MUTUAL WITHDRAWAL OF US/NVA FORCES FROM SOUTH VIETNAM APRIL 1969

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T02095R000500260001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 42
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 23, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 1, 1969
• Content Type: AG

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON. D.c. 20506.
National Security Study Memorandum 37
TO:
The Secretary of State
? The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Vietnam
As indicated in NSDM 9 of April 1, 1969, the President has
directed the preparation of certain studies on Vietnam. He has
asked that the following papers be prepared by the interdepartmental
Ad Hoc Group on Vietnam and submitted to t,141.e NSC Review Group by
the dates indicated.
" Phased Withdrawal
Mutual Withdrawal
This paper should examine the modalities of mutual with..
drawal, whether agreed to publicly or privately by both sides, tacit,
or de 'facto. It should cover timetables, phasing, types of personnel,
.....regroupment, local cease fires and_any other relevant subjects.
Military, logistic, territorial and political factors and implications
shoulct be, considered. (May 16, 1969).
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b. Vietnarnizing the War
This paper should examine the modalities of US withdrawals
under conditions of our progressively turning over combat efforts to
the South Vietnamese in the absence of reciprocal enemy withdrawals.
It should cover timetables, phasing, types of personnel, regroupment,
and substitution of South Vietnamese forces. Military, logistic,
territorial, and political factors and implications should be considered.
. This study should reflect the findings of the preliminary
report of the Secretary of Defense on a specific timetable for Vietnarnizing
the war. (June 13, 1969). (See. NSSM 36) :
. ?
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Verificationlor Mutual Withdrawal
This paper should examine various means and mechanisms for
verifying the process and completion of mutual withdrawals, whether
agreed to publicly or privately by both sides, tacit, or de facto. It
should set forth the advantages and disadvantages of various types of
verification machinery including joint be commissions,
reactivation of the ICC, and creatioa of new international groups
(such as an :'Asian body). The paper should include a discussion of
our unilateral capability to verify withdrawals drawing on all sources
of information. It should consider how agreed arrangements can
usefully supplement our unilateral capabilities. (May 16, 1969).
Political Settlement for South Vietnam
This study should explore various types of political settlement
within South Vietnam and the possible US role concerning these
questions. The paper should examine all feasible options, including
elections at all levels, sharing of governmental power before and/or
after elections, constitutional considerations, agreed or de facto
territorial accommodations, decentralization of government power.
The study should discuss the feasibility of each alternative and the
- likely attitudes of the CAW, the various segments of the South Vietnam
populace, the 1?1".LF? and Hanoi. It should evaluate the likely evolution
within South, Vietnam under alternative arrangements. Finally, the
possible US role in Vietnam as well., as in the negotiations
in achieving a political settlement should be covered. (May 16, 1969
International Guarantees
. The paper should explore
GIP
U
mutual withdrawal'
political settlement ill South, 'Vietnam
the DMZ
any other appropriate aspects of an overall Vietnam settlement.
In so doing, the study :,hould be cont.istent with the separate pz,pers
mutual withdrawal, verification for =Aura withdrawal, political
settlemea for PVN, and our policy on the DMZ. This paper shc,uld
approved Fnr 1,401155 9n6r0412I:....0
, .4.
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discuss the advantages and disadvantages of attempting to achieve
internation,ai guarantees, and ways to negotiate them -- e.g. , at
Paris, in a follow-on international conference, etc. (June 13, 1969).
ri
A. Kissinger
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
A
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
April 14,. 1969
MEMORANDUM FOR;
Office of the Vice President
Office of the Secretary of State
? Office of the Secretary of Defense
Office of the Director of Emergency Preparedness
SUBJECT: Papers on Vietnam: Mutual Withdrawal and Negotiating
Strategy
Enclosed are the final approved papers on Mutual Withdrawal and on
Over-All Negotiating Strategy which reflect the decisions made by
the President as set forth in NSDM 9.
Jeanne W. Davis
Secretariat
cc: Under Secretary of State
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Director of Central Intelligence
Attachments
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POLICY PLAN XI NG COUNCIL
MEMORANDUM
TO:
WASH I NGTON1
SECRET ATTACHMENT
EA/VN - Mr. Matthews
- Mr. Aldrich
INR/REA - Mr. Smyser
DOD/ISA - Col. Schandier
'JCS - Capt. Scott
CIA - Mr. Carve,''
April 11, 1969
I
FROM: S/P - Ralph N. Clough n,,,7 {I
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SUBJECT: Meeting of Subcommittee''on Inspection and /
Verification Withdrawal of Forces /
There will be a meeting of the Subcommittee on
inspection and verification withdrawal of forces in the I '
S/P Conference Room (State 7261) at 2:30 p.m., April 15,
1969, to discuss the attached draft outline.
Attachment:
Draft Outline
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DRAFT OUTLINE
Inspection and Verification of Mutual Withdrawal of Forces
I. Introduction (State)
Purpose and scope of paper.
Verification of an agreed mutual withdrawal; of a
reciprocal withdrawal without agreement.
International, bilateral, or unilateral verification?
Desirability that any international machinery for
verifying withdrawal be used also to verify on a
continuing basis other aspects of settlement,
particularly cessation of infiltration.
II. U.S. Obiectives (State)
III. GVN and NVN Positions (Stat)'
I-VMajor Options (State)
r-.
A. UN-sponsored body.
B. New international commission, possibly all-Asian,
r.
reporting to continuing body established by Peace
Conference.
C. Improved ICC.
D. Joint Commission
tjowt,
Territorial Scope of Inspection and Verification: the
Problems of North Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia (State)
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?
VI. Participants in Inspection and Verification Organization
(State)
A. Composition of Organization.
B. Asian Non-Communist Nations
C. Other Non-Communist Nations
D. Communist Nations
VII. Functions of International Inspection and Verification
1
Organization (DOD-ISA)
A. Verifying withdrawal of U.S. and NVN personnel.
B. Investigating complaints that withdrawal not proceeding
as agreed.
C. Reporting regularly on withdrawal to control body
(e.g., UN Security Council, Peace Conference
participants, Co-Chairmen)
Other possible functions (e.g., monitoring cease-fire,
patrolling DMZ, investigating reports of re-infiltration,
observing election, etc.)
VIII. Rights and Powers of International Inspection and
Verification. (State)
(Most important desiderata for effective verification--
recognizing that not all will be fully attainable)
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A. Freedom of movement.
B. Protection
C. Adequate financial support.
D. Maximum freedom from reliance on host government
assistance.
E. Decision by majority vote.
F. Freedom of communication.
G. Requirement to report to control body.
:ot
Relationship of Verification to Guarantees or Sanctions.
(State)
X. Organization, Staffing, Deployment, and Logistic Support
for International Inspection and Verification Body. (DOD-JCS)
XI. Negotiating Strategy (State)
? S/P:RNClough:lm 4/11/69
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AN,
US POSITION ON MUTUAL WITHDRAWALS
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Introduction
For action purposes, we need a USG position on mutual withdrawals
that would permit full exploration of the subject at an early date in
Paris. Our first step must be to coordinate at least the opening
elements of that position with the GVN.
The Issue is inherently complex. It involves a number of key
?
Issues on which .01,1.,x. 4ening position of principle seems to have
little-'possibility of modification. But it also involves elements
on which we would wish to take a strong opening position, but to
leave the way open to possible modification as the negotiating
? situation and the situation on the ground evolve. Thirdly, there
? are a number of points?notably detailed arrangements on the ground
In terms of regroupment areas and such -- that simply cannot be
set forth in detail at this time, and that in any event would not be
required until we had reached substantial agreement on principle
In Paris.
Since the immediate need is for coordination with the GVN, this
paper is in the form of an instruction to Ambassador Bunker.
The instruction treats the issue on its own bottom arid without
specific initial reference to past exchanges with the GVN. ? However,
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we must recognize. as a practical matter that the GVN and the troop-
contributing allies continue to set great store by the language of the
Manila Communique of October 1966, which was carefully negotiated
and approved personally by Thieu and Ky for the GVN, and by the
heads of state or government of Australia, Korea, New Zealand,
the Philippines, and Thailand.
There is general agreement throughout the Government that we .
should mit invoke. the Manila Communique, by any specific reference,
either in our public statements of position or in our dealings with the
North Vietnamese. At the same time, there should be no public
repudiation of that communique in view of its GVN and allied concurrence.
What we should be aiming to do--as is stated clearly in the instruction
to Ambassador Bunker below--is to work out a more detailed and
full position on the whole subject, which in due course would be
coordinated fully with the GVN and undergo the required consultation
with the troop-contributing countries, and could then replace the
Manila Communique as a libint of reference.
An additional background fact is that discussions on this subject
took place in late 1968 a.nd early Tanuary 1969 between the US and
GVN delegations in Paris (Paris 659). Certain key points were framed
in the form of draft language *setting forth the position of each
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delegation. Obviously, these statements do not, bind the present
administration, or have anything like the same weight that the Manila
Communique has to the GVN.
Finally, Paris 20873 contains the record of what was said to
? the North Vietnamese in Paris, in a private session on September .15,.
1968. This reflects the full position conveyed by the last Administration
on this private basis.
, -INg(11-iUCTION TO AMBASSADOR BUNKER
]htrodactory Points
A. In view of the urgent need to have a more detailed position
on mutual withdrawal for use in Paris, you should now make this
you.r highest priority for consultation with the GVN. This cable sets
forth positions and supporting comment to serve as your guidance in
these consultations. We leave it in your discretion whether you
approach Thieu personally in the first instance. We wish to go forward
as rapidly as possible, but of course recognize that his personal
? approval will be required for major elements, and particularly on
issues where there have been past differences between our positions
and those of the GVN.
B. You should make sure during your discussions with the GVN
that they understand that the positions on mutual withdrawals which you
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present are the.)Det?which we have been able to produce to date, and
that as the negotiations proceed we will be continually consulting the
?
GVN. Among-relevant factors which may affect our position as
negotiations proceed you should indicate: (1) the DRV reaction to
our position as it unfolds; and (2) the success of the GVN effort to
deal directly with the other side, in particular the NLF, on internal
political matters.
?-?
?
C. You will note that the positions set forth below are stated
? without express reference to the Manila Communique. The relationship
to that document is specified, wherever necessary, in the Supporting
Comments for your oral use. We have of course likewise taken
account of the preliminary exchanges in Paris summarized in Paris
1559, and, these too are noted in the Supporting Comments for oral use
:Ln your discretion. In general, you should make clear that we believe
the negotiating requirement now goes beyond the rather general language
of the Manila Communique, and that it therefore seems wise to work
toward a new and more detailed formulation which would initially be
clearly understood between the GVN and ourselves, and might thereafter
be circulated for consultation with the troop-contributing countries
(TCC). As your consultations proceed, we would of course be prepared
to discuss with the GVN just what should be shared with the TCC and
how--bearing in mind both the wisdom ,of such consultation and our
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? past undertakings..
D. We leave entirely in your discretion whether the positions
stated below should be.put in writing, wholly or in part. We would
however wish to be kept advised what your plans are in this respect.
On the one hand, your experience has often indicated that only a written
document really brings the GVN into focus; on the other hand, we would
wish to avoid any apparent commitment on points where there is
?
? inevitable play hi" the hand as the situation may unfold. We also have
much in mind that a lengthy written document may cause major delay
In what might in fact be adequately agreed for our initial purposes in
Paris. With this last in mind in particular, we believe that separable
discussion of key points will in any event be wise, and that any
written papers should be on a separable basis.
E. In setting forth positions below, we have adopted an organization
and number headings which we hope can be used with the GVN and
among ourselves, from now on, to keep this issue as clearly focused
. and stated as possible. These number headings are as follows:
1. Basic Objectives?.
? ? 2. Definition' of North Vietnamese Forces and Elements Subject?
?
to Withdrawal
Definition of US and :Allied Forces and Elements Subject to.
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Withdrawal.
4. .,Conditions Precedent to Any Initiation of US and Allied
Withdrawal.
'Elements of an Agreed Withdrawal Timetable: Initiation,
Phasing, and Completion.
? Subsequent Conditions Affecting Phasing and Completion
of Withdrawals.
? The Relation Between Mutual Withdrawals and Prog: es'g
Toward apolitical Settlement.
. The Related Issue of Withdrawal from Laos and Cambodia
of North Vietnamese Forces and Elements Whether or Not
They Were Ever in South Viet-Nam.
9. Inspection and Verification.
10. Possible Unilateral Force Reductions or Withdrawals,
Including Our Response to Any Unilateral Withdrawals
by the Other Side. .
F. In the positions and supporting comment below, you will
note that repeated reference is made to "the measures necessary to
maintain the agreement." This language reflects our firm view that
the ultimate settlement must include a complex of measures to insure
that it will be preserved. In effect, we have in mind what we are
calling, "guarantees" within the USG circle. However, we have de-
liberately used "measures necessary" -- rather than "guarantees" --
so as to avoid any present implication on the difficult question of any
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:uture specifip commitment by the USG to take action in the event of
a breach of the settlement. As you are aware, the GVN sets great
store by future "international guarantees' and may at some point seek
specific commitments from us. It is important that we not give any
verbal indication to them that would suggest present willingness to
give such future commitments, and thus you should stick to the language
.that we have used throughout on this point. As you know, we have
*further work in process on the question of the totality of measures and
actions that would in fact provide assurances that the settlement would
be preserved.
Positions and Supporting .Comment
???
Basic Objectives
a. Position. Our basic objectives in the? area of mutual with-
drawal are (a) to obtain the withdrawal of military forces and other
elements introduced from North Viet-Nam into South Viet-Nam, Laos
and Cambodia at any time; (b) to insure that such personnel return
:all the way to North Viet-Nam; (c) to get adequate assurance, through
verification and supervision machinery, through the measures necessary
to maintain the agreement, and through our own resources, that Llano'
complies with the conditions we have specified for agreed mutual with-
- ?
.drawals (see paragraphs 3 and 6 below).
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b. Supporting Comment. With regard to enemy forces in
South Viet-Nam this formulation is wholly consistent with the objective
of the US and SVN, to end external aggression. The Manila Communique.
speaks of the withdrawal of "military and subversive forces to the
North." We believe the proposed position is self-explanatory, and
that the GVN would have no difficulty in accepting it. It is, of course,
subject to other points set forth below, for example, our recognition
that we may not in practice be able to identify all of the North Viet-
namese or regroupees, that .no verification and supervision system
can be 100 percent effective, and that forces in Laos and Cambodia
.are not covered in the Manila Communique.
Definition of North Vietnamese Forces and Elements Subject
to Withdrawal
a.
Position. We will insist, in prinCiple, upon the withdrawal.
?? to North Viet-Nam. of North Vietnamese regular. 'forces, North Viet-
namese Soldiers serving in nominally Viet.Cong units, and all other .
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.personnel infiltrated from North Viet-Nam into the South at any time,
for the purpOse of supporting the effort to seize control of South
Viet-Nam. :
While this would be the position we would take at all times in
Paris, we must recognize among ourselves that our ability, with or
' without an effective supervisory organization, to identify all political
and supporting elements introduced from the North is far from total.
This is particularly true of native southerners. We should be prepared
to live with some inevitable ambiguity on their remaining presence.
This is not a point that should arise at an early stage, although it
should be considered as we examine our own actions and inspection and
,supervisory machinery.
We recognize that the GVN might urge us to demand the
removal of all military equipment and supplies introduced from the
North. If they do so we should explain the problems this would create,
? particularly in terms of the probable demand from the other side that
we withdraw our military equipment and supplies. We should inform,.
? the GVN that this problem needs further study among ourselves.
b. Supporting Comment. We believe that this definition of three
*categories conforms in essence to the Manila Communique. You will
note that it does not repeat not agree with the position which the GVN
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was asserting in Xanuary, that all' personnel bearing arms against the
GVN hould be subject to withdrawal. Your reporting indicates that
Thieu has backed off this position, although others such as Thanh may
not have done so. In any event, we believe it is inconsistent with the
whole thesis of aggression from the North?as opposed to a purely
civil war--to take the negotiating position that southerners who never
left the South are subject to withdrawal. Since the point is of major
Importance, and' could lead to serious criticism here, we believe the .
GVN must accept the definitions stated above.
On the question of withdrawal of equipment and supplies you
should explain frankly that we would not expect to take up this issue
early in Paris. If we were to do so, we could well be confronted with
Immediate demands that all U.S. equipment and supplies should
likewise be withdrawn. Since we both have in mind the necessity of
leaving the GVN in an adequate military posture after the conclusion
of hostilities, and that this may involve transfer of substantial equipment
presently in U.S. hands to GVN forces, we would not wish to complicate
matters in this area.
3. ? Definition of US and Allied Forces and Elements Subject to
Withdrawal
a. Position. We should be prepared to withdraw all combat
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iorces from South Viet-Nam. if Hanoi. meets specific conditions of a
,
mutual withdrawal agreement. These conditions should include pro-
visions for:
? 1. Verification and supervision of withdrawal.
2. The withdrawal of North Vietnamese Forces from Laos
? and Cambodia, as well as from South Viet-Nam.
Measures necessary to maintain that agreement.
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A difficult question concerns the definition of the term "military
. ? ?
forces." We believe that we should at the outset employ general
language in such a way as not to foreclose in any way our insisting,
at the appropriate time, that the settlement permit?or at least not
exclude?the continued presence of US military personnel in certain
key categories. These categories should include US military advisory
arid logistic, personnel as may be worked out between the GVN and
ourselves?recowzing that we must be prepared to accept that
agrped and verified mutual withdrawals and the final settlement will
In the end include the withdrawal of all US and allied combat forces
and units if Hanoi complies with the agreed conditions.
b. Supporting Comment. As was suggested in the paper tabled
in Paris (Paris 559), the question of what residual forces we would
wish to leave must depend on joint GVN/US judgments which could be
modified by the other side's compliance with any settlement, and the
quality of verification, inspections, and "guarantees." At the same
time, 'we must be clear that the situation we envisage is one in which--
if withdrawal and other elements of a settlement are in fact satisfactorily
.achieved?the responsibility for the internal security of South Viet-
Nam will be solely in the hands of the GVN as a sovereign government.
We, of course, understand the importance of preserving the right of
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the GVN to request outside military and other assistance on a continuing
\
- basis,' and this matter would be addr6ssed under the appropriate'
headings related to other parts of the negotiation.
4? Conditions Precedent to Any Initiation of US and Allied Withdrawal
a. Position. We would begin phase-out of US and Allied forces.
as North Viet-Nam begins its withdrawals and the flow of new manpower
?.has ceased.
With respect to the level of violence, removal of the North
Vietnamese should lower the Viet:Cong capability for violence. Thus,
? while we recognize that reductfon in the level of violence is not a
condition precedent to the initiation of withdrawals, failure to realize
a reduction of violence after repeat after withdrawal had apparently
been begun would be a strong indication that the North Vietnamese were
not carrying through the withdrawal in good faith.
b.. Supporting Comment. This formulation conforms fo the
interpretation we have consistently given to the Manila Communique, .
as wap stated in Paris in il-nuary. The Manila Communique used the
?
language: "As the violence thus repeat thus subsides. " By this we
have always meant--as Thieu and TCy are, aware from the Manila
backroom discussions of the langtage?the level of violence associated
with the presence of external forces and elements. We have not
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repeat not had in mind that we could expect to exact any condition with
respect to wh,atever level of violence and terrorism might remain as
the result of internal South Vietnamese action only. Such residual
violence would in our view have to be dealt with by the South Vietnamese.
For purposes of discussion with the GVN, you should make this
clear, while noting that the practical difference should not be significant
particularly since we would--as already noted under point 3 above--
require that Hanoi meet specific conditions of .a mutual withdrawal
agreement; including provisions for: (1) verification and supervision
of withdrawal, (2) the withdrawal of North Vietnamese forces from
Laos and Cambodia as well as from South Viet-Nam, and (3) measures
necessary to maintain the agreement.
:You will note that the cessation of infiltration is here applied
.solely to the flow of new manpower, and not of equipment and supplies.
You should be prepared to explain that we do not believe we could.- -
require a cessation of all movement of equipment and supplies at the
outset, but may need to tolerate some such movement, on a subsistence
basis, during the withdrawal process. However, we would expect that \
this movement from North to South would decrease as the withdrawal
went on and cease altogether when the withdrawal was completed.
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5. Elements of an .Agreed Withdrawal Timetable: Initiation, Phasing,
a. Position. We would indicate in Paris that we were prepared to
work out a withdrawal timetable that could include (a) phasing of agreed
withdrawals on each side, (b) simultaneous initiation of the first
Increments of withdrawal, (c) and a completion Schedule under which
North Vietnamese forces and elements would be fully withdrawn before
? we. were required to complete our withdrawals under the agreement.
,V*
.
There will be no public repudiation of the former U. S. position
that we would complete our withdrawal within six months of the
completion of Hanoi's withdrawal. This position will be adopted
with the recognition that, in practice, the U.S. will be in a position
to control the timing of the completion of our withdrawal, since we
can determine if Hanoi has fully met the conditions of the mutual
withdrawal agreement. The key point will not be the timetable but
rather getting Hanoi to comply with the conditions for withdrawal.
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b. Silpportincr Comment. Our specific willingness to accept
simultaneous initiation is, we believe, wise in principle and also in
s?. accord with the principle of phasing that was inherent in the Manila
Communique.
6.- Subsequent Conditions Affectin Phasina and Com-oletion of
1-?
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? Withdrawals.
a. Position. We would make clear, at an appropriate stage
an the negotiations, that we could not carry through our withdrawals,
' whatever the timetable, if the total pattern of North Vietnamese a:Ctions-
indicated that their withdrawal was not being carried through in good
faith. Measures necessary to maintain the agreement would include
not only the required assurance through verification that forces and
elements were being and had been removed to the North, and that in-
filtration had ceased, but such elements as respect for the DMZ, absence
of indiscriminate attacks on major cities, and absence of attacks on
US and allied forces being withdrawn or being deployed for withdrawal. -
We would make clear that the DRV must recognize`and accept these
practical factors.
b. Supporting Comment. You should make clear that these
points--which reflect our true reading of the significance of the "level of
violence" reference in the Manila Communique?should not arise in
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the early stages of discussion. We would need to stay in close touch
with the GVN to see at what point they would be introduced but we
gthould be in no doubt among ourselves that we intend to insist on an
a.
? over-all situation where Hanoi is not making up for the withdrawals by
other actions that destroy the necessary atmosphere for carrying it
through and for reaching a total settlement.
7. The Relations Between Mutual Withdrawals and Progress Toward
.1 ?
A Political Settlement
.--
a. Position. This issue has two aspects. On the first, the
question of the future internal political structure of South Viet-Nam we
see no necessity to establish any connection with the issue of mutual
withdrawals. We would thus expect to press the issue of Mutual
withdrawals without raising this question, which in any event falls
within the primary concern of the GVN. As a practical matter, if we..
were in fact able to get agreed withdrawals on a satisfactory basis
without any separate or related agreement on the internal political
solution in the South the slluation would be advantageous to the GVN.
In this sense, mutual withdrawals Could proceed independently of
any political settlement among authentic South Vietnamese.
On the other hand, we recognize the force of the point made
by the GVN that the question of troop withdrawals is a major and
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determining fact or in the formulation of an over-all political settlement
for Vi'et-Nath. We would not expect to carry withdrawals to completion
if the total picture--including the degree of agreement reached in
? negotiations--gave us ground for serious doubt concerning Hanoi's
Intentions. We would thus expect to make a continuing judgment of the
seriousness of Hanoi's intent to comply with the conditions for withdrawal
specified above, and would take no position that foreclosed our right
; A'?
and ability to do?So. Elements of judgment would include actions and
agreements with respect to the DMZ, the withdrawal of North Vietnamese
forces from South Viet-Nam, Cambodia, and Laos, the adequacy of
verification and supervision; and any other factors' bearing on the
issue.
b. Supporting Comment. This basic position conforms to the
discussions of this issue in Paris. You should note to the GVN that this
Is not a point that should come up in the early stages, and that all that
we are saying now is that we have it very much in mind and would
wish to consult further with them on the subsequent negotiating positions
and actions that would be required to carry it out. Our position boils
down to reserving the right and capacity to use the withdrawal issue
to the fullest possible extent, for its leverage on the Laos and Cambodia
settlements and on an adequate inspection and verification machinery
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related not merely. fo the caiirying, out of withdrawals but to continuing
verification that there is not further infiltration.
In making the first point in the stated position, you should of
? course take pains to make clear that our desire to go ahead with mutual
withdrawals, separately from. the question of an internal political
1 solution in the South, in no way diminishes the urgency we attach to
early GVN/NLF contacts directed to a 'southern political solution.
8.. The Related,Issue of Withdrawal from Laos and Cambodia of North
? .
Vietnamese. Ftii.ces and Elements Whether or Not They Were Ever
in South Viet-Nam
a. Position. As already noted, we would insist that North Viet-
namese forces and elements in South Viet-Nam be withdrawn all the
way to North Viet-Nam. This would involve removal of such forces
and elements from Laos and Cambodia.
As we take these positions in principle, we must bear in
0
mind that?in terms of desired negotiating results?our first priority
Is the withdrawal of North Vietnamese forces and elements from South
Viet-Nam and Cambodia all the way\to the North. Our second priority
Is the withdrawal of North Vietnamese forces and elements, chiefly
in the Laos panhandle, which operate in direct support of the aggression
against South Viet-Nam. Our third priority, in terms of timing,. is
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the withdrawal of bther North Vietnamese forces and elements --for
.?
example in the more remote areas of Laos. In the end, we aim to
.achieve all three objectives, but it may become desirable, in the
negotiating process, to attack them separately and in their order of
priorities. All three categories would of course, be covered by the
positions in principle that we would take from the outset.
b. Supporting Comment. The question of priorities is, again,
one that may lie""dowiri the line. " ?The point of stating it now is that
we should pot get into the position with the GVN where each of the
three priorities is absolutely dependent on the achievement, even in
principle, of all three. Moreover, the practical fact is that some
North Vietnamese elements in the northern provinces of Laos go back all
the way to 1954 and will in practice be very hard to root out on any
verified basis. While such elements in' northern Laos would be a
continuing security problem, they are not realistically part of the
present or possible future major threat to South Viet-Nam.
9. Verification and Supervision
a. Position. As already noted, we would insist from the outset
that agreed withdrawals must be subject to adequate verification and
supervision.
In the opening stages of negotiation, we would expect to leave
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open whether inspection and verification would be conducted in the
f:irst instance by our own GITN/US resources, by some form of joint
commission, or by a new international group with a satisfactory
composition and charter. These are complex issues and will require
continuing consultation as the need for a firmer position arises. What
is important is that we take the clear position in principle that there
muat be complete assurance that agreed withdrawals are being carried
out in full compliance with the agreement.
In thus deferring detailed discussion, we would expect to
make clear that our ultimate requirement extends not only to verification
and supervision of the actual withdrawal process, but to assurance
that there would not in the future be infiltration or any threat from
North Viet-Nam against South Viet-Nam, Laos or Cambodia. This
gets to detailed and complex questions concerning the nature of future
verification and supervision machinery, and also relates to the measures ,
necessary to maintain the agreement. What is important is that we
take the clear position that there must in the end be complete confidence
that agreed withdrawals are carried out in full compliance with the
. agreement.
? b. Supporting- Comment. Essentially
this position means that.
. we 'might be prepared to commence withdrawals before any new
. ..
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verification and supervision machinery was in place. We believe that
our own GVN/US intelligence and military resources could, 'under
present circumstances, give us sufficient confidence for this purpose.
However, 'as noted above, we would not carry through or complete any
withdrawal process in the absence of a fully functioning and satisfactory
. verification and supervision machinery and Measures necessary to
maintain the withdrawal agreement.
10.. Possible Unilateral Force Reductions or Withdrawals Including
Our Res-oonse to Any Unilateral Withdrawals by the Other Side
? a. Position. This is a question of our own actions, rather than
any initial statements of position in Paris.
As we have already agreed, US and allied force reductions
?. may be carried out at any time, on the basis of full consultation with
? the GVN and an over-all judgment of the situation, including the effect
. on .our negotiating posture.
In addition, if there should be unilateral North Vietnamese
. withdrawals to North Viet-Nam, we would consider--in further
consultation with the GVN--efforts to obtain an express acknowledgement
and confirmation of such withdrawals, andY would then consider the
possibility of reciprocal US and allied withdrawals in advance of any
agreement on the subject. Any. such decisions and consultations would
? \ ?
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of course take into account the military and over-all situation existing
at the time.
b. Supporting Comment. In the event of tacit North Vietnamese
? withdrawals, we might in fact carry out unilateral withdrawals but
would withhold, explicit reciprocity until there was at least agreement
? to the principle of mutual actions. We see no significant difference
with the GVN, which has simply noted--in the Paris exchanges?that
there should be.blear .indication and understanding given by both sides--
?
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tl'ttrikt4e*se--200 /04/21 . CiARDP79:497tY3R000500260001-6
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
-April 1,0,
, TOP SECRET SENSITIVE
I
Ot/11X
National Security Study Memorandum 37
The Secretary of State
? The Secretary of Defense
The Director ,of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Vietnam
As indicated in NSDM 9 of April 1, 1969, the President has
directed the preparation of certain studies on Vietnam. He has
asked that the following papers be prepared bythe intez,-departrpen.tal
Ad Hoc Group on Vietnam and submitted to the NSC Revile* 'Group by
IP.,?????
the dates indicated.
! ; ? 17.? , i
Phased Withdrawals
a. Mutual Withdrawal
This paper should examine the modalities of mutual with-
drawal, whether agreed to publicly or privately by?both sides, tacit,
or de facto. It should cover timetables, types types of personnel,
regroupment, local cease fires a.nd,any other relevant subjects.
Military, logistic, territorial and political factors and implications ?
abould_ be considered. (May 16, 1969). Cotati-,..
b. Vietnamizing the Wal:
2 5X1
This paper should examine the modalities of US withdrawals
under conditions of our progressively turning over combat efforts to
the South Vietnamese in the absence of reciprocal enemy withdrawals.
It should cover timetables, phasing, types of personnel, regroupment,
and substitution of South Vietnamese forces. Military, logistic,
territorial, and political factors and implications should be considered.
This study should reflect the findings of the preliminary
-,eport of the Secretary of Defense on a'apecific timetable for Vietnamizing
the war. (June 13, 1969). (See NSSM 36)
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Verification'for Mutual Withdrawal
OLJDX
This paper should examine various means and mechanisms for
? verifying the process and completion of mutual withdrawals, whether ?
? agreed to publicly or privately by both sides, tacit, or de facto. It
should set forth the advantages and disadvantages of various types of
verification machinery including joint belligerent commissions,
reactivation of the ICC, and creation of new international groups
(such as an Asian body). The paper should include a discussion of
? our unilateral capability to verify withdrawals drawing on all sources
of information. It should consider how agreed arrangements can
' usefully supplement our unilateral capabilities. (May 16, 1969).
, Political Settlement for South Vietnam
This study should explore various types of political settlement
within:South Vietnam and the possible US role concerning these
questions. The paper should examine all feasible options, including
elections at all levels, sharing of governmental power before and/or
after elections, constitutional considerations, agreed or de facto
territorial accommodations, decentralization of government power.
The study should discuss the feasibility of each alternative and the
- likely attitudes of the GVN, the various segments of the South, Vietnamese
? populace, the NLF, and Hanoi. It should evaluate the likely evolution
within South Vietnam under alternative arrangements. Finally, the
possible US role -- in Vietnam as well as in the negotiations --
in achieving a political settlement should be covered. (May 16, 1969).
International Guarantees
. The paper should explore the subject of international guarantees
12111.0
mutual withdrawal
political settlement in South Vietnam
-- the DMZ
any other appropriate aspects of an overall Vietnam settlement.
In so doing, the study should be consistent with the separate papers on
mutual withdrawal, verification for mutual withdrawal, political
settlement for SYN, and our policy on the DMZ. This paper should
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..discuss the advantages and disadvantages of attempting to achieve
international guarantees, and ways to negotiate them -- e.g., at
Paris. in a follow-on international conference, etc. (June 13, 1969).
;
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL.
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20506
National Security Study Memorandum 36
The Secretary of State
-The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence
S TSB 3E C T Vietnamizing the 'War
The President has directed the preparation of a specific time-
table for Vietnamizing the war. He has asked that the Secretary of
? Defense be responsible for the overall planning and implementation
, of this process, in coordination with the Secretary of State and the
Director of Central Intelligence.
The plan should cover all aspects of US military, para-military,
and civilian involvement in Vietnam, including combat and combat
support forces, advisory personnel, .and all forms of equipment.
The plan can draw on current studies, including those for T-Day
?planning and RVNAF modernization and improvement. However, this
timetable will be directed toward the progressive transfer to the South
Vietnamese of the fighting effort with the US and other TCCs in?
-
creasingly in support roles, assuming that the war continues and
--that ;North Vietnamese as well as -Vietcong forces-are in South Vietnam.--
--r----- -Assumptions for this timetable will include:
a starting date of July 1, 1969;
.. ?
current North Vietnamese and Vietcong force levels, (i. e.,
we are not able to achieve mutual withdrawals); these levels
should be continually adjusted in future months to ongoing
iztelligence estimates; .
current projections of RVNA.F force levels;
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no deescalation in allied military efforts, except that
.resulting from phased withdrawals of US, and other, ,TCC
forces which are not fully compensated far by the South.
Vietnamese;
-- the highest national priorities for the equipping and training ,
of South Vietnamese forces.
o?
Based on these assumptions, timetables should be drawn up for
,? the transfer of the combat role to the GVN and restriction of the US
role to combat support and advisory missions only, with alternative
completion dates of December 31, 1970, June 30, 1971, December 31,
1971, and December 31, 1972. For each alternative schedule the plan
should identify the degr.adation in combat capability, if any, which
would result, and the implications for the per cent of population under -
'relatively secure GVN control. Each schedule shauld also estimate,
the budget and BOP implications. .
Continual study, refinement and reevaluation .of these,sproblems
? will be necessary as the Vietnarinization process proceeds. The
President has requested by June 1 an initial overall report outline,
as well as specific recommendations, with alternatives, for the first
-? six months (July 1 to December .31, 1969), and a complete report by
September 1. Further studies, ,recommendation, and progress
reports will be requested. subsequently. ,
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