VIETNAM STATISTICS SEP-DEC 67

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T02095R000500290001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 81
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 23, 2006
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 25, 1999
• Content Type: AG

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Vietnam Statistics
Sep-Dec 67,
STAT
19 Sep 67 ~(OCI) memo re Appraisal of Vietnam Statistical
Charts
STATINTL
Attachments:
67, re Comments on US Statistics
Related to the War in Vietnam (with
the following charts attached)
to DD/OER memo, dated 19 Sep
Ratio of VC/NVA Friendly Forces Killed
in Action
The Chieu Hoi Program
VC/NVA Confirmed Combat Strength
Rolling Thunder Sorties, 1966-67
Ratio GVN to US KIA
Ratio GVN KIA/MIA/Cap to US KIA
VC/NVA Initiated Attacks
Rate of SVN Desertions per 1,000 OB
VC/NVA Defections
Ratio of Military Chieu Hoi-VC/NVA KIA
to Confirmed Enemy Strength
VC/NVA Incidents, Sabotage-Terrorism-
Harassments
Ratio of VC/NVA ARVN Weapon Losses
29 Sep 67 Blind memo re Indicators of Progress in Vietnam
26 Oct 67 Carver to Rostow memo re Preliminary Report of Data
Task Force
Attachment: Blind Memo, dated 26 Oct 67, re Report
of Task Force on Vietnam Data and Trend
Indicators
DOS, USAF, DIA, NAVY, ARMY, JCS, OSD and NSC reviews completed
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Vietnam Statistics
Sep-Dec 67.
(Continued)
27 Nov 67 Carver to DCI (and various) Short Note re The Little
Blue Book
Attachment: Rostow Memorandum, dated Nov 1967,
forwarding "The Little Blue Book,"
Statistics on the War in Vietnam
prepared by MACV Headquarters, Saigon
27 Nov 67 Carver Memo for Record re 17 November White House Data
Meeting (to review the Vietnam data problem and current
related actions
22 Dec 67 Carver to Ambassador Leonhart (and various) memo re
Vietnam Data Task Force Progress Report (draft report
attached)
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THE WHITE HOUSE
Washington
November 1967
These charts were compiled at the headquarters of
Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV), in Saigon.
They reflect the best data available at this time to
our field commanders on the movement of the war in Vietnam
in the period from the third quarter of 1965, when substantial
U. S. forces were committed to Vietnam, to the third quarter
of 1967.
Ambassador Bunker and General Westmoreland used
these charts in briefing the President in November 1967.
They emphasized -- and it is important to note -- that these
working estimates are only part of the data on which their
judgments are formed.
The evidence of progress these statistics demonstrate
is confirmed by captured documents, prisoner interrogations,
estimates of field commanders, and by other sources.
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FORM NO. 9-17 Use previous editions (40)
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ODCI V -
~~ DATE: 27 Nov 67
To: DCP, DDI, D/OCI, D/ONE, C/FE
FROM: GACar ver, Jr.
v
REMARKS:
1. Attached is a "Little Blue Book" of MACV
statistics brought back by General Westmoreland
on his recent trip and shown by the General to the
President. Walt Rostow has told me that the
President liked this book very much and has
instructed that it be given wide circulation through
out the Executive Branch and to selected members
of Congress. The attached cover memorandum
was written by Mr. Rostow at the President's
direction.
2. Rostow was rather apologetic in relaying the
above information. He said he had been presented
with a fait accompli. On the whole, these statistic
could be worse, but there are some tables we feel
should not have been given such wide circulation.
In any event, the deed is done and the attached
copies are being circulated for your information.
3. The Data Task Force will endeavor to
rectify the errors in the attached book. On the
whole, I doubt if any serious damage has been done
George A. Carver, Jr.
Special As si, stant for Vietnamese Affairs
r nN, 1067
11
10
0
1E
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STATISTICS ON THE WAR
IN VIETNAM
PREPARED BY MACV HEADQUARTERS
SAIGON
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 www72F077/1 ~Nwm ^ w0w~ m ~7wZ^
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- -- --- - - ----- --- - ----- -
GVN _ CONTESTED NOTE: 1965 AND 1966 FIGURES ARE
VC FROM THE GVN SYSTEM; 1967 FIGURES
ARE FROM THE HES SYSTEM.
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(MONTHLY AVERAGE)
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SUUTH VIETNAM I LEGI IONS
(MILLIONS]
SEPT 1966 SEPT 1967
_ ADULTS REGISTERED _ ADULTS VOTING
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SECURED HAMLETS
(MONTHLY AVERAGE)
5,000
4,000
3,000
2,000
1,000
3,602
4, 1 44
4,645
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RD CADRE TEAMS
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VC/NVA STRENGTH
(too,ooo)
285,000
207,000
242,000
(FIGURES DO NOT INCLUDE POLITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE OF ABOUT 80,000)
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VU/NVA MANtUVER BATTALIONS
(MONTHLY AVERAGE)
COMBAT EFFECTIVE _ NOT COMBAT EFFECTIVE
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KILLED IN ACTION
(MONTHLY AVERAGE)
7
000
,
6,000
151
5
5,000
,
4
000-
,
3,513 3,7
3. 9
1
3,000-
2,0 00
1,661
1,306 37
113
959
6 03
1,000
86
361
M873
908
945
3RD QTR 65 3RD QTR 66 3RD QTR 67
GVN ^ VC/NVA U. S. ^ OTHER FREE WORLD
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? ?~~ .. v11L`v V 1 f\LI\U 1 fl
6 (100,000) MONTHLY AVERAGES
541,141
484,003
341,346
303,997
136,900
132,300
3RD QTR 65 3RD QTR 66
DOES NOT INCLUDE ADDITIONAL FORCES ANNOUNCED
3RD QTR 67
BY AUSTRALIA, THAILAND, SO. KOREA, NEW ZEALAND,
AS WELL AS THE UNITED STA'rP-~
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U.S.
OTHER
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%AV111 J 1IU I1 I1II (1vv,000J
(MONTHLY AVERAGE)
622,300
689,498
719,238
DOES NOT INCLUDE ADDITIONAL 65, 000 ANNOUNCED BY GOVERNMENT OF
VIFTAI A AA
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GVN MANEUVER BATTALIONS
(MONTHLY AVERAGE)
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KVNAr KILLtu IN At; I IUN
(MONTHLY AVERAGE)
^ REGULAR ARMY REGIONAL FORCES . POPULAR FORCES
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III w 1I L/ILV1.1\ 1 1V1\%7
(AVERAGE MONTHLY RATE PER THOUSAND)
INCLUDES REGULAR ARMY, AIR FORCE, NAVY, REGIONAL FORCES, AND
POPULAR FORCES.
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vv irunJ LUJ I
(MONTHLY AVERAGE]
3RD QTR 65 3RD QTR 66
= GVN
VC/NVA
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CHIEU H01 (OPEN ARMS)
MONTHLY AVERAGE
3,000
2,000
1,109
1,000
1,106
1,814
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AIRFIELDS
SEP 66
C-130 ^ JET
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OVERLAND HAUL (ROAD)
(THOUSANDS OF SHORT TONS) (MONTHLY AVERAGE)
1,229,110
1,200
1,000
701,000
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PORT THROUGHPUT CAPABILITY
(THOUSANDS OF SHORT TONS)
18,000
730,000
1,118,000
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DEEP DRAFT BERTHS
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Ot(;Kt 11,
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR
26 October 1967
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Walt W. Rostow
Special Assistant to the President
SUBJECT : Preliminary Report of Data Task Force
1. Per your request, an interagency working group including
representatives from Ambassador Leonhart's office, the Department of
State, Department of Defense and CIA. has reviewed the whole Vietnam
data problem in detail. Attached is the working group's report, out-
lining the group's findings and action recommendations. This report
reflects the unanimous views of all participants.
2. If you concur, we will proceed with the implementation of
the working group's recommendations on the time-schedule outlined
in the attached report.
George A. Carver, Jr.
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs
Attachment
Report of Task Force on Vietnam Data and Trend Indicators
SECRET
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SECRET
Mr. Rostow
Ambassador Leonhart
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary
The Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
The Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary
The Assistant Secretary for Systems Analysis
The Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs
The Comptroller
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency
SACSA
SECRET
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26 October 1967
SUBJECT: Report of Task Force on Vietnam Data and Trend
Indicators
During the week of 9 - 13 October, an interagency working group
reviewed data used to measure trend in the war in Vietnam. The group
concluded that the data most frequently used for both internal and public
purposes are not adequate for the task and recommends that a special
interagency task force be established to systematically develop new ways
of measuring progress.
The group believes that indicators of trends should measure
results toward broad objectives, not the progress of individual programs,
or simply activities associated with our programs. Effective indicators
of progress will come only from a systematic interagency analysis of
statistics, reports, and candid assessments by people experienced in
South Vietnam. Moreover, the group strongly believes that Vietnam is so
diverse that as much indicator data as possible should be analyzed on a
district and province basis in order to determine whether trends shown in
countrywide data reflect wide-spread change, or simply changes in small
areas of intense activity.
In the short term, the group recommends that efforts be under-
taken immediately to: (1) improve the current indicator charts, (2)
develop additional indicators from the Hamlet Evaluation System, (3)
explore other potential indicators of trends (such as road and waterways
control, provincial price indices, etc.), and (4) prepare monthly narrative
statements on progress which cannot be portrayed statistically. Results
of these tasks should be furnished as they become available, and a com-
prehensive report submitted on December 4, 1967.
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In the medium range, the group concluded that improved
measurements of RVNAF effectiveness and VC military potential
should be developed and that periodic soundings of Vietnamese attitudes
should be provided to complement other indicators. Existing data are
not adequate to measure RVNAF effectiveness and the group recommends
that detailed data requirements be developed and discussed with the US
Mission and the GVN. On the other hand, a system for measuring the
impact of friendly operations and programs on enemy military potential
probably can be developed in Washington by relating various individual
indicators to each other on a systematic basis (e.g., activities, and
reported condition of VC/NVA forces). Vietnamese opinion could be
sampled by development of opinion polls and by use of various collection
mechanisms. These efforts should begin now, with data requirements
and proposed programs to be reported on December 4, 1967. A report
of substantive results should be provided on January 30, 1968, with
interim results reported as they become available.
The long term objective of all the foregoing efforts should be to
develop a small number of credible measurements which can be presented
in a clear, concise manner. The ideal would be a single "Dow Jones"
index of how the war is going, but such an index is not currently feasible.
It is likely, however, that substantial progress toward such a balanced
group of valid indicators can be made if the foregoing actions are under-
taken with sufficient priority and allocation of resources.
The group recommends that: (a) action assignments and suspense
dates be established as indicated in the text below; (b) that the results be
monitored by a special interagency task force, which will report
periodically beginning on 4 December; (c) interim results of all efforts
be provided as they become available; and (d) that plans be made now to
brief MACV and the US Embassy in Saigon not later than 15 December 1967.
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1. During the week of 9 - 13 October, representatives of
.Ambassador Leonhart's office, the Department of State (INR), CIA,
and the Department of Defense (DIA, JCS, OASD/Systems Analysis)
reviewed data currently used to measure trends in the war in Vietnam.
The group concluded that the data most frequently used to measure
progress for both official and public purposes are not adequate for
the task and recommends that a special interagency task force be
established to systematically develop new ways of measuring trends
in the war in all its facets.
2. The group focussed on four major aspects of the problem:
a. The current state of the art -- existing data and
presentational forms;
b. Short-term add-ons -- additional data and charts
that could be developed for early use;
c. Long-term add-ons -- developing an optimum
system for measuring trends in the war; and
d. Specific recommendations for courses of action
necessary to implement the group's findings on the first
three items.
Discussions of indicators of trends tend to confuse such
indicators with criteria for program evaluation. An indicator tells if
we are winning (or losing) and measures significant trends; it does
not measure program activities. Thus, a progress indicator may be
quite independent of US or GVN programs, and may not correlate with
particular programs. (For example, province price indices or the
price of the piaster in world markets could be indicators. Conversely,
the recruitment rate for RD cadre may have little relation to real
progress.) In short, the group believes that indicators of progress
should measure movement with respect to broad objectives, not with
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regard to individual programs. Progress indicators, furthermore,
should not be confused with indices of activity associated with the
implementation of our programs.
4. Several kinds of data, systematically analyzed by several
types of analysts, are needed to develop the required indicators.
Statistical data is a basic starting point because it can show trends and
help define base points and end points. However, statistics by them-
selves, particularly those from Vietnam, present their problems:
reports from several sources often do not agree, gaps exist, results
are sometimes faked, reporting systems are frequently changed, and
reporters often are not objective. Thus, narrative reports embodying
the judgment of qualified field observers also must be used to help the
analyst understand the trends in the statistics and help to highlight the
biases and inadequacies of various data series. In addition, field visits
by Washington observers and detailed "off the record" sessions with
returning officials from all echelons are both necessary. Thus,
effective indicators of progress will come only from a systematic
analysis of statistics, reports, and candid assessments by people with
experience in SVN.
5. Moreover, the group felt strongly that Vietnam is so diverse
that the data used for indicators should be analyzed on a district and
province basis wherever possible in order to determine whether trends
shown in country-wide data represent pervasive, widespread change,
or simply reflect changes in small areas where activity is intense.
6. The committee reviewed the commonly used statistical
indicators, including VC/NVA attacks, VC/NVA incidents (sabotage,
terrorism and harassment), VC/NVA defections, VC/NVA confirmed
combat strengths and VC /NVA weapons losses. It concluded that some
of the statistical indicators are helpful in assessing trends which may
reflect progress, but are usually presented without the explanations
needed to put them in proper context. Moreover, there is little or no
systematic effort to analyze enemy documents or to use systematic
reports of US field officials in conjunction with the statistics.
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7. In examining data showing VC/NVA incidents, for example, the
committee found that changes in reporting criteria can have a drastic
effect on the trends shown in the graphs currently used as indicators. The
VC attacks graph shows a high level of attacks during 1962 and 1963, a drop
from 1964 through mid-1966, followed by a substantial increase. However,
the high level of attacks in 1962 - 1963 probably results from counting
many harassing fire and other lesser incidents as attacks. In similar
fashion, about 25% of the increase in total attacks during 1967 results
from reporting mortar incidents as attacks even if no assault occurred;
before that, mortar attacks without assault were counted as harassing
fire. As with population control and enemy strength statistics, a retro-
spective set of data is required to show the trend accurately.
8. The committee concluded that the current state of the indicator
art was inadequate and that a comprehensive action program should be
initiated, with full participation of all appropriate agencies (State, DOD,
(,JCS, DIA, OASD/SA) CIA, White House), The program should include
the short term, medium range, and long term efforts indicated below.
The group felt that an effort should be made to improve charts
in current use to the extent feasible. For example, a retrospective
incident line should be developed along with guidelines for interpreting
the data. This effort should be started immediately with results furnished
as they become available. (Primary action: DIA; Participant: CIA;
Suspense: November 1967)
10. On the basis of short term analysis, we must develop addi-
tional statistical indicators from data currently available. The Hamlet
Evaluation System (HES), for example, has not yet been fully exploited.
Analysis of the HES is likely to provide some indicators of GVN effec-
tiveness, hamlet security, and the willingness of the people to commit
themselves to the GVN by moving from VC areas to GVN secured hamlets
and urban areas. Data series based on some of these indicators will
complement and amplify the overall population control picture presented
by the HES, and should provide a useful add-on to the current charts.
(Primary action: DOD/Systems Analysis; Participant: JCS, DIA, CIA;
Suspense: 28 November 1967)
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11. In addition to the HES data, the committee agreed it must
explore data on other potential indicators of progress, such as road
control, provincial price indices, rice harvest and distribution,
neutralization of base areas, refugee resettlement, and movement of
enemy units away from populated areas, in an effort to develop valid
indicators. (Primary action: DOD/Systems Analysis; Participants:
.TCS, DIA, CIA, State; Suspense: 28 November 1967.)
12. It was agreed that a monthly list of narrative statements
should be developed, similar to that prepared by CIA in September, of
those factors which cannot be portrayed statistically, but which demon-
strate real progress. Such narrative statements, covering a variety of
political, economic and military factors, can be gleaned from existing
periodic field reports, and would highlight trends in areas related to
specific US aims and purposes. These would include political develop-
ment, popular attitudes, Free World support, anti-corruption activities,
land reform, Viet Cong morale problems, reflections of VC logistical
difficulties, etc. This effort should be systematized, so that an overall
checklist can be developed against which incoming reports can be
scrutinized, with pertinent data summarized. Charts should be
developed as feasible to illustrate individual items, although this series
will not always produce recurring data and must remain flexible.
(Primary action: CIA; Participants: State, DIA; Suspense: 1 November
and monthly thereafter.)
13. Medium-Range
The group concluded that two broad areas for which better
measurement could be developed are those related to Viet Cong military
potential and RVNAF effectiveness. Data Measurement Systems for these
factors, together with the HES, would provide complementary analytical
and management tools covering a broad spectrum of US objectives in
Vietnam. The group agreed, however, that substantial research using
existing data was necessary,, and that additional data might be required
before any meaningful new systems could be implemented.
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14. The group agreed that existing data clearly were not adequate
for developing a meaningful. measurement of RVNAF effectiveness as an
indicator of trends. Detailed data on RVNAF deployments, missions and
operational units will be required to facilitate research and permit an
effective evaluation. Data requirements on this subject should be
developed in coordination with the US Mission in Saigon and the GVN.
(Primary action: JCS; Participants: DIA, CIA, DOD/Systems Analysis;
Suspense: 28 November 1967. )
15. The group agreed that a system for measuring the impact of
friendly operations and programs on enemy military potential probably
can be developed by relating various individual indicators to each other
on a systematic basis. In this effort, we should discern the relationship
between VC/NVA incident data and the data reported in the Hamlet
Evaluation System. In turn, those data should be related to order of
battle strength and location data for VC/NVA and friendly forces. In
addition, friendly operations data should be examined in conjunction
with VC activity and HES data to determine the impact of friendly
activities and their probable long term effect. Because of uncertainties
regarding the meaningfulness of potential combinations, we cannot now
envisage the precise form this measurement may take. In any event,
all relationships should be checked carefully against a comprehensive
analysis of the non-statistical data in US/GVN reports and VC documents.
(Primary action: CIA; Participants: OSD/Systems Analysis; JCS, DIA;
Suspense: 15 January 1968. )
16. The long term objective of all the foregoing efforts should be
to develop a small number of credible measurements which can be
presented in a clear, concise manner. The ideal would be a single
"Dow Jones" index of how the war is going, but such an index is not
currently feasible. It is likely, however, that substantial progress
toward a balanced group of valid indicators can be made if the foregoing
actions are undertaken with sufficient priority and allocation of resources.
Interim results which would provide individual useful indicators of
progress will be made available as the research effort progresses.
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SECRET
17. The group anticipates that in addition to data on the RVNAF
mentioned above, some modifications in field reporting formats may be
desirable as optimum measurement systems evolve. This will be
necessary to obtain some additional data, and particularly to obtain
narrative field explanations of phenomena derived from data analysis,
and to focus the reporting on supplemental information. Also required
are certain data files held in Saigon which would facilitate retrieval of
documents and interrogation reports. (Primary action: CIA;
Participants: DIA; Suspense: 28 November. )
The group recommends that: (a) action assignments and
suspense dates be established as indicated above; (b) that the results
be monitored by an interagency task force, which will provide periodic
reports beginning on 4 December; (c) that interim results be provided
as they become available; and (d) that plans be made now to brief
CINCPAC, MACV and the US Embassy in Saigon and solicit their
assistance not later than 15 December 1967.
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',( j " \ CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR
22 December 1967
MEMORANDUM FOR: Ambassador William Leonhart
Major General William E. DePuy
Rear Admiral William Lemos
Mr. Jerry Bush
Brig. General Burton Brown
Dr. Victor Heyman
Mr. Fred Green
SUBJECT : Vietnam Data Task Force Progress Report
1. Attached is a draft progress report of the Vietnam Data Task Force
which has been coordinated among and agreed to by all of our working-level
colleagues. If the principals on the Task Force (i. e. , the recipients of this
memorandum) so agree, I plan to submit this report to Mr. Rostow.
2. I would appreciate your advising me by phone of your concurrence,
or non-concurrence, in this draft report. If necessary we can, of course, }
schedule' a meeting of the principals to iron out any,major differences. If none
of you has any serious problems with this draft, however, I do not believe we
need burden this crowded time with an avoidable additional meeting.
3. We probably should meet no later than the first week in January to
agree on the timing of our representatives' field visit and the composition of
the delegation.
y
.CRE1
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George A. Carver, Jr.
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs
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SECRET
2 2 DEC 1967
1. Representatives of agencies participating im the Data Task Force
met at CIA on 4 December 1967 to review progress since the initial meeting
in October. The status of assigned research and analytical projects was
reported on and discussed. Agreement was reached on the direction which
further analysis should take, on the timing of coordination visits to CINCPAG
and MACV, and on general procedures to tighten coordination on certain tasks.
The results of the meeting are summarized below.
2. Retrospective Incident Line (DIA). The DIA representative reported
that an initial pilot study is being developed to classify Viet Cong attacks by
type and scale. Subsequent studies will be attempted on terror, sabotage, and
possibly harassment incidents. When completed, these data files can be used
to demonstrate more reliably trends in the nature and level of Viet Cong activity.
This improved data series will also permit more meaningful analysis, in
conjunction with other data series, of the relationships between the various
trend lines, such as casualties, pacification trends, and the impact of friendly
operations on over-all Viet Cong capabilities and unit effectiveness.
3. Research to date has uncovered a number of problems regarding
criteria and methodology in reporting the data over the years, and in coding
the inputs into the data base. It was agreed that coordination with MACV to
refine reporting and coding procedures would facilitate the handling of incident
data in the future. It was also agreed that it is essential that we obtain from
MACV copies of their past reporting directives so that we can better evaluate
apparent anomalies in the incident data series since mid-1966.
4. Progress in this key project has been slow because of the limited
manpower resources which can be devoted to it.
5. Hamlet Evaluation System Exploitation (DOD/SA Action). A study
produced by DOD/SA on "Statistical Trends from the Hamlet Evaluation System"
represents the results of this project thus far. This study led to the following
conclusions:
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SUBJECT: Data Task Force Progress Report
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SECRET
e('a. The individual indicators can be analyzed separately to
show meaningful trends, since the evaluators apparently are grading
each indicator individually rather than mechanically attempting to
arrive at some predetermined over-all grade for the hamlets;
b. The initial program formats which displayed only net changes
do not adequately reflect the internal dynamics of pacification
operations, since they tend to mask the large gross number of
hamlets changing ratings.-- both upward and downward; and
c. The HES data should provide a most useful base against
which to compare other data series (VC incidents, friendly operations,
opposing orders of battle, etc.) and analyze interrelationships. CIA
noted that its limited investigation of HES, data showed that aggregations
at higher levels (national and regional) also tended to mask dynamic
movements internally at lower levels. Thus, while very little over-
all movement was indicated when the data were displayed at corps or
province levels, a disaggregation at district level showed dynamic
movements in various districts. Analysis of the average scores for
the nine security indicators at district from March through September
showed significant improvement in 33 districts, and significant
deterioration in 28 districts.
25X1
6. The DOD/SA study analyzed trends between March and September in
eight of the 18,HES indicators. The analysis reflected slight over-all progress
in reducing the capabilities of village guerrilla forces, although there was some
:regression evident in II Corps. With respect to VC main and local forces, there
was an over-all slight regression indicated, with II Corps again reflecting the
:Largest downward movement. No significant changes were reflected in the status
of hamlet and village infrastructure components.
7. reported that new computer programs were being
developed to permit analysis of total movements rather than net changes, and that
further analysis of HES data using these programs should produce meaningful
:results. It was agreed that the effort to develop the optimum presentation of
HES data should continue on a priority basis, and that closer coordination between
the participating agencies on this matter was desirable.
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z5t(;KtI
8. Potential Indicators of Progress (DOD/SA). Several of the
environmental factors had been explored to determine their suitability as
progress indicators, but in each case difficulties either in acquiring basic
data or in developing meaningful criteria were encountered. Data on such
factors as provincial price indices and rice production are too scanty and
diverse. Data on the status of lines of communication are very general, and
the criteria not sufficiently precise for effective analysis at this time. DOD/SA
stated further information was needed on MACV's route control system,
including the precise criteria used, before a broader and potentially more
meaningful measure can be developed. DIA reported its plan to analyze a
number of data packages in an effort to evaluate the effectiveness of operations
aimed at neutralizing enemy base areas.
9. Monthly List of Narrative Statements (CIA). This project has been
temporarily held in abeyance because of extensive interagency and field actions
that have otherwise been meeting the need for subjective accounts of progress
in the war. The need for action on this project will be reviewed periodically,
with a view to quarterly rather than monthly preparation.
10. RVNAF Effectiveness Measurement (JCS/SACSA). The Joint Staff
has developed a proposed list of detailed data requirements to improve the
measurement of RVNAF effectiveness. The list, which is keyed to computer-
ization, requires comprehensive periodic information on all tactical units
down to battalion, ship, or district level. Comments have already been
received from data task force agencies and from MACV. The latter indicated
that it is developing a new RVNAF evaluation system, which is scheduled to
be implemented in January. Data from this new system may satisfy many of
the requirements listed by the Joint Staff and assist DIA in its automation of
RVNAF order of battle. Further action is dependent on coordination with
CINCPAC and MACV which will reveal the extent to which MACV's new reporting
system will meet Washington requirements as. developed by the Joint Staff,
DIA and DOD/SA. DIA reported that automating the RVNAF order of battle,
which is currently in progress (but encountering difficulties), should aid in
meeting task force requirements.
11. Measuring Viet Cong Military Potential (CIA). This key project is
partially dependent on the completion of certain related projects. As a
minimum, automated data files on friendly and enemy order of battle now
being developed by DIA, are a prerequisite. CiA reported on the status of a
pilot project on Binh Thuan province. Data on Viet Cong incidents, friendly
tactical operations, friendly air strikes, and the hamlet evaluation system have
been converted to periodic computer plots and are being analyzed, using a
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"SECRET
videotapU"recording technique to demonstrate relationships over time. Other
data, including friendly and enemy order of battle, and pacification plans, are
to be added. Detailed friendly order of battle for this project -- not yet
available in Washington -- has been requested from the field. This project
is being developed essentially for visual presentation, using either videotape
or bound overlay folios, with accompanying narrative. Development of this
project is continuing, and may require several additional months.
12. DOD/SA reported on a parallel project which attempts to collate
various data at the Corps level. A preliminary study of III Corps was published
in its November publication. This study analyzed opposing force strengths,
military operations, hamlet evaluation system results, and election data,
presented in tabular form. Detailed comments from task force participants
were solicited to facilitate further work on this, project.
13. Saigon Data Files (CIA)". A copy of MACV's Combined Document
Exploitation Center index files had been requested and its receipt was expected
momentarily. Arrangements are also in train to acquire selected Combined
Intelligence Center reference files, and to obtain CORDS monthly province
reports and copies of the 1967 provincial pacification plans. DIA reported that
it was now able to service requests for copies of any MACV Intelligence Report
since September 1966.
14. Balanced Set of Indicators (CIA). This project is contingent on
further development of all related research projects referred to previously.
The Joint Staff noted that both CINCPAC and MACV have evinced considerable
interest in the over-all scope of the Data Task Force mission, and apparently
are reviewing current reporting and evaluating procedures in a common search
for improved measures of progress.
15. Briefing of CINCPAC and COMUSMACV. The Joint Staff represen-
tative suggested that the timing for the projected field coordination visits to
CINCPAC and COMUSMACV be changed from mid-December to mid-January.
It was agreed that January would be more opportune from the standpoint of
the forthcoming holiday truces, as well as allowing further development of our
own research projects.
16. Management and Coordination Arrangements. It was agreed that
closer collaboration among the agencies involved in research projects of
mutual interest was required to accelerate progress. Most participants
reported difficulties in allocating requisite resources to Data Task Force
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%0 I%W
responsib6ilities because of the press of other high priority tasks related to
the Vietnam problems.
17. Recommendations. The participants recommend that:
a. All components press ahead with their research and
developmental projects, maintaining close liaison and coordination
with other components and reporting results as available.
b. That the liaison visits to CINCPAC and -COMUSMACV
be re-scheduled for mid-January.
c. The participants meet again before mid-January to
review progress on the various projects and coordinate preparations
for the projected field visits.
;EGRET
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FORM RFEB M 56.n REPLACES FORM 36-8
WHICH MAY BE USED.
EXTENSION
L
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 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000500290001-2
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR
iESe
Now
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
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C.
dad by casdc r Rob*** a er, Mr.
?3ta1 e* T* Philip t btb, Iw Victor Royxxa,
ccasion for ttho rn a ti iwas mousideratiois a
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co=-n. Witty tea m to +tftner an alas data pry tl
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7,41t A,, * o t +? to review the Viet 1
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led around $ lets..
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..a1UJ )
Nile
29 September 1967
Indicators of Progress in Vietnam
South Vietnam
1. Economic Stability and Growth
The most relevant measures of improvement in the civilian
economy of South Vietnam are: (1) the price level, (2) trend in
real wages, (3) trend in farm. income, (4) and trends in farm and
industrial output.
Some of these measures are prepared at present, including:
(1) a weekly index of retail prices in Saigon, (2) Saigon free mar-
ket rates for gold and US currencies, (3) monthly cost of living
index for working class families in Saigon, (1i) the money supply and
the level of GVN foreign exchange reserves. Other reports are issued
periodically from. South Vietnam. on rice stocks, domestic rice move-
ments to Saigon, rice imports, production of agricultural and indus-
trial commodities.
Unfortunately, the above indicators are available largely
for the urban areas, primarily Saigon. Price and wage data for rural
Vietnam and for provinces beyond the direct influences of Saigon are
not regularly reported. Indicators that include rice prices to farmers
in the delta, prices of consumer and capital goods outside Saigon,
and wages and incomes of civilians in all provinces would be a pre-
requisite for a meaningful understanding of economic conditions in
areas undergoing pacification.
Additional useful economic-statistical measure would be
data -- sex, age -- on the manpower situation, in areas long under
GVN control as well as areas undergoing pacification.
It would be useful to provide data on rents charged by land-
lords and taxes paid by them as indications of the degree of interest
and control by the GVN in rural areas. As land reform programs are
implemented, it would be useful to report periodically the volume of
land distributed to farmers.
Unfortunately, the underdeveloped state of the GVN economy
and the complications and confusions of years of war make it extremely
unlikely that the GVN can institute a statistical reporting system
that will be thorough enough and responsive enough to changing trends
SECRET]
Excluded i wa oM 11,
downgrading. ,
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throughout the country to become a "leading" indicator of overall
progress against the Communist insurgency.
2. Economic Indicators of Military Progress
Numerous statistical series are being reported that measure
changes in GVN control and influence over the GVN population. Each
of these series has only limited value and the appropriateness of
each will change over time as the war progresses. The major problem
in all such series is that the criteria for inclusion of a specific
reporting item may change over time so that long-term trends are
more an illusion than a reality. Taken together, however, such
statistical series as listed below can supply a basis for measuring
the overall progress of the war. Possible measures that could be
refined to become valuable indicators include:
(1) Miles of various types of transport routes, in use and
open with military escort, closed at night. Number of miles
travelled per public carrier per "incident,"
(2) growth in number of Revolutionary cadre engaged in paci-
fication duties, length of service of such cadres, re-enlistment
rates,
(3) Index of GVN hamlet control by area,
(4) Voluntary enlistments in ARVN and other friendly mili-
tary organizations. Deduction in desertions from ARVN; enlist-
ments of former VC; enlistments from "neutral" refugees,
(5) VC/NVA incidents by some weighted intensity-measure,
by area of country,
(6) In depth psychological studies of attitudes of former
VC controlled areas to measure changes in will to persist.
Viet Cong
There are no regular indicators on VC supply conditions and
financial situation. Prisoner interrogations, Chieu Hoi, captured
documents, and reporting on the rural economy can provide indicators.
Taxation by the VC on transport of products to GVN markets, if reported
regularly, could give clues to the status of the VC economy. Similarly,
food availability to the VC cadre and the military indicate to some
extent the control over indigenous production as well as the success
of procurement from outside. VC control over rice producing areas
and estimates of the rice being produced in these areas can indicate
VC economic conditions as rice is the source for income as well as
food for the VC economy.
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North Vietnam
North Vietnam plays two important roles in sustaining the war
in South Vietnam. It supplies personnel to fight in the South and
it acts as a conduit for movement of military supplies from other
Communist countries to its own and Viet Cong forces in South Vietnam.
In addition, North Vietnam, must retain the capability of defending
its own country and maintaining at least a subsistence standard of
living. Indicators of North Vietnam.'s ability to persist must measure
how effectively these roles and requirements are being met.
(1) Imports of military and war-supporting goods by type and
quantity. More information from place of origin of imports. More
information on the level and characteristic of imports of military
goods would be a useful indicator of the determination of the North
Vietnamese to carry on the war and the degree to which other Communist
countries are willing to underwrute the war.
(2) Imports of economic goods by volume and type -- such as more
detailed information on portable generators -- would give insights
into the disrupted effects of the bombing program and the possibility
of effective countermeasures.
(3) More information on current military manpower situation
including draft regulations, lowering of age limits, calling of reserves,
ease of draft exemptions. Information of this nature has been very
inadequate.
(4) Diversion of manpower from service-type occupations to war-
related activities; employment of normally unemployed, employment of
students, old people, very young.
(5) Any use of the Draconian measures to force workers to work
in unusual places or at abnormal hours. Hours of work and willingness
to do additional part-time repair work could give some indication of
the will and efficiency of the labor force.
(6) Repair of LOC's -- The ability of the North Vietnamese to keep
open their lines of communications indicates their capability to con-
tinue military efforts in the south. Any evidence of serious delays in
repairing vital transport facilities would indicate either a severe
manpower shortage or a severe equipment shortage. Information on this
subject is usually complete and accurate.
(7) Although information on food imports is good, that on produc-
tion is inadequate. Food availability is considered to be the prime
indicator. Domestic prices give some indication of food availabilities.
Price information has been very sketchy.
-
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3-CR.,
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'etta:as
1S. ?*rc*s, st`lietiv.*.ss
po at. CT ?I .
r mvtatra better(
I of V"40.
grivOture.
0eY,
t impact
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S EA a`
10,
.rte. inflicted on
in oitticai life)
;etmre struggle
T
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PERFORMANCE EVALUATORS
RVNAF EFFECTIVENESS (1)
US/TN EFFECTIVENESS (3)
GVN POLITICAL PERFORMANCE (2,11)
GVN ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (7)
VC PERFORMANCE (=)
ENEMY FORCES and INFRASTRUCTURE (4)
CIVILIAN CASUALTIES (6)
NVN CAPABILITY TO SUSTAIN WAR (8)
MANPOWER RESOURCES (5)
COMPARATIVE BURDEN (10)
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2.
a. also t battalion is, tt
fie
l+
j~_
~p
l
b. also eata talion con is
on9w ing ti .
also Percentage
Of COwt*ctV initiated by
llZr. DOW ti
(If into ar lable)
a. *RtNP &Ubt-.#i . null-fit 00ft*at a
b. ` t t is with oftemy
11--i ti*t.4.
KU by AXVN (O"na i
#p.r battalion day to fj*1 j~"
Pri admen
b. UMPOW n o by
le. ARM +E tity ratio to o y
8.
x AJVK VWTrXT rated bat a fec
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2.
Percent*ge ASM offi'
re c*irv rural milit$ '
Number r swall sue, w r y vw4wno,, srmenrod
v igils wmil*blsr to AM Per 100 troops.
NUmber air sorties flees in supsi tionsr.
S C T
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Combat Effectiveness
S Ground Forces
Graph:
1. Number of combat battalions by field force
and MAP (idea to show extent of deployments to
meet enemy threats)
a. Average present for duty strength per
1,000 in combat battalions by FF and IMF
area,
b. Average number of rif en per battalion
(weighted) by FF & MAP area.
2. Battalion days of operation by FF & MAT.
a. Percentage of battalion contacts with
enemy
b. Frienc-lly-initiated contacts.
c. Length of battalion operations
d. armament expended per operation
wall--unit operation by Ff, l ` & Division
(if info can be developed)
Percentage night-time sail unit operat ions.
b. Percentage contacts with enemy & friendly
initiated contacts.
4. Number 135 companion sated combat effective or
available for combat duty.
5. Enemy
I.A
K
i
K
a. Mirw~ & ~~ MA7 area.
eak out by Y pwi'
b. Prisoners and detainees.
c. Weapons captured during combat and in caches.
d. casualty ratio to enemy.
e. Casualties per 1000 friendly in combat units.
Average length of service in Vietnam for combat
personnel per 1000 in combat units.
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Overall Personnel strength
Graph:
1. Variations in overall incountry strength, Army
and Marines
a. By Army field force (f) and Marine area (MAP)
2. Ratio of manpower in combat units and support
units.
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Air War in North
1. Sortie Data
A. Sorties Flown Per Month
B. Sorties Flown by Route Package
C. Sorties--Primary Targets/Armed Rocco
D. Sorties--Strike/Support
It. Ordnance Data
A. Total Ordnance Delivered
B. Ordnance By Route Package
C. Types of Ordnance Delivered
Ill. Lose Data
A. Losses to All Causes
B. Combat/Operational Losses
C. Loss to AAA/Sagas/SIGs
D. Losses By Route Package
Sortie Data Same as Borth
dnance Data ## ##
Lou Data
A. Losses to All Causes
B. Combat/Operational Losses
C. Losses by Corps Area
~SE:CRE~
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U,i# navy
Sea War in North
Shore Bombardment Data
A. Average Number of Guns On Line
B. Number of Rounds Fired (By Tepee)
C. Counter-latterp Fire Received
I). Rounds Field By Route Package
11. Mining Operations
A. Total Mines Laid (By Type)
B. Mines Laid by Route Package
III. WB C Interdiction Operations
A. Number Vessels Sighted/Destroyed
B. MIMIC Activity By Route Package
-ter-- -
L. Number of Vessels Sighted/Detained by Corps Area
. Infiltration Interdiction
A. Number Vessels Sighted/Mearch
B. Number of Vessels Detained
Shore Bombardment
A. Average Number of Guns On Line
B. Number of Rounds Fired (By Type)
C. Rounds Fired By Corps Area
D. Troop Support Operations
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19 September 1967
MEMORANDUM
FROM : OCI/Indochina Division
SUBJECT: Appraisal of Vietnam Statistical Charts
1. Methodology: The overall purpose of the statisti-
cal charts is to provide a pictorial display of the pro-
gress of the war in Vietnam. Of the 21 individual charts,
15 are calculated in a "three-month running average" which
tends to even out extreme short-range variations. The
basic design of the charts, all based on monthly cycles,
are of manageable size and are sufficient to depict a
relatively good description of long-range trends and tenden-
cies.
2. Accuracy: A spot check of several selected charts
revealed some descrepancies with figures used in OCI. In
most cases, however, the delineation closely coincides
or parallels similar charts currently prepared in OCI.
Two specific questionable charts were the "VC/NVA Confirmed
Combat Strength" and "VC/NVA Maneuver Battalions (Con-
firmed)." Figures shown in these two charts do not agree
with MACV-supplied information used by OCI for similar
charts.
3. Sources: Of course, any charts are only as
representative as the reliability of the information on
which they are based. It appears for the most part,
that these charts were prepared on the basis of informa-
tion supplied by MACV and integrated into the Statistical
Services unit of the Department of Defense. OCI and DIA
generally use the same sources for the preparation of
statistical reports and therefore achieve similar results.
4. Conclusions: Most of these charts are generally
of limited value to _the OCI analyst because of their con-
tent, scope, or method of presentation; however, they may be
useful generally for briefings, etc. to describe general
trends, etc. Charts; which do not show important short-range
1967
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fluctuations are not truly representative of the situation.
Such events as pre-holiday increase in terrorism followed
by a holiday lull in the overall incident rate would not
necessarily be represented in this type of graph.
An exacting review of these presentations would be
necessary to fully determine their accuracy. Assuming
these charts were based on MACV/DOD-supplied information,
which is also used by OCI and DIA, the reasons for the
many minor and some major variations are unknown.
Charts showing the ratio of South Vietnamese casual-
ties in relation to US killed, etc., are questionable in
regard to drawing valid conclusions about the overall
progress of the war.
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TRANSMITTAL SLIP
-TO:
DATE
19 September 19
c n r
ROOM NO. BUILDING
4F-18 I Langley
REMARKS:
VdTa4
FORM NO . REPLACES FORM 36-8
I FEB 55 241 WHICH MAY BE USED.
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 c rh hCT
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19 September 1967
MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Director of Economic Research
SUBJECT Comments on US Statistics Related to the War in
Vietnam
General Comments
Statistics, regardless of how effectively presented, constitute
only tools to be used in reaching a conclusion. They are never
answers or conclusions in themselves. Well qualified experts can
legitimately arrive at completely different sets of conclusions
from the same statistics. These statements are particularly appli-
cable to the immense mass of data produced regarding the war in
Vietnam. It is impossible to use any set of statistics up as an
absolute indicator of US progress, if only because it is difficult
to arrive at an agreed judgment as to what constitutes real progress.
Well chosen and effectively presented statistics can, however,
be an effective tool in explaining and understanding what has
happened in the past and in identifying new trends as they emerge.
The attached set of graphically presented statistics contains some
series that are quite useful as analytical tools, and others that
are of questionable value. For example, the graph of VC-Initiated
Battalion or Larger Attacks clearly shows the precipitious climb in
the attack rate during 196+ and 1965 that resulted in large scale
US intervention. It is followed by a decline in the rate during
1966 which appears to be continuing in 1967, after a brief spurt
SECRET
Excladea t M F'10'113`1
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000500290001-2
 c+rnnrT
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000500290001-2
in the early spring. At the same time, total attacks (composed
mostly of small-size unit attacks) have continued to rise at a
relatively constant rate. If this pattern persists, it may signal
Hanoi's intentions to continue the war on a guerrilla and harass-
ment basis. On the other hand, the Ratio of GVN to US KCA graphic
is of little use in understanding the war. It depicts only what
everyone already knows; the US has taken the initiative in combat
operations and given GVN troops pacification duties. It would be
useful to add two additional graphs -- first, a three-month moving
average of NVA infiltration and second, a simultaneous display of
VC/NVA main force strength and Free World military forces. A plot
of the ratio of the two force strengths could be superimposed on
the graphic.
In almost all cases the data could be presented more effectively.
For example, the graphic of VC/NVA Incidents would be more useful
if sabotage, terrorism, and harassments were plotted separately and
the total superimposed.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000500290001-2
 nrnnrT
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000500290001-2
Specific Comments on Individual Series
1. VC/NVA Confirmed Combat Strength. Order of battle date prepared
by MACV for main force troops since 1965 is among the more reliable data
available on the war and should be included in any statistical analysis.
2. Ratio of VC/NVA - ARVN Weapon Losses. Unfortunately, US military
authorities do not report losses of weapons by US troops. The ratio would
be more meaningful if these were added to GVN losses. The graphic could
be made more useful if losses for both sides were displayed along with the
ratio between them.
3. VC/NVA Incidents. Reporting on this series has not been reliable
over time -- GVN has attempted to soft-pedal reporting during some periods,
and in some areas no reports whatever are made. In addition, the seriousness
of individual incidents are not weighted. As suggested above, various types
of incidents should be seperated and plotted separately, along with the
total.
VC
4. Ratio of Military Chieu Hoi/NVA KIA to Confirmed Enemy Strength.
A display of total Allied and VC/NVA losses excluding wounded graphed to-
gether would be more illuminating than the relationship of enemy losses to
strength. It should be bourne in mind, however, that loss data is based
primarily on a body count which may fail to include enemy soldiers killed
by air strikes, but may also include civilians killed by artillery and
mortar crossfire.
5. Rate of SVN Desertions per 1,000 OB and VC/NVA Defections.
Desertions are useful as an indicator of morale on both sides. However,
GVN desertions should be compared only to regular forces. Desertions from
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000500290001-2
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000500290001-2
other elements of the GVN military structure are sometimes only seasonal
and not morale-associated. Similarly, VC/NVA Defections should be presented
as a ratio to main force OB and superimposed on the graphic of the SVN
desertion rate.
6. VC/NVA Initiated Attacks. As explained above, this series is useful
in judging the level of organized military effort expended against allied
forces. However, all attacks are aggregated despite differences in inten-
city and duration and analysis of small changes in the data may lead to
erroneous conclusions.
7. Various Ratios of GVN to US KIA. These series are of little value
in a continuing analysis of the war and should not be included.
8. Rolling Thunder Sorties. No one has ever demonstrated a relation-
ship between Rolling Thunder sorties and the war in the South.
9. The Chieu Hoi Program. Information in this graphic duplicates
that given in 5, above, and should be eliminated.
10. Ratio of VC/NVA Friendly Forces Killed in Action. The information
in this graphic is indirectly conveyed in 4, above, and should be eliminated.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000500290001-2
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000500290001-2
RATIO OF VC/NVA
FRIENDLY FORCES KILLED IN ACTION
(3 MONTHS RUNNING AYERA6EJ
OCT 1961
JUL
Y 1966
TAY LOR
OPE
RATION
MISSION
HAS
TINGS
FEB 1
962
MACV
ORGA
NIZED
OCT 196
6
S
!
OPERAT
ION
ATTLEB
ORO
~
MAY 196
5.
~
5
t
5.4
FIRST US r
TROOP'S ARRIVE
^^
5.0
.
1
5
0
MID 1%4
4.6
NVA IN 1LTRATICN
4.5
4.6
.4
4.5
1
4.2
RAISED TO REGH
2
MENTAL LEVEL
4.0
4
2
41
?
4.1
4.0
4
1
3
3
.8
3.1
35
3.7
3
.5
3.
6
X
5
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ii
3.
3
1
3.
4
~~
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3.
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3.3
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3
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I
.
3.1
2.1
.4 2.
3 2.4 2.4
T.1
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Y 196
3
O
2
2 2
2
AUG 1966
BU
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N
V 196
3
1.5
.
.
OPERATI
ON
RI
OTS
DIEM
2.!
2.4
2-6
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1
OUSTED
1.4
1.7
OCT
--NO
V 1965
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I ME
AND
AUG 1964
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ONS
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ON NVN BEGAN
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M A M J IA S ON 0 J F HAM J IA SON Di F MA H Ii A SON Di F HAM ii A SON Di FM AM ii A SON Di FM AM ii A SON Di F
1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000500290001-2
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000500290001-2
THE CHEW HO1 PROGRAM
BY MONTH
7,000
6000
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i
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Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000500290001-2
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000500290001-2
THE CHIEU HO1 P OG AM
THREE MONTHS' RUNNING AVERAGE
~!~ - i ill
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J A S
F M A M
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Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000500290001-2
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000500290001-2
~' `rTr
VC/NVA CONFIRMED COMBAT STRENGTH
13 MONTH RUNNING AVERAGE)
ju'un
Ili 11GLS.11 NOT I
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FIRST US COMBAT
.
11
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I!
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100
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_
131
-
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--
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FED
1964
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ON NVN BEGIN
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JULY 1966
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TINGS
,
66
13.1
1
.
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55
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60,000
I
1.5
T-NOV 1965
PLEI ME AND
SD
DOO
A DRANG ACTIONS
_
_
,
0
F
M A
M
A S O
S O N
1 A
M
N
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1 F M A M 1 J A S O
F M A M 1 1 A S O N
N D J F M A N
D 1 F M A M J
J A
A S
M A M 1 J A S
1965
O N D J F M A M 1 J A S 0 N D 1 F M A M J 1
1966 1967
VC/NVA MANEUVER BATTALION GROWTH (CONFIRMED)
I1 MONTH RUNNING AVERAGEI
S 0
NVA
--
-
-
AUG 1966
OPERATION
PPAIRIE 1
--
- -
M
AY 196
5
FI
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S CO
MBAT
6
5
6
1
1
13
,6
TR
OOPS
ARRI
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OCT-NOV 1964
136 1
95
.
1
1.1
PLEI ME AND
IA DRANG ACTIONS
59;6
k
6.3
1
1.1 6
1.1
3
11
.1
5.1
FEB 1965
13.
1
I'6
US AIR STRIKES
OPERA
TION
ON NVN BEGIN
ATTL
EBORO
31
%
0
31.1
JULY 1966
,
0
OPERATION
--
--
--
NAST
INGS
11.
5
151
12
1 13.1 11.1 1
1.1 11
.1
_
I
S.1
F N A M J J A S 0 N D J F M A M 1 1 A S 0 N D J F M A M J 1 A S 0 N D 1
N A M J J A S 0 N D 1 F M A M J J A S 0 N D J F M A M J J A S 0 N D J F
1965 1966 1967
T
. AUG
I
'
1 l5
3
OPERATION
R
ll.
i !3.
.
11
I
.1 PRAIRIE
MAY 1965
171
1
3.1 1
1
1
1
1
1
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FIRST us coMDAr
TROOPS ARRIVE
II.I
lO.i 11
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.
1 1
1 11
.1 11.1 II
.1 1
1.1
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91 11
.3
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171
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111
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966
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1164
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PLEI ME
AND
JULY 1966
ATTL
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ANT NON
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1 F
1965 1966 1967
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000500290001-2
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000500290001-2
ROLLING THUNDER SORTIES
1966-1967
19,
941
_
19,629
?++*
19,2
13
? ~~~
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8,816
s
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1966
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1967
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1968
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000500290001-2
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP78T02095R000500290001-2
RATIO GVN TO US KIA
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP78T02095R000500290001-2
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000500290001-2
Ratio GVN KIA/MIA/Cap to US KIA
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000500290001-2
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000500290001-2
Ratio GVN KIA/MIA/Cap to US KIA
Per 1,000 OB
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000500290001-2
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000500290001-2
GVVI C 1a/E`vIl /Cap and US CL
Per 1,003 0
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000500290001-2
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000500290001-2
VC/NVA INITIATED ATTACKS
(3 MONTH RUNNHI6 AVERAGE)
NMY 1965
FRET US C
OMBAT
MID 1964
TROOPS AR
RIVE
LY 1966
O
CT 196
1
NvA INFILTRATION
9
6fi
ERATION
:
TAYLOR
RAISED TO REf~
.
NGS
s-
MISSION
MENIAL LEVEL
FEB
US
196
AQ2 STROPS
!.0
AUG 1966
ON
INA BEGIN
2
OPERATION
=
FES 1962
A& 19 /
1. i
PE 1
MACV
O
GULF
1.1
7
3
3
R
GANI
ZED
.
OCT 196
6
OPERAT
ION
MAY
1963
N
OV
1963
I
1
l
ATTI
EB
ORO
.
,
_.._
..
BUDDHIST
RIOTS
DIEM
OUSTED
5.66
33
6.0
-
t-77
77
-
.
5.33
7
7
4.66
3
i
46
3.33
OCT-N
OV 196
3.
33
2.33
1
2.1
2
2
33
2.i6
PLEI M
E AND
2.66
L
~
1.
66
1 6
.
2.33
u DRA
NG ACTIONS
1.33
1.33
I
.0
1
1
6 6
I
I
V
I
7
33
I
I I I
I I I 1
.i6
1
1
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.
33
.
1.
0 1.0
X
1.3
1.0
3
1.1
ft
.3
JFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJAS0IIJFHAHIJAS010JFhAHJIAS0NDJFHAHJJA,50ND
FMAMJIASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAHJJAS0111fMAMJJASOIDJFHAMIJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJ
M A M i J A S 0 N D J F MA M J J A S O I D J F M A M J 1 A S 0 1 1 J F M A M J JASON 0 J F M A M J J A SON D J F M A M J J A S 0 N D J F
1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967
TOTAL ATTACKS
546 538
5
504
X244 1
46
410
4
j
~
716
4
23
14
4
199
161
120
iD5
80
86
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1
5 6
6 66
74
9
9
9
11
73
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64
61
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M A M J J A S 0 N D J F M A M J J A S O N D I F M A M J J A S 0 N 0 1 F M A M J JAS O N D J F M A M I I A S O N D J F M A M 1 J A SON D J I
1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000500290001-2
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000500290001-2
L ET C 0061 DESEMTIONS PE! 1,000
(Regular, Regional, Popular, & C I DG)
THREE MONTHS RUNNING AVERAGE
th oftftww- %11.4 ". ~ 11\ / /
000
J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S 0 N D J F M A M J J A
F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S
M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A 5 O N D J F M A M J J A S O
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000500290001-2
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000500290001-2
VC/NVA DEFECTIONS
(3 MONTH RUNNING IVERUE)
it CORPS
I
I I.
11
1 Est
231
1
I,
~
'171
21
i,
111
113
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117
190
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M A M J 1965 1966 1967
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us j
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8 1I1
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311
119
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51
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I
791
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310 301
1
i
:F
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:
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1965 1966 1967
D SI If I III leaf I I I I j I
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1965 1966 1967
IPO~ 7 r r 7 r
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1600
1100
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F MA M 11 A S`0 N D J F M A M 1 J A S0 N D 1 F M A M J I A S O N D 1 F
M A M I l A c 0 N N I F M A M J 1 A c 0 N D 1 F M A M I I A S 0 N D I F M
1965 1966 1967
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 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000500290001-2
RATIO OF MILITARY CHIEU HOI-VC/NVA KIA
TO CONFIRMED ENEMY STRENGTH
(PER 1,000 ME11
I
3
3
1
OCT
1966
o
OPER
ATION
4
r
32
JULY
1966
ATTL
EBOR
O
OPER
ATION
M
FI
AY 19
RST
65
US CO
MBAT
HAST
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INGS
T
ROOPS
ARRI
VED
1
/
26
23
2
1 2
1
2
1 2
1
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1 2
1 2
1
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9
1
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2
19
1
9
19
7
1
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12
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OC
T-NOV
1965
AUG 1
966
PL
IA
EI ME
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ACTI
ONS
OPER
ATION
PRAIR
IE I
FEB
1965
US
AIR S
TRIKE
S
ON
NVN B
EGAN
-
-
-
-
J F
F M
M A
-
M A
A M M J
s 0
0 N
N D
N D
D J
J f
1968
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000500290001-2
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000500290001-2
VC/NVA INCIDENTS
SABOTAGE-TERRORISr1-HARASSMENTS
(3 MOITIS RUNNII6 AVERAGE)
life
916
JULY 1'966
j
OPEWATIO
N
2145
HASTINGS
M6CI 5
964
NV/A I
PFAISE
RiFIL
D T
TPWTION
O~REGI-
M
FI
AY 19
RST
85
US-CO
MBAT
2706
2642 2651
MENT
AL L
EVEL
TR
OOP
S ARR
IVE
I
j
211
2515
2319
24~
O
CT 1'%1
66
N
OV 196
3
ZOO
O
A
PERAT
TTLEH
ICN
OAFO
D
IEM
m
usTED
2102
ntJ
2125
2046
I
~
I
1637
1!1
191
111
1
8~5
7!
?
192
6
104
2
1
56
17
52 1
873
1612
1146
15
831
0
1961
OCT
TLOR
16
10
Y
1710
1T:FI
14
6
M~essION
'
15
P
~
51
1
651
I
AU
G 1966
FEB -2
AUG 196
#
OP
ERATI
ON
M4CV
1
1451
TONHIN
PR
AIRIE
I
OR6AN[ZED
GUUF
OCT-
NO
V 1965
PLEI
ME
AND
7
M
74.Y 19
63
FEN 1965
W DR
AN
G ACT
IONS
L
?
WDDM
IST
US AIRS
TRIHeS
106
RI
OII75
ON NV N