EVALUATION OF OASD/SA STUDY THE WAR IN CAMBODIA MAY 1971

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T02095R000500230001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 117
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 20, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 1, 1973
• Content Type: AG

Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000500230001-9
Evaluation of OASD/SA Study
The War in Cambodia
May 1971
14 May 71. Report, Military Assessment in Cambodia, prepared
in the Department of Defense (OASD/SA)
Report, The War in Cambodia, prepared in the Department
of Defense (OASD/SA)
17 May 71
STATI NTL
21 May. 71
21 May 71
STATI NTL
25X1
OSD review(s) completed.
to ACh/D/I memo re Comments on OASD Draft
Report, The War in Cambodia, 17 May 1971, Secret
to ACh/D/I memo re Evaluation of OASD/SA Study,
The War in Cambodia
Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000500230001-9
Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : 40RepT02095R000500230001-9
MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Chief, D/I
SUBJECT : Evaluation of OASD/SA Study,
e W
May 1971
In Cambodia
1. The OASD/SA study =keg a unique and strong contribution to
our knowledge of the war in Cambodia by providing a comprehensive data
base capable of lending substance to assessments of the changing nature
and quality of the military action. For the most part0 the questionable
consistency and accuracy of the individual data inputs are adequately
recognized and the statistical analyses are hedged accordingly. Although
the paper is marred by some inconsistencies in numerical data, as well
as a few questionable conclusions, it nevertheless is a very useful study.
2. With that caveat, we note the following:
a. The statement in the last paragraph of Page 16 that FANK
cut Communist forces off from the port of Sibanoukville in our view
overstates both enemy intentions and FANK capabilities.
b. We also think that the possibility of "local accommodation
between FANK and the enemy" is overemPhasized (in Paragraph 3 of Page 7).
Also, the suggestion (in the cited paragraph and also in Paragraph 1,
Page 32) that the enemy has been "trying to disengage" in MR-4 is contra-
dicted by the recent increase in enemy attacks there.
c. On Page 14, the comparison of FANK with RF/PF in IN should
be caveated to reflect the more extensive Allied air and artillery
support available to the ARVN.
d. In view of subsequent analysis, the statement (on Page 20)
that "FANK may fight better when near ARVN troops" does not seem appropriate.
The conclusion reached from analysis of the December ARVN intervention
is that "there is nothing in the data which suggests the ARVN intervention
In December was paralleleekbygreater:aggressiveness or higher combat
performance on the part of FAIN." This, coupled with the counter example
in MR 2 alluded to on Page 23, would seem to outweigh the evidence of the
FebruarY/mrcb period. Moreover, there was much less FANK/ARVN interaction
in February/March than in DeceMber. (Iaci!entally? the KU data in Tables
11 and 12 are not consistent.)
e. There are minor numerical inconsistencies between data on
combat ections presented in the last paragraph on Page 14 and in Tables
6 and 13. (Specifically, 1,597 vs. 1,598 and 1,560 vs. 1,563.) There
Approved For Release 2002/07/3SEG
I."
P78T02095R000500230001-9
hrmlommozia......,exemcrionaaa,nw....1
I
tiRuth 1
Excluded ircin autornaLi.
downgrading and
decias3itication
717.11,n1nr
Approved For Release 2002/07/30 iMMILUIr78T02095R000500230001-9
is an additional discrepancy between these data and the statement in the
last paragraph on Page 23 that there were 83 more combat actions in MR 2
than in MR 1 (1,597-1,560 = 1,598-1'563 = 35).
f. As noted in the first draft, we still maintain that 8-10,000
TANK combat troops were involved in the Pich Nil operation of January 1971,
rather than the 5,000 cited in the last paragraph on Page 25.
g. In our view, the regional strength ratios (cited in Page 30)
Irrelevant when applied to specific operations.
h. The strength ratio for the PFSMR (Page 36) is not comparable
at of other MR's since it includes 4 "fat" concentration
rters troops and is also a center for R & R and logistic activity.
onversely, most of the enemy strength "threatening" Phnom Penh is outside
of the PPSMR.
Approved For Release 2002/07/3M
10 '4 -
25X1A
P78T02095R000500230001-9
Approved For Release 200AC4GQA-RDP78T02095R000500230001-9
b1:1;lit, I 7
Command and Control. Command and control problems in FANK are generated
by communications and transportation systems primitive by South Vietnamese
standards, and by a tradition of regional autonomy. In a very real sense, the
FANK Headquarters is cut off from direct control of forces outside of Phnom
Penh Special Military Region and seldom commands in the full sense of the term.
The fact that the regional commands respond to the extent they do attests .
not only to the network of personal loyalty which extends from_Lcoa_W_
downward -- which his subordinates have played upon in the premierIB
absehce--- but to the almost fanatical commitment to the common cause
of ridding Cambodia of Vietnamese.
Centralized control is increasing. The creation and activity of FANK's
"intervention forces"--those units controlled directly by Headquarters--
the :evision of administrative procedures. (such as the military pay system),
the compilation of personnelrecords and; perhaps most important of all, the
monopoly the Headquarters has on the flow of arms, ammunition and supplies
and 7,rained personnel coming into the country, are all giving Phnom Penh
grea-;er control over the war it must wage. But these are phenomena which erode
regional antonomy rather than replace it entirely, and it is likely to be at
leas-; a year before the Headquarters in Phnom Penh can exercise the kind of
contml over FANK that Saigon was able to exercise over ARVN as early as
three years ago. In the meantime, command and control between Phnom Penh
and -the region must rely primarily upon ties of personal loyalty rather than
institutionalized procedures.
One of the dangers in this arrangement is the possiblity of local
accommodation between FANK and the enemy in relatively isolated sections of
the country. The data suggestthis may already be occurring in GKR military
region 4, where the tradition of regional antonomy and difficulty of communi-
cation may be combining to promote that development.
The Action
NOTE: The statistics discussed in this section are tenuous and from a
reporting system that is still shaking down. We believe that the trends they
show are probably about right, but the data and findings must be viewed with
some caution for awhile yet.
Most assessments of the Cambodian situation foresaw increased activity as
the dry season began in October 1970. There were several reasons for this
expectation. Experience with the cyclical pattern of warfare in Vietnam, the
increased size of FANK and the growing realization of how much the loss of
Sihanoukville and the disruption of the Cambodian sanctuary had hurt the
communists all contributed to the assumption that the war would escalate in
the dry season.
Table 2 shows that the levels of activity in Cambodia, excluding any ARVN
involvement, doubled between the third and fourth quarters of 1970 and have
remained at the higher level ever since. The increase stemmed from
an upsurge of enemy attacks by fire and contacts between FANK and enemy forces.
Approved For Release 20S iVI1A-RDP78T02095R000500230001-9
Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000500230001-9
SECRET
TAMP 21
ACTIONS IN CAMBODIA: FANK VS THE ENEMY a/
(No ARVN Involvement) bj
3rd Qtr 1970 4th Qtr 1970 1st Qtr 1971
FANK Actions
Ground Attacks
45
Ambushes
7
Other
2
Subtotal
?
37
Enemy Actions
Ground Attacks
185
Attacks by fire/harassment
412
IOC Interdiction
94
Sabotage/Terror
40
Other
13
Subtotal
7177-(6331)E/
Contacts
197
Total Combat Actions
995
69, 65
17 18
8 :To
-?-7 TJ
323 202
W,' 942
89
43 57
12 15
1362 (4298) 15.05 (4889)
605 862
2061 2260
7 Source: Khmer Computer File from daily attache reports. For definition
of each activity, see appendix. Actions reported as a "contact" are often
ambiguous regarding the circumstances involved and, in particular, which
? side initiated the action. "Contacts" are defined by FANK as combat actions
which occur outside FANK,defensive positions, and, accordingly, many con-
tacts are probably brought about by conscious FANK efforts to find and
destroy enemy units. But, because "contacts" can also refer to actions in
? which FANK either was not seeking nor expecting combat activity, they have
been dealt with as a separate category of activity.
12/ Does not include actions in which ARVN was reported as involved.
-2/ Figures in parentheses indicate count of similar action in South Vietnam
for same period. Source: OASD(C) Southeast Asia Statistical Summary.
While there was an upsurge in activity during the dry season, it is im-
portant to keep the figures in perspective; they are far below what has been
occurring in South Vietnam forlat least the last five years. The figures in
parentheses, referring to comparable actions in South Vietnam, show that enemy
activity in Cambodia, excluding actions against ARVN, has been about 22% of that
recorded in South Vietnam during the same period. Even the highest monthly
figure for enemy attacks by fire or harassing actions (about 376 in March 1971)
is only about two-fifths of the lowest monthly figure recorded for similar
actions in the RVN since 1965 (about 968 in November 1970).1)
IT Sources: Cambodian data: Khmer computer file; South Vietnam: SEA
Statistical Summarm.
Approved ForRelease 2elplepikfipiCIA-RDP78T02095R000500230001-9
,' I
Approved For Release 20tElttrA-RDP78T02095R000500230001-9 9
Enemy Patterns. The enemy appears to have moved toward. greater reliance
on standoff attacks as opposed to ground assaults. In absolute number, enemy
ground attacks nearly doubled last fall, but returned to last summer's level
this year. Because of the increase in attacks by fire, however, enemy ground
attacks now constitute a smaller portion of total enemy activity than in 1970
(15% this year vs 25% in 1970). Attacks by fire and harassment have risen to
about 72% of all enemy combat activity compared to about 60% last year (Table
2).
The shift in enemy activity has probably contributed to lower casualties
on bothsides during the.first three months of 1971. While about 2295 FANK
and 5409 enemy have been killed in action since July 1, 1970, exclusive of any
ARVN involvement, almost half of this 7704 total occurred during the last three
months of 1970. The enemy KIA figures for the first quarter of this year slipped
below the level reported for last summer, while FANK deaths returned to the
summer level.
In addition, there have been fewer casualties per action in 1971. FANK,
for example, lost about 1.3 KIA per enemy ground attack in 1970; this year the
loss per attack has been about 0.6. Likewise, the enemy KIA in ground attacks
has dropped from about 3.3 to 1.9 KIA per attack. Thus, the drop in casualties
in the face of high levels of activity appears due to both a shift in the mix
of enemy activity and a reduction in intensity.
TABTE 3
COMBAT DEATHS IN CAMBODIA: NO ARVN INVOLVEMENT
1st Qtr 1971
FANK KIA
3rd Qtr 1970
4th Qtr 1970
In Enemy Actions bJ
419
607
243 -
In FANK Actions c
111
52
13
In Contacts
123
333
Subtotal
653
992
.394_
650
Enemy KIA
In Enemy Actionsly
645-
1215
291
In FANK Actions c
442'
258
149
In Contacts
442
.1104
863
Subtotal
1529
2577
1303
Total KIA (FANK plus Enemy)
2182
3569
1953
2/ Source: Khmer computer file from attache reports; data excludes incidents
with any ARVN involvement.
b/ Includes enemy ground attacks, ambushes, attacks by fire, harassment LOC
interdiction, sabotage and terror..
c/ Includes FANK ground attacks, ambushes, attacks by fire.
Approved For Release 2
I '
^
r I A-RD P 78 TO 20 95 RO 0 05 0 0 230001 -9
Approved For Release 20 N.479A-RDP78T02095RD0050023000V9
FANK Patterns and Peeformance. FANK is clearly on the defensive. At
least 64% of all actions reported since July 1970 have been attributed to
enemy initiative (Table 2) and the overall pattern of activity clearly shows
that the war is being fought along Phnom Penh's lifelines, not in the enemy
base areas (see map plots). Nationally, about 80% of all reported actions
have occurred on or within 5 kilometers of a major Cambodian LOC.
The percentage of actions which are clearly attributable to enemy
initiative has declined over the last nine mo4ths, from 75% in the summer to
66% in the fall and 58% this year (Table 2). Likewise the circumstances of
FANK deaths have changed. As Table 4 shows, there has been a definite shift
in FANK KIA toward actions reported as "contacts."
These trends can be accounted for in two ways. They could be a result
of changes in the reporting system; FANK may simply be reporting as contacts
what they earlier would have reported as enemy attacks, etc. If this is the
case, the data doe S not say FANK is getting better.
On the other hand, the shift toward "contacts" which appears both in
the reports of activity and in the casualty data, may actually portray a
greater willingness on the part of FANK to move out of defensive positions.
If FANK is reporting honestly, and means what it defines as a "contact" (ie:
a combat action that takes place outside FANK defensive positions), than
the shift probably reflects greater aggressiveness on FANK's part. The
detain this case say that nine months ago 64% of FANK KIA were killed when
FANK remained behind its own defenses, now 64% are dying when FANK has at
least moved outside its own wire.
TABLE 1-1-
CIRCUMSTANCES OF FANK KIA2/
During:
FANK
3rd Qtr 1970
.4th Qtr 1970
1st Qtr 1971
Attacks
107
50
13
Ambushes
1
2
1
Other:
3
0
1
Subtotal
111
52
75
Enemy
Attacks
215
427
104
AW/Harassment
92
122
68-
Ofaer
112
58 .
71
Subtotal
-4-179*
Contacts
123 .
333
409
Total FANK KIA
653
992
667 r.
2../ Source: Khmer computer file from attache reports; data excludes incidents
with ARVN involvement.
laj During patrol.
Approved For Release 2StratiCIA-RDP78T02095R000500230001-9
Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000500230001-9
..,
(I)
?r-I
..-%
C.)
CCI ,C2,
-I-)
4-) g
CI3 C.)
cd
.... -P
-P
O cd 0
cct F-1
0
0
O al
rd -P0
CU ctS
-P Q.)
cci r(7 tla
..--I (I) CU
4 .,-1 ,.0
?,-1 VI
,?I ?H
E
CD
Ca
4
rCI 4
4 cr)
?H ,S0 0.) ,0
r-i H 1811
;=-, cti 14 co
?
111
?
%
^ ao
maw
I
lb
WI
?
U
?
I+
Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000500230001-9
Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000500230001-9
CVcH
H g'
U
co )0
-I-)
-1-,
CO c.)
co
A-)
c.) cci 0
03 P
-P ..., F..,
? ..W a)
O c..) -P
c.) aS
-i-D Fq
rti +'O
a) co
4-) a)
co rcs bn
..-1 CU C13
-P
4 ?,-1 ,C)
4-1 -P ai
.1-4 VI
r4 ..--I ^
4
;1 r 42! 1
1
El *
I+
Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000500230001-9
Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000500230001-9
Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000500230001-9
Approved For Release 20gerflA-RDP78T02095R000500230001-9
But the effectiveness of FANK, measured in terms of casualties inflicted
on the enemy, is not impressive. In terms of total KIA figures, the enemy/FANK
kill ratio has been maintained at about 2 to 1 for the past nine months. Table
5 shows that this is low?below the overall kill ratio achieved by RF/PF units
in South Vietnam and only about half the ARVN record.
FANK ability to kill the enemy comes closest to the kill ratio associated
with the RR and PF in Military Regions II and III of South Vietnam over the
last three years; but these units are considered to be the worst in South
Vietnam.../ The ratio has been better when FANK takes the fight to the enemy,
(ie: FANK attacks, ambushes, attacks by fire) and when the action takes
place outside FANK defensive positions (ie: contacts) but in neither of
these cases has FANK come close to the ARVN record in similar categories.
TABLE 5
KILL RATIOS
Enemy/FANK,
Enemy/FANK in Cambodia a/
ARVN, RF/PF
3rd Qtr 1970
4th Qtr 1970
1st Qtr 1971!
2.3
2,6
2.0
(TANK Actions)
(3.0)
(4.8)
(4.8)
(Enemy Actions)
(1.5)
(2.0)
(1.'2)
(Contacts)
(3.6)
(3-3)
(2.2)
_1968
1969
1970
Enemy/ARVN in SVN 12/
5.4
4.4
5.7
Enemy/RF-PF in SVN b/
3.6
3.8
2.0
(MR II)
(3.5)
(1.7)
(1.3)
(MR III)
(2.5)
(3.2)
(2.3)
2/ Source: Khmer Computer File.
b/ Source: SEER Computer File for ARVN; TEES for RF/PF.
Kill ratios are only one measure of combat effectiveness. But
RANK is not very effective by other measures either. It has not, for example,
expanded the territory it controls nor has it been able to expand the Cambodian
government's (GI) control over the population. There are probably more people
in government controlled areas now than there were six months ago, but the
increase has been due to an influx of refugees, not to an expansion of GKR
controlled territory. (Thus, increases in the number of people in government
controlled areas are a measure of enemy ineffectiveness rather than FANK combat -
ability.) And field assessments generally agree that while FANK is now perform-
ing better than it was six months ago, its combat proficiency remains low.
SEA Analysis Report November/December 1970.
Approved For Release 20 STIA-RDP78T02095R000500230001-9
Approved For Release 20?ItIVIA-RDP78T02095R000500230001-9 15
The War by Military Regions
The war differs in each of-Cambodia's military regions, making generali-
zations difficult. Indeed, regional variation is probably more pronounced in
Cambodia than in South Vietnam for a number of reasons.
-- Enemy strategy in Cambodia differs greatly depending upon locale, if
only because a large part of Cambodia east of the Mekong is more intimately
Involved with the war in South Vietnam. It is possible that the enemy sees
two major arenas in Cambodia. The first, and probably most important, is
the general border area--a defensive arena so far as the enemy is concerned
In which his primary antagonist is ARVN and the primary purpose is the
maintenance of the southern terminous of the Laotian supply system. The
second arena lies generally west of the Mekong. live enemy activity is pri-
marily devoted to the isolation of Phnom Penh from its internal sources of
sustenance.
-- The participants vary from region to region. Both FANK and the enemy
have operated in all of Cambodia's military regions, but ARVN, the war's
third major participant, has not often operated west of the Mekong and never
in GKR MRs 3 and 4.
-- In contrast to the situation in South Vietnam, Cambodian military
regions are not held together by a centralized, institutionalized military
establishment. Although efforts are underway to centralize, difficulties in
communication combine with tradition to give regional commanders great
autonomy. The character of the War, in each region therefore necessarily
reflects the personalities, aggressiveness and orientation of the men on the
groundl resulting in the kind of regional variation South Vietnam knew per-
has 20 years ago.
Each of Cambodia's military regions is discussed below in the same general
terms: (1) the intensity and character of the war, (2) the patterns and
effectiveness of enemy units there, and (3) the effectiveness of FANK.
Military Region 1
-.Actions and Casualties in MR 1. In absolute numbers, MR 1--north
and east of Phnom Penh--most active o all MRs for four of the ten months
surveyed,- both in terms :f combat actions and the production of casualties.
More combat actions, exclusive of any ARVN involvement, have occurred here
than in any other MR (1597 compared to 1560 in MR 2, the nearest rival),
and about 34% of all FANK casualties since July have been reported from
MR I (Table 6).
Approved For Release 2SECREItIA-RDP78T02095R000500230001-9
Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000500230001-9
16
Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000500230001-9
Approved For Release 20SEICKTIA-RDP78T02095R000500230001-9
TABLE ,6
ACTIONS IN MR 1: NO ARVN INVOLVEMENT
3rd Qtr 1970
4th Qtr 1970
1st Qtr 1971
Contacts
51..
175
241
Enemy Actions:a
219
509
331
FABK Actions' b
21
31
20
Total
7gT_
71-3 .
592
Enmy Actions as % Of Total 75 71 56
iTIncludes attacks, ABF, LOC interdiction, sabotage, terror.
12/ Includes attacks, ambushes.
Source: Khmer computer file from attache cable.
17
The enemy has initiated most of the combat activity each month for the
past nine months but as Table 7 indicates, the activity has gradually moved
away from situations in which FANK was clearly in a tactical defensive posture.
Casualties on both sides paralleled the pattern of activity until this
year, when they fell closer to the lower levels of the rainy season. This
decrease, portrayed in Table 9, reflects the enemy shift toward a greater
reliance on standoff attacks.
FANK KIA
TABU', 7
CASUALTIES IN MR T;
NQ ARYN. INVOINEMIUT
1st Qtr 1970
3rd Qtr 1970
4th Qtr 1970
.
In Contacts
12
118
124
Ir t Enemy Actions
141
351
76
In FANK Actions
19
22
4
. Subtotal
172
4-91
TcT
Enemy KIA
? In Contacts
55
349
260
In Enemy Actions
.145
799
189
In FANK Actions
18
71
16
Subtotal
Total KIA KIA
72
390
1219
1710
669, .
Eneny/FANK Kill Ratio, 1.3 2.5 2.3.
Approved For Release 26ENETCIA-RDP78T02095R000500230001-9
Approved For Release 2
RETIA-RDP78T02095R000500230001-9
- Enemy Activity in MR l. Enemy activity in MR 1 surged last fall but
retarned this year to a level much closer to the rainy season level last .
summer. The mix of enemy activity in MR 1 indicates a greater reliance on
attacks by fire than anywhere else in Cambodia. As Table 8 indicates, the
enemy launched about six attacks by fire for every ground assault in the 3rd
quarter 1970. This ratio dropped to about 4 to 1 in the upsurge of enemy
activity during the last three months in 1970, but has increased to about
nine attacks by fire for each ground attack this year.
TABLE 8
MIX OF ENEMY ACTIVITY IN MR 1
Attacks
ABF/Harassment
LOC Interdiction
Sabotage/Terror
Otber
Total _
Ratio: ABF/Ground Attacks
3rd Qtr 1970
4th-Qtr 1970
1st Qtr 1971
28
159
21
5
6
92
384 ,
24(
7
2
30
262
25
14
8
219
5.6
509
4.2
339.
8.7
--FANK Patterns and Performance. Table 9 shows FANK strength in MR 1 for
four of the last nine months. The FANK-Enemy strength ratio in MRH1_is the
worst in the country, but the presence of ARVN compensates for the relatively
poor ratio.
TABLE 9
FANK STRENGTH rND OF MONTH ESTIMATES)
000)
1970 1971
Sep Nov Jan Mar
MR 1
Combat
27.0
34.6
33.2
38.0
Support
2.3
2.3
2.6
4.2
Total
29.3
36.9
35.6
18
MR I was the site of the first FANK effort to launch a large scale clearing
operation against enemy forces, at that time threatening Kampong Thom. Chen La,
as the three month operation was termed, involved 23,000 FANK troops, but bogged
dowm shortly after being launched on 7 September. Troops associated with the
operation ultimately required ARVN assistance to break out of holding positions
along route 7.
Approved For Release 2
TCIA-RDP78T02095R000500230001-9
Approved For Release 201SECRETIA-RDP78T02095R000500230001-9
By most accounts, Chen La showed that FANK had to ?improve considerably
before it could seriously challenge enemy units in MR 1. Most assessments,
of the operation identified inexperience and leadership deficiences as the
primary problems.
19
But the attention given FANK difficulties in Chen La may have obscured
other facts. FANK units in MR 1 have, for example, a comparatively good
enemy/FANK kill ratio. (turn to Table 7;) It remains low compared to the
ARVN record in Vietnam (about 2 to 1 compared with the ARVN record of about
6 to 1 over the last three years), but was one of the best in Cambodia this
year. (The kill ratio was slightly higher in MR 3, but at a lower absolute
level:).
The number of enemy killed per 1000 TANK comiTat strength has also been
impressive compared to other areas of Cambodia. As Table 10 indicates, FANK
was killing only about 3 enemy a month for each 1000 FANK combat troops sta-
tioned in MR 1 last summer. In the fourth quarter of the year this ratio
jumped to 8.8 per month, still only about a third of the ARVN level in South
Vietnam (second half 1970) and about half that achieved by ARVN units in GVN
MR II (considered poor), but the best ever achieved by the Cambodian Army.
The 4.6 level attained in 1971 was, again, the highest in Cambodia. 1/
TABTR 10
ENEMY KIA PER 1000 FRIENDLY COMBAT STRENGTH IN MR 1
(Monthly Average)
3rd Qtr 1970
4th Qtr 1970
1st Qtr 1970
FANK vs Enemy in MR 1 2/
Enemy KIA
73
306
155
FANK-Strength (000)
27.0
34.6
33,2
KIA per 1000 Strength
2.7
8.84.6
ARVST vs Enemy in RVN 12/
2nd Half 69
1st Half 70
2nd Half 70
(KIA/1000/Strength)
19
41
25
(in MR II)
(17)
(23)
(17)
(in MR III)
(14)
(34)
(17)
Source: Khmer Computer File (excluding all actions with ARVN involvement
11/ Source: SEER Computer File; record of ARVN units in RUN MR II and III,
considered to be worst in ARVN (See SEA Analysis Report, Nov-Dec
1970), included for comparative purposes.
-5.7- But was far below what has been reported for the ARVN units operating in
GKR MR 1. During February 1971, about 18,000 ARVN, involved in operation
Toan Thang killed nearly 2200 enemy, for a kill ratio of about 125 per
1000 combat strength. In March, the ARVN kill ratio for Toan Thang rose
to about 135 per 1000 combat strength. (Based on NMCC reports of I March
and 2 April 1971.)
Approved For Release 2gyzobv- 1CIA-RDP78T02095R000500230001-9
Approved For Release 20SECRETIA-RDP78T02095R000500230001-9
The improved FANK performance implied by the 8.8 ratio during the last
three months of 1970 reflects the output of the Chen La operation, It
suggests that FANK can perform more effectively when it tries--although it
is still unimpressive when compared to the ARVN.
20
The high kill ratio also suggests that RANK may fight better When near
ARVN. ARVN has, after all, operated extensively in GKR MR 1 since the cross
border operations last year, and on two occasions--the relief of FANK forces
on Route 7 and Operation Toan Thang--has engaged the enemy in the vicinity of
the major concentration of RANK forces in MR 1 (the general Kampong Cham area).
To test this hypothess, we isolated two periods of ARVN involvement in
Canbodia and looked closely at the effect ARVN had on the FANK-enemy relation-
ship in the general area of ARVN operations (see map 2: The ARVN -relief
operation on Route 7 and Operation Toan Thgng). We found ARVN operations
had significant impact on the enemy tactics adopted Vis-a-vis FANK, and that
recent'ARVN operations have been paralleled by higher combat performance on
the part of RANK units in the same general area.
Table 11 shows combat activity involving the enemy and YANK peaked
shortly before the ARVN relief force arrived in Kampong Cham on December 15.
It also demonstrates how the enemy disengaged from contact with FANK as the
ARVN clearing operation pushed along Route 7 toward Prey Totung. No ground
attacks were launched against RANK positions and standoff attaeks dropped
to about half the level recorded during the two weeks just before the ARVN
intervention. As the /enemy disengaged, however, FANK remained inside their
defensive positions./ The result was a drop in both enemy and FANK casualties.
There is nothing in the data which suggests the ARVN intervention in December
was paralleled by greater aggressiveness or higher combat performance on the
part of FANK.
Perhaps because of the heavy losses taken just before ARVN entered the
picture.
Approved For Release 26E
ETCIA-RDP78T02095R000500230001-9
Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000500230001-9
SECRET
MAP 2
THE ARVN-ENEMY-FANK RELATIONSHIP: AREA INVESTIGATED
pn
Ar?
M?
ATE
34
THAILAND LAOS
C ?
A CAMBODIA
11?
REPUBLIC fe.?
OF
VIETNAM
105?
BO:RIPER
105?
1531
C A
........ ??11111
fe
CT noi^
154
?.3
, e A
IT
AR
Feb,
!A"
21
OAR THANG OPN
71 -
0
STATUTE MILES
REPUBLIC OF
VIETNAM
25
?1
SECRET
Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000500230001-9
Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000500230001-9
SECRET
TABLE 11
FANK-ENEMI INTERACTION NEAR ARVN*
(Weekly Average)
Enemy Activity
1970
Nov
ARVN
Present
i
1971
1-15
Dec
15-31/
Dec29
Oct
Jan
-.-.-.-.
Ground Attacks
2
11
5
0
0.3
ABF/Harassment
6
8
12
5
3
FANK Attacks
1
2
1
1
0
Other Contacts
3
7
10
6
Enemy killed by FANK
22
54
186
30
10
FANK killed by Enemy
9
39
87
13
5
Enemy/FANK Kill Ratio
(2.4)
(1.4)
(2.1).:
(2.0)
ARVN Present
.FebV Mart
* Data includes incidents involving only FANK and Enemy Forces.
2/ Period of ARVN relief operation on Route 7.
b/ Period of ARVN Toan Thang 1/71 NB operation.
_
22
But data from the second period of ARVN operations in the same general
area paint a different picture. The ARVN operation Toan Thang in February
an March was paralleled by higher Enemy/FANK kill ratios, (between 3.)4 and
6.5 compared to a high of 2.4 for the pre10_ous four months), greater FANK
willingness to seek and engage .the enemy/, and as Table 12 indicates, slightly
better performance than three or four months earlier.
IT FANK launched 25 ground attacks against enemy positions in March compared
with a total of 16 for the previous five months; in addit'on, the con-
ditionsof FANK casualties shifted between October and January 31 only
about 30% of all FANK KIA were incurred outside FANK defensive positions;
in February and March about 50% of all FANK KIA died outside their own
wire.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000500230001-9
Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000500230001-9
SECRET
TABU, 12
ENEMY/FANK KILL RATIOS a/
Oct
Nov
Enemy Attacks
(8)12/
(22)
Enemy KIA
36
154
FANK KIA
8
90
Ratio
4.5
1.7
FANK Attacks
(4)-
'(7)
Enemy KIA
0
26
PANE. KIA
2
6
Ratio
4.3
Other Contacts
(12)
(27)
Enemy KIA
28
28
FANK KIA
13
45
Ratio
2.2
0.6
ARVN Present
Feb Mar
Tr Data includes incidents involving only FANK and enemy forces
12/ Figures in parentheses refer to number of actions.
These statistics by no means prove that FANK fights better simply
because ARVN is present. (A counter example is provided by data from MR 2;
see below p.27).The most important effect ARVN has on FANK combat proficiency
is probably indirect; ARVN makes the enemy change his activity vis-a-vis FANK
whLch, in turn, affects what FANK does. But the data from February and March
strongly imply that when ARVN's presence is accompanied by other factors,
such as good communicAtion between FANK and ARVN leaders, ARVN's presence
tends to have a direct and beneficial effect on FANK performance.
Military Region 2
- Action and Casualties. MR 2, south and west of Phnom Penh, has vied
with MR 1 as the most active military region. Although 83 more combat actions
have been reported in MR 1 for the period beginning last July, MR 2 led the
nation in. total combat actions for five of the last nine months. Casualties
have also been high; MR 2 has contributed about 24% of total FANK KIA.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000500230001-9
Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R0005002-30001-9
SONNET
The enemy has dominated tae war in MR 2 despite about an 8:1 combat. -
strength ratio in favor of FANK over the last nine months. Table 13 indicates
FANK has gradually moved outside their defensive positions (i.e.: FANK actions -
plus-contacts) but even if all reported contacts are considered as FANK initiated,
the data indicate the gap between enemy and FANK activity has not narrowed
significantly. Although the ratio has improved slightly, the enemy continues to
start at least two fights for every one started by FANK, even if we assume all
"contacts" are FANK initiated.
24
TABLE 13
ACTIONS IN MR 2: NO ARVN INVOLVEMENT
3rd Qtr 1970
41h Qtr 1970
1st Qtr 1970
Contacts
67
200
229
Enemy Actions a
26
28
22
FMK Actions bjr210
332
449
Total
303
.767
700
Enemy as % of Total Actions
69
59
64
7..7- Includes ground attacks, ABF, LOC interdiction, sabotage and terror.
12/ Includes ground attacks and ambushes.
Casualties in MR 2 have declined in 1971 despite high activity levels on
both sides (Table 14). It is difficult to account for the decline; there has
been no shift in activity similar to the enemy concentration on standoff attacks
which occurred in MR 1. The ability of the enemy to limit his KIA total this
year to a level below that sustained last summer--despite the upsurge in activity
brought about by the Pich Nil operation in January--suggests either that the
enemy units in MR 2 are very good or FANK forces there are very poor.
TABLE 14
CASUALTIES IN MR 2: NO ARVN INVOLVEMENT -
FANKKIA
In Contacta
In EnemY Actions
In FANK Actions
Subtotal
Enemy KIA
3rd Qtr 1970
4th Qtr 1970
1st Qtr 1971
38
148
2
TEE
80
110
18
ToE
122
63
11
176
In Contacts
213
327
176
In Enemy Actions
56
185
59
In FANK Actions
75
30
48
Subtotal
347
-5-57
TETS.
Total KIA
.532
750
479
Enemy/FANK Kill Ratio
1.8
2.6
1.4
Approved For Release 2002107/30-:-gIA-RDP78T02095R000500230001-9
Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000500230001-9
SECRET
- Enemy Activity in MR 2- Man for man, the enemy units in MR 2 are more
active against FANK than enemy units in MRs 1, 3 and 4. The mix of enemy
activity in MR 2 (Table 15) has been different from that reported for MR 1,
ald shows a greater reliance on ground attacks. The enemy launched only
&pout 1.5 attacks by fire for each ground assault in the last half of 1970.
This ratio increased to 4:1 in 1971, but was lower than the 9 to 1 ratio
ia MR 1. One of the factors which must have contributed to low enemy
casualties is better performance during attacks. The highest enemy casualty
rate during attacks was one KM per attack (3rd Qtr 1970) and it has been as
low as .3 (1st Qtr 1971); in MR 1 the enemy usually loses 2 to 3 KIA per
attack..
TABLE 15
00
MIX OF ENEMY ACTIVITY IN MR 2: NO ARVN INVOLVEMENT
3rd Qtr 1970
4th Qtr 1970
1st Qtr 1971
Attacks
60
107
87
ABF/EAR
82
160
319
LOC Interdiction
42
51
28
Sabotage/Terror
22
9
15
Other
4
5
2
210
332
75-7_
Ratio: ABF/Ground Attacks
I.4
1.5
.3.7
- FANK patterns and Performance. Table 16 shows FANK strength in MR 2.
FANK combat troops have outnumbered the enemy there by as high as about 9:1.
TABLE 16
FANK STRENGTH (END OF MONTH ESTEMATES)
(000)
1970 1971
Sep Nov Jan Mar
MR 2
. Combat
31.4
36.9
33.0
37.1
Support
3.1
3.6
3.6
8.3
Total
34.5
.7375
767
45.4
The second effort by FANK to launch and carry through a major clearing
operation--Operation Pich Nil--was made in January and involved 5,000 FANK
combat troops. Although ultimately successful in opening Route 4, this
operation required ARVN assistance and US air support. Most observers have
commented or implied that the operation demonstrated FANK problems rather than
proficiency. Again, the problems identified most often in field assessments
were poor leadership and lack of combat experience.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000500230001-9
Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000500230001-9
SECRET
26
FANK units in MR 2 have performed at levels lower than thosaattained,by
units in MR 1 since the dry season began in October 1970. Despite a friendly
enemy combat strength ratio which has been as high as 9 to 4. (September
1970), FANK units in MR 2 have not been able to improve their enemy kill ratio
(Table14); this year the kill ratio in MR 2 has fallen to about the level
attained in MR 4 (1.4 for MR 2, 1.7 for MR 4), which is slightly worse than
the poorest record achieved by RF/PF units in South Vietnam in the last three
years (1.6 in the 2nd half of 1969 in GVN MR II).
The enemy KIA per 1000 FANK combat strength has not improved noticeably
either. As Table 17 indicates, it declined after reaching a high of about 5
Last fall to a point below that attained last summer. For the last six months
it has been only about half as good as that achteved by FANK units in MR 1.
TABLE 17 _
ENEMY KIA PER 1000 FRIENDLY COMBAT STRENGTH
-(Monthly Average)
FANK vs Enemy in MR 2
3rd Qtr 1970
4th Qtr 1970
1st Qtr 1971
Enemy KIA
115
181
94
FANK Strength (000)
31.4
36.9
33.0
KIA per 1000 Strength
3.7
4.9
2.8
FMK vs Enemy in MR 1
'cIA per 1000 Strength
2.7
8.8
4.6
MR 2 has alSo been the site of joint ARVN-FANK operations comparable to
those discussed in MR 1. We investigated closely the ARVN assistance in opening
Pich Nil Pass on Route 4 (14-31 Jan 1971), to judge whether the patterns we saw
in MR 1 were also reflected here. They were not.
Table18 shows how the introduction of ARVN to the Pich Nil operation during
the last two weeks of January reduced enemy pressure against FANK. As ARVN
entered the picture, the enemy standoff attacks dropped to about a third the
level attained the two weeks prior to ARVN intervention. Ground attacks had
actually slackened earlier, and the lower rate of about one per week was main-
tained as ARVN pushed along Route 4.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000500230001-9
Approved For Release 2002/07/30: CIA-RDP78T02095R000500230001-9
SECRET
. TABLE 18
Enemy Activity
FANK - ENEMY INTERACTION NEAR ARVN IN MR 2
-7-------(Weekly
Mar
Average)
ARVN
1970 1-15 Present
Oct Nov Dec Jan 15-31 Jan Feb
Ground Attacks
1
3
4
1
1 1
1
ABF/HAR
1
1
2
6
2 3
3
FANK Attacks
0
0
0.3
1
0
0
Other Contacts
2
1
5
3
1
3
Enemy Killed by FANK
4
3
37
15
1
3
FANK Killed by Enemy
1
8
lo
7 3
3
Kill Ratio
4.o
o.4
3.7
3.8
3 3
1.0
In contrast to the December road clearing operation in MR 1,
the ARVN
27
intervention was paralled in MR 2 by a greater FANK willingness to move out
of defensive positions. (The average rate of FANK attacks and contacts
increased.) But FANK combat proficiency, as measured by its ability
to kill the enemy, actually declined. As Table 19 indicates, the number of
enemy killed per FANK attack or contact was lower while ARVN was present than
when ARVN was absent.
TABTE19_
ENEMY/FANK KILL RATIO
ARVN Present
Dec 1-15 Jan 15-31 Jan Feb
---.
Enemy Attacks/Amb (14)12/ - (1) (3)
_Enemy KIA. 130 0 0
FANK KIA 16 0 o 0
Ratio 8.1
FANK Attacks/Amb (1) (1) (0)
Enemy KIA 2 30 0
FANK KIA 2 0
Ratio 1
Other Contacts (20) (7)
Enemy KIA 14 0
PANIC KIA 19 4
Ratio .7 -
T Data includes incidents involving only FANK and enemy forces.
Li Figures in parentheses refer to number of actions.
Approved For Release 2i302/0740 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000500230001-9
(5)
4
9
.4
Approved For Release 2002/07/30: CIA-RDP78T02095R000500230001-9
SECRET
28
Military Region 3
-r Action and Casualties. MR 3, west of Phnom, Penh, has less than half
as much activity as either MR 1 or MR 2. Higher levels of FANK activity in
the last three months raised MR 3 from the least active MR (excluding MR 5)
to slightly ahead of MR 4, but only in. December 1970 did the number of reported
actions exceed 100 per month. Casualties have,also been low; MR 3 has con-
tributed about 9% of total FANK KIA.
The locale of combat activity has steadily moved away from FANK defenses.
This year more than half of all reported actions have taken place outside FANK
wire (i.e. FANK attacks, ambushes and contacts), a situation that occurred else-
where only in MR 16
ACTIONS
IN MR
TABU', 20
3: NO
ARVN INVOLVEMENT
3rd Qtr 1970
4th Qtr 1970
1st Qtr 1971
Contacts
75
152
127
Enemy Actions a
20
74
142
FANK Actions b
13
12
Total
108
238
27?3'
Enemy Actions as % of Total
69
Tir Includesground attacks, attacks by fire, LOC interdictions, sabotage and
terror.
12/ Includes ground attacks, ambushes, and contacts.
Both friendly and enemy KIA peaked at the end of 1970. The enemy-FANK
kill ratio has been low, but shows signs of improving. This year it was the
best in Cambodia, but at a much lower absolute level than MR 1 (Table 21).
SECRET
Approved For Release 2002/07/30: CIA-RDP78T02095R000500230001-9
Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000500230001-9
SECRET
TABTR 21
CASUALTIES IN MR 3:
NO ARVN INVOLVEMENT
1st Qtr 1971
FMK KIA
3rd Qtr 1970
4th Qtr 1970
In Contacts
6
49
39
In Enemy Actions
49
44
25
In FANK Actions
11
0
0
Subtotal
.6-6.
93
Enemy KIA
In Contacts
31
139
133
In Enemy Actions
40
29
4
In FANK Actions
74
8
17
Subtot41 .
145
176
157
TQtal Kik
211
269
218
-.: ? ,
En.my/EANK Kill Ratio
2.2
1.9
2.4
- Enemy Activity in MR 3. As in MR 1, enemy activity peaked during the
last quarter of 1970, but at a much lower level (509 enemy actions in MR 1
compared with only 152 in MR 3). The gain was due both to an increase in
enemy forces and to greater aggressiveness. The level of enemy actions per
1000 combat strength increased nearly 20% from the summer to the fall.
29
Enemy activity in MR 3 has demonstrated a high reliance on ground attacks.
Last summer_the enemy initiated twice as many ground attacks as attacks by
He has since relied more heavily on attacks by fire, but the ratio of
at-;acks by fire to ground assaults is only 3.5 to 1 this year (compared with
9 1 in MR land 3.7 to 1 in MR 2).
LOC interdictions in MR 3 rose sharply in the last quarter of 1970; but
have returned to rainy season levels this year. Terrorism became evident in
MR 3 beginning about six months ago and has constituted about 10% of all
enemy initiated action during the last six months. (Table 22)
TABLE 22
MIX OF ENEMY ACTIVITY IN MR 3
3rd Qtr 1970
4th Qtr 1970
1st Qtr 1971
Attacks
36
50
22
ABF/Harassment
19
54
78
LOC Interdiction
13
32
12
Sabotage/Terror
6
14
13
Other
1
2
2
? Total
75
152
127
Ratio: ABF/Ground Attacks_
.5
1.1
3.5
SECRET
Approved For Release 2002/07/30: CIA-RDP78T02095R000500230001-9
Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000500230001-9
30
SECRET
FANK Patterns and Performance in MR 3. Table 23 shows FANK strength in
MR 3. FANK combat personnel have outnumbered their enemy counterparts by
as high as 14:1, but MR 3 is considered a general training area by RANK and
the best troops there are often sent elsewhere. (Table 23)
TABTR 23
YANK STRENGTH (END OF MONTH ESTIMATES)
(000)
MR 3
1970
Nov
1971
Mar
Sep
Jan
Combat
17.1
19.7
18.2
21.0
Support
2.0
3.0
2.5
3.3
-2777
Total
19.1
22.7
21.2
FANK has conducted few large operations in MR 3 although they have -
outnumbered the enemy by as high as 14 to 1. The reluctance to begin larger
scale operations may be partly a result of difficult terrain (enemy base
areas have been established in relatively inaccessable areas of the Cardamom
Mountains) and the difficulty of launching and supplying large operations from
Phnom Penh.
FANK troops in MR 3 have generally killed fewer enemy per 1000 FANK
combat strength than FANK in MRs 1 and 2. During the last three months of
1970, when enemy activity levels reached their highest level, kills per
1000 strength have improved slightly, but Table 24 indicates that enemy KIA
per 1000 FANK combat strength currently remain low and at about the same
level as in MR 2 (Table 24).
TABLE 24
ENEMY KIA PER 1000 FANK COMBAT STRENGTH
Monthly Average)
3Qtr 1970
4Qtr 1970
10tr 1971
RANK vs Enemy in MR 3
39
58
51
Enemy KIA
39
58
51
FANK Strength (000)
17.1
19.7
18.2
KIA per 1000 Strength
2.3
2.9
2.8
RANK vs Enemy in MR 1 (KIA per 1000 strength)
2.7
8.8
4.6
RANK vs Enemy in MR 2 (KIA per 1000 strength)
3.7
4.9
2.8
SECRET
Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000500230001-9
Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000500230001-9
SECRET
Military Region 4
31
=Action and Casualties. This year, MR 4, northwest of Phnom Penh,, has
been the least active region in Cambodia for FANK because enemy activity
dropped off. A total of 565 actions have been reported in MR 4 since last
July, the lowest for any region. The region has contributed about 13% of
all FANK KIA since July, although both FANK and enemy KIA are declining.
As in the case of MR 3, most combat activity appears to now be occurring
outside of FANK defensive positions. (Table 25).
TABLE 25
: NO ARVN OR THAI INVOLVEMENT
ACTIONS IN MR
3rd Qtr 1970
4th Qtr 1970
1St Qtr 1971
Contacts
29
65
92
Enemy Actions
124
158
71
FANK Actions
10
15
1
Total
YES'
238
164
Enemy Actions as % of Total
76% 66% 43%
Both FANK and enemy casualties have dropped steadily; the monthly KIA rate
for FANK has fallen from about 57 last summer to about 19 this year, and the
enemy KIA rate has slipped from 97 to 28. The enemy-FANK kill ratio dropped
slightly last fall and has remained constant at about 1.3-1.7 enemy KIA for ?
each FANK KIA, the lowest level of any MR. (Table 26)
TABTR 26
CASUALTTPS IN MR NO ARVN OR THAI INVOLVEMENT
TANK KIA
3rd Qtr 1970
4th Qtr 1970
1st Qtr 1971
In Contacts
58
48
41
In EneMk-ACtions
44
32
18
In FANK Actions
68
19
0
Subtotal
. 170
99
59
Enemy KIA
In Contacts
114
110
"101
In Enemy Actions
In FANK FANK Actions
32
144
4
17
I
Subtotal
290
131
102.
Total KIA
460
230
161
Enemy/FANK Kill Ratio
1.7
1.3
1.7
SECRET
Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000500230001-9
Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000500230001-9
SECRET
32
--...Enemy?Activity in MR 4. The data suggest an enemy effort to dis-
engage in MR 4. Enemy activity surged in August, October and November (64,
55 and 54 actions respectively), but has declined in 1971 to about half the
level of last fall. Enemy combat strength in MR 4 has also declined, but the
activity drop seem to be more a result of conscious choice by the enemy than
of strength reductions. The enemy activity per 1000 strength has, for example,
declined from about 79 in the last three months of 1970 to 27 for the first
quarter 1971. The argument that the enemy is trying to disengage is further
supported by the few enemy KIA in .enemy initiated actions this year. (See
Table 26).
The mix of enemk activity has also changed markedly; since the beginning
of the year only one enemy ground attack had been reported from MR 4 by
April 28. (Table 27)
TABLE 27
MIX OF ENEMY ACTIVITY IN MR
14.
3rd Qtr 1970
4th Qtr 1970
1st Qtr 1971
Attacks
27
19
1
ABF/Harassment
91
120
55
LOC Interdiction
3
16
14
Sabotage/Terror
1
2
6
Other
2
1
___1
I:27
15g,
-71
- Ratid: ABF/Ground Attacks ,3.4 6.3 55.0
FANK Patterns and Performance in MR 4. Table 28 pOrtrays FANK strengths
in MR 4. MR 4 has the second worst FANK/Enemy strength ratio in the country
(exceeded only by MR 1). . (Table 28).
TABLE 28
FANK STRENGTH (END OF MONTH ESTIMATES)
(000)
MR 14.
1970
Nov
1971
Mar
Sep
Jan
Combat
13.4
12.1
15.0
17.8
Support
2.5
2.4
2.5
2.5
Total
15.9
7575
17.5
20.3
The enemy effort to disengage does not appear to have been prompted by
greater aggressiveness on FANK's part. The number of enemy killed per 1000
SECRET
Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000500230001-9
Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000500230001-9
SECRET
33
FANK combat strength has declined. Table 29 shows the steady decline from
the highest level of any MR last summer to what has been the second lowest
level (exceeded only by the PPSMR) this year.
TABLE 29
ENEMY KIA PER 1000 FRIENDLY COMBAT STRENGTH
(Monthly Average)
FANK vs Enemy in MR 4
Enemy KIA
*3rd Qtr 1970
4th Qtr 1970
1st Qtr 1971
97
44
34
FANK Strength (000)
13.4
12.1
15.0
KIA per 1000 strength
7.2
3.6
2.3
Ratios: In MR 1
2.7
8.8
4.6
In MR 2
3.7
4.9
2.8
In MR 3
2.3
2.9
2.8
It is difficult to account for the pattern of activity in MR 4, but one
of the hypotheses generated by the data is that FANK and enemy units in
NR 4 are moving toward or have reached an accomodation with each other.
Several bits of evidence support the argument.
-First, MR 4 has a comparatively balanced strength ratio--in Cambodian
teTms,anyway. Although the worst force ratio exists in MR 1 (about two FANK
td one enemy) the enemy units there must contend with ARVN. The strength
ratio in MR 4 is better (about 7 to 1), but below the ratio of MR 2. FANK has
shown its reluctance to raise its combat output even in MR 3 where it has a very
favorable force ratio; it might be even more willing to avoid combat when the
ratio is much less favorable.
- Second, command and control between Phnom Penh and MR 4 is probably
the weakest link in the entire FANK structure. FANK units in MR 4 would be
the most difficult to support from Phnom Penh, and even now probably get
last choice so far as the flow of money, material and weapons is concerned.
MR 4 commanders realize this fact of military life, a reaization which could
_
increase the desire for some sort of accomodation with enemy units in the
region.-
- Third, the composition of enemy units in the region could contribute
to arrangements. Although our understanding of enemy structure and activities
is by no means complete; there is some evidence indicating enemy units in MR 4
have a higher percentage of Cambodian personnel than enemy units stationed
elsewhere in Cambodia. This may serve to dampen the conflict somewhat.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000500230001-9
Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000500230001-9
SECRET
- Fourth, there are compelling strategic reasons on both sides for
some sort of accomodation. The NVA/VC elements in MR 4 may hope to avoid
Thai involvement, something they face if they raisethe level of conflict
too high; and the Cambodians may be quite reluctant to take the war to the
enemy when, as is often the case, enemy positions are in or adjacent to
national or traditional shrines (eg: Angkor 1:Tat).
Accomodation is only one explanation generated by the data. The will
to fight may exist on the part of. FANK units in MR 4; they may simply lack
? the resources. Efforts to improve, the combat potential of FANK in MR 4 are
underway and we hope to soon have data which indicate whether the resources
obtained are having 'a beneficial effect. 2/
34
Phnom Penh Special Military Region (PPSMR)
Action and Casualties. Activity in the Phnom Penh Special Military
Region has risen steadily; in March this area had become the second most
active region in the country. It has contributed about 21% of the FANK KIA
since July. An upsurge in FANK activity in the fourth quarter of 1970 moved
the focus of most action outside FANK defenses but the continued increase in
enemy activity this year has prevented FANK from reducing the ratio much more,
despite the best strength ratio in the country. (Table 30).
TABTR 30
ACTIONS IN THE PHNOM PENH SPECIAL MR
(No ARVN Involvement)
3rd Qtr 1970 4th Qtr 1970 1st Qtr 1971
Contacts 30 87 139
Enemy Actions 116 210 282
FANK _Actions 8 21 38
Total -5:-.4
Enemy Actions as % of Total 75% 66% 61%
FANK casualties have remained steady and enemy KIA have declined despite
the increase in activity. The monthly enemy KIA rate dropped from about 160
per month last fall to about 75 this year. As Table 31 shows, these changes
have been reflected in a noticeable decline in the Enemy/FANK kill ratio.
The MR 4 commander has continued to build his combat base despite
difficulties in resupply. Beginning, in April 1970, he has recruited
and either trained or sent to training in RVN about 21 battalions.
SEEET
Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000500230001-9
Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000500230001-9
SECRET
TABTR 31
CASUALTIES IN THE PPSMR. ,N0 ARVN INVOLVEMENT
FANKKIA
3rd Qtr 1970
4th Qtr 1970
1st Qtr 1971
Contacts
9
,34
74
In Enemy Actions
37
70
59
In RANK Actions
13
31
14
Subtotal
59
135-
1477
Enemy KIA
.
Contacts
27
169
125
2n Enemy Actions
372
198
39
Hn FANK Actions
22
123
62
Subtotal
.47T.
490
226
Total KIA
480
625
373
Enemy/FANK Kill Ratio
7.1
3.6
1.5
Enemy Activity. The increase in enemy activity suggests the Phnom
Penh Special Military Region assumed more strategic importance to the enemy
around the turn of the year While the January attack on Pochentong Air-
field captured the attention of FANK and led to extensive troop reshuffling,
enemy actions in the PPSMR have been maintained at high levels since then;
104 actions in January, 91 in February and 122 for Marbh, compared to .a
monthly average of about 70 last fall and 40 last summer (Table 32.).
35
The increase of enemy activity has been a function of greater aggressive-
ness. Enemy combat strength in the PPSMR has remained fairly stable, but
the units have more than doubled their activity level.
Man for man, their level of combat output was over twice that of enemy
units elsewhere in Cambodia, took place in the military region where the enemy -
enemy has the worst strength ratio, and in the faces of FANK's best troops. These
factors, combined with the data which indicate the enemy in the PPSMR has cut
his casualties drastically, suggest either that the enemy in the PPSMR is the
best in Cambodia or that enemy units elsewhere are operating far below their
capacity.
Most (88%) enemy activity in the PPSMR has been.. devoted to ground attacks
and attacks by fire. The ratio of attacks by fire to ground attacks has
increased gradually to the level attained in MR 2 this year.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000500230001-9
Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000500230001-9
36
SECRET
TABLE 32
MIX OF ENEMY ACTIVITY IN THE PPSMR
1st Qtr 1971
3rd Qtr 1970
4th Qtr 1970
Attacks
34
55
62
AEF/Harassment
61
125
228
LCC Interdiction
15
17
10
Sabotage/Terror
' 6
11
15
Other
'0
2
2
116
210
317
Ratio: ABF/Ground Attacks
1.8
2.3
3.7
FANK Patterns and Performance
? The PPSMR has always been the core of the defense of Cambodia so far
as FANK headquarters is concerned. FANK units there are the best equipped,
and as the January attack on Pochentong Airfield demonstrated, the FANK
command is willing to quickly erode the defenses of other military regions
when it senses the capital is threatened. As Table 33 indicates, the importance.
placed on the PPSMR has been reflected in FANK strength there. FANK combat
strength has outnumbered the enemy by as high as 43 to 1 (Table 33).
TABTR 33
FANK STRENGTH (END OF MONTH ESTIMATES)
(000)
PPSMR
1970
Nov
1971
Mar
Sep
Jan
Combat
25.1
32.7
43.4
42.0
Support
10.4
10.2
10.2
15.0
Total
35.5
42.9
53.6
56.0
But the performance of FANK units in the PPSMR has not been up to the
st:mtegic importance of the region to FANK leaders. As Table 31 indicated,
the FANK kill record has not been particularly good since last summer. Despite
the increase of FANK combat strength in the region since January and the
favorable force ratio, enemy KT.& per 1000 FANK strength has declined sharply.
As Table 34 shows, it has been the worst in the country in 1971.2i
Perhaps because many of the FANK units in the PPSMR are held as reserve
and not!committed to combat.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000500230001-9
Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000500230001-9
SECRET
TABU; '34
37
ENEMY KIA PER 1000 FANK COMBAT STRENGTH
(Monthly Average)
3rd Qtr 1970 4th Qtr 1970 1st Qtr 1971
FANK vs Enemy in PPSMR .
Enemy KIA
FANK Strength
KIA per 1000 Strength
FANK vs
Enemy in MR
1
(KIA/Strength)
FANK vs
Enemy in MR
2
(KIA/Strength)
FANK vs
Enemy in MR
3
(KIA/strength)
FANK vs Enemy in MR
4
(KIA/Strength)
SECRET
140
25.1
163
32.7
75
5.6
5.0
1.7
2.7
8.8
4.6
3.7
4.9
2.8
2.3
2.9
2.8
7.2
3.6
2.3
Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000500230001-9
The Data
Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000500230001-9
SECRET
APPENDIX
NOLE ON TIE DATA AND DKNINITIONS
Many of the statistics used in this paper are from the Khmer Computer
File, originated and maintained by OASD/SA. The file, now containing about
15,000 separate records, is based exclusively on data provided by the daily
defense attache cable from Phnom Penh (DAMSREP). The DANBREP, in turn,
iacludes all situation reports which FANK units in the field have sent to
FANK headquarters in Phnom Penh. The reports are passed to the Attache, trans-
lated, and forwarded to Washington within 24 hours of their arrival in FANK
headquarters.
The statistics are therefore based on operational and not confirmed data,
aad should be used on the assumption that any given number may not be precisely
correct. However, close analysis of the reports, direct observation of the
collection and translation process in Cambodia, comparison with other reporting
systems, and experience with similar data from Vietnam indicate that data
derived from the DAMSREP provide the most comprehensive and complete portrait
of actions in Cambodia currently available.
Definitions
The following definitions have been applied to the terms used:
Contact - A combat action which takes place outside of FANK or friendly
front lines,
Attack - A ground assault, usually accompanied by fire, in which one
antagonist attempts to occupy physically the position of another.
The size of the forces involved is not specified.
Attack by Fire/Harassment - The firing of weapons of any caliber or type by
one antagonist at another which is not accom-
panied by an "attack." The number of rounds
involved is not specified.
LOC Interdiction - Efforts of one antagonist to halt or impede the movement
of an opponent. This category includes reports of
ambushes, minings, or physical destruction of bridges,
etc.
Sabotage/Terror - Efforts of the enemy directed primarily against the rural
population or military materiel as opposed to military
personnel.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000500230001-9
Approved For Release 2ifyyjA3 ptst-,,,RpriTI-02095R000500230001-9
m r
AJLj'16 .
may. 14, 1971
ORANDUYi 170.1.; SEMETARY OF DEFENSE
THiCJ AS'6I312,7..T 3CRETA.a17 OF DEFENSE (INTEMITIOITAL SECMITY
AFFLIRS)
SUBJECT: Military Assessment in Cst:.bodia
In accordance with your instructions on April 16, 1971 to
conduct a military assessment of the situation in Cambodia, the
attached report is submitted.
F. J. West M. J. Brady
Col: USA
Enclosure
T. 'Owens
USMC
Approved ForReleki$114192/00,:tr.IPP78T02095R000500230001-9
11 tf
Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000500230001-9
SUMMARY
By direction of the -President, three members of the Department of
Defense completed an on-the-scene assessment of the military situation
in Cambodia and its relation to the situation in Vietnam .and Vietnamization.
Their report is summarized below.
Assessment of the Threat
In the past year, the enemy has been deprived of his Cambodian
sanctuary and forced to protect his supply lines. Consequently, he has
withdrawn over half his forces from MR 3. By cross-border operations,
the ARVN intends to keep the 20,000 NVA combat and 30,000 NVA supply
soldiers in Cambodia on the strategic defensive in 1972.
In contrast, 11,000 NVA combat soldiers hold the strategic initia-
tive against 180,000 FANK soldiers. With FANK tied down, the NVA is
organizing a Khmer Communist Party. The development of a Khmer insurgency
during 1972 may attract less attention than some NVA high-point attacks,
but it is a greater danger in the long term both to the Government of
Cambodia and to Vietnamization.
The Military Situation in Cambodia
The tempo of combat is light. Eighty-five percent of FANK have
a defensive mission to hold the ground they occupy. Operations are short-
ranged; the majority of contacts occur along the lines of communication
(LOC). Only 35% of FANK is considered trained and ready for combat.
Artillery, mortars, and non-U.S. tactical air support is inadequate.
Adequate communications equipment is unavailable. There is virtually no
military transportation system to move supplies or units.
Forecast
The period through November of 1972 will see moderate combat
activity and will be used by all sides as a period of preparation and
building.
The Issues
1. Time
Much more could have been accomplished during the first year
of Cambodian mobilization. Full use must be made of the next year or
accept the increasing probability of communist success.
2. Training
A major military training effort is required.
174-41i111 Ze
e r
l
Approved For Release 200t/MOO t
;I
T8T02095R000500230001-9
2
Approved For Release 2002/C170 sifs f78T02095R000500230001-9
3. Logistics
A responsive logistics system is needed to support FANK
military operations.
4. Strategy
To date, the national strategy has not been aggressively
executed.
5. The U.S.Role
In Cambodia) the constraint of a low U.S. profile has become a
goal in itself and is operating virtually as a national objective: as
opposed to the true objective of preserving the Government of Cambodia.
In order that U.S. actions support national goals, representatives of
the United States operating in or for Cambodia must be guided by direc-
tives which adapt to the changing situation.
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000500230001-9
Lkid OiLUALA May 14, 1971
Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000500230001-9
THE MILITARY SITUATION IN CAMBODIA
Introduction
There is but one war in Indochina, the aggression of North Vietnam
(NVN) against South Vietnam (SVN). This report concerns Cambodia and
its relation to the two southern Military Regions (MRs) of South Vietnam
and, as such, is intended to be read as only one element in any evaluation
of the Indochina war. It is the product of an on-the-scene assessment by
three members of the Department of Defense who have had extensive experi-
ence in Vietnam. The team traveled throughout Cambodia and undertook
by means of a stratified sample to collect data concerning the military
situation and the performance of the Cambodian armed forces. In five
Military Regions, the team was able to observe over 30 battalions in a
variety of combat conditions, and conduct in-depth interviews with 24 of
these. In addition, the team visited Cambodian supply depots, head-
quarters, naval and air facilities, as well as Udorn, MACV, CINCPAC
and the SVN Joint General Staff. Discussions were also held with top
Cambodian officials. The assessment was conducted in a one-month
period, from 18 April to 15 May 1971.
The report is divided into four basic sections:
I. Threat Assessment (through May 1972).
The Military Situation (through May 1971).
Forecast (through May 1972).
IV. Issues(for 1971-1972).
There are also seven annexes:
A. The Threat
B. RVN Role
C. FANK
D. FANK Battalion Data
E. Training
F. Logistics
G. MAP Plan
I. THREAT ASSESSMENT
There are about 65,000 North Vietnamese military personnel located
in Cambodia, of whom 32,000 are concerned with operating a logistical
pipeline which equips the enemy combat forces in Cambodia and in the
southern two MRs of SVN. The other 33,000 NVA in Cambodia are combat
soldiers now waging two campaigns: (1) 22,000 enemy are engaged in
a main effort against SVN and are on the defensive due to ARVN initiative;
and (2) 11,000 are oriented against Cambodian forces and have the tactical
initiative. The enemy's options are limited by munitions and manpower
constraints and by credible ARVN counter moves.
Approved For Release 20
II
P3SEVIREF178T02095R000500230001-9
1 2
Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000500230001-9
This section is divided into three portions:
A. The Main War -- NVN versus SVN.
B. The Cambodian Subphase NVN versus the Government of.
Cambodia (GOC).
C. Major Enemy Options in 1972.
A. The Main War -- North Vietnam versus South Vietnam
Since the overthrow of Sihanouk in March 1970, the North
Vietnamese in Cambodia have devoted most of their attention and resources
to the struggle against South Vietnam. However, the enemy's position in
MRs 3 and 4 of SVN has steadily deteriorated over the past year due to
four factors: (1) dislocation; (2) net attrition; (3) force diversion;
and (4) supply deprivation.
1. Dislocation
While Cambodia was a sanctuary, the enemy did not deploy
significant forces to guard his rear or his supply lines. With the U.S./
RVN cross-border operations in May and June of 1970, however, the enemy
was forced to pull units out of SVN MR 3 and back from the border areas
in order to avoid their encirclement and destruction. Throughout the
past year, the ARVN has continued to attack into Cambodia and the enemy
has been obliged to steadily pull his forces out of MR 3. As a result
of this dislocation, there has been a 57% drop in the number of enemy
soldiers of all types physically located within MR 3 -- from 63,000 in
February of 1970 to 27,000 in March of 1971.
This dislocation of enemy forces has allowed up to 60% of
the ARVN forces in MR 3 to deploy into Cambodia, where their attack
posture near Chup has threatened the southern sector of the enemy's main
logistic route south. The enemy, deprived of his sanctuaries, has been
forced to protect his supply lines. Without the strategic initiative,
the enemy has been prevented from launching sustained attacks of his
choosing against targets in either Cambodia or SVN MRs 3 and 4.
The ARVN has maintained the offensive pressure, keeping the
enemy on the strategic defensive, despite a steady redeployment of U.S.
forces. In the spring of 1971, with six U.S. battalions remaining in
MR 3, the ARVN still deployed into Cambodia 30 of their 51 battalions
assigned to MR 3.
17,
Approved For Release 2
FRIX:078T02095R000500230001-9
Va& Mai M.c.9 a a ao M
Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000500230001-9
2. Net Attrition
By infiltration, the enemy has replaced his casualties in
main force units in Cambodia. However, the dislocation of his main forces
has resulted in the exposure of his guerrillas in MB 3 and their losses
have not been replaced. The resulting attrition has cut the guerrilla
troops from 4,300 in February of 1970 to 2,800 in March of 1971, a net
reduction of over 30%. Moreover, the surviving enemy combat soldiers
in MR 3 are now fragmented, short of supplies .and working in small units,
constituting a low order threat which is being successfully contained
and further attrited by 80,000 Regional and Popular Force troops.
3. Force Diversion
Of the 33,000 NVA combat troops currently in Cambodia, the
enemy has diverted 11,000 from missions against South Vietnam to Cambodian
targets. The diversion has further reduced the magnitude of the threat
inside Cambodia which could threaten MR 3.
4. Supply Deprivation
The closing of the port of Kompong Som (Sihanoukville) --
coupled with the 1970 U.S./ARVN cross-border operations, Operation Lam
Son 719.of 1971, and air interdiction -- has curtailed munitions resupply
for the enemy forces in Cambodia and in SVN MRs 3 and 4. While reports
from the intelligence community differ concerning the exact amount of this
curtailment, they agree that a lack of munitions had adversely affected
enemy aggressiveness and offensive tactics, limiting his willingness to
engage and endure in combat. The ensuing lower level of combat in SVN
MRs 3 and 4 has increased the willingness of ARVN to redeploy regiment-
size units into Cambodia and thus keep the pressure on the enemy.
5. Net Effect
Due to the four factors described above, the enemy has been
forced on the strategic defensive in his struggle with ARVN.
B. The Cambodia Subphase
In the case of Cambodia, the North Vietnamese have been compelled
to seek by force the vital forward logistics facilities denied to them
after the ouster of Prince Sihanouk. This is the heart of the issue and
explains enemy willingness to expend against Cambodian targets those
resources which, while Sihanouk held power, had been allocated against
SVN. To ensure a safe and effective line of communication (LOC) which
can support their efforts against SVN,,the enemy has launched a campaign
within Cambodia with two objectives; (1) to neutralize the FAX forces
and to demoralize the Cambodian government; and (2) to organize a Khmer
Communist Party.
Approved For Release 2002 I PO : garii7T1T02095R000500230001-9
E LEI M:.61;11 4
Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000500230001-9
1. The Neutralization of FANK
In contrast to the Main War against SYN, the NVA do hold the
strategic initiative in their lesser battle against Cambodian forces.
The enemy's activities during the past year resulted in three accomplish-
ments:
a. The FANK forces were totally pushed out of northeast
Cambodia, allowing the NVA to control their vital LOC from South Laos
virtually unmolested on the ground. Efforts to place Khmer guerrilla
units in the area have been unsuccessful, and the enemy has upgraded his
main LOC to continue resupply during the wet season. Given air inter-
diction, the wet season through-put of supplies may not substantially
reduce the enemy munition shortages. On the other hand, the existence
of a secure LOC, which the enemy is attempting to use regardless of
weather, poses a long-term threat to the security of SVN MRs 3 and 4 --
a threat which may become severe as our air. operations are curtailed.
b. By diverting 11,000 NVA soldiers against Cambodian
targets, the enemy has tied down in defensive positions a 180,000-man
Khmer army. The FANK response to enemy pressure has allowed the NVA to
successfully employ economy-of-force tactics. Prisoners have alleged
that NVA squads are dispatched to harass and pin-down full FANK battalions,
while the FANK tend to report small contacts as major attacks. By forcing
the Khmers to worry about their towns and roads, the enemy has prevented
offensive maneuvering by the FANK.
c. To neutralize the GOC, the enemy has moved to isolate the
cities from the countryside, which has been largely abandoned by the FANK
forces, and to deny Phnom Penh access to Cambodia's only port. In this
effort, the enemy appears to be carefully expending his resources, content
to keep up the pressure as long as the cost is not high while refusing
decisive combat when FANK makes a resolute and competent push.
2. A Khmer Communist Party
The neutralization of FANK may be remediable by external aid
and advice. However, the NVA have also been active in giving assistance
and advice to Khmers, and the Government of Cambodia is engaged in an
organizational race for control of the rural population.
There is no evidence that the NVA have been willing to divert
its leadership, manpower, and logistic resources in the quantities which
would be necessary to exploit in a short time-frame the governmental
vacuum in the rural areas. Rather, the NVA appear to be following a game
plan, similar in style and time-phasing to the growth of the Viet Cong,
which is designed for slow and steady communist progress in organizing
the countryside.
Approved For Release 20
F
PaRgOrRET78T02095R000500230001-9
%.4AA,
Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000500230001-9
The proselyters of the Lao Dong Party have developed several
propaganda themes which they are exploiting. From intelligence sources
and from POW interrogations*, the following points have emerged:
5
The Lao Dong Party has dispatched experienced cadres into
Cambodia to work with dissident elements, such as the Khmer Rouge. NVA
soldiers are acting as advisors to some Khmer Rouge units, and in other
cases are integrating Khmers into NVA units. The NVA claim to support
Sihanouk, whose stock still appears to be high in rural areas. Sihanouk
maintained that as long as he was Premier, there would be peace. When
he left, there was war. The NVA claim the war is between the Sihanouk
forces and the Lon Nol forces, who are "American lackeys." When asked why
they are in Cambodia, the NVA say they are there only temporarily to help
the Khmers and ask the people to judge by the NVA actions who is the true
enemy. This invites contrast between their own careful conduct and use
of small bore weapons on the one hand, and the undisciplined depredations
of the ARVN and their heavy use of air and artillery on the other.
By cloaking themselves as liberators, the NVA seek to
justify their prespce and organize local support in the countryside they
occupy. This is largely done by organizing Khmer political fronts and
presenting them as the true representatives of the people. These fronts
then serve as the vehicles to organize the countryside politically and
militarily in support of the North Vietnamese Army. For the sake of
wider credibility, the NVA surrender, in name, much of their autonomy by
subjugating their own activities to Khmer Rouge interests. However,
little control is in fact given the Cambodian Reds and none that is
harmful to the purpose of the NVA.
If the Lao Dong organizational work is successful and
an indigenous communist force becomes sufficiently powerful, the objective
of the NVA to provide a Cambodian base for their operations in South Vietnam
will spawn a second war -- that of a Khmer Communist Party against the
Government of Cambodia. In the long term, this "breeding potential" places
the existence of the Khmer Republic in jeopardy. In the short term there
is the danger that, as the FANK forces build up, so will the Khmer Communists.
One military force could offset the growth of the other, resulting in a
stalemate in which FANK would not have the surplus forces to join with ARVN
in offensive operations against the NVA.
As things now stand, the FANK profess little concern about
the countryside they have abandoned, being convinced that ethnic differences
preclude the organization of Khmer by any group of Vietnamese. Thus, while
the FANK plan for rural pacification is two months behind schedule and has
not yet begun, the Cambodian government sees no reason for urgency. Occur-
rences during the next dry season will demonstrate whether the Cambodian
* Unable to interview in the countryside, our sources were the
handful of available NVA prisoners in Cambodia and, therefore, we are
talking about a potential danger rather, than an established fact.
Approved For Release 2001p
veLoI.
ki
r
8T02095R000500230001-9
m ui 6
Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000500230001-9
officials were correct in assessing a low priority to pacification or
the NVA has been successful in mobilizing a sizeable portion of the
rural population.
C. Enemy Options
Given the enemy situation as described above, there are three
basic courses of action for the 1972 dry season (November 1971 through
May 1972) open to the NVA units operating in Cambodia opposite SVN MRs
3 and 4. They are: (1) attack South Vietnam in force; (2) attack the
Government of Cambodia in force; and (3) continue protracted war.
1. Attack South Vietnam In Force
This option seems the least appealing alternative to the NVA,
given current assumptions concerning munitions and manpower drawdowns in
Cambodia. Due to ground and air interdiction efforts, the enemy has been
obliged to consume more arms and munitionsthan he has received over the
past 18 months. It appears unlikely that the NVA would launch major
attacks against SVN MRs 3 and 4 during a period when they are uncertain
of adequate resupply.
The same reasoning applies to manpower. Heavy losses, if taken
without prepositioning replacements, would seriously degrade the enemy's
ability to defend against an ARVN counterstrike against Kratie or Stung
Treng. Loss of either of those Cambodian towns would cut NVA logistic
lines to the south. Given that gain-loss equation, it appears doubtful
that the NVA would attempt an attack in force against either SVN MR 3 or
4 in 1972.
2. Attack the Government of Cambodia In Force
The primary constraints upon this option are enemy goals and
force diversion. Concerning goals, it is assumed that the NVA would expend
sizeable quantities of munitions and men against Cambodian troops (backed
by U.S. air) only if such action in a substantial way served their purpose
in SVN. The NVA cannot govern Cambodia directly and, even if a puppet
Khmer government were placed in power, it is questionable whether SVN
would allow Chinese munitions ships to once again enter the port of Kompong
Som. In addition, too much attention to objectives in Cambodia might lure
the NVA into a force diversion which would expose their vital LOC east of
the Mekong to ground interdiction. The NVA must keep two to three divisions
protecting Chup as long as ARVN forces threaten the enemy's LOC. In this
sense, RVN's self-interest protects the self-interest of the Government of
Cambodia. The NVA do not dare to ignore ARVN by moving in force against
the GOC.
(i"Vn
Approved For Release 2a0-2107/30
VrZ78T02095R000500230001-9
'Oft OLitirLitE.
Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000500230001-9
3. Continue Protracted War Under Adversity
7
This option differs from the two above in that it would
represent for the NVA more a recognition of reality than of desire. It
would simply be an admission, in terms of resource allocation by the NVA,
of a physical fact of life: that the RVN possess the strategic initiative
in the actual border areas of Cambodia and that a big push against Cambodian
objectives would not compensate for the risk and costs. Thi's option would
call for high-point attacks in SVN MRs 1 and 2 to gain political leverage
in the U.S. and to demoralize the people of SVN. This strategy would keep
pressure on SVN.
In Cambodia, the NVA would continue to build both supply stocks
and the Khmer Communist Party. By adopting a Laos-type scenario of short,
sharp attacks and long lull periods, the EVA would seek to demoralize
rather than destroy the FANK. If the FANK forces showed signs of crumbling,
they could expect the EVA forces to come on with renewed vigor, not by
diverting more forces to the battle but by increasing the tempo of opera-
tions of their forces already committed. (The EVA forces committed against
Cambodian targets are fighting at a rate of intensity four times less than
the tempo of operations in, for instance, Quang Nam province in SVN.)
This Protracted War option would be a recognition by the EVA
that in 1972 the situation in Cambodia would not change substantially. Thus,
1972 would be a building year for all. This option appears the most
probable event.
II. THE MILITARY SITUATION
A. The Character of FANK
1. Tempo of Operations
Throughout the Cambodian countryside, there is a general lack
of the physical evidence of war. This impression comes from the relatively
small amount of damage caused by explosive ordnance, the few bridges
destroyed, and the intact condition of most of the buildings. Moreover,
during the past year, less than 3% of the Cambodian infantry strength
were killed in action -- compared to an average of 9% for ARVN, who are
better trained, led, and equipped than FANK. Battle statistics also
indicate a significant increase in attacks by fire and small-unit harassing
tactics. The nature of these contacts is not severe and the damage is
comparatively light.
FANK is disposed in an overwhelmingly defensive posture.
The primary mission of 85% of the 24 battalion-size units visited was to
defend the ground they occupied. The Commanders of these units limit their
actions to squad and platoon-size patrols ranging on an average three
kilometers from their unit location. Eighty percent of all reported con-
tacts occurred along the lines of communication. The conclusion to be
drawn is not that there is no conflict, but rather that the nature of
the battle is light and the initiative belongs to the enemy.
n.rt F7t1
Approved For Release 200M7/aigtoltigEOP78T02095R000500230001-9
htSt ZflasLitl 8
Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000500230001-9
2. Ammunition Distribution
A hoarding phenomenon affects FANK's offensive operations.
Unit commanders interviewed indicated a reluctance to initiate combat
operations that were likely to require a significant expenditure of
ammunition. This same attitude generally restricted expenditures of
ammunition for training purposes. Due to unresponsive resupply procedures,
commanders refuse to expend ammunition without strong provocation,
believing such action would increase their vulnerability in the event of
enemy contact before the ammunition has been replaced. Therefore, it
was common for a commander to indicate a desire for more ammunition.
However, none of the commanders interviewed were at that time, nor had
they ever been, out of ammunition.
The FANK G-4 and Director of Materiel both acknowledged the
principle of pushing ammunition down to the units. However, they also
recognized their inability to do this, saying that the best they could
presently hope for was to ensure an adequate ammunition supply at military
region headquarters. It was then the business of the unit to complete the
resupply. However, transportation is a missing link; 23 out of 24 battalions
visited had no vehicles. The most wealthy battalion in this regard that
we encountered owned two trucks. In no case did we find transport that
was considered adequate to responsively meet the needs of a maneuver
battalion.
3. Initiative
Enthusiasm for war in the abstract is not enthusiasm for
warfighting in the mud and heat. Most FANK units on the battlefield
are no match for MA units of like or smaller size. The Cambodian
soldiers do not seek contact. Although the reasons for this are complex,
the recognition of MA prowess is believed to be a significant deter-
rence. The tendency not to seek offensive military operations is
encouraged by the strong central command-and-control procedures of FANK.
Operational orders originate in only one of two places -- either FANK
headquarters (referred to in awe as "The High Command") or, at the Military
Region headquarters. Orders issued by subordinate commanders are done so
in strict compliance with the instructions received from FANK headquarters
or the Military Region.
4. Firepower
Another notable characteristic that directly impacts on the
FANK military capability is the widespread lack of organic firepower, as
well as the failure to integrate and apply the available firepower. At
the time of our visit, there were only 54 105-howitzers in all of Cambodia.
Of the battalions visited, 70% had eight or less mortars; the average
battalion had five mortars of all calibers. Half of all mortars inspected
had no sights or other aiming equipment. An estimated one-third of all
mortars were Chinese 82-millimeter mortars in which U.S. 81-millimeter
ammunition is fired.
Approved For Release 201
r
/3Q4:6
Dr78T02095R000500230001-9
E ,ak:-.1nLilf. I
Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000500230001-9
9
Of the 24 battalions sampled, 50% never used artillery and had
never been supported by tactical air. -In the case of those units who had
used artillery or close air support, the fires were adjusted by the battalion
commander. Typically, the battalion commander feels that he is the only
member of his command skilled enough to adjust fires.
5. Communications
The FANK units are constrained by the lack of communication
equipment. The average battalion possesses seven radios with which it
must communicate with higher headquarters, subordinate companies, and
available fire support. As a result, normal coordination is minimal,
and reports are generally fragmentary and late.
Of 9,000 radios in the FY 71 MAP, only 3,000 have been
delivered to date.
6. Military Skills
It was clear at all levels that there is a great need for
people who know what they are doing. By generous standards, only 35% of
the FANK officers can be considered trained, with another 35% being former
NCOs. Thirty percent of the officers have been assimilated directly
into their positions without prior experience or training. The situation
is most critical in the combat specialists skills of weapons crewmen,
communications, medics, and small-unit logistics. Our sample indicated
that one-third of the battalions have received no training, with the
remainder ranging from partially trained to about 35% that are considered
well-trained.
The total effect is that of a slow-moving army encumbered by
a lack of supplies and poor leadership, and with little appreciation for
the integration of military operations*.
B. FANK In Perspective
1. A State of Seige
Cambodia is in a state of seige. Only the Mekong and a few
National Routes remain open, and their future as supply routes is far from
a certainty. Cambodia is being isolated and divided -- isolated by inter-
diction and divided by the loyalties of the people of the cities and the
agrarian culture of the countryside. The pattern is not new. The urban
population is subject to a government information system and has been
exposed to political concepts, whereas the farmer is insulated by a lack
of communication.
2. Esprit
The strongly nationalistic Khmers see themselves in the midst
of an interminable mobilization to maintain a free Cambodia. Their efforts
in this regard are directed by the three-phased Lon Nol strategy that calls
--na E:n. nu-17
Approved For Release 2400/y7/49b,Meti BP78T02095R000500230001-9
aiCA3LiEl 10
Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000500230001-9
first for Holding and Building -- holding the centers of national wealth
while building toward a position of offensive strength. The next phase
is the Base Expansion, a process of increasing the area, population, and
resources controlled by the Government of Cambodia from which the final
Offensive Phase of the strategy to reclaim total control of the country
is to be launched.
Although relatively untested in a direct contes2t, the FANK
leaders believe that they are locked in an intense struggle with the Army
of North Vietnam. The Khmers allege a deep dedication and faith in
ultimate victory. They are eager to recount their battle's and tell of
their success. This enthusiasm is undimmed by the actual magnitude of
the reported events. Khmer nationalism is held to discount the possibility
of a division of loyalties between the urban and rural population. This
identity relegates all ideologies to a lesser status and is regarded as
uneffected by foreign influence.
Concern must also be voiced over whether or not the FANK
will be able to overcome their deficiencies in time to save Cambodia.
It is clear that FANK depends, as they must, on U.S. military assistance
to pull them from their present status up to a more viable position. All
inquiries referring to FANK shortcomings were met with an optimistic
response. Even the Americans in Cambodia are eager to contrast FANK's
meager beginnings with their continuing initiative to build an army.
However, the Cambodians have been mobilizing for more than a year and,
while they have much to show for their efforts, much more could have
been accomplished. A brief examination finds their efforts incomplete
when compared to the vital nature of the task they face. The issue is,
therefore, how.much time is needed to gear for war. Yet, there is
no phased schedule of objectives to identify requirements or measure the
progress made. An institutionalized response attesting to FANK's youth
and enthusiasm is offered to explain their poor performance. The explana-
tion is not persuasive.
C. Military Assistance Program
The assessment confirmed that without assistance the Government
of Cambodia cannot meet its military requirements. The United States
portion of that assistance is critical to the Cambodians. In view of the
undetermined, but nonetheless finite, time factor within which the Govern-
ment of Cambodia must build its forces to a level capable of defeating the
enemy, military assistance must be responsive to Cambodian needs. There-
fore, periodic analyses of the military situation are required.
Four factors have surfaced during our assessment which impact on
the U.S. Military Assistance Program:
1. Hidden Costs
Of immediate concern'are the costs of MAP which have been
borne by other services or organizations rather than by MAP funds. For
example, normally 10% of the MAP program is dedicated to the packing,
nefe?-,F2a_ cuoar,-)72
Approved For Release 2g, pflaikaichtyP78T02095R000500230001-9
E
Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000500230001-9
crating, handling, storing, and transporting of MAP goods. However,
because the Cambodian MAP is using Service warehousing and storage
facilities in SVN, which the recipient. country normally provides, these
costs are expected to increase significantly. To date, some of these
costs have not been borne by MAP. Moreover, the important Mekong River
supply route has largely been sponsored and financed by the U.S. Navy,
which has accepted the major portion of the repair and support costs for
the river fleet.
2. Ammunition
11
In the 1972 MAP program, ammunition costs amount to 60% of
the program. Ammunition planning for Cambodia has been based on ARVN
offensive expenditure rates. Thus far, both the tempo of the action and
the actual rates of expenditure in Cambodia have been considerably below
those experienced in the Republic of Vietnam. As a result, some savings
may be possible by programming ammunition stockage for Cambodia at a more
realistic level, thereby releasing additional program funds for other
military items. (The Services are pressing for sufficient funds to
introduce a Cambodian ammunition pipeline in lieu of continuing the support
through Vietnam.)
. 3. Cross-Funding
There is a current shortfall of approximately $76 million
in the FY 72 Cambodian MAP plan. In view of this deficit, a review of
all assistance programs for Cambodia -- specifically, aid funds -- would
determine whether non-MAP funds can be used to buy military-related items.
4. Expenditures
About $75 million of the FY 71 $185 million authorized had
been delivered by May of 1971, despite, the high and obvious demand. The
stated rationale is that deliveries are not to exceed FANK's absorptive
capacity. Yet our assessment revealed the urgent need for additional
equipment at the battalion level, such as individual equipment and mortars,
which FANK could absorb right now with minimum training.
5. MAP Coordination
From a rather austere beginning, the U.S. MAP for Cambodia
has become the second largest U.S. assistance program. However, the
assessment team's observations at the unit level pointed up equipment
deficiencies which officials at higher levels, both U.S. and Cambodian,
assumed to have been remedied by. the U.S. MAP program. In fact, this
program is designed to support an 85,000-man force in FY 71 and is being
diluted when spread among 180,000 men. Moreover, MAP deliveries to
Cambodia are running slow and delivery from Phnom Penh to the unit level
is a major deficiency in FANK.
Approved For Release 2q)@;P/3SE 78T02095R000500230001-9
12
Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000500230001-9
U.S. personnel limitations and to a much lesser degree FANK
reluctance has limited on-site inspections and unit visits. It appears
that the two principal U.S. agencies responsible for execution of the MAP
are operating with conflicting objectives. On the one hand, the Embassy
views the guidance of a low U.S. profile in Cambodia as the operative
constraint. In contrast, the MEDT views the objective of building.FANK
to a 220,000-man forces as the overriding consideration.
The urgency of the situation and the extremely limited
program in the early stages dictated a departure from the normal MAP
procedures. .Since these instructions have been issued, significant
changes have occurred both in terms of the size of the MAP and the organ-
ization to administer the program. The lines of authority for efficient
administration of the MAP are not clear and are presently interpreted in
conflicting terms by the various field agencies.
D. ARVN In Perspective
As was indicated in the Enemy Situation, the emergence of a
friendly government in Cambodia has contributed significantly to the
improved internal security of southern SVN. This is especially true of
SVN MR 3, where pacification is proceeding apace. The VSSG Control Indica-
tor has risen from 47% in February of 1970 to 71% in March of 1971.
In MR 4 also, the main force was has continued to improve during
the current dry season as ARVN has applied pressure against four enemy
base areas. One of these -- the Seven Mountains area -- has reached the
point where the Joint General Staff (JGS) is planning to redeploy a
regimental combat team for operations across the border. The enemy threat,
however, is low in the Cambodian area closest to MR 4, so the ARVN regimental
task force operating out of MR 4 will also help hold open the Mekong,
currently the economic life-line to Phnom Penh.
Additionally, it may be necessary for RVN to continue to conduct
the bimonthly naval escort convoy to Phnom Penh. The JGS is dissatisfied
about the costs of this naval support and their reluctant compliance may
prove an additional spur to the GOC attempts to hold open a land route
to the sea.
Finally, it should be pointed out that the JGS is well aware of
their limitations and of reduced U.S. support. While they believe cross-
border operations in the northern sectors of SVN -- opposite MRs 1 and
2 -- would be strategically more effective in 1972, they are more apt to
limit themselves to sorties from MRs 3 and 4, where terrain, LOCs and rear
areas are safer. To cope with the flareups expected next year in the
northern two MRs, the JGS is relying upon reinforcements from the two
General Reserve Divisions, perhaps buttressed by a Provisional Ranger
Division. Movements by the General Reserve, however, should not affect
the planned cross-border operations of the ARVN forces regularly assigned
to MRs 3 and 4. The area of greatest concern is the Chup rubber plantation,
to the west of MR 3 and Saigon. The JGS plans to use between one and
three ARVN divisions to offset the two to three enemy divisions in that area.
fra r:17
:
Approved For Release 2 BD / '!1 AMI P78T02095RD00500230001-9
k
We,-.040FICI..
Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000500230001-9
13
ARVN has the troops to do so, because the enemy divisions around Chup
were formerly within MR 3. RVN plans, as stated by the JGS Deputy Chief
of Staff, and the current employment of ARVN units both reflect a Viet-
namese perception that it is in their own best interests to operate in
force inside Cambodia. They intend to continue to do so throughout the
next year, even though they anticipate a diminution in U.S. air and
logistic support. At the least, these operations should tie down between
two and three enemy divisions, enhancing security inside South Vietnam
and limiting the pressure which the enemy can apply against Cambodia.
In sum, the most probable course of events in Cambodia during
the 1972 dry season will see the enemy placing first priority upon the
protection of his north-south logistic LOC, which runs from South Laos
to the Chup area. Provided the ARVN retain the initiative and maneuver
so as to pose a threat against that LOC, the enemy in Cambodia should
remain on the strategic defensive and, because of logistics constraints,
should not be able to mount a strong attack threat against SVN MRs 3 and
4.
Hence, Cambodia does not appear to be a critical problem for
RVN in 1972. In fact, RVN should benefit from the situation in terms of
increased internal security.
However, the NVA are fighting a two-track war: the political
revolution within SVN and the main force threat to SVN. Even as the
political revolution wanes, NVN still retains the capability for main force
combat. The enemy position at Chup presents a long-term main force threat
to southern SVN. We will probably see a stalemate there in 1972, based on
an RVN reluctance to absorb casualties and an NVN necessity to restock
supplies. In 1973, a reduction in U.S. air interdiction is likely with
a refurbished main force enemy in Cambodia on the one hand, opposing
increased internal security in SVN on the other. In the long term, a
stalemate around Chup which sees three NVA and three ARVN divisions glaring
at each other is a benefit for NVN. The leaders of SVN may have to be
prodded to look beyond 1972 in order to see this.
E. Cambodia and Vietnamization
The situation which exists between the Government of Cambodia awl
the NVA is not expected to change sharply enough during 1972 to have a
major impact on Vietnamization. The ARVN will continue to operate in
Cambodia, but a Major drain on RVN resources to shore up the GOC appears
unlikely. Equally improbable is the emergence of a strong, aggressive
FANK capable of putting pressure upon the NVA base in Cambodia.
It is in 1973 and beyond that Cambodia will emerge as a plus or
minus to Vietnamization. If the GOC becomes seriously entangled fighting
a Khmer Communist Party, RVN resources may be diverted to shore up the
GOC, with a resultant net deficit accruing to Vietnamization. On the
other hand, if FANK grows stronger and more aggressive, the GOC, in concert
with RVN, will be pressing in on the NVA enclave in northeast Cambodia
and the progress of Vietnamization will be improved.
rD (ZFATLI,
Approved For Release 20 / 78T02095R000500230001-9
E 14
Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000500230001-9
For this reason, the events of 1972 need to be watched as a
harbinger of things to come.
III. FORECAST
A. RVN
Next year will probably see a stalemate between NVA and ARVN
in Cambodia (1) because the NVA must replenish their manpower and supplies
and (2) because the ARVN appear war-weary and politically constrained to an
acceptable number of casualties. This situation should .allow internal
security in SVN MRs 3 and 4 to improve, provided the ARVN in Cambodia
apply enough pressure to keep the NVA tied down in the Chup area. An
increase in internal security may free more ARVN units for operations in
1973 in Cambodia. By then, FANK may be able to contribute offensively.
On the other hand, the enemy may increase his strength in the next year.
We simply do not know. In the Main War in Cambodia, 1972 will be a year
of building for both sides.
B. GOC
In the Subphase War of the NVA versus the FANK, we do not expect
a sharp deterioration in the position of the GOC. But we are concerned
about two potential dangers:
1. Accommodation
If the sacrifices for prosecuting the war become costly
(and they are not now), the GOC may seek an accommodation with their former
"business partners." Since RVN will most likely not permit a reopening of
Kompong Som to enemy shipping, an accommodation could be struck with the
NVA desisting in their efforts to organize a Khmer Communist Party in
return for use of eastern Cambodia.
This development would not be a severe blow to Vietnamization,
since the FANK has not as yet manifested an offensive capability. It would
free the 11,000 NVA currently targeted against Cambodia, which would be a
significant but not overwhelming gain for the NVA.
2. A Civil War
The development of a Khmer Communist Party could proceed
through two phases. In the first phase, FANK would be tied down fighting
Khmers. This development would not be a severe blow to Vietnamization,
but the attendant publicity could adversely affect the level of our aid
to the GOC. In the second phase, the Government of Cambodia might fall,
with new leadership sympathetic to the Lao Dong Party then seizing power.
Psychologically and physically, this would be a severe blow to Vietnamization.
An RVN attempt to blockade Kompong Som against the strenuous objections
of the Cambodian Government might prove politically disastrous.
.mn eurtm-73.
Approved For Release 20U07/3831Mi-,101378T02095R000500230001-9
OLULik: I
Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000500230001-9
IV. THE ISSUES
A. The Time Remaining
Cambodia has used about one year in its mobilization program.
The findings of the assessment team indicate that their efforts have
fallen short of the requirements. There is still some time left,
estimated at approximately one year, within which the GovernMent of
Cambodia must meet its mobilization goals or, failing that, accept a
decreasing probability of success with each passing day.
B. Needs of the Government of Cambodia
The findings of the assessment indicate three areas of concern:
1. Training
15
The Government of Cambodia requires a training capability,
in or out of country, which will provide a qualified army to preserve the
Republic.
2. Logistics
The Khmer army needs an adequate logistics base that will
provide the materiel needed to fight the war.
3. Active Prosecution of Strategy
The national strategy must be aggressively executed. To date,
this has not been the case.
C. Needs of the United States
In Cambodia; the constraint of a low U.S. profile has become a
goal in itself and is operating virtually as a national objective, as
opposed to the true objective of preserving the Government of Cambodia.
In order that U.S. actions support national goals, representatives of
the United States operating in or for Cambodia must be guided by direc-
tives which adapt to the changing situation.
An accurate overview of military progress, measured against time-
phased objectives, is lacking. This is in contrast to our Vietnamization
experience which has provided a unity of effort in achieving national
goals through an explicit program which integrates the responsibilities
of U.S. agencies, their field representatives and, where possible,
participating third countries.
Approved For Release 2po rAiP78T02095R000500230001-9
Approved For Release 2002/07MMIAMDP78T02095R000500230001-9
eXL-OgIAL, fa: 16
ANNEX 4 - The Threat
I. From CDTCPAC J2: "NNA Manpower/Munitions/Food Input Options into
Cambodia: June 1971 - December 1972."
II. The MACV J2 Enemy Order of Battle comparative recapitulation for
Cambodia and for SVN MR 3 from February 1970 through March 1971.
III. A Summay of some salient themes which emerged from POW interrogations
in Cambodia.
Approved For Release 2002/07SE
P78T02095R000500230001-9
elm=
Approved For Release 2002/07478T02095R000500230001-9
I. NVA Manpower/Munitions/Food Input Options into Cambodia:
June 1971 - December 1972
Q. What is the current number of VC/NVA battalions in the "dual threat"
area inside Cambodia; i.e.,. capable of attacks on either the GKR or .
GVN?
A. Strength of VC/NVA combat and administratiVe.forces broken down by
areas opposite RVN MR's 2, 3, and 4 (as of 1 April 1971):
1. MR 2
Combat (3 Bns) 1500
Admin svcs 7500
? Total 9000
2. MR 3
Combat (51 Bns) 16000
Admin svcs 24000
Total 40,000
3. MR 4
Combat (9 Bns) 2400
Admin svcs 1100
Total '3500
Q: How does present disposition of VC/NVA forces in dual threat area
compare with the situation in July 1970?
A. Strength of VC/NVA combat and administrative service forces broken
down by areas opposite RVN Mr's 2, 3, and 4 '(as of July 1970)
1. MR 2
Combat (11 )3ns). 4800
Admin svcs . 8300
2. MR 3
Combat (43 Bns)
Admin svcs
3. MR 4
.Combat (9 Bns)
Admin svcs
12;700
19,800
2600
1100
Q. If there is a marked differenCe, why?
17
A. A marked difference in the areas opposite RVN MR's 2 and 3. For
MR 2 the difference is due to redeployments into RVN and Laos of several
combat units to include elements of the 24th, 28th, .66th and 95B NVA
Regiments. For MR 3 the difference is due to additional deployments from '
the RVN into Cambodia as well as the arrival. of 1971 infiltration replacements.
gAApproved For Release 2002/ CIALDP78T02095RD00500230001
Approved For Release 2002/0 EqDP78T02095R000500230001-9
Q. What is the current number VC/NVA battalions in Cambodia targetted
only against Cambodia?
A. Strength of VC/NVA combat* forces targeted only against Cambodia
by FANK MR. (as of 1 April 1971):
1. MR 1
900 (3 Bns)
2. MR 2
7900 .(17 Bns)
3. MR 3
800 (3 Bns)
. MR 4
1100 (3 Bns)
5.. 'MR 5
900 (2 Bns)
"
adrilnistrative service forces have yet been identified in this
category.
Q. How does present disposition of VC/NVA forces targeted against
Cambodia Compare with the situation in July 1970?
A. The strength of VC/NVA forces presently targeted against
Cambodia is estimated at 11,600. It .July 1970, the enemy was
almost exclusively deployed in defensive reaction to allied cross-
border operations, with only limited forces in FANK MR 2 and 5
targeted against Cambodian installations. No precise breakout of
forces thus committed is available, but the best estimate of VC/NVA
strength in Cambodia is approximately 49,000 by end July 1970, and
of this number as many as 4,000 combat troops were oriented against
Cambodian targets.
Q. How are VC/NVA forces in the "dual threat" area inside Cambodia
supplied: (a) with food, (b) with munitions?. How does the process
differ for those units targeted only against Cambodia?
A. (Reference VC/NVA logisties Factbook (Second Update) 1 April 1970.)
1. The enemy has a fairly complex and efficient supply system in support.
of his forces throughout Southeast Asia. Insofar as possible the
enemy will procure' needed supplies from th:e local market. Monies
reeuired for needed purchases are obtained primarily through a taxation
system. The populace in VC/NVA controlled .or contested areas pay tax
in money or goods in kind. Goods are apnverted to money instruments
which in turn is distributed throughout the system for use in local
procurement.
O 1
Approved For Release 2002/A ; DP78T02095R000500230001-9
18
Approved For Release 2002/0M4r4WROP78T02095R000500230001-9
tl,P bff. 1 19
?
2. As the taxation base supporting the VC/NVA diminishes, increased
amounts of money instruments must be imported from NVN or countries
supporting NVN. However, the principle of local procurement inso-
far as possible holds. Available information indicates that the bulk
of enemy supplies are obtained as follows:
a. Foodstuffs. Southern MR II, III, and IV of RVN and Cambodia:
predominately local procurement. Food deficient areas of southern MR
II and III of RVN and northeast Cambodia are supplied from the food
surplus districts of this area. Northern RVN, local procurement with as
much as 307 possibly imported from NVN.
b. Clothing. Initial issue is carried by the individual when he
infiltrates from NVN. Replacements predominately obtained through local
procurement.
C. Military equipment. Equipments that have a commercial use
. (entrenching tools as example) are obtained looally. Equipments
of purely military value are predominately. imported With a significant
amount'obtained by battlefield capturc-.------
d. AMmunition. The bulk of ammunition requirements must be imported./
HOwever some, possibly significant amounts continue to be obtained by
battlefield capture and local manufacture.
3. One supply system serves enemy forces located in Cambodia and in
southern RVN.. Consequently, it is effectively impossible to breakout the
supply status by units located in various portions of this area or by the
threat posed by units in this area. Since July 1970 CINCPAC has viewed
the supply status of units in RVN MR III and IV and in Cambodia as a
package. The only variableis difficulties imposed by distribution
distances, i.e. even though supplies are available in the system,
their delivery to a unit operating on the Ca Mau peninsula is far more
'difficult than delivery to a unit operating in northern Cambodia.
4. Viewing this area as a package, it is generally food surplus
and contains a relatively dense population (taxation base). Consequently
it is concluded that enemy food, clothing and the bulk of military
equipment requirements can be obtained locally. .
A large quantity of weapons were.captured during cross-border operations,
but many were old family retrograded weapons. With reduced enemy strength
in the area, weapons resupply .is not expected to be critical to the
enemy's selection of, options at least through mid CY 1972. Consequently
the enemy's current critical import requirement is ammunition.
Approved For Release 2002/0
aii1P78T02095R000500230001 -9
Approved For Release 2002/02/4A,T..1FiRDP78T02095R000500230001-9
c2)?UctL
Q, Prognosticate. Regarding enemy logistics, what are the worst,
best and most probable cases during the separatedry and wet seasons
which will occur before January of 1973?.
A.
1. Worst. On the high range of 769 tons the enemy logistically
could mount a seven day attack on Saigon if the enemy were willing
to face total supply exhaustion before resupply could be accomplished.
2. Bekst. On the low range of 64 tons, he would probably husband this
as a reserve for unforeseen contingencies.
20
3. Probable. It is believed the enemy will continue his economy of
force operations, attacking extremely lucrative targets of opportunity.
while attempting to restock his supply system to the March 1970 levels.
(The above estimate applies, regardless of season, until January 1972.
Projection beyond this date is limited by unknown friendly capabilities).
4. Analysis of prognosis through begtnning 1971:-72 dry season
throughput.
a. Most of current enemy expenditures, particularly in southern RVN
is due to FWF initiated actions. Consequently it is doubtful that the
.enemy can significantly reduce his current level of consumption.
b. Faced with the 1 Dec 1971 balance sheet the enemy can be
expected to conduct limited offensive actions only under the following
circumstances.
(1) Overruns of FWF outposts when the probability of capturing
more ammunition than is expended is great.
(2) When his remaining stocks are threatened. In this instance
he can be expected to tenuously defend his reserves.
(3)) When the target or objective of the attack is extremely
lucrative while offering minimuM risk.
(a) The opportunity of decimating a FWF unit while suffering .
no risk of counter action.
(b) An opportunity to reap an extreme psychological/
political gain at minimum risk and cost (i.e. ABF/Sapper/Terrorist
attacks against Phnom Penh).
5. Prognosis through the 1972-73 dry season throughput is more difficult.
It is not believed that the enemy will withdraw more units from the
Approved For Release 2002/1fig:iiWRDP78T02095R000500230001-9
g4N
Approved For Release 2002/0MIWTP78T02095R000500230001-9
RVN nos. divert more supplies therefrom. However, as reduced U.S.
air assets cause air interdiction to become less effective, supply
throughput can be expected to increase out of proportion to the
degraded effectiveness. Reduced ground interdiction or threat
of ground interdictions would also release significant ground forces
from LOC security in Laos for employment in Cambodia or RVN. While
such a prognosis could be made its validity will be entirely dependent
on estimates of the effectiveness of residual U.S. air resources
and the degree of improvement of RVNAF and FANK to include paramilitary
forces.
Q. What are the independent variables and critical assumptions which
drive this prognostication?
A. An estimate of supply posture, considering ammunition as his critical
requriement, is subject-to significant variables because of numerous
factors that can noe be accurately quantified.
a. How much ammunition remained after May-June 1971 cross-border
operations? We now have an accurate estimate of the amount of ammunition
input through Kompong Som' (Sihanoukville),from 1966 through 1969. We
know how much ammunition was captured. during cross-border operations.
However,, estimates of how much the enemy shot or lost to capture and
destruction during 1967 through 1969 can"not be accurately assessed.
Our best .estimate is that he had 1000-1700 tons of ammunition remaining
after cross-border operations.
b. The enemy overran the national depots at Lovek and kompong
Speu, the district depot at Stung Treng'and smaller but significant
depots at Siem Pang, Virachy and other areas. Contacts in which
FANK withdraws probably'result in battlefield captures. Although
FANK reports state that all ammunition was either evacuated or
destroyed, the probability exists that some (but an unknown amount)
of ammunition was captured.
? c. Estimates of daily consumption (expended, captured and destroyed)
is considered acceptably accurate for MRs III and IV of RVN. Knowledge
of enemy consumption in Cambodia is totally dependent on FANK reporting.
,Many incidents are not reported by FANK and those that are, are believed
to be inflated. As a consequence best estimates to date of consumption
in Cambodia are developed by extrapolation of consumption in MR III and
IV of RVN.
d. Considering these variances, the enemy is estimated to have the
following ammunition tonnage.available in his Cambodia/southern.RVN
supply system:
(1) Remaining after cross-border operation 1000-1700
(2) Input from Laos through 21 Apr. 1158
(3) Probable input by steel-hulled trawlers 200
E.) 17 ir
Approved For Release 2002/1,%6d.114Leat-RDP78T02095R0.00500230001-9
21
Approved For Release 2002/07/SiggiP78T02095R000500230001-9 22
(4) Total
.2358
(5) Minus daily consumption 1 Jul 70 7 21 Apr
(@
(1770)
6 STPD)
(6) Total available 21 Apr 71
588-1288
(7) Possible Laos throughput through mid-May
.600
(8) Possible additional throughput until
height of wet season
400
(9) Total availability until input resumption
for 1971-72 dry season (1 Dec 71)
1588-2288
?
(10) Minus additional draw-down @ 6 STPD until
1 Dec 71
(1524)
(11) Available for high points or stockpiling
64-764
Q. At what level of munition g (and in what geographic configuration)
can the enemy legitimately be considered to pose a credible threat
against Saigon? Against Phnom Penh?
A. Two division equivalents with attached anti-Aircraft units
ittacking Saigon for a period of .seven days plus an 'additional 12'
battalions at a lower level of holding actions would require an -
ammunition availability of about 550-600 tons. The enemy would
compensate for heavy supply loss due to pre-stock captures and air
dist-ruction. Therefore it is doubtful that the enemy would consider
an attack of this magnitude with less than 750-800 tons of ammunition
pre-stocked. If the enemy should have this amount of ammunition
available in his COSVN supply system it is doubtful that it would
be cached much forward of the Kratie area. It is possible that the
enemy could move supplies to the Cambodia/RVN border by truck, but
further movement would have to be by man-pack, animal cart or waterborne
logistics craft.
For an attack on Phnom Penh the level of stockage would be the
same. Since the VC/NVA control few of Che roads between Kratie and
Phnom Penh, movement would be almost exclusively by man-pack,
animal cart, or boat.
Approved For Release 2002/13*3e: d7VRDP78T02095R000500230001-9
Approved For Release 2002/0S
rg-FDP78T02095R000500230001-9
Q. What level of input with what lead times would he need to establish
in order to move towards a credible offensive attack posture?
A. To minimize the possibilities of detection, it is doubtful that.
the enemy would employ more than 20 trucks per night to the border
(80 tons) and transship the following night. As numerous routes would
be used from the border a further move' of about 160 KM would be
required. Given the worst possible situation that the enemy could move
all 'supplies by cart or boat (carts about two tons, small boats
about One ton) about 50 vehicles would be' required for each nightly
shuttle of about 20 KM. Therefore 20 trucks would be active in
Cambodia for about 10 days,and starting with day two, fifty vehicles
shuttling would'increase to a peak of 400 vehicles active. The
entire move would require 18 days.
The logistics lead time for an attack on Phnom Penh would be
shortened to approximately nine days. Input level would remain the
same.
Q. Would we detect such a build-up, if so, and when? What is the
range of possible error?
A. Although the enemy would spare no effort to move supplies
discretely with the number of vehicles involved and a large number
of transshipment points, the possibility of detection would be good. '
The most probable period of detection would be at the height of
movement or 8-10 days lead time. In order to carry out these attack,
however,. the enemy would also have to reposition the participating main
force units.
.The movement toWitin 20-30 KM of the target area could be delayed
until a week prior to the attack. Based .on current disposition of
enemy forces, movement lead times of at least two weeks for Phnom Penh
and 30 days for Saigon should provide ample opportunity for detection.
Q. It is alleged that Lam Son 719 may have resulted in over 6,000 tons
of enemy supplies captured, 'consumed or destroyed. How does that break
out between munitions and food?
A. The final MACV report on Lamson 719 reflected 20,000 tons of
ammunition and 1,282 tons of food captured or destroyed.
rar
Approved For Release 2002/M.
P41
RDP78T02095R000500230001-9
23
Approved For Release 2002/
lar1RDP78T02095R000500230001-9
Q. It is alleged that Lamson 719 resulted in only about 257 as much
throughput reaching SVN/Cambodia as of 23 March as was true last
year. What is the significance of such an allegation? That is, how
does it relate to enemy capabilities in Cambodia? Does it affect the
rate and intensity at which they can prosecute the .war in Cambodia?
If so, how and why?
A. There has been no known allegation that Lamson 719 resulted in
only about 25% throughput reaching RVN/Cambodia compared to last
year. However; Lamson 719 along with increased effectiveness of
air interdiction, increased irregular operations (as exemplified by
Operations SILVER BUCKLE and DESERT RAT) and increased consumption
required by additional NVN units in.Laos have combined to restrict
the enemy's throughput into Cambodia and RVN to about 337 of the
throughput into RVN last year. Thus far .this year (20 April) it is
estimated that the enemy has throughput 6260 tons from Laos compared to
18,525. tons last year.
To understand the significance of this reduction in SEA, the
loss of an average of 15 .tons per day of ammunition that was available
through Kompong Som prior to March 1970 must be considered. This
year's total estimated availability of 6260 tons compares to 23,925
tons last year. As relates to Cambodia, we estimate that the entire
availability of supplies through Kompong SC:kin (a consumption availability
pf about 5,400. tons per year) was destined for forces in RVN MR III and
IV. This year, he must sustain his forces in southern RVN as well as
Cambodia with a maximum estimate of about 2,350 tons (1350 estimated
to have been throughput plus 600 tons that could enter Cambodia
prior to the onset of the wet monsoon and as much as 400 that could
be throughput before heavy rains stop all traffic). After considering
draw downs for a low level of operations (see discussion of questions'
1 through 8) the enemy would have available only about 60 to 760 tons
for stockpiling or offensive actions. We expect the enemy to hold
a portion of this reserve to protect the stocks from being overrun by
FU operations.
Although the enemy would retain the logistics capability to mount
selective high points or offensive, the objective would have to be
sufficiently lucrative for the enemy to accept a "go-no-go" prpposition.
That is, the enemy would understand that if he failed to accomplish
his objective, his ability to continue even the current low level of
activity might be negated.
/1311,,,
?
Approved For Release 2002
RDP78T02095R000500230001-9
24
Approved For Release 2002/ D P78T02095RD0050023000V9
Ogie24.TR
Q. It is alleged that in March of 1970 the enemy was massing to
strike into GVN MRs. What was the strength, disposition and munition
level of those forces then? What was it in March of 1971?
A.
25
1. In mid-March 1970 there were 17 MNVA regiments comprising
elements of four divisions, operating along the RVN/Cambodia border
with an estimated combat strength of 24,000 men. Disposition of
these forces is shown on the attached map.- Prior to the allied cross-
border operations, based on an analysis of input minus consumption,
it is estimated that the enemy had about 5,000 tons of ammunition in
base areas. A lower figure of about 2,800' tons is based on an estimated
18 month resupply cycle with no consideration given consumption or BDA.
2. In mid-March 1971 these forces had been augmented by both replacements and
a new regiment' from NVN and by creation of two new regiments. However,
many of the units had moved well into the interior of Cambodia. Along
the border, the enemy forces still stood at 17 regiments and an
estimated combat strength of 24,000 men. Disposition of these forces
as well as those in the interior is shown on the attached map. The
estimated stockage in border base areas cannot be currently estimated,
however, overall stockage available as far south as the Kratie area
is estimated to have been approximately 300-1000 tons as of mid-
March 1971.
Q. What is our best estimate of the average number and size of enemy
battalions and guerrillas operating in Quang Nam Province from Nov
1968 through May of 1969? What is our best. estimate of the number
of tons of munitions supplied to them during that period?
A.
1. The following are average enemy strength figures for Quang Nam
Province during the November 1968 - May 1969 time-frame:
a. Number of battalions - 19
b. Battalion strength 240 - -
c. . Guerrilla forces - 3600
2. The tonnage of munitions supplied to Quang Nam Province is not
available. However an estimated 2001 short tons. was supplied to
enemy forces in MR-I dUring the period. Based on the proportion
of enemy strength in Quang Nam Province a pro-rata figure of 25-30
percent (500-600 tons) of the MR-I tonnage was probably supplied to
the province,
1
Approved For Release 2002/0 . IDP78T02095R000500230001-9
Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000500230001-9
\
Re* tui
_
ekta
1,014 PHA"
BO KHEO
(.77
PLEIYA
I
CA,acea
_
I- "---K0MP2NG,TH0M
9
a!":"
, 0?O
? ",?\\ ChAMCAR
o0a
mEAS?il
-a.; ? 0
. .
r o""\--""n
PRE K KAK
KRATIE
L.?
p BAN M'E THUOT
PHNOM
SPELl -
SVAI ATOk\
.(ark,3j? -P11; 'i.,.....)
's if;::5?4.1 "..#
, I
-.---e?P t4 k.
rlu i BA?
KEEf ..,,?,,
'6% a'al's i Ls:1,N LOC
atR> iCali.,,^ ' AN ' 0 > >
OK3cc
0oHT
o
0
CO -R
CD I
fri 0 0
0
7
02095R000500230001-9
P1
3 A I_L'Ve:JJ?S 1 N I IA1 CV
>
m
0 1? W
C
r P1
C?I > 00
11 0 Z
P1?
D(D0 H
r
App;oved For Release 2002/07/30:
714
. -
T02095R0005002300011
- TAB 3 -f (Annex F)
fiParcik
Approved For Release 2002/0 k DP78T02095R000500230001-9
ANNEX G
ABBREVIATED MILITARY ASSISTANCE PLAN
CAMBODIA
Background, Objectives, Guidelines,
and Constraints
Approved For Release 2002/077313':
P78T02095R000500230001-9
75
SLIv ann-
Approved For Release 2002/07gg1LUI4.AIDP78T02095R000500230001-9
ABBREVIATED MILITARY ASSISTANCE PLAN
CAMBODIA
76
Background
The U.S. Military Assistance Program (MAP) in Cambodia had its
origin in the small MAAG Indochina established as a result' of the
Pentalateral Agreement of 23 December 1950, a mutual defense assistance
treaty with France and the associated states of Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam.
The MAAG was established to administer equipment sent to the French (and
through the French) to indigenous forces in the area to combat the spread
of communism in Southeast Asia. In 1954, following the French defeat at
Dian Bien Phu, MAAG Indochina was split into MAAG Cambodia and MAAG Vietnam.
Subsequent MAP Cambodia was administered on a modest scale. Aid
granted during the period 1950-1964 amounted to 03.2 million. This aid
included the provision of 20,000 carbines and 3,000 wheeled vehicles.
Part ofthe equipment remains in use but its condition and distribution'
are unknown.
From 1960 to 1963, a primary objective of the MAP Cambodia was to
strengthen the Cambodian forces against subversion and insurgency. This
objective was achieved to a very limited degree through the delivery of
substantial amounts of arms, ammunition and equipment; through construction
of numerous facilities; through efforts to develop the country's ability'
to produce basic items of military clothing and to maintain, repair, and
rebuild MAP weapons and equipment.
In 1963, Prince Sihanouk renounced U.S. assistance, claiming that the
United States was supporting the Khmer Serei movement against the Cambodian
government. The MAAG withdrew in December and was formally discontinued
in January 1964. No grant aid was programmed in the period FY 64-69.
Reasons for failure, in the opinion of the-CHMAAG Cambodia, varied from
U.S failure to recognize a smoldering grudge against colonialism and an
inability to change Cambodian preference for French training, to a lack
of coordination between the MAAG and USAID and a failure to support ade-
quately a commitment to maintain Cambodian independence.
U.S. military assistance resumed on 22 April 1970 Increasing
hostile action early in 1970 by the Viet Cong (VC) and North Vietnamese
Army (EVA) caused the Cambodian government to seek aid from not only the
U.S. but also South Vietnam and Thailand. The growing enemy threat
demanded prompt response and development of a military assistance program.
Q,r-spr
Approved For Release 2002/0*?joktPkIDP78T02095R000500230001-9 Annex G
01,7 rt p_kza
Approved For Release 2002/07/411Z;n4NR78T02095R000500230001-9
77
Additional assistance has been proevided by both the United States and
the Republic of Vietnam through delivery of captured weapons and ammuni-
tion to Cambodia. This supplemented the same 18,000 individual weapons
Cambodia had previously received from Communist China and related sources
prior to 1970.
The actual strength of the Cambodian forces in 1960 was estimated
to be 28,000, of which 26,000 were Army. The Cambodian forces increased
to the MAP authorized 31,000 by the end of 1962. In February 1970, strength
of Cambodian Armed Forces (Forces Armees National Khmer - FANK) was estimated
to be 35,000 with 1,300 in the Air Force and 1,600 in the Navy. This strength
rapidly increased and, as of 30 June 1970, was reported to be over 110,000.
On 1 December 1970 the strength of FANK was reported to be 178,000 regular
and 35,000 self-defense forces. During April 1971, FANK planned for the
reorganization of the Armed Forces and established a mobilization manpower
ceiling of 220,000 personnel for FY 72.
Lack of training and poor communications, problems existing in 1964,
continued to be matters of concern in 1970. Additionally, rapid buildup
of forces was accomplished through mobilization of reservists, enlistment
of volunteers and conscription; the introduction of these inexperienced
men increased the need for an extensive training program.
Objectives
To provide the Cambodian Armed Forces the capability to sustain
national independence and neutrality.
To develop Cambodian Armed Forces sufficiently capable to disrupt
NVA/VC base areas and LOC's in Cambodia with a corrollary objective of
facilitating Vietnamization of the war in South Vietnam.
To encourage and assist Third Country efforts in support of Cambodia.
Guidelines
Assist in the development of an organizational structure for the
Cambodian Armed Forces, capable of exerting effective command and control.
Assist the Cambodian Armed Forces in the establishment of a functional
maintenance and logistics system to support U.S. furnished equipment.
Assist the Cambodian Armed Forces in developing TOE and tactics
compatible with the RVNAF and RTARF.
To maximum extent feasible, phase-out nonsupportable arms and equip-
ment of third country origin and equip selected FAUX units with appropriate
U.S. manufactured arms.
u310,'Ir
Approved For Release 2002/07litYt*-RDP78T02095R000500230001-9 -
Annex G
.......c:Tor,r6t4IL...1'
Approved For Release 2002/0r-rst DP78T02095R000500230001-9
Constraints
78
(For FY 72) Support selected GhR forces, not to exceed 220,000, with
critical equipment and supplies unavailable from other sources.
No U.S. military personnel in Cambodia will act in an advisory or
training capacity.
Vietnamization continues to. be the top priority of U.S. aims in
Southeast Asia. Therefore, U.S. assistance for the defense of Cambodia
should be compatible with progress in Vietnamization.
Dollar guidelines,
annual program:
($ Millions)
FY 72
FY 73
FY 74
FY 75
FY 76
FY 77
MAP
200
275
225
175
125
125
Supply Operations
20
27.5
22.5
17.5
12.5
12.5
rfl:ir
x?,yLla.1
Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000500230001-9%nnex G
STATI NTL
STATI NTL
Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000500230001-9
TRANSMITTAL SLIP
TO:
ROOM NO.
REMARKS:
Attached is one
Military Assess
for your info.
FROM:
ROOM NO.
FORMFE 1'51?
l5 241
REPLACES FORM 36-8
WHICH MAY BE USED.
DATE
?
AI
opy of the
ent in Cambodia
(47)
Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000500230001-9
STATI NTL