AN ASSESSMENT OF THE ROLLING THUNDER PROGRAM THROUGH 31 MAY 1967

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T02095R000300120001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 8, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 20, 1967
• Content Type: IM

~'f r~" ~' 1/`
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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
An Assessment of the Rolling Thunder Program
Through 31 May 1967
Top Secret
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Summary . . . . i
I. Physical. Effects , . . . I-1
A. General . I-1
B. Economic Damage . . . I-4
1. Direct Effects. . I-4
2. Electric Power. . . I-5
3, Petroleum Storage Facilities. I-8
4. Manufacturing Facilities. I-10
5, Transportation. . . I-14
6. Indirect Effects, . I-24
C. Military Damage . I-27
1. Barracks . . . I-28
2. Airfields . I-29
3. SAM Sites I-30
4. Naval Bases . I-31
5. Radar . I-31
6. Communications. . . I-32
7. Supply and Ordnance Depots. I-32
8. Ammunition Depots I-33
9. Naval Craft . . I-34
l0. Aircraft. I-34
D. Miscellaneous Targets of Armed
Reconnaissance. , . . I-34
E. Manpower Effects. I-35
1. Casualties. I-36
2, Diversion of Manpower . I-38
A. Civil Defense II-1
B. Air Defense Countermeasures IT-3
C. Decentralization of Industry. II-7
D. Countermeasures on Lines of
Communication (LOC's) II-9
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1. Construction and Repair ?activity.:.. II-9
2. Manpower Involved in
Countermeasures II-12
3. Effectiveness of Bombing Bridges. II-12
E. Contingency Planning. . II-14
F. Imports and Foreign Aid as
Countermeasures . II-15
1. Econ~crni~ Aid. . . . . II-15
2 Milit~::ry Aid. . . II-17
III. Rolling Thunder Operations,
January-May 1967. . III-1
A. Scale of Attack III-1
B. Ordnance . . IIT-5
C. Losses. III-6
D. Costs . . . III-9
IV. Prospects of an Effective Bombing Program IV-1
A. The. Success to Date . . IV-1
B. Outlook . IV-2
C. Costs to the United States. IV-4
1. Value of Economic and Military Damage
Attributed to the Rolling Thunder Program,
1965 Through May 1967. . I-3
2. Electric Power Facilities Attacked
in North Vietnam, 1965, 1966, and
January - 12 June 1967 following page. . I-40
3. Petroleum Storage Facilities Attacked
Under the Rolling Thunder Program, 1965,
1966, and January-May 1967 following page. I?~_~n
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4. Manufacturing Facilities Attacked Under the
Rolling Thunder Program, 1965, 1966, and
January-May 1967 following page. . . I-40
5. Major Railroad Yards and Railroad Shops
Attacked Under the Rolling Thunder Program,
1965-66, First Quarter of 1967, end April-
May 1967 following page. ~ . . . I-40
6. Maritime Ports Attacked Under the Rolling
Thunder Program, 1965 and 1966, First
Quarter of 1967 and April-May 1967
following page . . ~ . . . I-40
7. North Vietnam: Destruction and Damage of
Transport Equipment, 1965-66, First
Quarter ?`^~%', and April-May 1967
following page . . . . . . I-40
8. Strikes Against JCS-Targeted Bridges, 1965,
1966, and January-May 1967 following page. I-40
9. Bomb Damage Assessment of Bridges in North
Vietnam, 1965 - May 1967 following page. I-40
10. Barracks Attacked Under the Rolling
Thunder Program, January-May 1967
following page . . . . . I-40
11. Airfields Attacked Under the Rolling
Thunder Program, 1965,.1966, and January-
May 1967 following page. . . . . I-40
12. Naval Bases Attacked Under the Rolling
Thunder Program, 1965, 1966, and January-
May 1967 following page. . . I-40
13. Cost of Damage to JCS-Targeted Radar Sites
Inflicted Under the Rolling Thunder
Program, 1965, 1966, and January-May 1967
following page . . . . . I-40
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14.
North Vietnam: Estimated Volume of
Imports, 1965, 1966, and January-March
1967 following ?age. .
II-20
15.
North Vietnam: Imports from the USSP.,
1965, 1966, and January~-Ifarch 1967
following pa e .
II-20
16.
Soviet Military Aid to North Vietnam,
1965, 1966, and January-May 1967
following page
II-20
17.
Chinese Communist Military Aid to North
Vietnam, 1965, 1966, and January-May 1967
followinc~~ page . .
II-20
1$.
Sorties Against North Vietnam, by Mission
and Nationality, 1965 and 1966
following page . . . .
ll-~'~-~
19.
Sorties Against North Vietnam, by Mission,
January-May 1967 following page.
III-10
20.
Sorties Against North Vietnam, by Program
and by Service, 1965, 1966, and January-
May 1967 following pacte. .
III-10
21.
Distribution of Attack Sorties Over North
Vietnam, by Route Package, ~?anuary 1966 -
May 1967 following page. .
III-10
22.
Ordnance Delivered by Air on North Vietnam,
by Month and by Program, March-December
1965, 1966, and January-May 1967
following page .
III-10
23.
Attacks on JCS Fixed Targets in North
Vietnam, 1965, 1966, and January-May 1967
followi~ page . .
III-10
24.
Aircraft and Personnel Losses in T*~~.ck.s on
North Vietnam, by Service, 1965, 1966, and
January-May 1967 following age. . .
III-10
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Illustrations
Page
Figure 1. Value of Economic Damage to North
J Vietnam, by Sector, 1965, 1966,
and January-May 1967 (chart)
following wage . vi i
Figure 2. Value of Military Damage in North
Vietnam, by Sector, 1965, 1966,
and January-May 1967 (chart)
following page . . . vii
Figure 3. Index of Sorties Flown in Southeast
Asia and Relative Amounts in Each
Area, 1965, 1966, and First Five
Months 1967 (chart) following page . vii
Figure 4. Index of Ordnance Delivered in
Southeast Asia and Relative Amounts
in Each Area, 1966 and First Five
Months 1967 (chart) following page vii
Figure 5. The Laos Panhandle (map)
following page . . . . II-12
Figure 6. By-passes for the Destroyed Phuong
Dinh Railroad and Highway Bridge
(photograph) following, page. . II-14
Figure 7. Effectiveness of Bombing JCS
Targeted Bridges in North Vietnam -
February 1965 - January 1967 (chart)
following page . . II-14
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AN ASSESSMENT OF TFIE ROT,I,ING THUNDER PROGRAM
THROiiGH 31 MAY 1967
The Rolli..ng Thunder progr..am has made some progress
in meeting its current twofold objective:
1.
To limit, or raise the cost of, the move-
ment of men and supplies to
South
Vietnam.
2.
To make North Vietnam pay a
its aggression against the
price
South.
for
The recent expansion of the bombing program has
had some positive effects relative to these objectives,
particularly in the modern sector of the North Viet-
namese economy. Increased disruptions to orderly
economic activity and sustained pressures on North
Vietnam's limited human and material resources are
evident. The damage to economic and military target
systems has not been sufficient, however, to cause a
meaningful degradation of North Vietnam's ability to
.support the war, at least at current levels of combat.
There are no signs that the determination of the re-
gime to persist in its aggression has abated. Despite
increasing hardships, popular morale has not eroded
to the point where widespread apathy and war weariness
are threatening the control of the Hanoi regime.
The bombing program has forced North Vietnam to
divert from 575,000 to 700,000 individuals, about
equally divided between full-time and part-time
workers and troops, to air defense activities and
to repair, reconstruction, and dispersal programs.
The cost of physical and military damage has been
growing. Total damage resulting from air attacks
through May 1967 is estimated at nearly $266 million.
Nearly 70 percent of this damage was inflicted on
economic target systems (see Figures 1 and 2, follow-
ing p. vii) .~
This report was produced solely by CIA. It was pre-
pared by the Office of Research and Reports and coor-
dinated with the Office of Current Intelligence and
the Special Assistan ~ for Vietnamese Affairs. The
estimate and conclus ons represent the best judgment
of the Directorate of Intelligence as of 17 June 1967.
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Despite the increasing costs and burdens result-
ing from the air attacks, North Vietnam, aided by an
increased flow of imports from the USSR and Communist
China, has managed to maintain, and in many respects
to improve, its organized support of the war. The
electric power industry has been the most heavily
damaged sector of the economy, and its neutralization
may paralyze almost all of the modern industrial
sector. However, the modern sector makes only a mar-
ginal contribution to the war effort since virtually
all war-supporting materiel is imparted. Other im-
portant targets which have been subjected to heavy
attack -- particularly transportation and petroleum
storage facilities -- have successfully employed
countermeasures so that their overall performance
and support capabilities remain as high as, if not
higher than, they were when the bombing programs
started.
The attacks on military target systems through
May 196'7 had not significantly reduced the capabili-
ties of the military establishment. These capabili-
ties have, in fact, been greatly expanded through
large infusions of military aid from the USSR and
Communist China.
The ability of North Vietnam to withstand the
pressures of air attacks is explained by several
factors, The economy is essentially agrarian and
provides little direct input, other than manpower,
into the war in the South. The increasing flow
of essential economic and military aid into North
Vietnam far surpasses the total damage resulting
from air attacks. This aid provides North Vietnam
the necessary materials to continue the war. It
also implies that the USSR and Communist China will
underwrite the damage sustained and the eventual re-
construction of the country, as they did in the case
of North Korea. Finally, the North Vietnamese have
devised and employed an elaborate and highly suc-
cessful system of countermeasures -- dispersal of
industry, mobilization of labor units, evacuation
of population, and the like -- which negates most
of the desired impact of air attack on the vital
flow of men and supplies to the war in the South.
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During January-May 1967 the number of sorties
flown against North Vietnam was at a rate about
22 percent higher than during 1966 (see figures 3
and 4 following p.vii.). Over 2,500 sorties were
flown against fixed JCS targets compared with 2,620
sorties during all of 1966. The armed reconnais-
sance program changed dramatically. Almost one-
half of all armed reconnaissance sorties were flown
against non-JCS fixed targets compared with about
25 percent throughout 1966. Despite the extension
of the Rolling Thunder program to more densely pop-
ulated and heavily defended areas, the overall air-
craft loss rate during 1967 declined, with the ex-
ception of losses during strikes against targets in
the immediate urban areas of Hanoi and Haiphong.
The recent concentration of attacks agaii~~
lucrative fixed targets in the northern parts of
North Vietnam has resulted in an improved trend in
the costs of inflicting damage on North Vietnam.
There is little prospect for improved cost effec-
tiveness in the future, however, because the number
of significant undamaged targets is decreasing
rapidly.
The results to be expected trom a furttrer ~x-~
pansion of the bombing program, with the possible
exception of a mining program, are limited, ruling
out attacks on dikes or population centers. Ex-
perience indicates that the remaining land trans-
portation targets will be extremely difficult and
costly to interdict. The few lucrative economic
targets remaining do not make a significant con-
tribution to the war effort, and their loss can
be compensated by additional foreign aid. The neu-
tralization of the remaining military targets, such
as airfields, SAM sites, and radars, would reduce
losses to US aircraft but would have virtually no
effect on the ability of Hanoi to support the war
in the South.
In summary, no bombing program alone is likely
to create sefficient pressures or problems to pre-
vent Hanoi from sustaining the flaw of essential
military materials and continuing its support of
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the war in the South. While the mining of Haiphong
and other ports would impose greater hardships on
North Vietnam and raise further the cost of sus-
taining the insurgency than would other alternatives,
such action, b1 itself, would prohahly not have a deci-
sive impact on North Vietnam's determination to pursue
the war.
Virtually all of the remaining economic targets
are concentrated in densely populated and heavily
defended areas of North Vietnam. Their neutraliza-
tion could be very costly to US air forces. The re-
cent attacks on targets in the immediate Hanoi-
Haiphong areas indicate, far example, that the com-
bat loss rate for U5 aircraft could be as much as
10 times greater than that experienced in the air
campaigns over other areas of North Vietnam.
Continued harassment and attacks on the road,
rail, and trail network in the southern portion of
North Vietnam and in Laos will not prevent or stop
infiltration but will make it more costly and will
force North Vietnam to pay a continuing price on its
own territory for its continued support of the war
in the South.
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ECONOMIC DAMAGE
1965
36.2
INDIRECT
LOSSES
~Agriculture~
Fishing
& Exports)
~ 9.4
1966
93.3
POWER-
PLANTS
INDIRECT
LOSSES
(Ag riculture, F i sh i ng
& Exports)
36.9
POWER-
PLANTS
6.3
EQUIPMENT
5.9
-PETROLEUM 1.6
MARITIME PORTS 0.7v V
TRANSPORT
EQUIPMENT
29.8
PETROLEU
5.5
-RAILROAD YARDS 1.2
'MARITIME PORTS 0.8
1967
Jan- May
53.4
POWER-
PLANTS
RAILROAD
YARDS
3.9
MANUFACTURING
FACILITIES
Figure 1 . Value of Economic Damage in North Vietnam, by Sector, 1965, 1966,
and January -May 1967
TRANSPORT
EQUIPMENT
11.4
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MILITARY DAMAGE
MILLION US DOLLARS
1965
32.5
CRAFT
2.0 ,
AMMO
DEPOTS
4.5
:OMMO SITES 1.8
BARRACKS
. 2.5
1966
19.1
NAVAL
CRAFT
1.8
AIRCRAFT
8A
COMMO SITES 1.0
1967
Jan-May
31.0
Figure 2. Value of Military Damage in North Vietnam by Sector 1965, 1966,
and January -May 1967
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MISCELLANEOUS
ARMED RECCE
V
3.T
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SORTIES FLOWN
F M A M J J A 5 0 N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M
1965 1966 1967
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Figure 3. Index of Sorties Flown in Southeast Asia and Relative Amounts in Each
Area, 1965, 1966, and First Five Months 1967
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