HANOI'S OPTIONS AND PROBABLE STRATEGY CHOICES DURING THE PERIOD FROM APRIL 1971 THROUGH DECEMBER 1972

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T02095R000300250001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 48
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 22, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 26, 1971
• Content Type: IM

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25X1 12 Apr 71
ER IM 71-72 - for SRG Meeting
(Hanoi's Options and Probable Strategy-
Choices During the Period From April 1971
Through December 1972)
Ito DD/OER memo re Assessment of VSSG Control
Indicators
No Date Table re Military Strategy, Force Augmentation, Mininum
Time Required to get the Infiltree Increment into
Place, by Case
Attachment: Table: Enemy Force Manpower Requirements
under Various Friendly Redeployment
Options, no date
25X1 13 Apr 71
No Date
23 Apr 71
26 Apr 71
No Date Blind Memo, Effects of a "Lam Son" Force Level on
the 1971-72 Dry Season Requirements
26 Apr 71 ER IM 71-72, Hanoi's Options and Probable Strategy
Choices During the Period From April 1971 Through
December 1972 (distribution list attached)
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Attached ate two copies of
this analysis of enemy strategy
alternatives during 1972 requested
in your memorandum of 15 April. I
an also sending copies of this
study to the SRG principals and
to General Bennett.
Richard Helms
Attat:
ER-ZM 71-72
Copies 1 & 2
26 April 1971
'(DATE)
FORM N lOl REPLACES FORM
AUG 54 WHICHMAYBEUSED,?:,....',
MEMORANDUM FOR: The . David Pac ^- d
Ate is the CIA anglys,
anwor strategy alternatives
during 1972 requested by Dr.
iesi.ng+er in his memorandum of
15 April. fte report is on the
agenda, for the SRG meeting
scheduled for 27 April.
attacIN"t
ER In 71-72
Copy . 3 & 5
26 April 1971
(DATE)
Io AUGN 54 loi WHICH RELACES FORM
USED.
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EC T
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Idexti.Cal
- copy . 6
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M,06.7% Copy 4 sent to Secretary Laigid
via SAVA
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-MEMORANDUM FOR: DDCI
The attached study, a joint effort of
the Agency components concerned, is the CIA
analysis requested by Dr. Kissinger for the
SRG meeting scheduled for tomorr
2 7 Apri 1.
puty Director
Economic Research
Attachment:
ER IM 71-72, April 71,
Copy #11.
APR 1971
(DATE)
FORM I AUGN 54 101 WHICH RELACES FORM
USED.
MEMORANDUM FOR:
George,
Here is your copy (No. 13)
plus Copy No. 4 that you wanted to
send to Secretary Laird.
Attachment:
ER IN 71-72
FORM I AUGN 54 101 WHICH RELACES FORM
US10-101
ED.
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Distribution:
Orig. Addressee
nn/(HER
DD/OER:
126 Apr 71)
Identical Memos sent to:
DDI
D/OCI
Ch/DDP/FE
Ch/DDP/FE=
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MEMORANDUM FOR:
The Hon. Ray Cline
Attached is the CIA analysis
of enemy strategy alternatives
during 1972 requested by Dr.
Kissinger.
Attachment:
ER IM 71-72
Copy No. _~E
zrector
ECOnomic Research
BE IO-IOj
FORM GN 54 IOi WHICH RELACES
MAY FORM
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-( GATE)
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NO.H 1074.9'5
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TYPE OF MATERIAL
ENVELOPE(S)
PACKAGE(S)
DAT DTI PICCKK-UP
ORIGINATING I n
OFFICE LOG G
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Intelligence Memorandum
Hanoi's Options And Probable Strategy Choices
During The Period From April 1971 Through
December 1972
SECRET
ER IM 71-72
26 April 1971
Copy No.
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WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
GROUP I
EXCt IIUEU FROM AUTOMATIC
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DEC I ASSIFIC ATIUN
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
26 April 1971
Hanoi's :Options And Probable Strategy Choices
During The Period From April 1971
Through December 1972
Introduction
This memorandum's primary object is to analyze
the manpower and logistics constraints likely to
impinge on the. Vietnamese Communists' strategic
choices from now through the end of 1972. But
logistic and manpower considerations are neither
the sole nor even the primary determinants of
Hanoi's strategic decisions. Hence, we also
attempt to put these-factors in proper perspec-
tive -- that is, the perspective from which they
are viewed and weighed in Hanoi.
I. Hanoi's Objectives and Concept of the Struggle
1. For more than 40 years the Vietnamese Com-
munist party has struggled to unify all of Vietnam
under its political control. Because of the his-
torical context within which this long struggle
for power has been waged, the Party's unswerving
pursuit of its paramount objective of political
control has necessarily entailed the simultaneous
pursuit of two related objectives: crushing all
indigenous (Vietnamese) opposition to Party rule
and expelling from Vietnam all foreign presence,
especially military. presence, capable of consti-
tuting an obstacle to the Party's political ambi-
tions.
2. During their four-plus decades of struggle,
the Vietnamese Communists have fought with courage,
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tenacity, and a ruthlessness born of intense con-
viction. Despite the loss of two key members
through death (Nguyen Chi Thanh in July 1967 and
Ho Chi Minh in September 1969), there have been
no significant changes in or additions to the
Politburo for more than a quarter of a century --
a period during which the Party's non-Communist
Vietnamese opponents have lived under a bewildering
variety of governments and a period that has en-
compassed six American Presidents.
3. One key element of the Vietnamese Com-
munists' underlying world view is the conviction
that they are tougher, more resilient, and
possessed of more staying power than any of their
opponents -- domestic or foreign. This convic-
tion is coupled with, and buttressed by, a scorn
for their opponents -- again both domestic and
foreign -- whom the Communists, as an article of
faith, deem lacking in equivalent motivation or
determination.
4. The Vietnamese Communists believe they
were cheated out of their rightful spoils of
victory after the French abandoned Indochina,
primarily because the United States opted to
sustain an anti-Communist regime in South Vietnam
after the Geneva Conference of 1954. When the
1956 elections provided for in that agreement were
not held and the Diem government failed to collapse,,
the Communists set out in the late 1950s to eradi-
cate the non-Communist political structure in South
Vietnam by whatever combination of subversion
and armed force might prove necessary.
5. After the United States assumed a direct
participatory role in the military struggle in
1965, Hanoi tailored its strategy primarily to
wearing down the US will to persist -- just as
the Party's strategy during the Franco-Viet Minh
struggle had been primarily tailored to eroding
the French will to persist. Subsequently, cap-
tured documents reflecting decisions made by the
Party's Central Committee in December 1965 demon-
strate that the Communists then envisioned sev-
eral more years of hard but militarily inconclu-
sive fighting, which would be followed by negotia-
tions in which the United States would agree to
a political settlement on Communist terms.
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6. Much has happened in Indochina during the
six years since the United States intervened in
force, yet Hanoi's objectives and its basic stra-
tegy for pursuing them have not appreciably
altered. Firmly embedded in and central to the
Communist view of the whole struggle are two re-
lated ideas: that of outlasting the United
States and that of ultimately inducing or com-
pelling the United States to abandon the struggle
in a manner likely to collapse the will and
capacity of the. Party's non-Communist domestic
opponents to resist the imposition of Party rule.
Various types of reliable evidence indicate that
Hanoi believed that the United States might be
ready to negotiate its way out of Vietnam in the
spring and summmer of 1969, but Communist docu-
ments dating from that period acknowledged that
the war might drag on for a long time before the
United States could be brought to make the kind
of fundamental political concessions that would
produce a settlement on Hanoi's terms -- and
Hanoi is not yet ready to consider settlement on
any other terms. Events of the intervening two
years have dampened these tentative 1969 Hanoi
hopes, but the Vietnamese Communists still regard
as basic the idea that the US involvement can be
brought optimally (for them) to an end, not by
driving US forces out of Vietnam (as French forces
were never driven out of Vietnam) but by a
negotiated solution that produces the results
the Party thought would be produced by its 1954
settlement with the French.
7. While the Communists very much want the
United States out of the struggle, at the same
time they are violently opposed to President
Nixon's clear policy of relatively rapid disen-
gagement through Vietnamization. The answer to
this seeming paradox is that what Hanoi does not
want -- indeed, clearly feels it must endeavor
to thwart at almost whatever cost -- is to see the
United States curtail its presence in a way. that
leaves behind a viable, confident, and. reasonably
effective non-Communist strture even potentially
capable of indefinitely thwarting the Party's
quest for power over all of Vietnam. What Hanoi
does want is to have the United States get out in
a way that, of itself, helps collapse effective
Vietnamese opposition to Communist rule.
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II. Hanoi's Targets
8. In assessing Hanoi's probable behavior
and its view of its strategic options, it should
be remembered that the Party targets primarily
on its enemies' will, not their territory. In
Hanoi's eyes, the struggle is a struggle for
political power to be pursued by any and all
methods or techniques capable of contributing to
this objective. It is not a struggle for terrain
or conventional military objectives per se. Over
the next year the Vietnamese Communists' mix of
actual actions will probably be directed against
three primary targets.
9. First, and at the moment probably the most
important in Hanoi's eyes, is the will and attitude
of the American electorate. The Vietnamese Com-
munists know, and acknowledge, that they beat the
French not through force of arms but when continua-
tion of the struggle became a politically unsale-
able commodity in Paris. Hanoi's highest current
aspiration is to see continuation of the struggle
become equally unsaleable in Washington. Hence
Hanoi's action choices over the next year or so
will be heavily influenced by its estimate of the
immediate or short-term impact these actions. are
likely to have on American domestic opinion.
10. Second, Hanoi's actions will be targeted
against the unity and confidence of the Communists'
domestic Vietnamese opposition. The Party is
clearly determined to do everything it can to
foment discord, strife, discouragement, and de-
featism within the GVN's military and civil estab-
lishment and among the South Vietnamese populace.
11. Third, and closely related to the other
two, Hanoi clearly wishes to target against South
Vietnamese confidence in continued US assistance
and support. Hanoi will do everything possible to
poison relations between the United States and
South Vietnam and exacerbate any extant sources of
friction. The concept Hanoi wants to sell in South
Vietnam is that the United States is an unreliable
partner on the verge of being compelled by domestic
pressures to opt out of the struggle, leaving the
South Vietnamese without resources sufficient to
carry on the struggle alone.
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III. Factors Hanoi Must Consider
12. As it attempts to devise action packages
that will further its objectives and attack its
chosen targets, there are certain basic factors
that Hanoi must weigh: The first of these is the
overall situation itself. Over the past two years,
the broad trends in South Vietnam and developments
in Cambodia and Laos have generally run in direc-
tions adverse to Hanoi's interests. From Hanoi's
point of view, these trends must be checked, for
the attitudes Hanoi wishes to induce in the minds
of its opponents will be difficult to implant if
the overall situation does not change or -- in
Allied terms -- improves during a time when the
direct US presence and degree of military involve-
ment in the struggle progressively decreases. In
endeavoring to reverse these trends -- and indeed
in all its actions -- Hanoi must, however, be con-
scious of the political risk of public failure.
If it wants to project an image of growing Communist
strength and capacity, Hanoi can ill afford to
attempt major actions that appear unsuccessful.
13. One particular factor the Communists must
assess is the net impact of Lam Son 719, an opera-
tion which has come to be invested on all sides
with a considerable degree of psychological and
symbolic importance. The North Vietnamese had
anticipated such an operation for some time and
were quite concerned over the impact such an
Allied move might have on their ability to sus-
tain their forces farther south.
14. But because it weathered the operation and
its forces were able to mount a counterattack that
made the position of the South Vietnamese in Laos
untenable, Hanoi's confidence in its longer term
prospects probably has been enhanced. Hanoi prob-
ably calculates that ARVN, on its own, would have
great difficulty in mounting further cross-border
operations of this magnitude once the US is largely
out of the picture. In addition, Hanoi may now be
more confident that the South Vietnamese will be
unable to contain Communist forces over the longer
term as the US withdraws from Vietnam.
15. Some broadcasts from Hanoi suggest that
in the wake of the Lam Son 719 operation the Com-
munists are more inclined to believe the time is
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ripe for mounting stronger attacks against South
Vietnamese forces in order to challenge the
strategy of Vietnamization. An article published
early in April asserts, for example, that a
Vietnamized Allied force such as the South Viet-
namese in Laos cannot cope with an adversary
fighting a "bit campaign of annihilation" waged
by large, concentrated formations. It says flatly
at one point that the results of the operation show
the Communists are fully able to defeat the Allies
militarily -- a boast notably absent from Communist
commentaries in the past two years. This writer
does not argue that Communist tactics in Laos can
be transferred to all of South Vietnam. He acknowl-
edges that Communist forces in some areas must
stick to guerrilla warfare, but he implies that when
conditions are appropriate the Communists should
strike hard and decisively as they did in Laos.
16. Another factor clearly figuring in Hanoi's
calculations is what Hanoi sees as a sharp rise
in the tide of opposition to the war within the
United States -- a theme prominently played with
considerable supportive detail in the North Viet-
namese domestic press. Hanoi has often miscal-
culated American opinion and the impact of Viet-
namese Communist actions on American policies.
Nonetheless, heavily influenced by its experience
with the French, Hanoi's leaders are convinced
that domestic opposition to the war within the
United States constitutes one of their strongest
political assets. During the latter part of 1970,
Hanoi appeared to be discomfited by President
Nixon's success in muting or disarming US critics
of the war, particularly after October when his
proposals for a cease fire and an international
conference received widespread endorsement in the
United States and abroad. Its own comments show
that Hanoi is clearly heartened by the current rise
in the decibel count of US opposition in the wake
of Lam Son 719 and the Calley trial verdict.
Indeed, current US reactions to Lam Son 719 -- or
at least the way that operation was generally
reported have almost certainly strengthened
Hanoi's inclination to conclude that strong Com-
munist military action that can credibly be por-
trayed as successful is among the best methods of
intensifying opposition to the war within the
United States as it did in France in the early 1950s.
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17. The Hanoi leadership is certainly aware
that events over the next year or so are likely
to affect the Vietnamese Communist Party's for-
tunes and prospects well into the 1970s. The
October 1971 Vietnamese presidential election pro-
vides both opportunities and risks for Hanoi.
If, regardless of who actually wins, the electoral
process diminishes the credibility and interna-
tional acceptability of the GVN or has a divisive
net impact on the South Vietnamese body politic,
then Hanoi's fortunes will have been improved.
On the other hand, again regardless of who actually
wins, if the electoral process contributes more to
unity and cohesion than divisiveness, then Hanoi's
prospects will have suffered a setback.
18. In Hanoi's eyes, however, the US elections
in 1972 and the political campaign preceding them
probably have an importance considerably greater
than that of the Vietnamese elections in 1971.
Hanoi clearly regards President Nixon's present
policy of Vietnamization and gradual US disengage-
ment as a major threat to Vietnamese Communist
ambitions. They would clearly like to see a situa-
tion and climate in which President Nixon either
was obliged to abandon the Indochina struggle or
else was defeated by an opponent publicly and un-
ambiguously committed (a la PZendes-France when he
succeeded Laniel in 1954) to the speediest possible
disengagement from the Indochina entanglement.
This, of course,,is the result Hanoi would most like
its actions to produce. We will now turn to the
question of Hanoi's capabilities for mounting
actions designed to increase the likelihood of
such a result.
IV. Logistic and Manpower Constraints
19. In the military arena, Hanoi's capabili-
ties are in large measure a function of logistics
and manpower. The logistic and manpower con-
straints on possible enemy actions in 1972 have
been analyzed with reference to seven possible
enemy strategies. Case I, the minimum case,
assumes a continuation of the protracted warfare
with its occasional high points which was typical
of 1970. Case VII, the maximum case, assumes a
sustained general offensive throughout South Viet-
nam and Cambodia. As intermediate cases we have
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also analyzed the logistic and manpower require-
ments to support more limited offensive strategies
confined to only one or two military regions, with
military action in the other regions being held at
1971 levels. The five intermediate cases are as
follows:
Case II - offensive confined to MR 1
Case III - offensive confined to MR 2
Case IV - offensive in both MR 1 and MR 2
Case V - offensive confined to Cambodia
Case VI - offensive in both MR 1 and
Cambodia
20. It should be noted that the strategies
discussed in this memorandum involve sustained
multi-battalion offensive actions over extended
periods of time. The Communists always have the
capability, however, to mount quickly actions
which would fall far short of the strategies we
are analyzing but would still be significant
escalations of the level df combat.
In this analysis
we make the following key assumptions:
a. The buildup of stockpiles and
force augmentations required for each
strategy would depend completely on the
performance of the Ho Chi Minh supply
system during a 1971-72 dry season of
eight months' duration.
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b. The air interdiction programs and
the associated BDA during the 1971-72 dry
season would remain at current levels.
c. The forces in southern Laos would
be held at the level maintained there at
the beginning of the current dry season --
80,000 troops.
d. The logistic and manpower require-
ments needed to implement each strategy
would be roughly equivalent to the average
maintained during 1968.
In this section we discuss our estimated require-
ments under the assumptions stated above, first
from the point of view of logistic considerations
and then of manpower requirements. The impact of
various changes in these assumptions is discussed
in Section V.
Logistics
22. Table 1 presents our estimates of the
daily input of supplies which would have to be
moved into southern Laos from North Vietnam
during the 1971-72 dry season to support each
of the alternative strategies. To give some
appreciation of the logistic feasibility of these
tasks, the input requirements are also compared
with our current estimates of the actual tonnages
which will have been put into the Laos system
during the 1970-71 dry season.
23. If the mid-points of our estimates are
used to compare input requirements and actual
performance during the current dry season, we
find that all of the alternative strategies ex-
cept Case VII -- the country-wide offensive --
would be feasible by the end of the 1971-72 dry
season.
24. If, however, the actual performance of
the logistic system were at the low end of the
range -- 295 tons a day -- Hanoi's choice of
strategic options would become more limited.
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In this circumstance Case IV (MR 1 & 2), Case VI
(MR 1/Cambodia) and Case VII (GVN/Cambodia) would
not be feasible during the 1971-72 dry season.
Case V, an offensive confined to Cambodia, would
under our model be technically feasible, but the
margin between input requirements and performance
at the low end of the range is so narrow that the
attainment of this capability during the next dry
season would be questionable.*
25. If performance of the logistic system
were at the high end of the range -- 370 tons a
* See paragraph 29 for a discussion of factors
that would change substantially the judgment on
Case V.
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day -- all of the alternative strategies, even
Case VII (the country-wide offensive) would be
feasible. However, in this case the margin is
so slight that even on logistic grounds we believe
Hanoi would feel constrained to await the start of
the 1972 dry season in order to ensure a reliable
supply line before attempting such a major offen-
sive.
Timing
26. The amount of time required to build up
the stockpiles required to support each alternative
strategy is shown in Table 2. The time required
ranges from a low of 20 days in the case of an
offensive strategy confined to MR 2 to a high of
314 days for a sustained countrywide offensive in
Cambodia and South Vietnam.
27. The calculated times should be regarded
as orders of magnitude only. They are, for example,
based on the assumption that supplies move through
the logistic system at a uniform daily rate. The
system, of course, does not work quite this smoothly.
It takes a certain amount of time for the system
to crank up and for stocks to be rebuilt. Thus, at
the beginning of the season, supply movements would
be considerably below the average rate for the
season. And later in the season, actual performance
would exceed the average. The speed with which any
one capability could be attained would also be
determined by the proximity of the area chosen for
offensive activity to North Vietnam. Given these
considerations, it is reasonabie to assume that
it would take longer than 20 days to carry out the
logistic movements needed for Case III (MR 2) just
as it would take considerably less than 160 days to
satisfy the logistic requirements of Case II (MR 1).
In addition, it is possible that Hanoi would not
feel it necessary to build stockpiles as large as
those used in our methodology.
28. For these reasons the timing required for
any one strategy may vary by a month or two. A
more reasonable approximation of the times during
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the next dry season in which the logistic require-
ments for each strategy could be met is shown in
the following tabulation:
Probable Period of Satisfying
Logistic Requirements
During the 1971-72 Dry Season
Mid-
Early Season Late
(Oct-Dec) (Jan-Feb) (Mar-May)
Case I (1970 Pro-
tracted Warfare) X
Case II (MR 1) X
Case III (MR 2) X
Case IV (MR 1 & 2) X
Case V (Cambodia) X
Case VI (MR 1/
Cambodia)
Case VII (GVN/ Not
Cambodia) attain-
able
29. Although the tabulation indicates that the
logistic requirements for Case VI (MR 1/Cambodia)
could be met during the late part of the 1971-72
dry season, this could only occur under highly
favorable conditions. It would require a dry
season of maximum duration, and even then the
stockpiles would be established so late in the
season that the Communists would probably prefer
to wait until the next dry season to launch such
an offensive. These constraints would be loosened,
however, to the extent that the NVA still retain
stockpiles left over from shipments made through
Sihanoukville. We estimate that these stockpiles
could in fact have amounted to at least 2,500 tons
of arms and ammunition at the end of 1970. We
also note an increasing body of evidence indicating
that the flow of supplies into Cambodia during the
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current dry season may be considerably greater
than the very small amounts
30. Case VII (GVN/Cambodia) would not appear
to be feasible during the 1971-72 dry season.
If the North Vietnamese were starting from scratch,
we calculate that it would take 10-11 months to
build the requisite stockpiles. Under normal
logistic patterns it would be well into the
1972-73 dry season before the logistic requirements
for Case VII were attained. Two factors could
reduce the required time. The first is the possi-
bility of sizable stockpiles being in place in
Cambodia. The second would be to resort to wet
season supply operations. We estimate that Hanoi
could throughput from 1,200 to 3,000 ton's during
the wet season. This amount would be equivalent
to 30-70 days' consumption in South Vietnam and
Cambodia. Thus the existence of Cambodian stock-
piles, or wet season resupply activities, or a
combination of both would give the Communists a
logistic capability to implement Case VII quite
early in the 1972-73 dry season.
Manpower
31. The force augmentations that might be re-
quired for the implementation of the alternative
strategies discussed in this memorandum are shown
in Table 3. The estimated force augmentations
range from a low of 10,000 in Case III, an offen-
sive confined to MR 2, to a high of 60,000 for
Case VII, an offensive throughout South Vietnam
and Cambodia.
32. The burden of augmenting the combat forces
in South Vietnam and/or Cambodia will fall pri-
marily on North Vietnam, which will also be re-
quired to infiltrate sufficient additional man-
power to maintain its force levels throughout
South Vietnam and Cambodia. The following tab-
ulation shows the total annual infiltration
required if Hanoi felt compelled to maintain its
total combat force at its current strength of
115,000 troops at the same time that it was aug-
menting forces as required by each strategy:
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33. On an annual basis the total manpower
drain on North Vietnam could range from 100,000
to 300,000 troops.* The manpower drain would not
appear to be a significant constraint until the
annual levy approaches that required for Case Vi,
or 180,000 troops. An annual levy of this magni-
tude would pose strains on Hanoi's training capa-
bilities and force. some drawdown on trained man-
power reserves. The requirement for Case VII --
250,000 to 300,000 troops -- is so large and the
prospects of heavy losses so great that we esti-
mate Hanoi would be unwilling to undertake such a
commitment.
34. Whatever the strategy Hanoi should choose,
the force augmentations we estimate to be necessary
could all be completed in a maximum of six months.
The only strategy which would seem to tax the
capacity of the infiltration system is the country-
wide offensive. We estimate that the augmentation
of forces for this strategy.-- 60,000 troops --
would stretch out the normal travel time through
the infiltration system by 4-8 weeks. But even
It should be noted that these requirements are
a maximum case. Hanoi has demonstrated consist
entl'y that it can continue its current low profile
warfare, even though its forces are being allowed
to erode.
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this augmentation could be completed within six
months, or well before the dry season would have
ended. The force augmentations required for stra-
tegies centered around MRs 1 and 2 (Cases II-IV)
could be completed in six to eight weeks. The
force augmentations for strategies involving Cam-
bodia (Cases V and VI) would require at least four
months to complete.
V. Factors Influencing the Assessment of Offensive
Capabilities
35. The analysi.s of logistic and manpower con-
straints in Section IV was based on several key
assumptions in our model, any one of which, if
changed, could substantially affect our results.
In this section the analysis is now modified to
reflect changes in our assumptions that would seem
to be warranted to reflect the situation as it may
actually exist in mid-1972.
Timing of Resupply Activities
36. Our previous calculations assumed that re-
supply was carried out solely during a 1971-72 dry
season.of eight months' duration and completely
through southern Laos. The analysis could be varied
by reducing the length of the dry season, by postu-
lating an effort to move supplies during the forth-
coming rainy season, and by acknowledging resort to
sea infiltration or movement across the DMZ.
37. If the dry season is estimated conservatively
to last only seven months, the reduced input from
North Vietnam into southern Laos would be on the
order of 10,000 tons of supplies. The effect of
this shortfall would be to place further con-
straints on the strategic options available to
Hanoi. The NVA would still be able to support a
protracted war and to mount offensive campaigns
confined to MR 1 or MR 2. Case V (Cambodia) would
under our model also be marginally feasible, but
the other strategies would be closed out for the
1971-72 dry season. The new relationships are
shown in the following tabulation:
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38. If the North Vietnamese made an effort to
sustain a flow of supplies during the next wet
season, we estimate that they could move from
1,200 to 3,000 tons of supplies into South Vietnam
and Cambodia. This is equivalent to 30-70 days'
consumption at current levels of combat. The addi-
tion of this wet seasons'throughput would make all
of the alternative strategies logistically feasible
at an earlier point. Case VI (MR 1/Cambodia),
which in our previous analysis was only marginally
feasible, would now become possible before the end
of the 1971-72 dry season. Case VII (GVN/Cambodia)
would still be unattainable during the 1971-72 dry
season but the time required for its logistical
implementation would be reduced by 1-2 months.
Air Interdiction Variants
39. Our previous analysis of logistic factors
was made on the assumption that the air interdiction
program would produce BDA equivalent to 25% of
the supply requirements of the Communist forces
in southern Laos, South Vietnam, and Cambodia.
To the extent that the 25% BDA misinterprets the
volume of supply losses, our estimates of input
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requirements would be affected. In the absence
of any available studies on the type and sortie
mix of alternative air interdiction programs dur-
ing the 1971-72 dry season, we have recalculated
our input requirements at varying levels of BDA --
15%, 30%, and 40% -- and have compared them with
our original estimates based on 25% BDA. The
results are shown in Table 4.
40. At 15% BDA the enemy's resupply require-
ments would be reduced across-the-board, and even
the two most costly options -- Cases VI and VII --
would be more feasible alternatives from the
enemy's point of view.
41. Assuming a BDA factor of 30% does not
significantly alter the results based on a 25%
factor. Case VII (GVN/Cambodia) remains unattain-
able and the feasibility of Case VI (MR 1/Cambodia)
becomes even more questionable.
42. A BDA factor of 40% would raise input re-
quirements to a level where offensive options would
be further restricted. With BDA at this level the
only options available to North Vietnam would be
offensive strategies confined to a single area --
MR 1, MR 2, or Cambodia.
Southern Laos
43. We have assumed that North Vietnam would
keep a force in southern Laos of about 80,000 com-
bat and logistic troops, the same level maintained
at the start of the current dry season. If
during the 1971-72 dry season Hanoi had to cope
with an operation similar to that of Lam Son 719,
the logistic and manpower requirements in southern
Laos would increase substantially.
44. If the same number of troops were deployed
to southern Laos as were sent in to cope with
Lam Son 719, their maintenance, even without
combat, would require an additional daily input
of 15-20 tons of supplies into southern Laos.
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If we assume an incursion of the approximate total
impact of Lam Son 719, the incremental burden on
the logistic system could be as high as 30-50 tons
a day.
45. The addition of this burden to the logistics
would put a substantial crimp into Hanoi's options.
Cases IV (MR 1 & 2), VI (MR 1/Cambodia), and VII
(GVN/Cambodia) would clearly be precluded, and
even Case V (Cambodia) would become marginal in
our model.
Logistic and Manpower Requirements
46. Our analysis to this point assumed that the
manpower and logistic requirements placed on the
North Vietnamese to mount any of the strategic
options would be roughly equivalent to those
maintained during 1968. This analysis was made
without reference to the effect of US troop with-
drawals and redeployments by ARVN forces over the
next 12 months.
47. To consider these variants, we have restruc-
tured our analysis on the basis of a 9 April draft
study prepared by the Military Capabilities Panel
of the Vietnam Working Group. We have focused
on two variants presented in the 9 April study:
-- a US residual force of 153,000 in
mid-1972.
-- a US residual force of 43,400 in
mid-1972.
48. On the basis of these variants, and assuming
that the North Vietnamese could retain offensive
capabilities by maintaining the ratio of friendly
to enemy forces the same as they are currently,
our estimates of enemy manpower requirements
have changed substantially, as shown in the
following tabulation:
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49. Under Variant 1 the maximum augmentation
required, as in Case VII, is reduced from 60,000
to 40,000 troops. Under Variant 2 the maximum
augmentation required is only 28,000 troops. The
force augmentations for more limited strategic
options are correspondingly reduced and in man-
power terms the options require only a small
drawdown on North Vietnamese resources. In the
case of Variant II the withdrawal of more than
25,000 US troops from MR 1, coupled with the pro-
jected absence of ARVN redeployments to the area,
would make it possible for the NVA to mount sus-
tained offensive operations without augmenting
the force already deployed in the area.
50. In terms of total infiltration require-
ments -- force augmentation for each strategy plus
the infiltration necessary to maintain other forces
at current strength -- the two withdrawal rates
change the model considerably. In our basic
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analysis we had assumed in the maximum case that
mounting and sustaining an offensive throughout
South Vietnam and Cambodia would require manpower
inputs similar to those maintained in 1968 --
250,000 to 300,000 troops. Under Variants 1 and
2, where the US presence is so drastically reduced,
the assumptions underlying this estimate appear to
be no longer valid. Given the projected situation
for mid-1972, it seems likely that enemy casualties
would decrease from their current levels and that
maintenance of force structures (as in our minimum
case) could be carried out with infiltration of
less than 100,000 troops.
51. We are unable at this time to quantify the
extent to which infiltration requirements would be
reduced by mid-1972 under either Variant 1 or
Variant 2. This type of measurement requires fur-
ther analysis of such factors as the specific de-
ployment and role of US residual forces, the level
and types of air support, and particularly the
possible changes in enemy casualty rates. Pending
the completion of such studies we estimate provi-
sionally that the manpower requirements needed for
offensive activities in mid or late 1972 would
decline appreciably. Thus, under Variant 1 the
maximum offensive strategy would probably become
marginally feasible. Under Variant 2 this strategy
could probably be sustained without any serious
drawdown of North Vietnam's manpower reserves.
52. The projected withdrawals of US troops and
redeployments of ARVN would also produce unfavor-
able changes in the existing balance between
friendly and enemy main forces, as shown in
Table 5.* Even without augmenting its forces, the
balance by mid-1972 becomes increasingly favorable
for NVA forces in all regions but MR 2. The most
favorable areas for a possible offensive in mid-
1972 would appear to be in MR 1 where only a small
augmentation of enemy forces would produce maneuver
strength parity.
53. The fairly significant changes in manpower
requirements which could result from US withdrawals
* These balances are computed on the basis of
maneuver forces only and not of the total number
of armed personnel on both sides.
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Ratio of Friendly to Enemy / Combat Forces
in South Vietnam
Current
Variant -1
Variant 2
MR 1
1.8
1.4
1.2
MR 2 /
1.6
2.0
1.9
MR 3 c/
1.5
0.6
0.4
MR 4
1.7
1.4
1.4
a. Assumes a constant level of enemy combat
forces in both variants.
b. Assumes ROK forces are retrained in both
variants.
c. Excludes 15,000 ARVIV personnel operating
in Cambodia; this number held constant in
both variants (if 15,000 are returned to
MR 3, ratios in Variants 1 and 2 would
change to 1.5 and 1.2, respectively.
are not reflected by parallel reductions in
logistic requirements. This results from the
fact that most of the supplies provided by North
Vietnam through Laos are arms and ammunition which
are only a small share of total requirements.
The major component of enemy supply requirements
is foodstuff, most of which is obtained from Cam-
bodian sources. The major effect of US with-
drawals on the logistic constraints to enemy stra-
tegies is that the time required to build stock-
piles is somewhat relaxed. This is particularly
true for Cases V through VII where we estimate
under Variant 2, for example, that the required
stockpiles could probably be built up some two
to three months sooner than in our basic analysis.
54. Even with this loosening of the logistic
constraints, the required buildup for the maximum
strategies would not be completed until very late
in the 1971-72 dry season. In such a situation
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we estimate that Hanoi would still turn away from
an all-out offensive. The need for secure re-
supply channels, difficulties in the forward
positioning of supplies, a generally unfavorable
control situation, and uncertainties about casualty
levels would all point to such a decision.
The Control Situation
55. One other factor which may influence
Hanoi's choice of strategies is the control situa-
tion in the countryside. Control of the rural
population by the government of Vietnam, according
to the VSSG indicator for January, was at its
highest level. As of the end of January, 67.5% of
the rural population throughout South Vietnam was
controlled by the GVN and its "presence" extended
over another 15.2%. MR 1 in January had nearly 73%
of its rural population under GVN control, the
same general level established during the last
quarter of 1970. Tentative readings of the con-
trol situation in February, however, indicate a
possible deterioration in GVN control because of
the increased number of enemy attacks. GVN con-
trol of MR 2 in January was the lowest throughout
the country -- 56.6%. Nevertheless, this repre-
sents a considerable improvement since April 1970,
when only 37.3% of the populace was under GVN con-
trol. Thus on the basis of the current control
situation, MR 2 would appear to be a likely area
for offensive campaigns. The peak of GVN control
in MR 3 was reached in September 1970 (71.7%) and,
unlike the other regions of the country, has de-
clined somewhat since then to 69.6% in January
with a further decline projected for February.
For MR 4 the January GVN control rating was 69.1%
of the population, and tentative estimates indi-
cate a possible increase for February.
56. Attempts to estimate trends in the control
situation on the basis of RVNAF and US deployments
have always been difficult and have not been very
accurate. The redeployment of US ground forces
will no doubt have the greatest impact on the con-
trol situation in MR 1. The drawdown of US combat
forces in MR 1 -- at the minimum some 17,000 of
the 25,000 now there -- will not be fully replaced
by ARVN personnel. The diminution of Allied main
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forces in the region undoubtedly will result in a
degradation of pacification efforts. US with-
drawals from MR 2, on the other hand, will be
relatively insignificant, and projected ARVN
ground forces deployments to the region will re-
sult in a net increase of friendly forces which
may work to improve the control ratings.
57. Possible strategy options available to the
Communist planners in light of the possible future
control situation appear most favorable to the
launching of an all-out offensive in MR 1. De-
spite the current relatively high level of govern-
ment control in MR 1, the potential decrease in
Allied strength in the region, and the proximity
of manpower and supplies to the war would appear
to be easily sufficient to offset GVN control
gains over the last several years. Although
current control levels in MR 2 are the lowest in
the country, over the longer term the area is not
so obviously a target for an enemy offensive
strategy, largely because of longer supply lines
from the north and projected ARVN force level aug-
mentations. Were sufficient numbers of NVA troops
introduced to offset increases in ARVN strength in
MR 2, however, it is likely that control ratings
would decline. Assuming a continued high level of
enemy combat forces in Cambodia, the relatively
high degree of government control in both MR 3 and
MR 4 probably will continue to deter an enemy
high-level strategy in the two regions.
VI. Probable Vietnamese Communist. Courses
of Action
Overview
58. Our review of the wide range of factors
that will affect Hanoi's selection of the military
courses of action it decides to initiate over the
next 12 to 18 months yields several general con-
clusions. Hanoi's current actions and statements
all indicate a Vietnamese Communist belief that
they can wear down the US will to persist by
perservering in the struggle. In essence,
although Hanoi has many problems, it believes
it can afford, to be more patient than can
Washington. Moreover, the North Vietnamese still
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adhere to the view that by perservering, they
can create an overall political climate conducive
to a settlement of the war that will result in a
new political order in South Vietnam favorable to
Communist interests.
59. Hanoi has a broad choice of options
through which it can endeavor to move this scenario
along. The least costly option would be a contin-
uation of the war at the protracted levels of 1970
in which the emphasis would be on tactics designed
to play for time and to conserve strength for the
long haul. The most costly option would be a
sustained offensive drive throughout South Viet-
nam and Cambodia. Between these extremes Hanoi
has a number of intermediate options calling for
sharply increased activity in one or more areas
of Indochina.
60. There is little hard evidence as yet
pointing strongly toward which of these courses
might be followed. There are indeed some indi-
cations that Hanoi has not yet made up its own
mind on its optimum course of action. We be-
lieve, however, that neither of the extreme
options -- Cases I and VII -- is likely to be
followed.
61. Any all-out effort such as that charac-
terized by Case VII seems unlikely. Several
factors tend to work against the undertaking of
major offensive actions on the pattern of
Case VII before the start of the 1972-73 dry
season. Even though one of the effects of con-
tinued US withdrawals will be to loosen the
logistic and manpower constraints operative on
the Communists, they must still cope with the
need to ensure reliable resupply channels once
a major offensive is undertaken, with the dif-
ficulties in positioning supplies and troops in
forward areas, and with their generally dis-
advantageous situation in terms of control of
the countryside and the relative balance of
combat forces. Thus we believe that Hanoi will
adopt a more prudent course as long as the
United States is still militarily strong in
Indochina and longer term US policy there is
still in doubt. The Communists must stay in a
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position to fight if the war goes on indefinitely,
and we think they would be unwilling to gamble
too many assets in an all-out military effort
until their prospects for early success are con-
siderably improved.
62. It seems equally unlikely, however, that
the Communists would be content to continue to
prosecute the war at the low levels typical of the
past two years. By almost any measurement, their
capabilities allow for more intensive offensive
action. These capabilities will almost certainly
increase as US troop withdrawals proceed over the
next 18 months and the position of the South
Vietnamese becomes more vulnerable.
Most Probable Course
63. Our analysis of North Vietnamese capabili-
ties and objectives in South Vietnam indicates
that we can expect to see progressively higher
levels of combat over the next 12-18 months. For
the most part these actions will be aimed at dis-
crediting the Vietnamization program and in-
fluencing opinion within the United States in a
way likely to compel changes in the US commitment
and policy toward South Vietnam.
64. In view of the generally low level of
infiltration this year, our estimates of logistic
performance during the current dry season, and
the Communists' currently unfavorable position
within South Vietnam, however, we would not ex-
pect to see any major tactical changes until at
least the end of this summer. Nevertheless, the
Communists now have and will retain a capability
for mounting frequent and relatively intensive
high points of military activity.. This would
seem, for example, to be the current situation
in Cambodia. In South Vietnam the most likely
areas for this activity are in MR 1, where supply
lines are short and units can quickly be rein-
forced, and MR 2, where the current control
situation and balance of forces is relatively
most favorable to the Communists.
65. But as we move into the .L971-72 dry
season, the logistic and manpower constraints
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on Hanoi's military capabilities are likely to
loosen, primarily because of the cumulative
effect of US troop withdrawals and less intensive
air interdiction programs. We estimate that early
in the dry season (October-December.) the North
Vietnamese could carry out the resupply and in-
filtration necessary to support offensive cam-
paigns in MR 1 or MR 2 (Cases II and III). By
mid-season they could also support an offensive
in Cambodia (Case V) or offensive activities.
carried on simultaneously in MR land MR 2
(Case IV).
66. Our projections of enemy and friendly
force dispositions indicate that by June 1972
MR.1 and the highland areas of MR 2 would. be the
most likely area for offensive action. The pro-_
jected-decrease of Allied forces in MR 1 in-
creasingly will shift the main force balance in
favor of the Communists and may result in a de-
terioration of GVN control of the countryside.
Over this longer term, MR 2 -- particularly the
highlands -- would become a-less likely area for
sustained offensive operations because of sizable
deployments of ARVN forces to the area by June
1972.
67. To the extent the relative force and con-
trol balances shift in their favor, we would
anticipate that the Communists will become in-
creasingly less prudent through 1972, as they
search for an opportunity to discredit the process
of Vietnamization and to demonstrate that they
are still a viable and effective military force.
This urge to score military and political gains
will increase as the process and extent of US
withdrawal become more certain and tend toward
irreversibility.
68. Finally, the Vietnamese Communists clearly
see the election campaign period in the United
States as an optimum time for applying pressures
that might induce the present US government to
disengage precipitately or help secure the elec-
tion of a new administration committed to such a
course. The Communists are likely to.pull out
more and more stops as November 1972 approaches
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in a mounting effort to heat up Vietnam as a US
domestic political issue and make the war a
greater political liability for President Nixon.
69. The most probable course of action dis-
cussed above -- a progressive increase in the
levels of combat over the next 12-18 months -- is
neither the best nor worst of cases from the US
point of view. While it might result in Allied
setbacks in some areas of the country, the lar-
gest and most heavily populated areas could
remain relatively unaffected. To the extent
that the postulated military activities do not
involve a well-coordinated and countrywide in-
crease in enemy offensive actions, a number of
Allied reactions -- ARVN redeployments, incur-
sions into southern Laos, and modification of
air, interdiction programs -- might dampen the
effects of such intermediate Communist stra-
tegies.
70. From our point of view, enemy strategies
consonant with Case VI (MR 1/Cambodia) or,Case-
VII (GVN/Cambodia) would be much more unfavor-
able. Even though these types of multi-regional
campaigns present increasing risks to the Com-
munists, they could create new and potentially
critical problems for the South Vietnamese. The
options for redeployment of ARVN troops would be
restricted and the prospects for a setback to
the process of Vietnamization would increase.
Moreover, major Communist successes in such
large-scale offensives could have severe political
repercussions in the United States.
71. The best case from the US point of view
would be Communist decision to adopt Case I --
the protracted warfare pattern of: 1970. This
strategy would be least disruptive to the
process of US withdrawal and keep US casualties
at a minimum. With the possible exception of
MR 1, it would also mean that.Vietnamization
could proceed. apace. In most parts of the
country the process of Vietnamization could be
consolidated and fostered by social and economic
development programs. Finally, a continuation
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of this strategy could further compound the Com-
munists' difficulties in maintaining the morale
of their forces and rebuilding a viable infra-
structure.
VII. Postscript -- Intentions and Achievements
72. The above memorandum has assessed at
length and in considerable detail what we believe
the Communists are capable of attempting, or con-
sider themselves capable of attempting, and the
courses of action the Communists are likely to
essay. We have also described the various mili-
tary and, particularly, political results the
Communists want to achieve through the actions
they initiate. Regardless of what Hanoi wants
or tries to do, however, the extent to which it
succeeds in attaining its goals obviously depends
in large measure on the reactions or pre-emptive
actions of others -- the South Vietnamese, the
Cambodians, the Lao, in-
cluding, naturally, the United States . Hence a
description of Communist intent is far from a
prediction of inevitable Communist success. This
memorandum was drafted as and should be read as a
detailed analysis of Hanoi's intentions and capa-
bilities. It was not written as an estimative
prediction of the course of events in Indochina --
in the outcome sense -- over the period between
now and the end of 1972. It should, therefore,
not be read or regarded as a net outcome estimate.
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ER IM 71-72
Hanoi's
Choices
Options and Probable Strategy
During the Period From April
1971
Through
December 1972, 26 April 1971
Copy 1 & 2 Dr. Kissinger
3 & 5 The Hon. David Packard
4 Secretary Laird (via SAVA)
6 Admiral Moorer
7 U. Alexis Johnson
8 General Bennett
9 The Hon. William Sullivan
10 General Vogt
24 & 25 Dr. K. Wayne Smith NSC Staff
Copy 11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
26
2 7 -:1-
31
32
3 cys
1 cy
1 cy
28
4'G
D/OCI
Ch, DDP/FE
Ch, DDP/FE/1I
D/OER
DD/OER
Ch/D/I
Ch/I/L
Ch/I/SV
ONE,
OCI,
ONE ,
DDCI
DDI
SAVA (with Cy 4)
T,/SV
I/LC
Ray, Cline
Approved For Release 2006/10/05: CIA-RDP78T02095R000300250001-8
 Approved For Release 2006/1
Effects of a "Lam Son" Force Level on
4 F1 Season equ rements
1. We have calculated the effects during the 1971-72
dry season of keeping in South Laos the forces which the
enemy committedNthere _during Lam Son 719. Further, we have
these forces engaging in various levels of combat. They
incremental input flow required to support these various
options during the forthcoming dry season ranges from 15.20
tons for force maintenance to 30-50 tons for high levels of
combat, using various assumptions about length of engagement
and losses.
2. As seen in the attached tabulation such incremental
burdens would change the enemy's strategic options. It appears
likely that the "Lam Son" variants would not prevent the
enemy from supporting the minimum strategy although the
supply situation would be tighter than we have estimated in
our 2 April memorandum. The maximum strategy would, as
indicated in the 2 April memorandum, continue to be infeasible
during 1971-72 dry season. High combat in MR 1 would be
feasible during 1971-72 (although the supply requirement:
would be much heavier) simply because of the short supply
lines involved. We judged in the 2 April memorandum that
the Cambodia strategy could be undertaken sometime before the
and of the 1971-72 dry season if the enemy was operating from
the high end of our estimated input range (295-370 tons per
-day). This would still be true, but the supply situation
would be much tighter. A high level of offensive action in
both MR 1 and Cambodia would certainly not be feasible if
the enemy only achieved supply inputs at the lower and of
the estimated range and would probably not be feasible even
with inputs at the higher end of the range. In our 2 April
memorandum we estimated that the strategy could probably not
be undertaken until the end of the dry season.
Approved For Release 2006/10/05: CIA-R DP78T02095R000300250001-8
 25X1 Approved For Release 2006/10/05: CIA-RDP78T02095R000300250001-8
Approved For Release 2006/10/05: CIA-RDP78T02095R000300250001-8
 Approved For Release 2006/10/05: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000300250001-8
MEMORANDUM FOR: D/D/OER
This is an extra manipulation. I time phased
the logistics stockpile using the force
variant ? (43,400 troops) Doesn't v4Rgft
make''i fference in conclusions about the
strategies. Enemy could still do all but
High Combat in MR 1 and Cambodia and General
Offensive i mid-dry season 1971 72; could
conceivably do those latter two by end of
Dry Season.
awl
N
(DAM
FORM NO. REPLACES FORM 10.101
1 AUG 54 lOl WHICH MAY BE USED.
Approved For Release 2006/10/05: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000300250001-8
 Approved For Release 2006/10/05: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000300250001-8 25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2006/10/05: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000300250001-8
 Approved For Release 2006/10/05: CIA-RDP78T02095R000300250001-8
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