns of an intriguing dilemma--let Hanoi founder
or risk a direct military confrontation with the
United States by forcing the US blockade--shutting
off North Vietnam's essential supplies and driving
Hanoi to the wall would probably not be viewed in
Peking as a politically profitable course of action.
Even more importantly, Peking would probably view
such a course of action as unacceptable ("incorrect")
on doctrinal grounds. The economic follies of the
"Great Leap Forward" (e.g., backyard steel mills)
and the record of the "Cultural Revolution"--show
that some of Peking's major policy decisions are in-
fluenced by doctrinal considerations or what might
really be called theological considerations.
96. For years, Peking has urged Hanoi to fol-
low the doctrinally pure ("correct") policy of un-
relenting struggle against the imperialist enemy
and to forswear..: the revisionist Soviets' cowardly
heresy of premature resort to negotiations ~. Under
the situation postulated at the outset of this
memorandum, Peking could not refuse to aid North Viet-
nam without thereby virtually forcing Hanoi to adopt
a policy Peking has always unremittingly opposed.
Conversely, by coming to Hanoi's rescue, Peking
would lend tangible support to its doctrinal argu-
ments and, at the same time, greatly increase Chi-
nese influence over North Vietnam. Thus Peking would
probably see the quarantine as a golden opportunity
to improve its standing in Hanoi, at Moscow's ex-
pense, and hence would provide the aid that would
make it possible for North Vietnam to cope with the
physical problems created by the quarantine. In
the propaganda field, Peking would almost certainly
attack the quarantine as the latest "proof" of US
wickedness, would accuse the Soviets of being too
cowardly to contest it, and would take the general
line that North Vietnam and other "fraternal" par-
ties could now clearly know who was the real stal-
wart in the "socialist" camp.
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97. Chinese foreign policy in recent years
has displayed a number of not always consistent at-
tributes. Doctrinally-inspired bombast is clearly
one. Pragmatic prudence, however, is usually an-
other. Keeping the supply lines open to North Viet-
nam and providing Hanoi with all possible material
assistance would almost certainly strike Peking as
a politically profitable course of action involving
minimal risks. Peking would also certainly mount
a high decibel propaganda campaign against the US,
possibly one interlaced with "warnings" or threats.
Taking actual physical action against US forces im-
posing the quarantine, however, would be an entirely
different matter. A time of burgeoning tension along
the Soviet border would hardly be an opportune mo-
ment to run the risk of any sort of armed conflict
with the United States. The record of Chinese re-
sponses to air space intrusions indicates that Com-
munist China would probably fire on any US ships or
planes that encroached on Chinese territory and
China would probably aid North Vietnam to some ex-
tent in mine-clearing operations, but Communist
China is unlikely to dispatch its own warships or
aircraft to contest US naval operations off the coast
of North Vietnam.
Probable Soviet Reactions
98. In responding to the imposition of a quaran-
tine on North Vietnam, Moscow would have to select
a course of action from a range of options that
would extend from urging Hanoi to abandon the strug-
gle and seek the earliest possible settlement in
Paris to using military force to break the quaran-
tine and, perhaps, threatening armed retaliation
in other areas (e.g., Berlin) if the quarantine
were not promptly lifted. Moscow's choice of the
optimum Soviet response, however, would not be de-
termined exclusively by the specific issues or con-
siderations directly related to the quarantine.
Instead, Moscow's choice would be made within the
total context of the Soviet Union's Far Eastern
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policy, relations with North Vietnam, posture toward
China and toward the United States.
99. It seems increasingly clear that the reas-
sertion of Soviet interests in Vietnam, signalled by
Kosygin's visit to Hanoi in February 1965, was not
prompted by a simple, opportunistic desire to join
what then appeared as a Vietnamese Communist effort
on the verge of success. Rather, this reassertion
of Vietnam interests was part of a broad new Soviet
policy to "encircle" and contain Communist China.
This consideration has become increasingly apparent,
in Soviet policies throughout South and Southeast
Asia and in the Soviet military buildup on the Chi-
nc--,t- horder,, which alqc) hpcran in 196-q- F J
containment o ina has become the priority Soviet
foreign policy objective.
100. This policy of containing China, however,
does not automatically lead to collaboration with
the US. In particular it does not necessarily lead
to Soviet pressures on Hanoi to end the Vietnam war.
While the war in Vietnam does present some obstacles to
US-Soviet collaboration in areas of interest to the
USSR, ever since the talks first began in Paris
(and particularly since the 31 October 1968 bombing
halt), the Soviets have not chosen to regard the
Vietnam struggle as an impediment to doing business
with the US on important matters such as the Middle
East or arms limitation talks. Moreover, it is im-
portant to the USSR, in the context of its anti-
Chinese policy, not to offend Hanoi and to maintain
a Soviet presence in North Vietnam. Hanoi is a
prickly pear, jealous of its autonomy within the
Communist world, and demonstrably capable of play-
ing the Chinese against the Soviets in order to de-
fend and advance its own interests. Moscow appears
well aware of Hanoi's sensitivities and to our knowl-
edge has never pressured Hanoi to adopt positions
which the Vietnamese Communists might. consider pre-
judicial-to their interests.
99. Furthermore, Moscow probably sees some
positive benefits in the prolongation of the war
in Vietnam. The war is distracting to the US, it
serves to erode US influence in Europe and in other
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areas of interest to the USSR, and Moscow can only
take comfort from the internal strains within the
US which the world attributes, in part at least, to
the war.
102. For these reasons, if none other, we be-
lieve that the Soviet response to the closure of
Haiphong would be conditioned primarily by a desire
to keep in step with Hanoi. Added to this, however,
would be the question of Soviet "face" as a great
power. Its ships are the principal users of the
port and Soviet prestige would be directly involved
in any mining or blockade. Because Hanoi would al-
most certainly request it, and because face required
it, the Soviets would feel compelled to provide assist-
ance--with equipment and personnel, probably in a semi-
overt role--for mine-sweeping operations and other
countermeasures (e.g., by having Soviet pilots fly
North Vietnamese aircraft.)
103. A blockade would confront the USSR with the
most difficult decisions, decisions which might well
produce severe strains within the Soviet leadership.
Unless it challenged the blockade with its own es-
corted convoys, the USSR would open itself to propa-
ganda attack from Peking charging that the Soviets
were chicken-hearted or secretly working in collusion
with the US. Nevertheless, the Soviet leaders would
recognize that the USSR does not have naval forces
capable of challenging a US blockade in that area ef-
fectively, and that the attempt to do this would pro-
voke an unprecedented, direct confrontation with the
US under very disadvantageous circumstances. During
the past five years the Soviets have never given any
indication that they consider the issues involved in
Vietnam worth the risk of such a confrontation with
the United States. (For example, the Soviets have
never made an issue of,.or even mentioned, casual-
ties suffered by Soviet personnel manning SAM sites
or assisting in the defense of North Vietnam during
the bombing). Thus a review of all evidence avail-
able weights the odds heavily against the Soviet's
offering a direct physical challenge to a US quaran-
tine or even a US blockade. Nonetheless, the USSR
would almost certainly issue grave warnings and at-
tempt to create the impression that a major world
crisis could soon result if the US quarantine were
not speedily lifted.
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104. To give point to these warnings, the
USSR would probably assert that the US quarantine
had generated very severe obstacles to US-Soviet
collaboration in any area, thus reversing Moscow's
current stance that circumstances are presently
favorable for attempting to resolve a variety of
difficult issues through negotiation. Following
this new tack, the Soviets might alter, or at
least perceptibly chill, their attitude toward
exchanges which have been taking place on such mat-
ters as the Middle East, Vietnam negotiations, and
arms control. They might go further and say that
they perceived a radical turn toward aggressiveness
in US policy, with the implied threat that if this
continued, critical situations would inevitably be
generated at points of confrontation in other areas.
While moves to provoke countercrises elsewhere can
never be entirely excluded, it seems more likely
that in the circumstances postulated, the Soviets
would see more advantage in demonstrating that the
US move could'not bring Hanoi to its knees and in
stimulating political pressures in the US and else-
where to impel the US Government to desist.
Probable North Vietnamese Reactions
105. If the analysis outlined above is correct,
soon after the imposition of a quarantine Hanoi would
have reason to be confident of securing enough ad-
ditional Chinese, and Soviet, assistance to be able
to minimize the quarantine's physical impact. Thus
Hanoi's decision on how to react could be made pri-
marily on political grounds and would probably not
be dictated by physical constraints.
106. In making its decision, Hanoi would have
a fairly broad range of options to choose from.
For example, it could move swiftly to seek a negoti-
ated settlement in Paris. Or it could develop and
mount a general, last-gasp type military offensive
in South Vietnam. Or Hanoi could protest loudly in
the propaganda field, but basically sit tight in the
action arenas--both in Paris and on the battlefield
in South Vietnam--continuing present policies and
programs while waiting to see how the quarantine
affected the over-all political climate and, particu-
larly, the political mood in the United States.
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107. There is abundant evidence indicating
that Hanoi follows the course of political develop-
ments in the United States with careful and detailed
attention. The evidence available does not show
just how much weight Hanoi attaches in making basic
policy decisions to its calculations of US domestic
political factors, but the broad outlines of the
frame of reference within which Hanoi views such
matters are fairly clear.
108. For almost 25 years the Vietnamese Com-
munist leadership has consistently displayed a seem-
ingly ineradicable penchant for repeating strategic
or tactical gambits that have proved successful in
the past. The writings of the Vietnamese Communists'
leaders--Ho Chi Minh, Truong Chinh, and General
Giap--all indicate strongly that the Vietnamese pol-
itburo believes the Franco - Viet Minh war was lost
by the French in Paris as much as it was won by the
Vietnamese on the battlefields in Indochina. In es-
sence, the present Hanoi leadership seems convinced
that one of their most successful strategies during
the 1946-1954 struggle against the French was the
utilization of politico-military pressure as politi-
cal abrasive burring on the will of the French people
and the French Government, a strategy which eventu-
ally made continuation of the struggle a politically
unsaleable commodity in Paris. When this point was
reached, the French Government then in power opted
out with hasty dispatch. (Mendes-France took office
in the summer of 1954 with a public pledge to end
the war within a month or resign.) Despite occa-
ional disclaimers or remarks about the difference
in the two situations, the writings and statements
of the Hanoi leadership over the past few years
demonstrates a strong and continuing inclination on
Hanoi's part to see (and look for) parallels between
the mood in France in the early 1950s and that de-
veloping in the United States in the late 1960s.
109. We know from captured notebooks, internal
party directives, and reports of cadre indoctrina-
tion sessions that the Vietnamese Communist Party
is spreading within its own ranks the thesis that
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Communist actions in Vietnam have produced a cli-
mate in the United States which "toppled"'(or, some-
times, "defeated") Secretary McNamara, General West-
moreland, and President Johnson. In propaganda pro-
nouncements, cadre indoctrinations, party directives,
and even in statements in public and private negoti-
ating sessions in Paris, the Vietnamese Communists
quote US newspaper articles and editorials and Con-
gressional speeches critical of the Vietnam war,
constantly playing the theme that the "liberation
struggle" is receiving a rising tide of support
from "progressive elements" within the United States.
The available evidence is not conclusive, but a very
strong case can be made for the thesis that Hanoi
has a lot of political chips riding on a calculation
that if North Vietnam sits tight and more or less
stonewalls on its present political posture (but-
tressed by its present levels of military activity),
within a finite time frame (measured in months) ris-
ing political pressures within the United States will
force the US Government to make major concessionary
gestures to Hanoi or accept North Vietnamese demands
that involve major allied concessions.
110. It is within the context just outlined
that Hanoi views the developments of the past 18
months: Secretary McNamara's resignation, the 1968
Tet offensive, General Westmoreland's recall from
Vietnam, the 31 March partial bombing halt accom-
panied by President Johnson's call for negotiations
and personal withdrawal from the electoral arena,
the opening of talks in Paris, the full bombing halt
on 31 October, the lack of US military response to
Hanoi's fudging on the "understandings" with respect
to the DMZ and shelling South Vietnam's major cities,
Governor Harriman's public criticisms of the Saigon
Government and the US negotiating rigidity, the US
Government's frequent public endorsements of the
concept of negotiated settlement, Mr. Clifford's
article, the initial withdrawal of US troops, cur-
rent public debate over how fast US forces in South
Vietnam can or should be withdrawn. Given Hanoi's
attitudes and perspective, there are ample grounds
for making the strong presumptive inference that
Hanoi believes the US is moving steadily down a
road of de-escalation and disengagement and, further,
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probably considers it unlikely that the US Govern-
ment would be politically able to initiate any sig-
nificant "re-escalation" of the struggle.
111. Under present circumstances, therefore,
and in the absence of any major new provocation
from Hanoi of a type discussed above in paragraph
90, Hanoi would almost certainly be surprised at
the imposition of a quarantine. Furthermore, Hanoi
would almost certainly calculate that the quaran-
tine's imposition would swiftly become a topic of
acrimonious debate within the United States and
would prompt a widespread series of public attacks
on the Vietnam policy of the US Government.
112. Since Hanoi could probably withstand or
minimize the physical impact of the quarantine (if
China and the USSR were willing to provide the
necessary aid), Hanoi would probably wait to see how
events unfolded and the political climate developed
before making any definitive decisions on North Viet-
nam's optimum response. Hanoi would not want to
rush to settlement in Paris, for this course of
action would make Hanoi lose face, appear to be act-
ing out of weakness, and probably involve Communist
political concessions Hanoi would not want to make
unless unfolding events proved that such concessions
were unavoidable. On the other hand, Hanoi would
probably see little advantage in immediately launch-
ing heightened offensive activity in South Vietnam--
a course of action that, in any event, would take
some time to organize and prepare.
113. In sum, Hanoi's initial reaction would
probably be to gamble that the US would not be polit-
ically able to sustain the quarantine for any appre-
ciable length of time. Such a gamble would involve
relatively few risks for Hanoi and would be rein-
forced by the calculation that if the US lifted the
quarantine without obtaining any major concessions
from North Vietnam, Hanoi's political image, pres-
tige, and position would be materially enhanced at
Washington's expense. The Soviets would probably
counsel Hanoi to take such a gamble and, in this
instance, Hanoi would find Soviet advice attractively
congenial.
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1
1
114. While waiting for events to ripen before
deciding on its final course of action, Hanoi would
certainly mount a strident propaganda campaign
shrilly attacking the US quarantine as an act of
"aggression" and proof positive of America's "neo-
colonialist," "imperialist" perfidy. Hanoi's propa-
ganda chorus would be energetically joined by Com-
munist China, the Soviets and Communist governments
and parties throughout the world. Hanoi would also
probably suspend--or at least temporarily walk out
of--the Paris talks, partly because "face" would
require some response and partly because this action
would fan worldwide apprehension that peace prospects
had been dashed.
115. If the US Government turned what appeared
to be a deaf ear to the criticisms the quarantine
would inevitably provoke at home and abroad and per-
sisted in the quarantine through a period of weeks
stretching into months, the arguments within the
Hanoi politburo would become increasingly nervous
and sharp. These arguments would not revolve around
the physical impact of the quarantine but around the
extent to which its continuation called into increas-
ing question certain fundamental calculations about
the political staying power of the US Government on
which Hanoi's present strategy is largely based.
Contingency plans for prolonged struggle unquestion-
ably exist in Hanoi, but despite a public posture of
implacable determination to fight on forever until
total victory (e.g., General Giap's recent speech),
the abundant evidence of mounting stresses and strains
within North Vietnam and within the Communist move-
ment in South Vietnam makes it debatable (at least)
whether Hanoi really is prepared to carry on the
struggle for a time span measured in years without
scaling down its present minimal political demands
in order to achieve an earlier settlement. Imposi-
tion of a quarantine would almost certainly not in-
duce Hanoi to opt. promptly for a negotiated settle-
ment. Persistence in the quarantine over a period
of months would--at a minimum--almost certainly com-
pel Hanoi to review its basic strategy and the po-
litical calculations on which that strategy is based.
Any final decisions on strategic options made after
such a review, however, would hot hinge on the quar-
antine alone but would reflect Hanoi's net analysis
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of all relevant factors--including levels of Chinese
and Soviet aid, the course of events in South Viet-
nam, trends in the fortunes of the Communists' south-
ern organization, manpower loss rates, the world po-
litical climate and Hanoi's assessment of the polit-
ical temper within the United States.
Probable South Vietnamese Reactions
116. President Thieu and his associates are
clearly convinced that domestic US opinion is a
major factor in determining the course and pace of
US policy in Vietnam. Thieu believed last year
that the decision to end the bombing of North
Vietnam was a move the Johnson administration felt
it had to take for domestic political reasons. Thieu
has also stated in private to his advisers that he
understands the need for President Nixon's admini-
stration to withdraw some American troops this year
in order to assuage public opinion in this country.
117. This view of domestic US political con-
siderations helped Thieu take calmly what he saw as
the failure of the US to retaliate when the Commu-
nists violated the "understandings" which led to the
bombing halt. He appears to have reconciled himself
to the likelihood that the US will not resume the
bombing of North Vietnam or escalate the war by
attacking North Vietnam in any fashion.
118. Thieu's estimate of the political con-
straints under which he believes the US Government
is operating seems to be generally shared by his
associates and, for that matter, by most politically
conscious South Vietnamese. Thus the imposition of
a quarantine against North Vietnam (without some
prior Communist provocation or other major change
in existing circumstances) would come as a surprise
to Thieu, his associates, and most of his fellow
countrymen. The initial reaction of non-Communist
South Vietnamese would probably be one of exultant
delight. There would be a lift in confidence about
the future and about the willingness of the US Gov-
ernment to stay the course (two concepts most Viet-
namese view as inextricably intertwined). This lift
would certainly improve South Vietnamese morale and
would probably have a beneficial effect on South
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Vietnamese performance in some areas. On the other
hand, the fact of the quarantine might somewhat
diminish South Vietnamese interest in seeking accom-
modation with the enemy or lessen the sense of ur-
gency with which they viewed the need to set their
own house in order to gird for a period of political
competition.
119. The longer term impact of the quarantine
on South Vietnamese attitudes, policies and perform-
ance would hinge on the course of events. If the
quarantine should eventually prompt significant
political concessions from Hanoi, these concessions
(more than the quarantine itself) would enhance non-
Communist political prospects in South Vietnam. On
the other hand, if the quarantine should be imposed
and then lifted without any obvious reciprocal ges-
ture from Hanoi, virtually all politically concerned
South Vietnamese would read this course of events as
a major US political defeat which greatly enhanced
the Vietnamese Communists' prospects of success.
Probable Reactions of Other East Asian Countries
120. Virtually all informed East Asians would
see the postulated action as a certain sign that
prospects for an early negotiated end to the war
had faded. Few would expect the US move to affect
decisively Hanoi's will to continue the war, or,
at least in the short term, its ability to do so.
121. The more hawkish US allies in East Asia,
Thailand and South Korea, would welcome the US ac-
tion as an earnest of its intention to persist in
seeking a favorable outcome of the war. In the
other countries reactions would be somewhat ambiva-
lent. While there is clearly a general desire to
see the Communists stopped in South Vietnam, most
governments want to see an end to the war and its
attendant perils. The increased possibility of a
US-Soviet military confrontation in the region would
be particularly unnerving to them. Thus, support
of the US action would be at best lukewarm. Leftist
and anti-US elements, of course, would react vocif-
erously wherever possible.
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Probable UK and Other Western European Reactions
124. The dominant reaction in the UK, in of-
ficial circles as well as among the populace at
large, would be grave concern and disappointment
over what would be generally viewed as a distinct
setback to hopes for any early peace in Vietnam.
The most hostile criticism would be focused on the
challenge being posed to the USSR and its implica-
tions for European security (e.g., Berlin), nuclear
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disarmament negotiations, and the East-West detente
in general. Violent large-scale leftist demonstra-
tions would once again plague the authorities. The
fact that a number of British-flag dry-cargo vessels
(based in Hong Kong) call regularly at Haiphong
would probably not be a major factor in the UK re-
action to the US move, because these vessels for
the most part are owned or leased by firms controlled
by the Chinese Communists.
125. Elsewhere in Western Europe, reactions
would be about the same as in the UK, with the
degree of antagonism toward the US probably greatest
in the Scandinavian countries. In France, however,
the reaction might lead to a reversal of the warm-
ing trend in Franco-American relations since the
advent of new governments in both countries.
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The only distribution of this memorandum was one copy to
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger.
3 C)C-
ce,
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TRANSMITTAL SLIP
TO:
ACh/D/I
ROOM NO. I B
DATE
17uly69
-I Ch/D/
The attached is not to go
dorm into the Divisions.
4DivR
ROOM NO.
4-F-18
XTENSION
FORM NO 1 FEB 55 24 I REPLACES FORM 36-8
WHICH MAY BE USED.
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