ROLLING THUNDER: THE 1967 CAMPAIGN AGAINST LOC'S
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Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP78T02095R000300170001-8
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Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
91
Document Creation Date:
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Document Release Date:
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Sequence Number:
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Case Number:
Publication Date:
September 1, 1967
Content Type:
IM
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Top Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Sensitive Report
This document shall not
be shown to or discussed
with non-Agency persons
without the express per-
mission of the Director
of Central Intelligence.
Intelligence Memorandum
Rolling Thunder:
The 1967 Campaign Against LOC's
Top Secret
Copy No. I _)
I
25X1
September 1967
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Contents
Summary . . . . . . . . .
I. Dimensions of the Air War . ..
Page
A. Air Operations.. . . . . . . . . . 5
B. The Effects of the Bombing -
Economic and Military Damage . . . 10
II. North Vietnam's Transport System . . . . 13
A. Capability and Performance Before
Rolling Thunder . . . . ? . . 13
B. Network and Inventory Since 1964 . . 14
1. Railroads . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2. Highways . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3. Waterways . . : . . . . . . . 16
III. Effects of Attacks on the Transport
System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
A. General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
B. Hanoi Area . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
C. LOC's North of Hanoi . . . . . . . . 21
1. The Dong Dang Line and Highway
Routes to the Northeast . . . . 21
2. Thai Nguyen Lines . . . . . 23
3. Lao Cai Line and Other Transport
Routes to the Northwest . . . . 24
D. LOC's from Haiphong . . . . . . . . 25
1. The Hanoi-Haiphong Railroad
Line . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2. Highways . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3. Water Transport and Trans- -
shipment Facilities . . . . . . 27
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E. LOC's to the South . . . . . . . . . 2 8
F. Destruction of Transport Equipment . 29
IV. Changes in Transport Requirements 33
and Patterns . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. Changing Requirements . . . . . . . 33
B. Changes in Imports and Exports . . 34
C. Changes in Domestic! Requirements . 35
D. Haiphong Port . . . . . . . . . . . 36
1. Increase in Imports . . . . . . 36
2. Port Congestion . . . . . . . . 36
V. The Logistics Burden of the Transport 41
System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. Area South of the Red River . . . . 41
B. The DMZ Area . . . . . . . . . . . 46
C. Laos and South Vietnam . . . . . . . 46
1. Laos Panhandle . . . . . . . . . 47
2. Northern Laos . . . . . . . . . 47
3. South Vietnam . . . . . . . . . 47
VI. Countermeasures to Attacks on LOC's . . 49
A. Bypasses . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. Type and Number . . . . . . . . 49
2. Rate of Repair . . . . . . . . . 51
B. "Hardening" of LOC's . . . . . . . . 54
1. Dong Dang Rail. Line . . . . . . 54
2. Haiphong Area . . . . . . . . . 61
3. Kep - Thai Nguyen - Hanoi 62
Rail Line . . . . . .
4. Lao Cai Rail Line . . . . ? 63
5. Presence of Chinese Engineering
Troops South of Hanoi . . . . . 64
C. Countermeasures in the South . . . . 64
1. Route 7 . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
2. Route 137 . . . . . . . . . . . 64
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VII. Prospects for the Interdiction
Campaign . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
Appendix
Photographic Evidence of Railroad Operations
During June-August 1967 . . . . . . . . . . 71
Tables
1. North Vietnam: Destruction and Damage
of Transport Equipment, 1965 -
August 1967 . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2. Effectiveness of Attack Sorties
over North Vietnam in Destruction
and Damage of Transport Equipment,
1965 - August 1967 . . . . . . . . . . 32
3. Effectiveness of Attack Sorties
over North Vietnam in Destruction
and Damage of Trucks, 1965 -
August 1967 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
4. North Vietnam: Average Monthly Volume
of Seaborne Imports Identified on
Foreign Ships,by Quarter, January 1965 -
August 1967 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
5. North Vietnam: Average Monthly Volume
of Seaborne Exports Identified
on Foreign Ships,by Quarter,
January 1965 - August 1967 . . . . . . 40
6. Estimated Civilian and Military Supply
Requirements Provided by North
Vietnam, by Area . . . . . . . . . . . 43
7. Military Supply Requirements Provided
by North Vietnam for Communist Forces
in the Southern Regions of North
Vietnam, Laos, and South Vietnam . . . 44
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8. Average Number of Bypasses per Damaged
Bridge on Selected Rail Lines . . . . . 50
9. Maximum Repair Times at Selected
Bridges on Rail Lines in North
Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
10. Bypasses and Other Countermeasures
on Rail Lines in the Northern Part
of North Vietnam . .. . . . . . . . . . 55
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Illustrations
Figure 1.
Rolling Thunder Attack Sorties,
by Route Package, January-
August 1967 (map)
following page . . . . . . .
Figure 2.
.
North Vietnam: Continuity
and Intensity of Attacks
on Railroads (
following page
ch
.
art)
. . . . . . .
8
.
Figure 3.
North Vietnam:
to the Basic T
Since March 19
I
ran
65
mprovements
sportation Net
(map)
following page
.
. . . . . . .
14
.
Figure 4.
Hanoi - Haiphon
g (
map)
following page
.
. . . . . . .
18
.
Figure 5. N
ortheast North
following page
Vi
.
etnam (:map)
. . . . . . .
18
.
Figure 6. E
stimated Intern
Carried on Nort
Railroads, 1964
(map) following
at
h
a
p
ional Traffic
Vietnamese
nd August 1967
age . . . . . .
34
Figure 7. E
stimated Milita
Supply Requirem
(map) following
ry
en
and Civilian
ts, by Area
age . . . . . .
42
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Page
Figure 8. Road Network - Laos
Panhandle (map) following page . 48
Figure 9. Concealment Sidings, Hanoi -
Lao Cai Railroad, North
Vietnam (photograph)
following page . . . . .x. . . . 54
Figure 10. The Bac Giang Combination
Railroad/Highway Bridge
on the Hanoi/Dong Dang Line
and Route 18, April 1967
(photograph) following page . . 54
Figure 11. The Hanoi Railroad/Highway
Bridge over the Canal des
Rapides, 29 June 1966
(photograph) following page . 60
Figure 12. Strike in Early August 1967
Against the Lang Son Railroad
and Highway Bridge (photograph)
following page . . . . . . . . . 60
Figure 13. The Haiphong Railroad and
Highway Bridge over the Song
Tram Bac (photograph) following
page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Rolling Thunder: The 1967 Campaign Against LOC's
Summary
During 1967 the Rolling Thunder program changed
significantly in its scope and intensity. North
Vietnam's major industrial targets were neutral-
ized, and new targets in the restricted areas
around Hanoi and Haiphong and in the China border
areas were attacked for the first time. Since
June 1967 the program has put a renewed emphasis
on the interdiction of lines of supply. The
interdiction campaign has been enlarged to include
intensive and repeated attacks against multiple
targets on the vital lines of communication (LOC's)
in the northern areas of North Vietnam.
Transport operations have been seriously dis-
rupted, losses of transport equipment have in-
creased sharply, and the costs and difficulties
of maintaining traffic movements have. multiplied.
But as a result of countermeasures, the use of
alternate routes, and foreign assistance, North
Vietnam's logistic capabilities have not been
reduced, and there is convincing evidence that
the military and economic goods needed to support
the war have continued to move.
Note: This memorandum was produced by CIA. It
was prepared by the office of Economic Research
and was coordinated with the office of Current
Intelligence and the Special Assistant for Viet-
namese Affairs; the estimates and conclusions
represent the best judgment of the Directorate of
Intelligence as of 29 September 1967.
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In the first eight months of 1967, more than
75,500 attack sorties were flown over North Viet-
nam, only about 6,700 less than were flown during
all of 1966. Attack sorties flown over Route
Packages V and VI in the North mounted from a low
of 9 percent in February 1967 to a high of 37 per-
cent in July 1967. More than three-fourths of
the 9,300 tons of ordnance dropped on northern
railroad targets in 1967 was delivered during the
three-month period June through August. Success-
ful attacks have been made against key bridges
over the Canal des Rapides and the Paul Doumer
Bridge over the Red River in the Hanoi area, and
many other targets - primarily bridges and rail-
yards - have been struck along the rail lines
leading north to China and Haiphong.
The main thrust of the air campaign during
1967, however, continues to be targeted against
the logistics flow south of Hanoi. The recent
extension to the key northern rail lines has not
retarded significantly the flow of traffic and
has not successfully entrapped transport equip-
ment. A small number of locomotives were caught
in the northern route packages, but more than 95
percent of the trucks and watercraft reported by
pilots to be destroyed were located in Route
Packages I-IV.
The attacks against logistics targets in the
north involved higher aircraft loss rates. The
overall combat loss rate for US aircraft was 3.0
per 1,000 attack sorties during 1967, an improve-
ment over the higher rates of 6.7 and 3.5 during
1965 and 1966, respectively. During the attacks
on the northern railroads alone, however, US
forces suffered a combat loss rate during 1967
of 6.8 aircraft per 1,000 attack sorties.
North Vietnam has demonstrated its ability to
counter the longstanding interdictions of through
traffic on the Hanoi-Lao Cai line and the heavily
pounded Hanoi-Vinh line. During the recent inten-
sive attacks against the remaining rail lines in
the northern area, the only additional disruptions
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to through service have been on the rail connec-
tions in the immediate Hanoi area. The resulting
delays in traffic have probably not been serious.
The North Vietnamese transport system has
emerged from more than 30 months of bombing with
greater capacity and flexibility than it had when
the Rolling Thunder program started. The inven-
tory of freight cars has been maintained and its
carrying capacity increased; the number of trucks
has also increased despite the high rate of
destruction.
The successful countering of the interdiction
program is explained by several factors. The
density of the logistics target system in North
Vietnam is so low and its diversity so great that
it is extremely difficult to neutralize. Many of
the more important elements of the system are
also located in densely populated and heavily
defended areas. In addition, the North Vietnamese
have an effective system of countermeasures,
abetted and strengthened by large infusions of
labor, material, and equipment from their Com-
munist allies. The extensive implementation of
contingency programs has given the target system
a redundancy and cushion that preempted the
effects of some of our most successful strikes.
Finally the neutralization of North Vietnam's
modern industry and the virtual cessation of
exports have relieved the transport network of
about 10 percent of the traffic it carried in
1966.
Although the air campaign destroys a large
volume of supplies as they move southward, the
requirements for supplies decrease further south
and become extremely small at the end of the
logistic funnel. It is clear that logistics
problems have not placed a relevant ceiling on
force structures or levels of combat.
Even a more intense interdiction campaign in
the North would fail to reduce the flow of sup-
plies sufficiently to restrict military operations.
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Prospects are dim that an air interdiction cam-
paign against LOC's leading out of Haiphong
alone could cut off the flow of seaborne imports
and isolate Haiphong.
Political considerations aside, the combined
interdiction of land and water routes, including
the mining of the water approaches to the major
ports and the bombing of ports and transshipment
facilities, would be the most effective type of
interdiction campaign. This program would increase
the hardships imposed on North Vietnam and raise
further the costs of its support of the war in
the South. It would, however, not be able to cut
off the flow of essential supplies and, by itself,
would not be the determining factor in shaping
Hanoi's outlook toward the war.
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I. Dimensions of the Air War
A. Air Operations
During 1967 the Rolling Thunder campaign
became a new type of air war in the scope and
intensity of its effort. North Vietnam's industrial
sector and new targets -- primarily key transpor-
tation targets -- in hitherto sanctuary areas
came under attack. During the past few months
the intensified campaign has been characterized
by tactical changes designed to disrupt more
effectively the flow of war-supporting supplies.
Concentrated, simultaneous, and multiple attacks
have been carried out with increasing intensity
against the key northern railroads. In the
southern areas particularly the emphasis has
shifted from attacks on fixed lines of communication
(LOC) targets to transport equipment and supplies.
During the period January-August 1967,
more than 75,500 attack sorties were flown against
targets in North Vietnam -- only about 6,700 less
than were flown during all of 1966 and nearly
three times the number flown in 1965. As a
result of an increase in the average ordnance load
per sortie, nearly as much ordnance -- 147,000
tons* -- was delivered in the first eight months
of 1967 as the total delivered during 1966 and
1965. The loss rate for aircraft downed by hostile
action has decreased from 6.7 per 1,000 attack
sorties in 1965 to 3.5 in 1966 and 3.0 during
January-August 1967. Total losses of aircraft from
hostile action during the three years amount to 682.
The following tabulation gives a comparison of
sorties, ordnance, and losses during 1965, 1966,
and January-August 1967:
* Data on ordnance are given in short tons; data
on traffic and trade are given in metric tons.
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Tons of
Tons per
Losses of
Losses per
Attack
Sorties
Ordnance
Delivered
Attack U
Sortie to H
S Aircraft
ostile Action
1,000
Attack Sorties
1965 25,880
34,300
1.3
173
6.7
1966 82,170
128,590
1.6
284
3.5
Jan-Aug
1.967 75,510
147,030
1.9
225
3.0
Total 183,560
309,920
1.7 a/
682 b/
3.7 a/
a. Average.
b. An additional 81 aircraft were operational losses. The total of
US losses from all causes, therefore, is 763.
During 1967 the Rolling Thunder program has
remained primarily an interdiction campaign against
the LOC's in the Panhandle. About 78 percent of all
attack sorties flown from January through August 1967
were against: targets in Route Packages I-IV (see Figure 1).
Since March 1967, however, an increasing share of
attack sorties has been directed against targets in
Route Packages V and VI. Thus, although only about
13 percent of total attack sorties were flown over
Route Packages V and VI in 1966 and the early months of
1967, this share rose to 37 percent in July 1967. The
following tabulation gives shares of attack sorties by
geographic area in North Vietnam during 1966 and 1967:
1966
1967
January
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
Route Packages I-IV Route Packages V-VI Total
87
13
100
78
22
100
86
14
100
91
9
100
89
11
100
81
19
100
82
18
100
77
23
100
63
37
100
73
27
100
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Rolling Thunder Attack Sorties by Route Package, January-August 1967
f -..
n
C.
4%
LAOS
r..l '..
r 1
c
18%
L..
10%
13%
10%
Route Package
4% Percentage of attack
sorties
25 5Q 75 Mlles
'?. 45%
~,?II. [. DEMARCATION LINE
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Haiphong*
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A significant share of the attacks against
targets in Route Packages V and VI has been against
railroads. During the period January-August 1967,
about 4,530 attack sorties -- 28 percent of the
16,220 attack sorties flown in Route Packages V
and VI -- delivered more than 9,300 tons of
ordnance against the six railroad lines (see the
tabulation below) located wholly north of the 20th
Parallel (see Figure 2). More than three-fourths
of this ordnance was delivered in the three-month
period of June-August. The greatest weight of
attack against northern lines was on the key
northeast line leading from Yen Vien to Dong Dang.
During the eight-month period, 5,590 attack
sorties delivered about 11,900 tons of ordnance
against the railroad running south from Hanoi through
Route Package IV to Vinh. This amounted to 56 percent
of total ordnance delivered against railroads in
North Vietnam. The changed focus of the campaign
against railroads is apparent in the fact that
while the Hanoi-Vinh line withstood almost 80
percent of the weight of attack from January through
May 1967, it took only about 35 percent of the
attack during June through August. The following
tabulation gives tons and shares of ordnance
against each railroad by time period.*
Six lines radiate from Hanoi. Traffic from
Hanoi to Lao Cai, Dong Dang, and Thai Nguyen moves
over the 11-kilometer segment to the Yen Vien yards.
This segment is sometimes treated as part of the
Hanoi-Dong Dang Zine.
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January-May
June-August
Total
Tons
Per-
cent
Tons
Per-
cent
Tons
Per-
cent
Hanoi - Yen Vien
164 26
472
74
636
100
Yen Vien - Lao Cai
577
26
1,636
74
2,213
100
Yen Vien - Dong Dang
564
22
1;983
78
2,547
100
Gia Lam - Haiphong
16
2
729
98
745
100
Kinh No - Thai Nguyen
503
29
1,242
71
1,745
100
Thai Nguyen - Kep
218
15
1,220
85
1,438
100
Total on lines wholly
located north of the
20th Parallel
2,042
22
7,282
78
9,324
100
Hanoi-Vinh
7,744
65
4,113
35
11,857
100
Total on all rail-
roads
9,786
46 1
1,395
54
21,181
100
During the period January-May, attacks against
railroads in the northern route packages were carried
out during 57 days -- about 38 percent of the 151-
day period. The intensity of the latest campaign
against these railroads is indicated by an increase
in the share of days they were under attack to almost
85 percent of the June-August period. Similarly,
the share of days that the Hanoi-Vinh railroad was
attacked rose from 89 percent during January-May to
about 95 percent during June-August. The following
tabulation gives the share of each period during
which attacks against railroads were carried out.
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NORTH VIETNAM
Tons
150-
LAO CAI-YEN VIEN
286 Kms
DONG DANG!' Continuity and Intensity of
100
o` 'PAI NGUYEN (,/)
Nl
No")NK~;EN Attacks on Railroads
1ANOI GIA :A
- ?HAfPHONG
50
VINH
Tons 0 HANOI-VINH
150 370 Kms -
0
Tons
150-
Month TOTAL Tonnage/Days Delivered
100 100
Month TARGET Tonnage/Days Delivered
11
Tons ? GIA LAM-HAIPHONG
150 103 Kms
Tons
150-
..111 11111
Tons ? HANOI-YEN VIEN Tons
150 11 Kms } u 150-
100
JAN FEB
AUG!
? DONG DANG-YEN VIEN
158 Kms
11, 1 1 11111 NJ
? KEP-THAI NGUYEN
50 Kms
? KINH NO-THAI NGUYEN
55 Kms
1H
H
Figure 2
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JAN FEB MAR APR MAY Rk1 JUI, AUG
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Hanoi - Yen Vien
Yen Vien - Lao Cai
Yen Vien - Dong Dang
Gia Lam - Haiphong
Kinh No - Thai Nguyen
Thai Nguyen - Kep
January-May
4.o
24.5
17.2
2.0
9.9
6.6
June-August
5.4
68.5
43.5
p8.3
39.1
33.7
Railroads north of the
20th Parallel 37.7 84.8
Hanoi-Vinh 88.7 94.6
The campaign against railroads has accounted for
13 percent of the Rolling Thunder attack sorties flown
during January-August 1967. Aircraft losses sustained
in these attacks totaled 41, or 18 percent of total
US combat losses during January-August 1967. A
share amounting to 68 percent -- 28 aircraft -- was
downed in June-August alone. This disproportionate
loss rate reflects the higher risk to aircraft attack-
ing railroads in heavily defended areas.
Thus, while the overall combat loss over North
Vietnam during these eight months was 3.0 aircraft
per 1,000 attack sorties, the campaign against rail-
roads resulted in a combat loss rate of 4.0 aircraft.
During the June-August period, attacks against rail-
roads resulted in a loss rate of 4.7 aircraft. The
loss rate for attacks against northern rail lines
alone during this period was even higher -- 6.3 air-
craft per 1,000 sorties although it was down some-
what from the loss rate of 6.6 for all attacks in
1967 against the northern rail lines.
The scale of attack against North Vietnam's
railroads during 1967 is indicated by a comparison
with the number of attacks against all other JCS-
targeted facilities. These targets, which include
electric powerplants, manufacturing and explosives
plants, petroleum storage facilities, airfields,
barracks, supply and ammunition depots, and radar
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sites, have been struck during 1965, 1966, and
January-August 1967 by about 9,700 attack sorties
delivering more than 15,700 tons of ordnance.
Attacks against railroads during 1967 alone amounted
to more than 10,100 attack sorties delivering almost
21,200 tons of ordnance.
B. The Effects of the Bombing - Economicand
Military Damage
Although the Rolling Thunder program is
preponderantly an interdiction effort against trans-
portation routes, and other logistic targets, attacks
against major industrial plants and important
military targets have given new dimensions to the air
war.
The 1967 campaign against important industrial
facilities has brought North Vietnam's small modern
industry to a standstill. About 80 percent of the
central electric power generating capacity is
currently out of operation. All the central gene-
rating plants in the main Hanoi-Haiphong network,
with the exception of the main Hanoi plant itself,
have been out of service since early June.
The country's only modern cement plant -- at
Haiphong -?- ceased production in April 1967 because
of bomb damage and the loss of its electric power
supply. The country's only metallurgical plant --
at Thai Nguyen -- which produced pig iron for export
and fabricated products from imported steel has
ceased production for the same reasons. The only
explosives plant has been out of operation for two
years., and the production of apatite and coal, both.
previously exported in quantity, has been drastically
reduced. One of the country's two textile plants
has been heavily damaged, production in the small
fertilizer and chemical industry has been curtailed,
and the production of paper has been reduced by 80
percent.
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The damage inflicted to North Vietnamese
industry by the bombing undoubtedly has crushed
North Vietnam's immediate hopes for continued
economic growth. Modern industry, however, plays
only a small and.l,imited, role in. North Vietnam's
ability to continue the war. By any measure, even.
by the standards of a less. developed country, North
Vietnam's industry has offered few lucrative targets
in terms of military significance.
The damage inflicted on military targets
also has had little significant impact on North
Vietnam's overall military capability. Attacks
against these targets however,:.have disrupted
normal military activities, have caused the"abandon-?
ment of many facilities such as barracks and supply
depots, and have forced widespread dispersal of
equipment and forces. Despite these disruptions,
the North Vietnamese have been able to strengthen
and improve the capability of many military systems.
During the past three years, Hanoi has developed its
air defense from a rudimentary state to. a complex,
sophisticated system and has increased its troop
strength from 240,000 to 385,000 men.
The cumulative effects of the bombing have
caused numerous management and logistical problems
for the North Vietnamese and have raised the cost of
Hanoi's support of the insurgency in South Vietnam.
Up to 600,000 persons are engaged in full-time or
part-time work defending against or countering the
effects of the bombing. The movement of men and
supplies has become more difficult and time con-
suming, and a substantial volume of war and war-
supporting material has been destroyed in transit.
The increased intensity of the air war in
1967, particularly during the past three months, is
shown in the tabulation below, which summarizes the
value of damage to economic and military targets.
The estimated cost of damage inflicted on
economic and military targets during the first eight
months of 1967 was about 40 percent greater than
the damage inflicted in all of 1966. Damage to
economic targets in the last three months, even with
bomb damage assessment incomplete, was about equal
to the damage inflicted in the five-month period of
January through May.
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Million US
1967
Type of Target
LE5
1966
Jan-May
Jun-Aug
Jan-Aug
Economic
36.2
93.3
53.4
53.7
107.1
Military
32.5
19.1
31.0
20.3
51.3
Total
68.7
112.4
84.4
74.0
158.4
Attacks against LOC's and transport targets
in 1967 have already inflicted about the same
damage as was inflicted in all of 1966. The cost of
damage by type of target is as follows:
1967
Type of Target
1965
1966
Jan-May
Jun-Aug
Jan-Aug
Railroad/highway
bridges
11.1
11.2
3.1
3.5
6.6
Transportation
equipment
5.9
29.8
11.4
18.6
30.0
Railroad'yards
0.1
1.2
3.9
0.6
4.5
Maritime ports
0.7
0.8
Negl.
Negl.
Negl.
Miscellaneous
armed recon-
naissance
N.A.
1.2
0.3
0.6
0.9
Total
17.8
44.2
18.7
23.3
42.0
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II. North Vietnam's Transport System
A. Capability and Performance Before Rollin
Thunder
The transportation system of North VJ,E;tnam,
in ruins at the end of the Indo-China conflict in
1954, had been largely restored by late 1964.
Except for a branch rail line to Thai Nguyen and
some roads in the frontier areas, no major exten-
sions were made to the system inherited from the
French. Five single-track meter-gouge rail lines
totaling about 965 kilometers radiated from Hanoi.
The Hanoi - Dong Dang line, the major line to China,
connected with the standard-gauge network of Com-
munist China at a transloading station at P'ing-
hsiang in Kwangsi Province. The Hanoi - Lao Cai
line connected with the Chinese meter-gauge line
to K'un-ming in Yunnan Province.
The highway system also radiated from Hanoi
and consisted of about 10,000 kilometers of roads.
Five roads connected with China, and several strategi-
cally important roads led west to Laos or south to
the Demilitarized Zone. The inland waterway net-
work consisted of about 5,400 kilometers of navigable
rivers and canals. Coastal shipping used North
Vietnam's only major seaport at Haiphong, two
secondary ports at Cam Pha and Hon Gai, and ten
minor ports, including one at Ben Thuy,
Before the bombing, motor transport served
primarily as a short-haul feeder system to the
railroads, provided access to remote:regionso and
served to support Communist military aggression in
Laos and South Vietnam. Inland water transport was
concentrated primarily in the Red River Delta, where
it served all of North Vietnam's several, industrial
centers. However, the waterways also provided access
to the upper reaches of the Red River and the Song
Cau. Inland and coastal shipping was used heavily
to glove agricultural, forest, and mineral products.
Total traffic on the transportation system
in 1964 reached about 1.75 billion ton-kilometers
(tkm) and 18.7 million tons carried as follows:
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Carrier
Million
Ton-kilometers
Percent Million Percent
of Total Metric Tons of Total
Railroads
926.8
53 x-.13
22
Highways
178.7
10 7.18
38
Inland waterways
-90.5
28 7.01
38
Coastal waterways
155.9
9 0.37
2
Total 1,751.9
100 18.69 100
Despite significant increases in traffic
between 1960 and 1964, the rudimentary North Viet-
namese transportation network was not highly utilized
in 1964. The tonnage moved by rail in 1964 was
only slightly greater than one-third of line capacity.
The total freight moved by all modes of transport
in North Vietnam during 1964 was about equivalent
to the traffic moved by regulated carriers alone
in the United States in a. period of less than
eight hours. Additional perspective of the
rudimentary nature of the North Vietnamese trans-
portation system can be gained by comparing it with'
Thailand. The average daily freight train density
in North Vietnam in 1964 was 21 trains, compared
with 132 in Thailand. The volume carried by all
modes totaled 19 million tons in North Vietnam and
146. million tons in Thailand. North Vietnam had
6,000 civilian trucks and Thailand, 73,000..
B. Network and Inventory Since 1964
1. Railroads
The flexibility and capacity of the
railroad network has been improved with the help
of Chinese construction troops since the bombing
began. Many bridges and yards throughout the
system have been bypassed by the construction of
alternate bridges and short sections of line (see
Figure 3).* A rail line with a rail ferry for the
river crossing was constructed as a bypass to the
Doumer Bridge before the br:Ldge was interdicted.
The most important addition,, include the construction
of a 50-kilometer standard--gauge line from Kep to Thai
* For a discussion of bridge construction and other
countermeasures in North Vietnam, see VI.
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North Vietnam: Improvements to the Basic Transportation Net Since March 1965
q
Dien Bien
Phu
Road
Section added since March, 1965
-a--+- Railroad (meter gauge)
Section improved or added since March, 1965
Major inland waterway
025 50 75 Kilometers
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Thai
Binh
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Nguyen and the installation of a third rail on the
lines from the yards north of the Canal des Rapides
to 'bong Dang via Thai Nguyen to accommodate standard-
gauge equipment.* The Kep - Thai Nguyen line forms
part of an alternate route between Kep and Yen
Vien. Installation of the third rail makes possible
the use of Chinese standard-gauge equipment on this
route and obviates transloading at.P'ing-.hsiang.
The inventory and capacity of the rolling
stock available to the North Vietnamese have increased
since the beginning of the bombing despite heavy
losses. Compared with an estimate of about 2,000
freight cars in North Vietnam at the end of.1964,
photography of July 1967 revealed an estimated
2,000 to 2,300 freight cars. Considering that at
least a portion of these cars are standard-gauge
cars, with doub~e the carrying capacity of meter-
gauge cars, it is certain that the capacity of the
inventory has increased significantly.**
2. Highways
The highway network also has been
extended since the beginning of the bombing, with
emphasis on increasing its flexibility. The length
of the road network has been increased from about
9,000 to 10,000 kilometers of roads at the end of
1964 to between 11,000 and 13,000 kilometers at
present. Instead of five motorable border connections
to China there are now at least eight. Instead of
one all-weather route into Laos there are now three.
The general quality of the highways and the capacity
of some individual routes have deteriorated as a
result of the bombing and increased traffic loads.
However, the ability of the system to handle increased
* Also referred to as "dual gauge" in this memorandum.
This term refers to three rails, making possible the
use of bath meter-gauge and standard-gauge rolling
stock, and is not to be confused with "double tracking" --
two separate tracks with a total of four rails.
** For an analysis of railroad operations in North
Vietnam as obtained from aerial photography, see the
Appendix.
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traffic has not been reduced, because of the many
new routes and bypasses that have been built to
avoid restricting sections.
Highway transport continues to serve
mainly as a short-haul feeder service to the rail-
roads, but trucks are being used increasingly to
handle traffic problems resulting from rail inter-
diction and to keep supplies moving to the military
forces in the outlying areas to the south of the
main networks. The heaviest movement of traffic,
however, continues to be centered around the t.~
main cities of Hanoi and Haiphong and other population
centers in the Delta.
Imports of trucks were sufficient to
increase the inventory from about 9,000 vehicles
at the end of 1964 to between 11,000 and 12,000 by
the end of 1965. The inventory has remained at
about this level. It appears, moreover, that trucks
are stored in quantity at P'ing-hsiang to be drawn
on in response to fluctuating traffic needs and
losses.
3. Waterways
The inland water network remains much
the same as it was in 1964, except for dredging and
other improvements that have increased the navigability
on the upper. portions of the Red and Black Rivers
and the canal system near Vinh. Work on the system
in the past two years has been sufficient to enable
water transport to be used effectively in overcoming
attacks on other modes and to carry an increasing
share of the total traffic. No reliable estimates
of the inventory of watercraft in North Vietnam are
available. Although destruction of watercraft has
been heavy, there is no indication that shortages
have been serious. Imports have continued throughout
the period and watercraft are produced domestically.
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III. Effects of Attacks on the Transport System
A. General
The intensified interdiction campaign
against LOC's and transport targets in the
northern areas of North Vietnam has certainly
compounded Hanoi's logistic problems and exacted
a significantly higher price in terms of damage
to facilities and equipment. Despite these
achievements, North Vietnam has sustained its
capability to keep traffic moving. Through
service has been maintained on all major rail
lines with the exception of the rail connections
in the immediate Hanoi area and the heavily, pounded
Hanoi-Vinh line.* The system is flexible and
resilient, however, and a variety of alternative
routes and previously constructed bypasses have
kept the flow of goods moving in those few cases
where a sustained interdiction has resulted from
air attacks. Although losses of transport equip-
ment have increased sharply during the past few
months, they have not been sufficient to reduce
inventories. The inventory of freight cars has
been maintained and its carrying capacity has
increased. If transport equipment continues to
be destroyed or damaged at the present higher
rate, however, North Vietnam's Communist allies
will have to step up significantly the level of
their deliveries of this equipment.
B. Hanoi Area (see Figures 4 and 5)
The transportation network in the immed-
iate Hanoi area - from the center of Hanoi to the
Yen Vien classification yard, 11 kilometers across
the Red River - is a key connection for all traffic
moving between Hanoi and China, south to Vinh, or
east to Haiphong. This section contains two of
North Vietnam's most important railroad/highway
bridges and two of its largest railroad classi-
fication yards, Yen Vien and Gia Lam. Both yards
have been struck occasionally, but operations have
not been seriously impeded. All rail and highway
* Throug service on the Hanoi - Lao Cai Line has
not been possible-since the bridge at Viet Tri was
interdicted in June 1966, but the Line carries only
a small volume of traffic.
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traffic from Hanoi to Haiphong, Dong Dang, Lao Cai,
and Thai Nguyen must cross the mile-long Hanoi
Railroad/Highway (Doumer) Bridge over the Red
River. In addition, traffic from areas north
of the Canal des Rapides must use the Hanoi.
Railroad/Highway Bridge over the Canal des Rapides
to reach the yard at Gia Lam and the Doumer
Bridge. The rail line from Haiphong to Hanoi
joins the rail line into Hanoi at Gia Lam, south
of the Canal des Rapides bridge.
When the vital Doumer Bridge was inter-
dicted on,11 August, through rail and highway
traffic between Hanoi and Haiphong, and Hanoi-and
points north of the Canal des Rapides was effec-
tively disrupted. After this date, traffic
across the Red River was limited to the use of
the following bypasses, all of which were avail-
able before the attacks started:
(1) A highway ferry 800 feet
south of the bridge;
(2) Highway ferries located 2,500
and 4,500 feet, respectively,
south of the bridge;
(3) A highway pontoon bridge
located 10 kilometers south
of the main bridge;
(4) A highway ferry located next
to this pontoon bridge, and
(5) A series of three pairs of
rail ferry slips located
7 kilometers south of the
bridge on spurs which con-
nect the Hanoi-Haiphong
and Hanoi-Vinh lines. All
of the slips may be serv-
iceable in lower water, but
during the present highwater
season, only one slip on each
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Hanoi
To
Lao Ca;
Haiphong
To Nam Dinh and
Route iA South
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Yen
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bank can be used. Photog-
raphy has shown that MK-36
magnetic--influence bombs,
dropped on the rail ferry area,
interdicted a low water ferry
slip, but loaded ferries are
operating between the high water
slips.
If all the highway and rail bypasses
across the Red River were in operation at one
time, an estimated 5,000 to 5,500 tons each way
per day could be moved, of which about 1,300 tons
could be moved by the rail ferries.
On 12 August the main bridge over the
Canal des Rapides was damaged, but the flow of
traffic from points north was not disrupted,
because a previously constructed railroad bypass
bridge equal in capacity to the main bridge was
available. On 22 August, however, the bypass was
also interdicted, thus disrupting the. flow of
traffic to the Red River and Haiphong from Dong
Dang, Thai Nguyen, and Lao Cai. Traffic across
the Canal des Rapides was forced temporarily to
utilize the following bypasses. Photography of
17 September shows the main bridge serviceable for
rail and highway traffic.
(1) A highway ferry located 6,800
feet west of the main bridge;
(2) A highway pontoon bridge 6,850
feet west of the main bridge;
and
(3) A rail ferry site 3,000 feet
east of the original bridge.
These bypasses can probably accommodate
traffic of about 5,000 to 5,500 tons each way per
day, of which. about 1,800 tons could be moved by.
the rail ferry. A second rail ferry and a high-
way cable bridge are under construction near the
original bridge.
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The rail ferry bypass over the Red River
serving Hanoi and areas south probably has a
capacity of about 1,300 tons each way per day.
This capacity is probably being utilized princi-
pally to handle traffic from Haiphong. Rail
traffic moving south into the Hanoi and Haiphong
areas on the Dong Dang line could be accommodated
by the rail ferry bypass at the Canal des Rapides.
To enter Hanoi by rail, however, trains from Dong
Dang would have to cross the Canal des Rapides,
enter Gia Lam, head east. on the Haiphong line to
the rail ferry bypass line across the Red River,
ferry across the Red River, and enter Hanoi from
the south. This routing would involve the use of
two rail ferries and would also interfere with
traffic from Haiphong which must use the Red River
rail bypass. Thus, it is probable that traffic
from DongDang is transshipped at Gia Lam and the
goods moved all the way into Hanoi by truck. The
several highway bypasses on the Red River and the
inland water system in the Delta area are more
than adequate to handle the diversions of traffic
imposed by the interdiction of rail lines in the
Hanoi area.
Photography of 1.7 September indicates that
repairs on the Red: River bridges are under way.
Cables and decking were noted across the damaged
125-foot span, and the bridge may now be serviceable
for limited vehicular use. At the Canal des Rapides,
the two damaged spans on the original bridge have
been repaired and are now serviceable for rail and
truck traffic. The restoration of these vital
bridges should greatly facilitate the movement of
goods to the Hanoi area and south.
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C. LOC's North of Hanoi
1. The Dong Dang Line and Highway Routes
to the Northeast
The most important rail connection
between Hanoi and Communist China is the line
extending northeast from Yen Vien, across the Red
River from Hanoi, to Dong Dang. The rail bridges
at Bac Giang and Dap Cau and the key rail yards
at Kep, Cao Nung, and Bac Giang were attacked in
June. In July, attacks continued against these
targets and against the yards at Vu Chua and
Bac Le, but less intensively. During August,
several new targets in the buffer zone along the
Chinese border were struck in addition to the
others under attack since June. These new'targets
included the railroad/highway bridge and its bypass
at Lang Son, the railroad/highway bridge at Lang
Dang, and the rail yards at Lang Dang and Lang Giai.
These strikes were not effective in
stopping through service, mainly because each
bridge had one or more bypass bridges available.
At Dap Cau the original bridge was serviceable
during much of the period and a railroad bypass
bridge and four highway bypasses were available.
At Bac Giang the main bridge was also serviceable
most of the time and a rail bypass bridge and rail
ferry were available. The attacks against the
railroad bridges at Lang Son in August destroyed
the original bridge and damaged a bypass. A
second rail bypass was available, however, and a
probable highway pontoon bypass was noted soon
after the strike. The original bridge at Lang Dang
remained serviceable throughout August. The rail-
road bypass bridges on this line are well constructed
and capable of supporting nearly the same volume
of traffic as the original bridges. As the Dap Cau
and Bac Giang bridges are south of Kep, they can
be bypassed by using the Kep to Thai Nguyen route.
Photography taken throughout the period
indicates that several yards, including Kep, Vu Chua,
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Cao Nung, and Bac Giang, were sometimes unserv-
iceable for through rail. service after they were
struck but had at least one through track open
for traffic within a short time. Attacks against
other rail yards did not. disrupt through traffic.
The yard at Vu Chua, for example, was struck on
19 and 20'July, and photography.of 20 July showed
two of five tracks available for through service.
Photography showed one through track serviceable
after a strike on 28 August.
The Dong Dang line is estimated to have
been operational for through traffic for nearly
20 days during August, and shuttle traffic could
have moved over the line between the few points
of interdiction throughout the month. The normal
capacity of this line is estimated to be 3,000
tons each way per day as a meter-gauge system and
nearly double this amount on the dual-gauge
portion of the line. The actual volume of traffic
currently moved on the line is estimated to be
about 800 tons per day southward over most sec-
tions. Northbound traffic is much lighter.
Highway Route 1A generally runs parallel
to the Dong Dang line and can serve as an alternate
route to the rail line. Two other highways from
Mong Cai and Cao Bang could also be used as alter-
nate routes from Kwangsi. Province to the Hanoi
area. These three routes together are estimated
to have an uninterdicted capacity of 2,700 tons
each way per day in the dry season and 650 tons
in the rainy season. Although we are unable to
estimate the reduction of daily capacity on any
one of these routes, the countermeasures observed
would indicate that no significant or sustained
reduction has been made. Moreover, there is no
evidence that these roads are being used at even
their wet-season capacity. Traffic consists
mainly of local economic: and military traffic,
except for that shifted temporarily from the
rail line to bypass rail. interdictions.
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2. Thai Nguyen Lines
The Thai Nguyen lines extend east to
Kep, on the Dong Dang line, and south from Thai
Nguyen to Hanoi. The Kep - Thai Nguyen segment is
a recently constructed standard-gauge line and
the Hanoi - Thai Nguyen route has been converted
to dual gauge. These lines can serve as an alter-
nate route for the portion of the Dong Dang line
from Kep to Hanoi. The rail line from Thai Nguyen
to Hanoi has a comparatively good quality highway
paralleling it, with an uninterdicted dry season/wet
season capacity of about 1,200/240 tons each way per
day. The Kep - Thai Nguyen line, however, is sup-
plemented only by low-capacity secondary roads.
The Thai Nguyen yard was heavily
attacked several times as were yards at Na Chang,
Thinh Dau, Thang Quang, and the important bridges
at Ha Gia and Lang Lau. These attacks have not
meaningfully restricted traffic on the Hanoi -
Thai Nguyen line. Photography indicates that the
Ha Gia bridge was serviceable until 4 August, when
one span was dropped. Photography of 11 August,
however, shows this bridge restored to service.
A rail-to-water transshipment point, a highway
bridge, and three fords were available to accom-
modate traffic during the few days the bridge was
out. At Lang Lau, either the original or a bypass
bridge has been available for rail traffic during
June-August. A comparison of photography reveals
that the two destroyed spans of the main bridge
were completely repaired in not more than 19 days.
The rail line at Thai Nguyen was
heavily damaged on several occasions during June-
August, but photography indicates that at least
one through track was probably serviceable through-
out the period. The other yards attacked were
unserviceable for short periods of time but were
able to provide through service within 24 hours
after each attack.
The Kep - Thai Nguyen line was also
heavily attacked. The rail yards at Mo Trang
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and Huong Vi and the rail bridges at Mo Trang and
Dong Muc were all struck several times. These
attacks did not disrupt through service at the
bridges. Photography shows the bridge at Mo Trang
serviceable throughout the three months. The
Dong Muc bridge, or its rail bypass bridge, appar-
ently was also serviceable throughout the period.
The two yards struck were serviceable for through
service most of the period.
3. Lao Cai Line and Other Transport
Routes to the Northwest
North Vietnam's other rail connection
to Communist China extends northwest from Hanoi
to Lao Cai on the Chinese border. Targets struck
during the intensified bombing period included
the rail yards at Viet Tri, Yen Bai, Phu Duc,
Phu Tho, and Som Tra and. the rail bridge at Chien
Ung. The Lang Con railroad bridge in the buffer
zone along the Chinese border was struck for the
first time in August.
The through capacity of the Lao Cai
line was reduced from 3,000 tons a day to about
700 tons in.June 1966, when the bridge at Viet Tri
was destroyed. A rail ferry has been utilized at
the site of the bridge and has been more than
adequate to carry present levels of traffic.
Other bridges on this line span small streams so
that repairs can be easily effected and bypass
bridges, of which several have been noted in
recent photography, readily constructed. One or
more yards were closed to through traffic from
time to time during June-August but seldom for
more than 24 hours.
The highway network between Hanoi and
the Lao Cai area has been considerably extended
and improved during the past two years. The two
principal routes, one on each side of the Red
River, could carry about 1,600 tons each way. per
day during the dry season and 300 tons during the
wet season, but they are only uded now for local
and feeder traffic. Highway traffic around the
destroyed bridge at Viet Tri is carried by ferries
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and a pontoon bridge. Other highway bridges
attacked on these routes have not been significant
structures and have been quickly repaired or by-
passed.
The Red River provides additional
capacity of at least 2,700 tons from June through
October and 900 tons during the dry season. Dur-
ing high water, craft drawing up to 7 feet can
reach Lao Cai. Traffic in the upper reaches is
relatively light and consists primarily of agri-
cultural and forest products and some construction
materials.
D. LOC's from Haiphong
Traffic into and out of Haiphong moves
over an effective, flexible network, which in-
cludes the main rail line, three major and
numerous secondary roads, two major inland water
systems, many minor waterways, and the coastal
water routes. Only the major routes have been
included on Figures 4 and 5.
1. The Hanoi-Haiphong Railroad Line
T TIT
The 103-kilometer railroad between
Hanoi and Haiphong carries a heavy volume of in-
ternational traffic. Only a few ineffective strikes
were made on this line until the last week in
June, when.the Hai Duong Railroad/Highway Bridge
East and one rail bypass were hit several times
and.rendered unserviceable. The July and August
attacks were directed against the Hai Duong
Railroad/Highway Bridge and its bypasses, the
Hai Duong Railroad/Highway Bridge East and its
bypasses, the railroad/highway bridge, the bypass,
the rail yard at Ngoc Kuyet, and the rail yard at
Hai Duong. In addition, during the first two
weeks in September, several strikes were made
against bridges in the previously restricted zone
around Haiphong. Photography of 17 September
shows the rail bridge in the restricted zone to
be serviceable.
Attacks against bridges on the line
east of Gia Lam interrupted through rail service
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only temporarily, if at all. The Hai Duong
Railroad/Highway. Bridge was successfully inter-
dicted in early July and remained unserviceable
through August. However, a railroad pontoon bridge,
probably able to support the weight of a regular
train, was available throughout the period, but
apparently was not in use during the daytime. A
rail bypass bridge is also under` construction at
this site. In addition,"five highway bypasses
(three ferries with a total capacity of 500 to
600 tons and two pontoon bridges with a combined
capacity of 5,000't6ns) are available.
Photography indicates that the Hai
Duong Railroad/Highway Bridge East was unserv=
iceable for only short periods during the three
months. Bypasses at this bridge include a prob-
able rail ferry bypass (1,000 tons each way per
day), three highway ferries (about 650 tons each
way per day), and one highway pontoon bridge
(2,700 tons each way per day). The railroad/
highway bridge at Ngoc Kyet was not interdicted,
but its :rail bypass bridge was badly damaged.
Attacks against rail yards and sidings interrupted
through rail service only temporarily. The effec-
tiveness of the MK-36 magnetic-influence bombs
used to seed the waterways and ferry site at the
two railroad/highway bridges at Hai Duong cannot
be judged.
The intensified air campaign during
June, July, and August did not effectively disrupt
rail service between Hanoi and Haiphong. Photography
shows changes in the composition and numbers of
rolling stock in the yard. in Haiphong and trains
on the line. The restricting facility for through
rail traffic was apparently the pontoon rail ferry
at the Hai Duong Bridge East. This ferry prob-
ably restricted through rail traffic to 1,000 tons
each way per day. However, by using the highway
bypasses at this point the uninterdicted capacity
of the line - 4,000 to 5,000 tons each way per
day - could have been achieved.
About 2,900 tons per day of import
traffic could normally have been expected to move
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over the line in August. This tonnage would re-
quire about 200 freight cars, or 10 trains, per
day. Photography of 20 June and 21 August revealed
268 cars and 205 cars, respectively, on the line
or in yards along the line, including the yards
in Haiphong but not those in the Hanoi; area.
Four made-up trains were found along the line on
20 June and one on 21 August. Although the full
2,900 tons could have moved out of Haiphong by
rail, some of, it was probably added to that already
carried by inland watercraft and trucks. About
1,000 tons.daily could be moved by watercraft be-
tween Haiphong and Hanoi utilizing forty 100-ton
barges with four days for the round trip. About
700 trucks-would be needed to move 1,000 tons per
day the full distance between the cities.
2:. Highways
Several major and numerous secondary
roads serve Haiphong. Route 5, paralleling the
railroad line to Hanoi, has a capacity of 5,000
tons each way per day, the highest of any road
in North Vietnam. Route 10, with a capacity of
1,000 tons each way per day, provides access to
areas both north and south of Haiphong. A number
of secondary roads that connect Routes 5 and 10
provide a ,very flexible and intricate network for
the movement of goods out of the port. In addi-
tion, the extensive waterway system in the Delta
provides an excellent complement to truck traffic,
with numerous transshipment facilities. available.
Vehicle ferries abound on these waterways.
Although a number of highway bridges in the Delta
area!have.been attacked, they have been rapidly
restored.
Water Transport and Transshipment
Facilities
Two principal and numerous minor water
routes connect Haiphong with Hanoi. The southern
route via the Canal des Bambous and the Red River
has the largest capacity and is the most heavily
utilized. The northern route uses the Song Thai
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Binh and Canal des Rapides. Photography of 20 June
shows at least 440 barges and sampans on the
northern route and 630 on the southern route. On
19 July, 203 were counted on the northern route
and 641 on the southern. On both days, many small
barges and sampans were noted onthe smaller water-
ways. About 30,000 tons of carrying capacity was
represented by the craft sighted on 20 June -
10,000 tons on the northern route and 20,000 on
the southern route. The craft sighted on 19 July
could carry about 20,000 tons - 6,000 on the
northern route and 14,000 on the southern route.
All of this capacity was not engaged, however, in
handling traffic between Haiphong and Hanoi. Some
craft were inactive, some were empty, and some
were serving intermediate points. The figures do
suggest, however, that watercraft are used in
large numbers and that they represent a substantial
carrying capacity.
The extent to which the drop in the
number of watercraft sighted can be attributed to
the air war is not clear. The reduction could be
attributed to the demand for watercraft elsewhere
in the country. The fear of striking mines cannot
be entirely discounted, however, although we have
no evidence of watercraft sunk or damaged by these
weapons in this area. It is significant that
photography reveals no attempts at camouflage of
watercraft in the area.
LOC's to the South
The capability of the Hanoi to Vinh line
to maintain through rail service has been severely
restricted by the cumulative effects of the
Rolling Thunder program. For the first eight
months of 1967, more ordnance was dropped on this
line than on the entire railroad system north of
the Red River. The line is almost continuously
cut at several points, and, because of the inter-
diction problem, a number of highway bypasses and
transloading points have been developed. The
substantial repair effort mounted to keep major
sections open for shuttle service reflects the
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need to.maintain overall transport capability and
the efficiency. of railroads in handling the volume
of traffic moving south.
Road:and water routes to the south-have-
increasingly served as alternates to'the rail
line. Route 1A, the major route. extending to the
DMZ, has a capacity of about 950 tons each way
per day.during the dry season and 150 tons per day
in the wet season in the area south of Vi:nh and -
a considerably higher capacity in the area north
of Vinnh..-Route 15, which was extended to the
Mu Gia Pass.'on the Lao border and parallels Route
1A, has a.capacity of_ about 750 tons each way per
day during the dry season and 250 tons during the
wet season in the area south of Vinh. Canal and
inland waterways both north and south of Vinh
have been dredged since the bombing began and are
being used extensively as are the coastal water-
ways. In the area south of Vinh, a lightweight
meter-gauge-rail line over which motor vehicles
with flanged wheels operate extends from Tan Ap
to the vicinity of Quang Khe. The relative
importance of each transport route in the move-
mentof'supplies varies according to season and the
extent and pattern of interdiction. Although all
of these'are attacked intensively, their aggre-
gate capacity is much greater than the volume of
supplies moved on them. A much larger share of
the interdiction effort in the southern route
packages is targeted against trucks and water-
craft than in the north. As a result the pre-
ponderance of destruction to trucks and watercraft
in North Vietnam occurs there.
F. Destruction of Transport Equipment
Since January 1965, destruction and damage
to transport equipment has included 67 locomotives,
4,792 rail freight cars, 8,371 trucks, and 19,21~
watercraft, see Table 1.* The damage and destruc-
tion inflicted during June-August 1967 constitutes
Data on equipment destroyed or damaged are based
on pilot reports,-which include some dupiieation.
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a major share of these totals. About one-third
of the cumulative damage and destruction of
locomotives, rail freight: cars, and trucks was
reported in these three months. If watercraft
are included, the attacks during these three months
account for one-fourth of the losses of transport
equipment since Rolling Thunder began.
Most of this equipment is destroyed in the
southern Route Packages (I-IV). Even during
June-August, when LOC targets in Route Packages V
and VI were emphasized, 97 percent of trucks, 95
percent of watercraft, and 45 percent of rolling
stock reportedly. were destroyed in the southern
Route Packages.
The effectiveness of attack sorties, in
terms of destruction and damage of transport equip-
ment per sortie, has increased throughout the Rolling
Thunder program. In 1965, one piece of transport
equipment was destroyed or damaged for each nine
attack sorties flown. By June-August 1967, one
piece was being destroyed for each four attack
sorties flown. The effectiveness of air attacks
against transport equipment during the first five
months of 1967 was about the same as during 1966,
but the rate increased markedly in June-August
1967, primarily because of the large increase in
the numbers of trucks destroyed and damaged. There
was also a large increase in the number of water-
craft destroyed and damaged per sortie during
June-August 1967 compared with the preceding
periods, but it was not as spectacular as the in-
crease noted for trucks. Tables 2 and 3 show
data for all transport equipment and trucks
separately by time period.
Although the total numbers of transport
equipment reported destroyed and damaged during
the course of the Rolling Thunder program are
impressive., the impact of these losses on North
Vietnam's transport capability has not been
significant. The railroad rolling stock inven-
tory has remained at the pre-bombing level, and
the truck inventory has increased. The watercraft
inventory is not known.
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Table 1
North Vietnam: Destruction and. Damage. of Transport Equipment
1965, August 1967
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hoco-
tives
Rail
Freight
Cars
Tr
ucks
Fe
rr
ies Bar es
Other
Water-
craft
mo
,
1965.. (10 montiis )
Destroyed
227.
318
,
53
.
263
''
144
Damaged
592
487_ ...
....
56
487
210
1966 (11 months)
,
Destroyed
10
1,101
1,
935
67
2,520
867
Damaged
14
935
1,
801
1
31
.4,289
1,372
1967
Jan-Aug (8 months)
Destroyed
Damaged
Jun-Aug (3 months)
21
759
1,178
2
1
,343
,487
10
10
2,858
5,447
139
288
Destroyed
10 61
4
1,678
1
0
1,312
6
29
Damaged
13 83
9
1,002
5
2,34
23
Total-1965.-
August 1.967
..Destroyed
26 2,08
7
4,596
13
0
5,641,
1,150
Damaged
41 2,70
5
3,775
19
7
10,223
1,870
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Effectiveness of Attack Sorties over North Vietnam
in Destruction and Damage of Transport Equipment a/
1965 - August 1967
Monthly
Monthly Average
of Transport
Units
Numb
pe
e
r
r of Sorties
Transport
Units _
Average
of Attack
Destroyed
Year
Sorties
Destroyed DamG&ed
Destroyed
Damaged
or Damaged
1965
2,594
101
184
26
14
9
1966
7,470
591
777
13
10
5
1967
Jan-May
8,168
493
841
17
10
6
Jun-Aug
11,556
1,218
1,409
9
8
4
a. Including locomotives,, freight cars, trucks, and all types of
watercraft.
Effectiveness of Attack Sorties over North Vietnam
in Destruction and Damage of Trucks
1965 - August 1967
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Monthly Average
Number of Sorties
Monthly
of Trucks
per Truck
Average
of Attack
Destroyed
Year
Sorties
Destroyed
Da
mag
ed Total
Destroyed
Damaged
or Damaged
1965
2,594
32
49
81
81
53
32
1966
7,470
176
164
340
42
46
22
1967
Jan.-May
8,168
133
97
230
61
84
36
Jun-Aug
11,556
559
334
893
21
35
13
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IV. Changes in Transport Requirements and Patterns
A. Chan ig ng Requirements
The air campaign over North Vietnam has
radically changed the composition and direction of
the goods that flow over the North Vietnamese modern
transport system. Imports into Haiphong have in-
creased greatly, reaching an average of almost 5,200
tons a day in the second quarter of 1967 and
averaging 4,300 tons a day during the first eight
months of the year, compared with 2,100 tons per
day in the first quarter of 1965.* Ultimately, most
of these imports must be distributed by the modern
transport system, which is now under intensive attack.
At the same time, the bombing has reduced the need
for some import traffic. Nearly one-third of the total
inbound traffic on the Dong Dang line from China,
for example, consisted of coal imports destined for
the Thai Nguyen Iron and Steel Complex which has
ceased production. (For estimated international
traffic moving on rail lines in 1964 and August 1967,
see Figure 6.) The bombing has also greatly reduced
North Vietnamese exports. Exports of apatite
virtually ceased in August 1965, and exports of
cement and pig iron ceased this year. This reduction
of export traffic, particularly apatite and pig iron,
has provided further relief to the transport system,
especially the railroads. The general disruption
of industry resulting from bomb damage and shortages
of electric power have reduced further the traffic
that must move over the transport system. Even the
large-scale evacuation of the population from urban
areas to rice-growing rural areas, while creating many
serious problems for Hanoi, has reduced North Vietnam's
modern transport problem. Finally, Chinese transit
traffic, amounting to 1,300 tons per day, no longer
crossed North Vietnam between Nanning and K'un-ming
after the attacks on the Lao Cai line began in 1965.
A new rail line in China for this traffic was com-
pleted in early 1966.
These figures include an estimated annual 250,000
tons - 400 tons per day - of unidentified cargoes,
primarily from China.
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The ne effect of the removal of Chinese
transit traffic and changes in traffic requirements
and patterns induced by the bombings is that the
North Vietnamese modern transport system is
presently carrying only about 90 percent of the volume
of traffic it carried during 1966. This explains, in
part, why the North Vietnamese have been able to
distribute the large volumes of economic and military
aid coming into the country. Furthermore, at the
same time that the volume of traffic has lessened,
the capacity of the transport system has increased
so that essential traffic can move at night or when
bad weather limits the effectiveness of airstrikes.
In 1964, for example, the Hanoi-Haiphong line
transported an estimated 3,750 tons of international
traffic in both directions (2,350 tons westbound and
1,400 tons eastbound). Presently, despite the
large imports into Haiphong, the line is estimated
to be. handling only 3,15.0 tons daily both ways
(2,900 tons westbound and 250 tons eastbound). The
capacity of the Hanoi-Haiphong line is presently
estimated at 4,000 to 5,000 tons each way per day.
The Hanoi - Dong Dang line, which was being used at
about one-third of its pre-bombing capacity, is now
being used at about one-fourth of that capacity and
an,even smaller share of its dual-gauge capacity.
B. Changes in imports and Exports
The war has induced a drastic increase in
North Vietnamese imports, particularly of economic
and military aid from the USSR and Communist China.
Seaborne imports, for example, increased from an
average of nearly :3,000 tons a day in 1966 to 4,300 tons a
day during the first eight months of 1967. Almost
all of this import traffic must be distributed over
the main domestic transport network. Excluding
exports of coal and cement, which do not move over
the main transport network, there has been a drastic
decrease in export traffic that offsets the increase
in imports. The movement of international traffic
has shifted from a "two-way" to a "one-way" flow as
shown in the following tabulation:
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1964
Estimated International Traffic Carried on North Vietnamese Railroads
Volume in Metric Tons per Day (to nearest so)
ther eco~i"151?/ric'~? 100
t ' 'i00:
Chinese transit traffic 1,300
Other"ectrnomic 300'
Chinese transit traffic
550
foal
300
Economic
Chinese transit
350
AUGUST 1967
Economic
Military
Military 50
entified cargo
m China 400!
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Metric Tons per Day
1964
August 1967 Change
Imports
3,300 J
5,100 J + 1,800
Exports c/
2,000
200 -.1,800
Total
5;300
5,300
b Average during January-August 1967 for sea-'
borne imports and current rail imports.
c.. Excluding coal and cement which does not
move on the main transport network.
C. Changes in Domestic Requirements
The'reduction in industrial production
because of bomb damage to modern industry and, to a
lesser extent, the urban evacuation carried out
during 1966 and 1967 have brought about a net
decrease in domestic traffic requirements. The
decreases in traffic are estimated as follows:
Metric Tons per Day
Coal for electric powerplents
1,700
Coal for cement production
570
Coal for other industry
1,000
Cement
650
Apatite
550
Pig iron
270
Textiles
60
Foodstuffs
400
5,200
Thus about 5,200 tons of the estimated
55,300 tons of traffic carried per day on the modern
transport system in 1966 did not need to be moved
by the end of August 1967 -- a reduction of nearly
19 percent. A large portion of the lost traffic had
been moved on the railroads, which probably originated
about '9,.00,0 tons of freight per day in 1966. These
reductions in traffic that moved principally by
a. Including Chinese transit traffic.
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rail have provided slack for the movement of those
imports needed to continue the war effort and maintain
a minimum standard of living.
D. Haiphong Port
1. Increase in :Imports
Haiphong normally receives more than 95
percent of North Vietnam's seaborne imports and about
three-fourths of total imports. Imports have.
increased from an average daily volume of 2,100 tons
in the first quarter of 1965 to a peak of almost
5,200 tons in the second quarter of 1967. This tonnage
has been verified from intelligence sources except
for an estimated 400 tons a day. Haiphong's volume
of identified imports and exports since 1964 are given
in Tables 4 and 5. Although much of the increase
in imports this year has been foodstuffs, very
significant and consistent increases also have occurred
in imports of miscell-aneous-and general cargoes and
petroleum products. Imports of miscellaneous and
general cargo have consisted largely of Soviet and
Eastern European rolled steel products (especially
rails and structural steel), trucks, construction
equipment, machinery and spare parts, barges, cable
and wire, chemicals, and textiles. General cargo
shipments from Communist China have been of smaller
volume than those from either the USSR or Eastern
Europe but have included many of the items listed
above, as well as coking coal and gypsum. Most of
the growing volume of petroleum product imports has
been provided by the USSR, but China has supplied
about 23 percent of the petroleum delivered by sea
in the first eight months of 1967. There is still
no evidence that military hardware is entering North
Vietnam via Haiphong, although war-supporting
equipment, such as trucks, does arrive by sea.
2. Port Congestion
Despite the destruction of much of North
Vietnam's fixed petroleum storage capacity and tanker
discharge facilities at Haiphong in June and July 19.66,
seaborne deliveries of petroleum were back to pre-
strike levels by December 1966, and in the first,
quarter of 1967 deliveries averaged 26,500 tons -?- a
somewhat larger quantity than in any quarter since
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31 December 1964. Haiphong port authorities have
also had to cope with sharply increased quantities
of dry cargo imports.
Although sharply increased levels of
imports were cleared through the port of Haiphong,
difficulties were encountered in doing so, as seen
in the. growing layover times for both dry cargo
ships and tankers. Layover times of freighters at
Haiphong averaged ten days in the first six months
of 1966, but increased to nearly 17 days in the third
quarter of 1966 following a sharp increase in deliveries
of miscellaneous and general cargoes. Similarly, the
large increase in imports in the second quarter of
1967 was followed by increased layover times that
reached a peak average of 33 days for freighters
clearing the port in August. The extended delays
are attributable primarily to poor port management
and a possible shortage of lighter capacity.
Over the past 18 months, there has been
a notable spillover of cargoes into areas adjacent
to the port area at Haiphong. Vacant lots, parks,
and even streets and sidewalks have been utilized
for storage of cargoes. Comparison of photography
of April and August 1967 shows further extensions
of areas used for open storage. The photography
also reveals an active turnover of goods in these
storage areas, indicating that storage is largely
temporary. The pileup of supplies in the port area
apparently developed because of failure to adjust
and speed up cargo-handling and distributing proce-
dures sufficiently to keep pace with the increased
quantities of imports. Attacks on transport routes
around Haiphong almost certainly have not contri-
buted significantly to the accumulation of goods in
the port area.
Haiphong's potential for handling even
larger volumes of imports is excellent. In view of
the port's ideal access to the country's road, rail,
and waterway networks, the principal limiting factor
is the capability for transferring cargoes from
ships to these distribution lines. Apparently
recognizing this, Haiphong port authorities have
undertaken construction of a new wharf that will
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add at least one berth to the seven existing berths
for oceangoing ships. Additionally, North Vietnam
appears to have stepped up imports of barges in 1967.
Delivery has begun from Communist countries of at least
200 barges with an aggregate capacity of at least
15,000 deadweight tons. The additional barge capacity
will significantly increase the capability for lightering
cargoes from ships and moving shipments over inland
waterways.
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Table 4
Average monthly Volume of Seaborne imports identified on Foreign Ships
by quarter, January 1965 - August 1967
(Thousand Metric Tons)
1967
1966
1965
J
Oct-Dec
Jan-Mar
Apr-Jun
Jul-Aug
Jan-Mar
Apr-Jun
Jul-Sep
Apr-Jun
Jul-Se
Oct-Dec
0
Jan-Mar
4
0
55.8
48.5
77.7
80.1
81.4
71.5
75.7
113.2
143.1
90.
Total
lk foodstuffs
5
.
5.3
7.2
9.0
18.1
3.5
6.2
3.4
12.8
23.8
25.3
55.5
Bu
Fertilizer
13.2
15.7
10.8
14.4
28.5
15.0
14.4
17.5
1
26
9.1
13.8
26.5
20.9
18.7
Petroleum, oil, and
11
4
18.4
4.7
22.2
18.0
.
4
2
lubricants
,
1
1
0.9
0.3
2.4
0.3
.
2.3
1.4
0.6
o.6
2.2
.
Timber
m=iscellaneous and general
18.2
13.1
23.4
22.4
27.8
33.0
43.6
31.3
35.2
cargoes
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Table 5
North Vietnam.: Average Monthly Volume of Seaborne Exports -dent;f; a
by Quarter, January 1965 - August 1967 111cu on voreign Ships
Total
Apatite
Cement
Coal
Pig iron
Miscellaneous and general
cargoes
(Thousand Metric Tons)
1967
Jan-Mar Apr-Jun jul-Sep Oct-Dec Jan-Mar Apr-Jun Ju1_Sep Oct-Dec Jan-Mar 4r-Jun Jul-Auk aj
168.o 142.6 127.4 133.0 146.5 82.7 61.6 98.2
94.1 43.9 27.3
55.6 31.8 18.3
3.5
11.6 7.3 4.4 2.8 7.0 13.3 6.2 6.5 10.0 1.3
80.3 92.8 93.5 116.7 136.6 62.0 43.6
70.6 69.6 32.1 24.8
9.2 1.7 3.2 1.7 0.5 2.8 10.0
6.1 1.1
11.2 8.9 8.o 11.8
5.5 11.2 8.4 9.4 2.5
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V. The Logistics Burden of the Transport System
A fuller appreciation of North Vietnam's
ability to withstand the impact of a sustained
and intensive air interdiction campaign can be
gained by.examining those war-supporting trans-
port functions which are essential to the conduct
of the war in the South. North Vietnam provides
little direct input into the war other than its
manpower. The basic sustenance that enables the
war to continue is the material input provided
by the USSR and Communist China. Among the most
important elements of this external assistance
are the supplies needed to meet essential military
and:civilian requirements in the logistic funnel
which runs south of Hanoi through the panhandle
of North Vietnam, to the Communist forces in
Laos, in the DMZ area, and in South Vietnam.
Although the flow of external assistance to North
Vietnam is. increasing continuously, only a small
share of this aid must be transported south from
Hanoi to South Vietnam.
A. Area South of the Red River
The area south of the Red River includes
55 percent of North Vietnam's civilian population
and 63-percent of its armed forces. Two-thirds
of this North Vietnamese civilian population is
concentrated in the Delta between the Red River
and the 20th Parallel. About 57 percent of the
armed forces in the area south of the Red River
are located in Route Package VI south of the
Red River and in Route Package IV.
We estimate, in very general terms, that
the civil and military requirements in the area
south of the Red River approximate 2,000 tons
a day (see Table 6). The movement of this small
tonnage is then the.key logistics problem of the
North Vietnamese transport system. As these
supplies move south, they are drained off by
consumers along the route so that only extremely
small tonnages emerge at the end of the logistics
system. These small flows require the utilization
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of only a small part of the diverse transport
connections running through Laos or to the DMZ
area.
The military supply requirement of the
Communist forces in North Vietnam deployed south
of the Red River plus supplies provided by North
Vietnam to forces in Laos and South Vietnam is
estimated to be about 740 tons* per day, including
about 200 tons of ammunition, engineering supplies,
and equipment; 275 tons of food, most of which is
supplied from domestic resources; and about 265
tons of POL products. The civilian population
located in the same areas is estimated to consume
roughly 1,200 to 1,300 tons per day of imported sup-
plies, such..as POL, fertilizer, tools and equipment,
and clothing and medicine - goods which are mainly
imported via Haiphong. In addition to these ship-
ments, which must be imported from outside the area,
there is a small flow of domestically generated
civilian traffic, most of which moves only short
distances.
These estimates do not include an allow-
ance for the quantities of supplies and transport
equipment destroyed by air attacks. Even if this
rate of loss were as high as 30 percent, it would
not represent a large absolute increase in the
tonnage to be transported. Given the pattern of
attacks against LOC's and storage sites and the
pattern of reported destruction, it is evident
that the rate of loss increases as supplies move
south. Figure 7 shows the movement of supplies
to the several end-use areas.
Because the civilian population and the
military forces are heavily concentrated in the
Delta area, their essential requirements consti-
tute about three-fourths of the supplies -,1,500
tons - that must move south of Hanoi. This
In this memorandum, military requirements are
expressed in metric rather than short tons to make
them consistent with transportation estimates.
Thus, the military requirements figures will differ
from those usually used in our estimates of Com-.
munist logistics requirements.
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Estimated Military and Civilian Supply Requirements, by Area
ong Saly
Lao Cal
\4
Tuyen Quang
L 13A
ang Prabang
PLAINE DES JARRES
1 7/4
DISTANCES (in kilometers)
Hanoi-Thank Hoa
145
Hanoi - Route 7 at North
Vietnam/Laos border
410
Hanoi - Plaine des Jarres
475
Hanoi - Ha Tinh
330
Hanoi -Demilitarized Zone
555
Hanoi - Mu Gia Pass
400
Hanoi-Attopeu (in Laos)
810
Hanoi - Duc Co (in Pleiku
Province, South Vietnam)
915
Metric Tons per Day
Imports
Requirements
0 25 50 75 Miles
0 25 50 75 Kilometers
MU O/A
PASS AAA
Demilitarized Zone
Dong Ha
Quang Tri
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Hanoi Area of Route
Package VI South of
Red River plus Route
Package IV
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Table 6
Estimated Civilian and Military Supply Requirements
Provided by North Vietnam, by Area
Civilian Mili
Area Requirement Requi
tary
rement
Total
Hanoi area of Route
Package VI south of
Red River and Route
Package IV 1,080
4
20
1,500
Route Packages I, II,
and III 165
2
35
400
DMZ 0
40
40
Laos 0 35 35
South Vietnam 0 10 10
Total 1,245 740 1,985
movement is easily handled by a diversified trans-
port system extending through the Delta to Haiphong
and up to the Chinese border, and distances are not
great. Ninh Dinh, a junction point in the southern
Delta, is 110 kilometers from Haiphong by road and
293 kilometers from P'ing-hsiang, China, by rail.
The remaining 500 tons per day that must
move into the Panhandle (Route Packages I, II, and
III) are predominantly military supplies - 320 tons -
and are moved over relatively longer distances.
These requirements are not large, however, and
although the air campaign has been largely con-
centrated against the LOC's in the South, the sup-
ply system has been improved and the requirements
delivered.
Food rations, POL supplies, and air defense
ammunition expenditures account for most of the
military requirement. The military POL requirement
includes an allowance for aircraft, naval vessels,
military wheeled vehicles, armored vehicles, and
generators. In addition, a substantial share of
civil transport activity is devoted to the move-
ment of military equipment and material. Table 7
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Military Supply Requirements Provided by North Vietnam for Communist Forces
in the Southern Regions of North Vietnam, Laos, and South Vietnam
Hanoi Area of Route
Package VI South of Red
Panhandle
(Route Packages
/
South Vietnam
Class of Supply
River and Route Package IV
I and III)
DMZ
Laos J
Other than DMZ
Total
Class I (food)
127
100
27
20
Negl.
274
Class II and IV
(clothing and
equipment)
18
5
5
3
53
Class III (POL)
181
72
5
9
Negl.
267
Class V
(ammunition)
90
45
3
1
1
146
25
1
420
235
40
35
11)
740
a. Requirements in the dry season; monsoon requirements are about 75 percent of dry season
requirements.
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shows estimated military requirements by class for
selected areas of North Vietnam, the DMZ area,
Laos, and South Vietnam.
Air defense ammunition and SAM expenditures
amount to about 258 tons per day for all of North
Vietnam, with about 35 percent of the total con-
centrated in the Hanoi area south of the Red River
and in Route Package IV. Roughly 20 percent of air
defense ammunition is expended in Route Packages I,
II, and III. Only about one ton of ammunition per
day is expended for training purposes.
The remaining supply items required by
military forces in North Vietnam are made up of
Class II and IV technical supplies: primarily
engineering, transportation, quartermaster, and
medical supplies.* It is estimated that on the
order of 40 tons per day of these are required
by forces in North Vietnam south of the Red River
in Route Packages I through IV and Vi. Engineer-
supplies used on the construction and repair of
lines. of communication make up most of the technical
supply requirement.
Despite the heavy bombing of rail lines
from China and the port of Haiphong and disruption
of LOC's in the South, it appears that food and
building materials for workcamps repairing bomb
damage in Route Packages I, II, and III south of
Hanoi continue to move. A workcamp in Quang Binh
Province, probably operating on Route 1A, 101, or
137, was to receive two bulldozers and 30 tons
of steel on 20 June from Hanoi. A. logging
camp in Nghe An Province which provides,
among other things, timber for bridge repair was
to receive an additional 25 tons of rice on
15 June. Although some intercepted messages
*. Weapons and signal and chemical equipment are
also included in the Class II and IV category.
Estimates for Class II and IV supplies include a
replacement factor for wear and tear but no allow-
ance for destruction by opposing forces.
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reflected "bad traffic conditions" south of Hanoi,
there were other reports of small shipments of
asphalt, cement, and gas generators to workcamps
in the southern part of the country in June and
July.
Currently, Communist forces in the DMZ
area require about 40 tons of supplies per day,
practically all of which are provided by North
Vietnam. Requirements in this region are higher
per soldier than elsewhere in South Vietnam be-
cause the rate of combat has been high, and the
troops are predominantly well equipped North
Vietnamese regulars. Food supplies represent
about two-thirds of the daily resupply requirement
for these forces.
The ammunition requirement, although low
in comparison with the requirement for food, is
beginning to rise. Estimated ammunition expendi-
tures of three tons per day include an allowance
for artillery fired into South Vietnam from posi-
tions within or north of the DMZ as well as mortar
and rocket firing in the northern part of Quang
Tri Province. The use of these weapons has in-
creased dramatically in recent weeks.
C. Laos and South Vietnam
The average daily volume of truck traffic
observed moving into Laos from North Vietnam dur-
ing the past dry season along with supplies pro--
cured locally and from Cambodia was more than
adequate to meet external requirements of Com-
munist forces in Laos and in South Vietnam. The
volume of truck traffic suggests that Communist
forces were able not only to satisfy dry season
requirements, but also to build up stockpile levels
in anticipation of the current rainy season and
increased levels of consumption or loss. There
is also some evidence that the level of truck
traffic has remained fairly high during the current
rainy season.
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1. Laos Panhandle (see Figure 8)
Communist forces in the Laos Panhandle
currently require about 20 tons of supplies per
day from North Vietnam in the dry season and about
15 tons of supplies per day in the rainy season.
Nearly half of these are food. Only about one-
fourth (5 tons) of Class II and IV requirements
need to be brought in from North Vietnam. Ammuni-
tion expended in ground combat and antiaircraft
reactions amounts to less than a ton per day.
2. Northern Laos
Communist forces in the northern part
of Laos require about 15 tons of supplies per day
from North Vietnam in the dry season and about
12 tons in the rainy season. Most of these sup-
plies consist of food and POL, as combat is light
and construction activity minor. Ammunition ex-
penditures in northern Laos are negligible.
3. South Vietnam
Communist forces currently deployed in
South Vietnam require between 45 and 55 tons of
supplies per day from external sources to sustain
their present level of combat operations. Only
about 10 tons of these supplies, principally
weapons, equipment, and ammunition, are supplied
from North Vietnam through the Laos Panhandle.
The remaining tonnages are moved directly across
the DMZ, supplied from Cambodia either directly
across the border or through the Laos Panhandle
(a minimum of 10 tons of food per day from Cambodia
for Communist forces in South Vietnam transits the
Laos Panhandle), or are infiltrated by sea.
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Road Network - Laos Panhandle
Kieui 9~ - NO R'
~Vrf TNAM -i.
x110 I
1~.. Don Bai Dinht `:--.JI
~Savannakhet BanP1cone
Roadnet, 1 Jan. 1964
Roadnet extension,
1 Sept. 1965
SOUTHH
ue
Chavane
Stung TrenD
B 0 D I A
Attopeu
0 25
F- 7-'LT
0 25 50
50 75 100 Miles
75 100 Kilometers
Road net extension,
1 June 1966
Roadnet extension,
1 June 1967
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The ability of the North Vietnamese to offset
the effects of bombing is explained, in part, by
the primitive target system that US air power is
trying to neutralize. Much of the success of the
North Vietnamese, however, is explained by the
numerous countermeasures they have developed or
borrowed. The resourcefulness and determination
of the North Vietnamese to counter the effectiveness
of the US bombing is more evident in the transport
sector than anywhere else.
Contingency planning by the North Vietnamese,
with Chinese Communist aid, has diminished the full
effect of. the increased bombing of the northern
LOC's. Using a large labor force and local building
materials, the North Vietnamese have built bypass
railroad bridges and have improved fords, pontoon
bridges, and ferries to insure the movement of
supplies from Haiphong port and China via the major
road and rail arteries. The North Vietnamese anti-
cipated the recent escalation of bombing by at least
one year. Since July 1966 there has been photographic
evidence of bypass bridges being constructed and the
reinforcing of existing bridges in the Hanoi and
Haiphong areas. Stockpiles of repair materials along
major LOC's have long been in evidence. Thus the
effect of long-range planning and contingency con-
struction by the North Vietnamese has been to
disperse the pre-strike chokepoints on LOC's, thereby
greatly complicating the task of interdicting
supplies.
A. Bypasses
1. Type and Number
A wide variety of bypasses have been
built by the North Vietnamese to counter the
effectiveness of US air attacks against LOC's. The
type of bypass constructed is generally determined
by the terrain. The number of bypasses at a
particular crossing depends on the strategic
importance of the route and its traffic volumes.
The North Vietnamese have employed a variety of
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bridging techniques, many of which were borrowed
from Chinese experience during the Korean War. At
river crossings along critical routes, there are
25X1
usually
one
or sometimes two alternate railroad
bridges
and
a rail ferry for backup. At combination
bridges,
one
or more pontoon bridges and vehicle
ferries
are
located to handle highway traffic.
The success of the North Vietnamese and
Chinese Communist construction effort in the Delta
and north of Hanoi and the significance attached
to the various transport routes can be seen by the
average number of bypasses built for damaged rail--
road and combination railroad/highway bridges on
each line. The figures include all types of bypasses
at damaged or destroyed bridges - alternate rail-
road bridges, rail ferries, pontoon bridges, and
highway fords and ferries. Rail-to-water trans-
shipment points are not included in the table. As
shown in Table 8, the important Hanoi-Dong Dang
line and Route 1A have the largest average number
of bypasses.
Average Number of Bypasses per Damaged Bridge on Selected Rail Lines
Bridges Number of Average Number of
Rail Line/Route Damaged Destroyed Bypasses bypasses per Bridge
Hanoi - Dong Dang line
and Route 1A
Hanoi-Haiphong line
and Route 5
Hanoi - Thai Nguyen
1.67
Kep line 4+ 5 1.25
Hanoi - Lao Cai line 25 15 0.60
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Many of the alternate bridges are used
together with the original bridges in a "tandem
service" arrangement. Aerial photography usually
shows only one bridge serviceable because many
alternate bridges are constructed with removable
decking or sliding spans to give the impression
that the alternate is still under construction
and not serviceable to traffic." The decking is put
in place at night when the bombing diminishes
(see Table 9).
In addition to the bypasses built on
major rail lines, concealed rail sidings, rail-to-
water transshipment points, and new railroad yards
have been built to protect rolling stock caught
unexpectedly at newly destroyed bridges and to
permit more options in dispatching traffic on the
bombed rail lines. Camouflaged sidings have been
noted on the Lao Cai line where the terrain affords
excellent cover for temporarily stranded rolling
stock (see Figure 9). Rail-to-water transshipment
points have been constructed at Bac Giang and Dap
Cau on the heavily used Dong Dang line, at Hai
Duong and Ngoc Kuyet on the Haiphong line, and
at Ha Gia on the Thai Nguyen line - all on
navigable waterways that interconnect to provide
bypass or alternate LOC?s. At least seven new
railyards plus numerous sidings have been built
since early 1966 on the two rail lines connecting
Hanoi with China. Many of them are located near
heavily bombed bridges and serve to make rail
traffic more flexible and to allow repair workers
greater option in choosing which yards to keep
:serviceable at any time.
2. Rate of Repair
Many of the damaged bridges and bypasses
have been repaired or completely rebuilt with
phenomenal speed. Engineering troops and conscripted
local workers are responsible for preassigned
targets and arrive at the bombed areas frequently
within one to three hours after a strike. In addition,
stockpiles of construction materials such as crushed
stone and lumber are pre-positioned at strategic
points and trained demolition units are organized
to remove or detonate delayed action bombs. Cratered
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Maximum Repair Times at Selected Bridges on Rail Lines
in North Vietnam
Dates of
Rail Line and Bridge Name_ Photpgraphy Days Type of Repair
Dong Dang line
25X1
Hanoi Railroad/Highway Bridge
over Red River
Hanoi Railroad/Highway Bridge
over Canal des Rapides
11, 30 Aug 1967
30 Apr, 10 Jun 1967
19
4+1
Two piers, 250 feet of deck
for vehicles
Two piers, 212+ feet of deck
on original bridge plus
670 feet of deck on bypass
bridge
Cau Railroad/Highway
Bridge
10, 17 Jun 1967
7
200 feet on bypass bridge
Bac Giang Railroad/Highway
Bridge
30 Apr, 1 May 1967
1
106 feet (two new spans)
Lang Bun Railroad Bridge
19 Sep, 9 Oct 1965
20
New 160-footbridge with
29 Oct, 9 Nov 1965
11
three cribbed piers
80 feet repaired
28 Sep, 8 Oct 1966
10
Replaced deck
Lang Quach Ngoai
New 80-foot bridge on old
(BE 616-01095)
28 Aug, 8 Sep 1965
11
abutments
Lang Quach Ngoai
(BE 616-olo9t+)
7, 12 Oct 1965
5
New 80-foot bridge
Lang Khay (BE 616-1133)
25, 31 Jul 1965
6
New 30-foot span
7, 8 Oct 1966
1
Replace and realign track
21 Nov, 3 Dec 1965
12
on bridge
New abutment, and 80-foot
span
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(Continued)
Dates of
Rail Line and Bridge Name Photography
Lao Cai line (continued)
Lang Khay ,-{ BE 1616-1132) `21 Nov, 3 Dec 1965
Pho Hop Railroad Bridge
Dai Loi Railroad Bridge
Tho Kho '
Lang Khay (BE 616-1131)
Haiphong line
7, '12 Aug 1966
12, 18 Jul 1966
1 Jul 1966
23 Jul; 7 Aug 1966
Hai Duong'-ailroad/k ghway
Bridge West 12 Aug, 12 Sep 1966
Hai Duong Railroad/Highway
. , -
Bridge' la`s
Maximum Repair Times at'Selected Bridges
Days Type of Repair
Heavy superstructure damage
bypass' bridge
`Realigned 75-foot through
truss and connected track
New 75-foot bridge on old
`abutments
Repaired two twenty-foot
spans and one pier
Repaired 25`5 feet (three
spans)
Realign and raise 145-foot
dropped through truss span
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sections of roads and railbeds are repaired within
five to ten hours, and bridges or bridge sections
under 100 feet have been built within two to four
days after a successful strike (see Table 10 and
Figure 10).
B. "Hardening" of LOC's
1. Dong Dang Rail Line
Constructing multiple bypasses has
enabled the North Vietnamese to harden their LOC's
to such a degree that the capacity of most important
highways and rail lines at present is considerably
higher than during the early days of the bombing
when natural fords and ferries were the primary
means to bypass destroyed bridges. The increased
bombing along the Dong Dang line since June 1967,
for example, has included successful strikes against
three key bridges in addition to those previously
hit, but there is a serviceable bypass now in
operation at each of these three bridges. The
recent airstrikes also included initial strikes
against railyard targets previously not authorized
for attack. All of these yards have been bypassed
or were quickly restored to full service. Strikes
against railyards seem, therefore, to offer little
promise of interrupting through rail service for
extended periods.
The most important bridge interdiction
on the Dong Dang line was the result of the 11 August
strike against the Hanoi Railroad/Highway Bridge
over the Red River in which about 250 feet of
this mile-long bridge was destroyed. Cutting rail
service on this bridge, the only connection to Hanoi
over the Red River, has affected the flow of traffic,
but there are four highway ferries, one vehicle
pontoon bridge, and a rail ferry with slips for use
during periods of low, medium, and high water in
operation along a ten--mile section of the Red
River south of the bridge. Repair work on the
bridge was seen on 30 August and 17 September, and
it is now serviceable for vehicular traffic. Five
miles northeast of Hanoi, the railroad/highway
bridge over the Canal des Rapides and its bypass
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Figure 9. Concealment Sidings, Hanoi-Lao Cai Railroad, North Vietnam N~"
These photos show construction of three new sidings on the Lao Cai rail line to provide
concealment for rolling stock whenever the rail line has been cut by airstrikes.
68023 9-67 CIA SECRET
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MSN UE 908C Date: 1
68032 9-67 CIA
Figure 10. The Bac Giang Combination
Railroad/Highway Bridge on the Hanoi/
Dong Dang Line and Route 18
(21--16-30N, 106-11-18E), April 1967
An example of rapid repair of bomb
damage is illustrated in this sequence
of photographs.
Strike photography of 30 April 1967
indicated that a direct hit dropped two
spans of the Bac Giang Bridge.
One day later the bridge had been
temporarily repaired and was serviceable
to rail traffic. Photography on 13 May
indicated that the bridge had been
completely repaired and serviceable to
both rail and highway traffic.
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Table 10
Bypasses and Other Countermeasures on Rail Lines in the Northern Part of North Vietnam
Length of Original Type and Number
Rail Line and Bridge Name Bridge (in feet) of Bypasses Other Countermeasures
Dong Dang line
Hanoi Railroad/Highway Bridge
3 rail ferries
29 support piers were
over Red River
Hanoi Railroad/Highway Bridge
5,532
vehicle
ferries
1 pontoon
bridge
1 rail bridge
built to minimize the
effects of bombing
over Canal des Rapides
738
2 rail ferries
1 highway ferry
1 pontoon
bridge
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Dap Cau Railroad/Highway Bridge
530
1 rail bridge
2 vehicle
ferries
2 pontoon
bridges
A rail-to-water trans-
shipment point
Bac Giang Railroad/Highway Bridge
i-6O
1 rail bridge
2 ferry
crossings
1 pontoon
bridge,
A rail-to-water trans-
shipment point
Vu Chua Railroad Bridge
100
Repaired original bridge
Cao Nung Railroad Bridge
175
1 rail bridge
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Bypasses and Other CouKntermeasuures on Rail Lines in the Northern Part of North Vietnam
(Continued)
Length of Original Type and Number
Rail Line and Bridge Name Bridge (in feet) of Bypasses Other Countermeasures
Bong Dang line (continued)
Lang Son Railroad/Highway Bridge
Total bypasses (25)
Total bridges (7)
Haiphong line
NgoC KuyCt Railrcadj Highway
Bridge /
Hai Duong Railroad/Highway
Bridge West
Hai Duong Railroad/Highway
Bridge East
Haiphong Railroad/Highway Bridge
Total bypasses (6)
Total bridges (4)
Kep-- Thai Nguyen - Hanoi Line
Ha Gia Highway Bridge
350
1)290
2 rail bridges
1 rail bridge
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1 rail bridge A rail-to-water trans-
shipment point
2 rail bridges
1 pontoon
bridge
1 rail bridge Reinforcing piers on
main bridge
2 constructed
fords
1 natural ford
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Bypasses and Other Countermeasures on Rail Lines in the Northern Part of_North Vietnam
(Continued)
Length of Original Type and Number
Rail Line and Bridge Name Bridge (in feet) of Bypasses Other Countermeasures
Kep - Thai Nguyen - Hanoi Line
(continued)
Hai Gia Railroad Bridge
320
Dong Muc
370
Lang Lau
24-0
1 rail bridge
1 rail bridge
Repaired original
A rail-to-water trans-
shipment point
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Total bypasses (5)
Total bridges (4)
Lao Cai line
Lang Bun Railroad Bridge
125
2 rail bridges
Lang Khay Railroad Bridge No. 2
45
N.A.
N.A.
Som Dong Dep Railroad Bridge
60
Repaired original bridge
Trai Hut Railroad Bridge Northwest
75
Repaired original bridge
Lang Quach Ngoai Railroad Bridge
80
Repaired original bridge
Lang Quach Ngoai Railroad Bridge
No. 2
89
1 rail bridge
Som Hang Railroad Bridge
95
1 rail bridge
1 highway bridge
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Table 10
By-passes and Other Countermeasures on Rail Lines in the Northern Part of North Vietnam
(Continued)
Length of Original Type and Number
Rail Line and Bridge Name Bridge.(in feet), of Bypasses
Lao Cai line (continued)
Other Countermeasures
Lang Bo Railroad Bridge
Lang Khay Railroad Bridge
Repaired original bridge
Northwest
1 rail bridge
Lang Khay Railroad Bridge South
Repaired original bridge
Lang Khay Railroad Bridge
Repaired original bridge
Trai Hut Railroad Bridge
65
1 rail bridge
Repairer?,Uiiginal bridge
Pho Chang Railroad Bridge South
Repaired original bridge
Lang Thip Railroad Bridge
Pho Hop Railroad Bridge
Dai Loi Railroad Bridge
1 rail bridge
2 rail bridges
Repaired original bridge
Tho Khoi Railroad Bridge
Repaired original bridge
Phu Tho Railroad Bridge
Repaired original bridge
Lang Khay Railroad Bridge
76
Repaired original bridge
Chieu Ung Railroad Bridge
Repaired original bridge
Than Quan Railroad Bridge
65
Repaired original bridge
Khe Se Railroad Bridge
Repaired original bridge
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Bypasses and Other Countermeasures on Rail Lines in the Northern Part of North Vietnam
(Continued)
Length?of Original
Rail. Line and Bridge Name Bridge (in feet)
Lao Cai line (continued)
Pho Chang Railroad Bridge 75
Lenh Khanh Railroad Bridge
Southeast 45
Viet Tri Railroad/Highway Bridge 1,000
Total bypasses (15)
Total bridges (25)
Type_ and Number
of Bypasses Other Countermeasures
Repaired'original bridge
Repaired original bridge
2 rail ferries Original bridge under
2 vehicle repair using cable
ferries anchorages
1 pontoon bridge
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rail bridge also were successfully interdicted on
11 and 22 August (see Figure 11). Rail and highway
ferries have been in operation at this crossing, and
the original bridge was serviceable to rail and
highway traffic by at least 17 September. The
destruction of the Lang Son railroad bridge on this
line in the buffer zone on 13 August has not stopped
rail traffic because a completed bypass rail bridge
exists nearby (see Figure 12). The remainder of the
previously struck railroad bridges or their bypass
rail bridges have been kept in "tandem service"
during this period.
Contingency planning has been particularly
obvious on the Dong Dang line. Between May and
November 1966, there were up to 29 reinforcing piers
installed under the Hanoi Railroad/Highway Bridge
to prevent complete collapse of long bridge sections
from direct hits. During the spring of 1967 a rail,
bypass around Hanoi was constructed from the Haiphong
to the Vinh line incorporating an elaborate rail
ferry which has three slips on each river bank for
use during low, medium, and high water levels.
Photography of 31 August showed this ferry in
operation and rolling stock on each bank of the
Red River. At the Canal des Rapides crossing
located five miles northeast of Hanoi, the rail
bypass bridge was under construction nine months
before the first strike on the original bridge.
Twenty days after the initial strike, this bypass
bridge was in operation for through rail traffic.
At Lang Son a rail line bypassing the town, which
included a railroad bridge, was under construction
in July 1966, 13 months before the initial strike.
The Dong Dang line is kept serviceable
by elements of the Chinese 2nd Railway Engineering
Division with an estimated 6,000 to 10,000 troops.
There have been no indications of an increase in
Chinese troop strength to cope with the additional
damage on this line. The existing force apparently
is still able to provide rapid repair of bomb
damage. When two 53-foot spans were dropped at
the Bac Giang Railroad/Highway Bridge on 30 April,
the Chinese had it repaired and serviceable one
day later. During their tenure on this line
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Figure 11 . The Hanoi Railroad/Highway Bridge over the Canal des Rapides
(21-04N 105-55E), 29 June 1966
The North Vietnamese started construction of a bypass bridge just northeast of Hanoi on
the rail line from China almost one year prior to an attack on the existing bridge. The
main bridge was first damaged in late April 1967. Photography in mid-May 1967
indicated that the bypass bridge was serviceable and that a second bypass bridge was
under construction (not shown in the photo).
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Figure 12. Strike in Early August 1967 Against the Lang Son Railroad and Highway Bridge
This photo shows results of the very successful first strike in early August 1967 against the
Lang Son Railroad and Highway Bridge 9 miles south of the China border in northeast
North Vietnam. However, there is a system of highway and rail bypasses around this
interdicted bridge.
68098 9-67 CIA
Figure 13. The Haiphong Railroad and
Highway Bridge over the Song Tram Bac.
This 2-span steel bridge on the western
edge of the city has been reinforced by
the installation of additional piers
(probably 4 piers) under the spans to
reduce the possibility of airstrikes causing
the collapse of an entire span. Similar
reinforcement has been seen on the
Hanoi Rail and Highway Bridge over the
Red River (Paul Doumer Bridge).
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since late 1965, the Chinese have also widened
the railbed to handle standard-gauge rolling. stock
and have built additional rail yards and probably
assisted elements of the Chinese First Railway
Engineering Division in the construction of the
30-mile standard-gauge rail line between Kep and
Thai Nguyen. The only unusual Chinese response to
increased bombing on this line was noted in radio
communications serving Chinese units in northeast
North Vietnam on 13 August 1967. The messages
passed may reflect Chinese advanced warning of
US Rolling Thunder missions against targets in
this area.
2. Haiphong Area
Countermeasures on the Haiphong line,
contingency planning in Haiphong, and road con-
struction between Haiphong and the Chinese border
reflect North Vietnamese preoccupation with the
possible destruction of their port facilities in.
future air attacks. Rail bypasses to the important
bridges on the Haiphong line were built to provide
"tandem service" with the main bridges. The com-
bination railroad/highway bridge at Ngoc Kuyet,
located 35 miles west of Haiphong, was struck in
early July, but a bypass bridge had been in place
since April. Within Haiphong city, a rail trestle
bypass to the Haiphong Railroad/Highway Bridge was
under construction in July 1966, and three reinforcing
piers were seen under the main bridge in March 1967,
although the bridge was not struck until 11 September
1967 (see Figure 13). A water-to-rail transshipment
area to handle POL and general cargo has been
developed during 1967 and used extensively at.Loi
Dong, about four miles northwest of the Chamber of
Commerce wharves in Haiphong. These facilities
undoubtedly relieve some of the pressure on the
main rail yard and storage capacity within Haiphong,
although cargo must be lightered to this point from
the port area.
Road construction, new bridges, and
improvements north of Haiphong suggest that additional
land transport capacity from China into North Viet-
nam is being readied for use in case the Haiphong
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port is closed. Aerial photography since November
1966 and more recently in July shows continued con-
struction in North Vietnam and in China of two
probable new border crossing roads. Both of these
roads were within three ::Hiles of being connected
as of 20 July. The existence of three border
crossing roads plus the key rail line between
P'ing-hsiang and Dong Dang makes the two new cross-
ings contingency roads in case Haiphong port is
closed.
A new type of bridging technique at
three sites on Route 18, a main road linking
Kwangsi Province, China, to the Hanoi-Haiphong area,
was seen in June 1967. These bridges are built
with masonry or concrete! causeway sections linked
by concrete deck spans over massive masonry or
concrete piers. The crossings range in length
from 330 feet to more than 700 feet and are very
sturdy structures. The three structures are
apparently part of a program that has been under way
for the past two years to improve Route 18 and its
feeder routes and to remove chokepoints from this
important coastal network. The massiveness of
construction greatly reduces the vulnerability of
these "bridges" to bomb damage.
There is also a cable bridge in place
at Ha Chanh on Route 18 where the original bridge
was interdicted. The cable bridge, another unique
bridging technique that is used extensively in
North Vietnam, uses steel wire rope stretched taut
and anchored on each river bank to provide sub-
structure support for the deck of the bridge. The
technique is widely used with removable decking to
make the bridge appear unserviceable during the
day.
3. Kep -.Thai Nguyen - Hanoi Rail Line
The Thai Nguyen rail line has taken on
new importance for the [forth Vietnamese during 1967
because, coupled with the completion of the Kep to
Thai Nguyen standard-gauge line, it acts as an
alternate rail line to that portion of the Dong
Dang line between Kep and Yen Vien, located on the
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outskirts of Hanoi. Moreover, the Thai Nguyen line
has been converted to handle both meter-gauge and
standard-gauge rolling stock, thereby providing
through rail service for both gauges. Although
bridges on this line have been destroyed by air-
strikes, they have been repaired or rail bypasses
have been built by elements of the Chinese First
Railway Engineering Division. The rail yard at
Thai Nguyen, which has been heavily bombed, also
continues to be repaired. Construction of a new
rail yard and probable storage facilities eight
miles south of Thai Nguyen, near Van Duong, has
been under way since January. The loop road
pattern and the large buildings being constructed
at this site suggest that it may have a missile-
related function,tbut no definite answer to the
purpose of this activity has been determined.
The escalation of bombing on the Dong
Dang line may force the North Vietnamese into
greater use of the Lao Cai line which connects
Hanoi to Yunnan Province, China. Most of the
bridges on this line are less than 100 feet long
and. have been rapidly repaired by Chinese engineering
troops without the need for bypass structures. How-
ever, the 1,000-foot-long bridge at Viet Tri has
not been repaired since it was destroyed in June
1966. Instead, a rail ferry was put into operation.
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During the period May to July 1967, new
countermeasures were observed along the Lao Cai
line. Seven new bypass bridges have been seen
under construction, and in late June reconstruction
was started on the Viet Tri bridge. A rail bypass
at Dai Loi was placed in service by the addition of
approach tracks within two days after a strike on
the original bridge in August 1967. Earlier in
1967, there was evidence of realignment on portions
of the line and a considerable amount of expansion
of rail facilities at K'un-ming, the terminus of
this rail line in China. In addition, a new
dual-gauge rail yard was constructed about seven
miles north of Hanoi where the Lao Cai line joins
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with the Dong Dang line. This construction together
with the new yard northeast of Yen Vien provides
additional yard capacity in the Hanoi area for both
meter-gauge and standard-gauge rolling stock.
5. Presence of Chinese Engineering Troops
South of Hanoi
South of Hanoi the rail line has been
kept serviceable, probably by Chinese engineering
troops, to Ninh Binh, where road connections from
Haiphong and rail and road connections from Hanoi
join. A North Vietnamese prisoner reported Chinese
troops in the Ninh Binh area during early 1967.
This confirms other reports that a Chinese con-
struction unit had moved to the Hanoi area in late
1966. This is the first time since the start of
bombing that Chinese engineering troops have been
seen south of Hanoi.
At the same time that key rail lines
and roads in the northeast were being kept open,
other main LOC's that connect North Vietnam to
Laos and the DMZ have been kept serviceable.
Route 7, the main highway for supporting Communist
forces in the Plain of Jars in Laos, was heavily
bombed early in the Rolling Thunder program, with
a total of 25 bridges being completely destroyed.
Initially, the North Vietnamese were forced to
rely mainly-on natural fords to keep traffic
moving on this important route. During the past
two years, however, they have built 17 alternate
bridges and constructed 20 fords to bypass the
25 destroyed bridges. Recent photography indicates
that Route 7 is heavily used in spite of continuing
attacks and that numerous storage facilities and
truck parks are dispersed along its entire length.
Another sophisticated means of hardening
LOC's in North Vietnam has been the construction of
roads through terrain that affords concealment from
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aerial view and which contain almost no chokepoints.
Route 137, which was constructed in the spring of
1966 as an alternate border crossing road to heavily
bombed Route 15 (the road through Mu Gia Pass), is
a good example of this. The road is 57 miles long,
including the stretch in Laos. Constructed or
modified rock-fill fords were used at two stream
crossings. No bridges were identified along the
route, and the only chokepoint that has appeared
since the route was first bombed is at a stream
crossing in Laos. This road also has numerous
storage facilities and truck parks along its entire
distance.
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VII. Prospects for the Interdiction Campaign
Our analysis of the intensified interdiction
campaign against lines of communication, particularly
the vital rail lines in the areas of Route Packages
V and VI, indicates that the campaign has not
attained any meaningful reduction in North Vietnam's
logistic capabilities. Although the repeated attacks
against key targets on all of the major rail lines
in North Vietnam have seriously disrupted transport
operations, there is convincing evidence that the
military and economic goods needed to support the
war in both North and South Vietnam have continued
to move. Damage to LOC's from air attacks continues
to be quickly repaired, while effective alternates
and improvised facilities are employed to maintain
traffic.
The inability of the airstrikes to cause
severe and sustained damage to the transport sector
or to restrict significantly the flow of supplies
results from several factors:
The North Vietnamese, with the help
of Chinese construction troops, are con-
tinuing to develop effective counter-
measures to the US air attacks. The main
LOC's continue to be hardened and more
alternative routes and improvised faci-
lities for the movement of traffic are
being developed. In addition, much of
the anticipated impact of air attacks
was effectively canceled out by the
execution of contingency measures long
before the attacks started.
The tonnages that move over the
North Vietnamese transport system are
small compared to the overall capacity
of the system. Moreover, the excess
of capacity over traffic requirements
has increased. In the northern areas,
particularly, the North Vietnamese
have a flexible rail, highway, and
water system with a great deal of
built-in redundancy.
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Despite a fivefold increase in the
weight of the attacks against the northern
lines during recent months, it has proven
difficult to damage severely many LOC
targets located in heavily defended areas.
Railyards and rail cuts have been easily
repaired. Destroyed. or partially destroyed
bridges have either been repaired quickly or
replaced by ferries, fords, or pontoon or
more permanent bypass bridges. Thousands
of trucks and large numbers of railroad
rolling stock have been destroyed, but
imports have made up the losses. Imports
and domestic production are alleviating
the large losses of water craft. In the
north most of the serious damage to the
railroads is probably being repaired by
the professional Chinese construction
(and air defense) troops numbering
30,000 to 50,000.
Even a greater intensification of the air
campaign against LOC's in the North would fail to
disrupt transport to such an extent that North
Vietnam would be unable to receive its essential
military and economic supplies. There is no evidence
that the added costs and increasing logistics burden
inflicted by these campaigns add sufficiently to
Hanoi's problems to cause it to reconsider its resolve
to continue with the war. The experience of the past
few months makes the prospect particularly dim that
a land-oriented interdiction campaign would reduce the
flow of seaborne imports or deny sea access to North
Vietnam. New weapons offer the promise of more
effective interdiction programs. But on the basis of
its impressive performance thus far, the possibility
of North Vietnam's developing effective counter-
measures can not be discounted.
The maximum yield to be expected from an inter-
diction campaign -- political considerations aside --
would result from a program that combines interdic-
tion of land and water routes. This program would
include the mining of the water approaches to North
Vietnam's major ports and the bombing of ports and
transshipment facilities. This program would maxi-
mize the hardships imposed on North Vietnam and
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increase the costs of its support of the war in the
South. It would, however, not be able to cut off
the flow of essential supplies and, by itself, would
not be the determining factor in shaping Hanoi's
outlook toward the war.
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Appendix
Photographic Evidence of Railroad Operations
During June-August 1967
Aerial photography obtained on ten days during
the period 20 June through 31 August has been
examined in an attempt to determine the extent of
railroad operations during a period of heavy air
attacks against the railroads. Although some
photography is available on all of the railroad
lines in North Vietnam, a complete analysis of rail
operations has been impossible because of gaps in
coverage, the different dates of available photog-
raphy, cloud cover, and the difficulty of inter-
preting poor-quality obliques.
Reasonably comprehensive coverage was obtained
on only two of the ten days: 20 June and 19 July.
On these dates a total of 1,429 and 1,373 cars
were sighted, respectively. The photography of
20 June showed 16 freight trains; photography of
19 July detected four trains. On 21 August,
photography showed a total of 1,305 cars on the
Hanoi - Dong Dang, Hanoi-Haiphong, and Hanoi - Lao
Cai lines alone.
On six of the ten days, partial photographic
coverage of the Hanoi - Dong Dang line showed the
following equipment:
Date
Trains
20 June
7
19 July
20 July
4
21 August
3
29 August
30 August
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In Trains
In Yards
Total
209
211
420
385
385
138
614+
752
42
738
780
96
96
275
275
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This line showed the highest concentration of
cars of any line covered, and it is significant
that the highest number of serviceable cars on
this line occurred on'21 August, several months
after the line had been taken under heavy attack.
it is also significant that on this date, 200 of
the cars sighted were in the Hanoi area and 300
north of Cao Nung in the buffer zone next to
China, indicating an attempt to retain the cars
in "sanctuary" areas during daylight with train
operations taking place ;principally at night.
The sample of trains does not lend itself to traffic
analysis, but the number of cars present on this
line on the dates of good coverage indicates that
the North Vietnamese retain a considerable potential
for the movement of freight.
Photography revealed the second highest
concentration of cars on the Hanoi - Lao Cai line,
as follows:
Date
Trains
20 June
4
19 July
2
20 July
21 August
31 August
1
In Trains
In Yards
Total
61
359
420
38
276
314
47
47
320
320
17
29
46
The Hanoi-Haiphong line was photographed
partially on six of the ten days, and concentra-
tion of cars on this line ranked third as follows:
Date
Trains
20 June
4
19 July
1
21 July
28 July
21 August
1
23 August
In Trains I
n Yards Total
61
207 268
30
17 47
82 82
30 30
13
192 205
40 40
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The Hanoi-Vinh line was photographed on only two
days, but the quality of the photography was so poor
that activity between Thanh Hoa and Vinh could not be
determined. On the dates covered, however, this line
had a higher concentration of cars than the Hanoi -
Thai Nguyen and Kep -- Thai Nguyen lines. On 20 June,
213 cars were observed between Hanoi and Thanh Hoa,
of which 13 were in a train. About 100 of these cars
were noted in the Thanh Hoa region, which serves as
the transloading point from conventional to modified
rolling stock. (Lightweight meter-gauge rolling
stock is used to overcome impaired track conditions
and limited bridge capacities south of Thanh Hoa.)
On 19 July, 333 cars were sighted at various points
along the line, but no large concentrations were
noted and Thanh Hoa was not included in the photog-
raphy. One train consisting of ten additional
cars was identified.
The Hanoi - Thai Nguyen line was observed on
20 June, 19 July, and 20 July. Cars in yards
numbered 31, 268, and 261 on these dates, respec-
tively. One train consisting of 27 cars was sighted
on 20 July. The Kep - Thai Nguyen line was also
observed on the same dates with cars in yards
numbering 77, 16, and 34, respectively. A 27-car
train was observed on 20 July, and 28 cars were
sighted in yards on 30 August.
Obviously, many of the car counts on the various
lines are not representative, because of incomplete
photographic coverage. By eliminating those counts
which are least representative and by averaging the
days of the more representative car counts on the
various lines during the period 20 June through
31 August 1967, we arrive at the following:
Railroad Line
Hanoi - Dong Dang
Hanoi - Haiphong
Hanoi - Lao Cai
Hanoi-Vinh
Hanoi - Thai Nguyen
Kep - Thai Nguyen
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584+
236
351
278
280
69
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If all cars except those on the Kep - Thai
Nguyen line are assumed to be meter-gauge cars
(capable of an average net load of 15 tons) and
all cars on the Kep - Thai Nguyen line are assumed
to be standard-gauge cars (capable of an average
net load of 30 tons), the average of 1,7-98 cars
sighted could carry 28,000 tons. The current
average turnaround time for freight cars probably
is about three days. Thus 9,300 tons could be
originated daily by using the cars sighted, an
amount very close to the 9,000 tons per day esti-
mated to have originated on North Vietnamese rail-
roads during 1966. There is, however, an estimated
total of from 2,000 to 2,300 freight cars available
in North Vietnam,* of which undoubtedly more than
69 are standard-gauge cars. This total would pro-
vide more than ample capacity to move North
Vietnam's current railroad requirements for domestic
and international freight.
h Derived by extrapolating the number of cars
sighted to include estimates for those portions of
the rail network not covered by photography.
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