THE ROLLING THUNDER PROGRAM -PRESENT AND POTENTIAL TARGET SYSTEMS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T02095R000300090001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 8, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 1, 1967
• Content Type: IM

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Sensitive Report
This document shall not
be shown to or discussed
with non-Agency persons
without the express per-
mission of the Director
of Central Intelligence.
Intelligence Memorandum
The Rolling Thunder Program --
Present and Potential Target Systems
Top Secret
Copy
i iJ
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 Jan 1967
McNAMARA IV
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IM, The Rolling Thunder Pro ram -
Potential Target S stems - Present and
January 967, copy 10 25X1
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CONTENTS
Page
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
II. Alternative Target Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
A. General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
B. Modern Industry in North Vietnam as a Target System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
C. The Mining Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
D. Interdiction of the Levees in the Red River Delta 9
E. An Unlimited Bombing Campaign . . . . . . . . 11
1. Transportation Targets . . . . . . . 11
2. Other Potential Targets . . . . . . . . . . 12
F. Restriction of Rolling Thunder to Route
Packages 1 and 2 and Laos . . . . . . . . . 12
G. Estimated Casualties Resulting from Alternative
Rolling Thunder Programs . . . . . . . . . . 13
Estimated Casualties from Rolling Thunder, 1965-66 . . . 4
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Page
Appendixes
Appendix A. An Appraisal of the Rolling Thunder
Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-1
I. Physical Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . A-1
II. Rolling Thunder Operations in 1966 . . . A-14
Appendix B. Modern Industry in North Vietnam as a Target
System
I. Electric Power Industry . . . . . . . . B-4
II. Manufacturing Plants . . . . . . . . . B-6
III. Iron and Steel -- Thai Nguyen . . . . . . B-13
IV. Mining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-16
V. Impact on Imports . . . . . . . . . . . B-18
Appendix C. Consequences of Mining the Seaports
of North Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . C-1
I. The Dimensions of North Vietnam' s
Foreign Trade . . . . . . . . . . . . C-2
II. Impact of Mining Under the Present
Rolling Thunder Program . . . . . . C-5
III. The Cumulative Effect on Imports of a
Mining and Industrial Bombing Pro-
gram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-9
IV. Impact of Mining Under an Intensified
Armed Reconnaissance . . . . . . . . C-10
Appendix D. Interdiction of the Levees in the Red River
Delta . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . D-1
I. The Levee as a Target System . . . D-1
II. Dimensions of the Air Attack . . . . . . D-3
Appendix E. Unlimited Bombing
I. Transportation Targets . . . . . . . . E-1
II. Other Potential Targets . . . . . . . . E-3
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Appendix F. The Logistic Funnel as a Target System . .
1. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F-1
II. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F-2
III. Estimated Effects on the Flow of Supplies
to South Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . F-3
IV. The Experience of Korea . . . . . . . . F-4
Appendix G. The Estimated Casualties Resulting from G_1
Alternative Bombing Programs . . . . .
1. General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-1
II. Attack on Modern Industry . . . . . . . G-1
III. The Mining Program . . . . . . . . . . G-2
IV. The Attack Against Dikes and Locks . . G-3
V. Unlimited Bombing . . . . . . . . . . G-3
VI. Interdiction of Route Packages 1 and 2,
and Laos . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-4
H-1
Appendix H. The North Vietnamese Will to Persist . . .
1. The Effect of the Present Program . . . H-1
II. The General Effects of Escalation . . . H-1
III. The Present Program Plus Electric Power
and Major Industrial Facilities . . . . H-2
IV. The Mining of Haiphong in Addition to the
Above Targets . . . . . . . . . . . H-2
V. The Inclusion of Dikes and Locks on the
Red River in the Above Targets . . . . H-3
VI. Unlimited Bombing, Except Population H-4
Centers . . . . . . . . . . . .
VII. Striking Only Routes 1 and 2 Plus Laos . . H-4
Appendix A
Al. Sorties Against North Vietnam, by Mission and A-22
Nationality, 1965 and 1966 . . . . . . . . . . . '
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A2. Sorties Against North Vietnam, by Program and by
Service, 1965 and 1966 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-23
A3. Distribution of Sorties over North Vietnam, by Route
Package, 1966 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-24
A4. Ordnance Delivered by Air on North Vietnam, by
Month and by Program, March-December 1965
and January-December 1966 . . . . . . . . . . . . A-25
A5. Attacks on JCS Fixed Targets in North Vietnam,
1965 and 1966 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-26
A6. Aircraft and Personnel Losses in Attacks on North
Vietnam, by Service, 1965 and 1966 . . . . . . . . A-27
Appendix B
B1. Selected Industrial Installations in North. Vietnam . . . B-3
B2. North Vietnam: Identified Imports Carried by Foreign-
Flag Ships, by Origin and Commodity, 1965-66 . . . B-24
B3. North Vietnam: Identified Exports Carried by Foreign-
Flag Ships, by Destination and Commodity, 1965-66 B-25
B4. North Vietnam: Estimated Volume of Maritime Foreign
Trade, by Port, 1965 and 1966 . . . . . . . . . . B-26
B5. North Vietnam: Transport Capacity Available for Dry
Cargo Imports as of January 1967 . . . . . . . . . B-27
Appendix C
Cl. North Vietnam: Estimated Volume of Foreign Trade,
1965-66 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-3
C2. North Vietnam: Identified Seaborne Foreign Trade,
1964, 1965, and 1966 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-4
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Appendix D
Dl. Estimated Loss in Production of 10th Month Rice Crop
in North Vietnam Caused by Flooding . . . . . . . .
D-4
Appendix E
El. Principal Fixed Targets in an Unlimited Target Pro-
gram Against Transport in North Vietnam . . . . . .
E-4
Appendix F
Fl. Logistic Capacities of Major Routes in Route
Packages 1 and 2, North Vietnam, and the Ho Chi
Minh Trail, Laos, 1966 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
F-6
F2. Targets Destroyed or Damaged by Attack Sorties
Route Packages 1 and 2, North Vietnam and Ho
Chi Minh Trail, Laos, 1966 . . . . . . . . . . . .
F-7
Appendix G
G1. Potential Casualties Resulting from an Attack on
Selected Modern Industrial Targets . . . . . . . . .
G-2
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Figure 1. Value of Economic Damage in North
Vietnam, by Sector, 1965 and 1966
(chart) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Figure 2. Value of Military Damage in North
Vietnam, by Sector, 1965 and 1966
(chart) . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Figure 3. Index of Sorties Flown in Southeast Asia
and Relative Amounts in Each Area,
1965 and 1966 (chart) . . . . . . . 14
Index of Ordnance Delivered in Southeast
Asia and Relative Amounts in Each
Area, 1966 (chart) . . . . . . . 14
North Vietnam: Average Distribution
of US Sorties, by Route Package,
January-November 1966 (map) . . . 14
Estimated Direct Operational Cost of
US/GVN Air Operations in North
Vietnam and Cost of Economic and
Military Damage to North Vietnam,
by Month, 1965 and 1966 (chart) . . . 14
Figure B-1. North Vietnam and South China:
Uninterdicted Capacity of Selected
Transportation Lines, January
1967 (map) . . . . . . . . . . . B-20
Figure F-1. The Laos Panhandle: "The Logistic
Funnel" (map) . . . . . . . . . . F-2
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THE ROLLING THUNDER PROGRAM --
PRESENT AND POTENTIAL TARGET SYSTEMS,"
Summary
This memorandum analyzes the effects achieved by the Rolling Thunder
Program of air attacks on North Vietnam through 1966; it also estimates
the probable effects which would be expected to ensue from restructuring
Rolling Thunder in a variety of other ways, ranging from deescalation to
substantial escalation. A summary of findings follows, with the details
contained in Appendixes A through H.
This memorandum was produced by CIA. Aside from the normal sub-
stantive exchange with other agencies at the working level, this memorandum
has not been coordinated outside CIA. It was prepared by the Office of
Research and Reports with a contribution from the Office of Current Intel-
ligence. It was coordinated with the Office of Current Intelligence and the
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs; the estimates and conclusions
represent the best judgment of this Office as of 31 January 1967.
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I. Rolling Thunder in 1966*
The evidence available does not suggest that Rolling Thunder to
date has contributed materially to the achievement of the two primary
objectives of air attack -- the reduction of the flow of supplies to the
VC/NVA forces fighting in South Vietnam or the weakening of the will
of the Hanoi regime to continue with the insurgency. There is no
doubt, of course, that Rolling Thunder has lowered the capacity of
transport routes to the South, and hence put a lower "cap" on the force
levels which could be supported in South Vietnam. However, it is
estimated that the "cap" is well above present logistic supply levels.
Also, Rolling Thunder has not succeeded in materially lowering
morale in the North. While there undoubtedly is some war weariness,
the general indication is that the North Vietnamese people are behind
the regime.
The North Vietnamese leaders continue to insist, both in public
and private statements, that they are willing to withstand even heavier
bomb damage rather than accept anything less than their often stated
demands for a settlement in Vietnam. Hanoi has been able to adjust
its military and economic activities, which support its war objectives,
to the bombing. Hence, while there may be some degree of escalation
that would force the regime to reexamine its position, it is believed
that as far as pressure from air attack is concerned, Hanoi would be
prepared to continue the insurgency in South Vietnam indefinitely in
the face of the current level and type of bombing program.
The will of the regime to continue the war is heavily bolstered --
and this is a key factor -- by the relatively massive flow of economic
and military aid from the USSR, China, and the Eastern European
countries. A comparison of 1966 measurable damage in North Viet-
nam with aid deliveries is revealing:
Measurable Aid
Damage Deliveries
Economic 94 275
Military 36 230
Total 130 505
* See Appendix A.
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The fact that aid was almost four times the damage inflicted by
air attacks not only gives Hanoi the muscle needed to strengthen the
VC/NVA insurgency and its own air defense but also provides the
services to overcome economic difficulties. Under these circumstances,
it is concluded that Hanoi would be able and willing to persevere in-
definitely in the face of the present Rolling Thunder program.
Air attacks have not eliminated any important sector of the economy
or the military establishment. The successful attack on petroleum
storage facilities eliminated 76 percent of the JCS-targeted national
capacity, but the strikes did not come until after the North Vietnamese
had already implemented a system of dispersed storage, The petro-
leum import flow has been maintained at adequate levels. The heavy
concentration of the Rolling Thunder campaign on the lines of transpor-
tation south of Hanoi -- particularly Route Packages 1 and 2 -- has not
succeeded in cutting route capacities to the point where the flow of
supplies needed to support the expanded insurgency in South Vietnam
has been significantly impeded.
The principal losses to the economy have been indirect and stem
from reduction in agricultural output and the fish catch, the impair-
ment of foreign exchange earnings through a cut in normal quantities
of exported commodities, the cost of repairing essential transport
facilities, and disruptions of production due to dispersal and other
passive defense measures (see Figure 1).
Aircraft losses by North Vietnam amounted to an estimated $17
million in 1966, while damage to SAM's, naval equipment, barracks,
and other facilities has also been significant (see Figure 2). These
attacks have disrupted normal military practices, caused the abandon-
ment of many facilities, and forced widespread dispersal of equipment.
However, the capabilities of North Vietnam's military establishment
continue at a high level.
In 1966, the attack sorties flown against North Vietnam increased
217 percent over 1965 and the program became virtually an armed
reconnaissance campaign (see Figures 3 and 4). Attacks flown against
fixed JCS targets in 1966 (including armed reconnaissance restrikes)
amounted to less than 3 percent of total attack sorties. About one-
third of the 242 JCS targets remained unattacked; a large number of
these represent powerplants, important industrial installations, and
key transport targets. Most of the armed reconnaissance sorties
were flown south of Hanoi, particularly in Route Packages 1 and 2
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(see Figure 5). The cumulative damage to economic and military
facilities is estimated at $200 million of which $130 million occurred
in 1966. These data plus the cost of the attack are shown in Figure 6.
Preliminary estimates for civilian casualties in 1966 are about
three times those in 1965, reflecting primarily the stepped-up level
of attack. Military casualties in 1966 are below the level of 1965,
largely because military barracks were heavily hit in 1965 but not
in 1966. Estimated casualties are presented in the table.
Estimated Casualties from Rolling Thunder
1965-66
1965 1966 a/ Total
Civilians 6,000 17,900 to 20,200 23,900 to 26,200
Fixed targets 2,000 900 2,900
Armed reconnaissance 4,000 17,000 to 19,300 21,000 to 23,300
Military 7,200 4,650 11,850
Fixed targets 4,300 400 4,700
Armed reconnaissance 2,900 4,250 7,150
Total 13,200 22,550 to 24,850 35,750 to 38,050
a. Preliminary estimates.
While these estimates are the best presently available and are
believed to be the right order of magnitude, they are subject to error.
The estimate for civilian casualties is more reliable than that for the
military. The total casualties are small in relation to a total popula-
tion of over 18 million, but losses have undoubtedly had a disruptive
effect.
II. Alternative Target Systems
A. General
A number of alternative target systems have been examined
in order to estimate the probable effects of their neutralization. These
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alternatives include an attack on modern industry, the mining of the
major ports and water entrances to North Vietnam, interdiction of
the levees in the Red River delta, and an unrestricted bombing cam-
paign with the exception of attacks against populated centers. These
alternatives are discussed in detail in Appendixes B through E. In
addition the effects of a reduced air campaign confined to Route
Packages 1 and 2 and the infiltration network through Laos are dis-
cussed in Appendix F. The estimated casualties to be expected from
these alternative programs are discussed in Appendix G. Finally,
the effect of these programs on the will to persist of North Vietnam's
leadership is discussed in Appendix H.
B. Modern Industry in North Vietnam as a Target System*
A review of modern industry in North Vietnam has resulted
in the selection of 20 facilities for inclusion in this target system:
Seven electric power generating plants
One cement plant
One explosives plant and one potential
explosives material supplier
One rubber products facility
One chemical plant
Four engineering plants
One steel producing complex
Three coal processing plants
The neutralization of all these North Vietnamese industrial
facilities would eliminate the fruit of several hundred million dollars
in capital investment, cut off the source of perhaps one-quarter or
more of the gross national product and most foreign exchange earnings,
and could halt the construction of additional modern plants in North
Vietnam by other Communist countries. It would also disrupt the func-
tioning of oth8,r sectors of the economy through the loss of electric
=,< See Appendix B.
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power and such materials as cement and some fertilizers and chemicals,
add to the burden of aid from the Communist countries, and produce at
least temporary displacement of the urban labor force.
A graduated, selective program beginning with air attack
against all the facilities in one industry (such as all powerplants) prob-
ably offers a more promising vehicle for the application of pressure
against the North. Vietnamese regime than a.widespread escalation
against numerous industrial targets in a variety of industries. Such
a program not only would maximize the economic and military impact
of the attacks but also would provide Hanoi with. a continuing opportunity
for second thoughts. If Hanoi failed to react, the completion of the total
program would deal a serious blow to North Vietnam's hopes for eco-
nomic progress and status, negating a decade of intense effort devoted
to the construction of modern industry.
There are two factors which are important to keep in mind
in considering the effects of any escalated program of air attack:
(a) The North Vietnamese leadership has been
making an even greater effort than usual over the
past two months to prepare the people of North Viet-
nam for further sacrifices during 1967.
(b) The will of the North Vietnamese to persist
in the war depends not only on the effect of the air-
strikes in the North but also on how they assess the
war situation in South Vietnam.
While severe damage to the modern industrial sector would
place additional pressures on the regime, it is not believed that this
burden by itself would be intense enough to bring Hanoi to negotiate.
The most relevant evidence -- the neutralization of much of the heavy
industry in North Korea during the Korean War -- would suggest that
the burden would be bearable.
Modern industry in North Vietnam -- machinery, chemical,
fertilizer, cement, and electric powerplants -- makes a contribution
to the military capability of the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces
in South Vietnam and/or to the air defense capability in the North, but
this contribution is not vital. The essentially agrarian nature of the
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economy together with numerous local and handicraft facilities, which
reportedly meet 70 percent of the population's demand for consumer
goods, provides a strong buffer against economic collapse.
The deficit of essential economic goods needed to sustain
North Vietnam's economy and the military supplies which are vital
to the country's air defense, as well as to the maintenance of large-
scale aggression in South Vietnam, come from other Communist
countries. In the absence of an effective program for the interdiction
of the transport system, it is expected that-the flow of imports would
increase. A successful air attack on all of the modern industry facili-
ties listed above would increase import requirements well above
present levels. The combined current capacities of the sea and
land routes leading to North Vietnam could sustain the flow.
The experience in the Korean War -- the most relevant one for
comparison -- suggests that the loss of modern industry may not be a
decisive factor, by itself, in critically reducing the will to persist, at
least as long as the abundant flow of war-supporting supplies continues.
C. The Mining Program*
Two alternative mining programs were examined. The first
is a conventional mining program designed to prevent the use of deep-
draft oceangoing ships but lacking a capability to prevent the use of
shallow-draft craft such as coasters and lighters.. The second alter-
native is a program using a newly developed mine with a capability
against shallow-draft shipping. ** Both mining programs assume the
use of intensive armed reconnaissance against lines of communication
and transport targets in order to maximize the potential effects of the
program.
The interdiction of the port of Haiphong would cause serious
concern to the Hanoi leadership. Their reaction would depend on the
effectiveness of the mining and the success of alternate methods of
supply. As long as North Vietnam believed that it could receive essen-
tial supplies, its resolve to fight on would probably remain.
See Appendix C.
This mine is the MK 36, a modification of the standard MK 82 aerial
bomb, which is effective against even unpowered small craft in depths
up to 50 feet. It can be delivered by all aircraft capable of using the
MK 82, and requires the same delivery techniques as the MK 82. The
MK 36 is to go into mass production in the spring of 1967.
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The North Vietnamese could probably continue to supply the
Viet Cong, the air defense system and essential war-supporting activi-
ties in the North with supplies for a while, using current stockpiles
and imports, even in the face of a reduced flow over Communist China's
road and connecting rail system. However, should the logistic pinch
become severe enough to deplete stocks in North Vietnam, the chances
of a reexamination by Hanoi of its whole approach to the war would in-
crease markedly.
The immediate impact of either mining program would be a
disruption of normal transport activity ranging from a situation in which
a substantial portion of imports could be maintained by sea and coastal
water movement to one of almost complete denial of water access to
North Vietnam.
Either mining program would have serious disruptive effects
on the North Vietnamese transport system and the effectiveness with
which it accommodates the movement of foreign trade. Almost all ex-
port trade would cease and foreign exchange earnings would become
negligible. It is estimated, however, that unless the rail and road
lines to China were interdicted, surplus transport capacity and ade-
quate equipment would exist, and hence North Vietnam will attempt
to maintain the flow of virtually all normal imports plus the new im-
port requirements generated by the attacks on modern industry. Thus
the effects of the mining program will tend to be those of delay but not
denial of imports.
A mining program directed solely against oceangoing ship-
ping would increase the traffic burden on the major rail connections
to Communist China to the extent that North Vietnam would be hard
pressed to meet all normal traffic requirements by using rail connec-
tions, but the traffic could be handled by resorting to road and inland
water routes.
A program including mining of coastal and inland waters
would be much more effective. North Vietnam would have to rely
almost completely on the existing road and rail connections to Com-
munist China and use them at or near capacity levels. If intensive
interdiction and armed reconnaissance were carried out against these
vital transport links, North Vietnam would face increasingly serious
problems. The vulnerability of transport equipment, the difficulties
of maintaining lines of communication, and the cost and unreliability
of transport would all increase significantly. Some import programs
would almost certainly have to be reduced. These problems alone
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would not be sufficient, however, to degrade meaningfully the flow of
essential military materials or to prevent North Vietnam's continued
support of the war in the South.
D. Interdiction of the Levees in the Red River Delta'
The rice fields and populated centers of the delta are protected
by an elaborate system of levees which have greatly reduced flooding
from natural causes. Damage to the rice crop -- the staple food in
North Vietnam -- would be maximized if these levees were breached
when the Red River is at its height, some time in the period mid-July
to mid-August.
The areas most vulnerable to flooding, if the primary levees
of this system were breached, are the Ha Dong area southwest of the
Red River and the Ha Bac area northeast of the river. If only the
main levees were breached, it is estimated that the crop loss would
be on the order of several hundred thousand tons of rice -- over 5 per-
cent of the annual production of rice. If the secondary levees were
also effectively breached, the decrease in rice production could reach.
a million tons, or over 20 percent of annual, production.
To mitigate the effects of the flooding, Hanoi would be forced
to divert a very sizable work force away from other activities, in-
cluding those of a military supporting nature, for a period of weeks
until the major damage had been repaired.
A successful attack on the levee system at Ha Dong would be
exceedingly disruptive in the short run. There are probably 1. 5 mil-
lion people in the Ha Dong area, including Hanoi. This Agency has
,not made an independent study of the probable level of casualties; mili-
tary target studies estimate they would be small, numbering in the
hundreds rather than thousands. Homes in the village areas would be
destroyed, and factory activity would be halted. Over the long run,
the effect on rice availabilities would probably be the hardest problem
for the regime. The loss of at least several hundred thousand tons,
and perhaps a million tons, of rice, particularly in a year of below-
average harvests, would force Hanoi to seek outside sources of supply.
Communist China, which in an average year produces 75 million to 85
million tons of rice, could provide the necessary amount.
If the effects of the attacks on modern industrial targets and
the mining program were at maximum levels, the attack on levees
See Appendix D.
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would increase North Vietnam's cumulative import requirements from
the present level of 4, 200 tons a day to a total of from 6, 100 to 8, 000
tons a day. The transport capabilities of North Vietnam in this situa-
tion would fall short of maximum requirements by 15 to 20 percent.
Their ability to sustain imports would be influenced strongly by the
effectiveness of interdiction programs against the road and rail con-
nections to China.
If an interdiction campaign reduced the capacity of the rail
lines on a sustained basis by only one-third and of the road systems
by only one-fourth, the available route capacity would then be only
6, 400 tons a day. The rail cut could be sharper than one-third; the
road cut represents the maximum interdiction sustained to date in
North Vietnam. The North. Vietnamese would then be hard-pressed
to move even their minimum import requirements. If the interdiction
program were even more successful, the regime would face increas-
ingly severe problems. Hard decisions would have to be made about
the imports which could be forgone and a system of more rigorous
rationing would probably become necessary. More importantly the
continuity and reliability of the flow of essential military and economic
assistance from the USSR and Communist China would become a matter
of highest concern.
Since the major burden of a successful attack on the levees
would fall on the civilians in agricultural areas, there probably would
be a highly adverse public reaction in the West. This criticism would
be more strident than that which would be expected from attacks on any
other target system, with the possible exception of raids on population
per se. The military effects of "levee busting" would probably be both
limited and short lived; the effect on the Hanoi regime's will to con-
tinue would be marginal.
Hanoi's reaction to strikes on the Red River levees would
depend on the damage done by the strikes, the effectiveness of the
regime's countermeasures, and Hanoi' s ability to obtain food from
China and the USSR. The Hanoi leaders probably believe that North
Vietnam can localize damage from attacks on the dike system and that
the attacks will not limit their abilities to persist in the war. The
North Vietnamese would certainly exploit the golden opportunity pre-
sented by such attack in their propaganda effort to put intense political
pressure on th.e United States.
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E. An Unlimited Bombing Campaign"
The major thrust of an unlimited bombing campaign following
the previous alternatives would be against transportation and military
targets and a small number of economic targets.
1. Transportation Targets
Although the transportation system has been a major tar-
get since the inception of the Rolling Thunder program, the weight of
the bombing effort has fallen on Route Packages 1, 2, and 3, where
military and economic requirements for traffic movement have been
relatively small in relation to route capacity. Hence, despite the
weight of attack, the North Vietnamese have been able to keep essen-
tial supplies flowing.
The basic concept of an unlimited attack on transporta-
tion would be to take advantage of the two major factors which emerge
from the bombing campaigns outlined earlier. First, a higher
import requirement -- ranging from 6, 100 to 8, 000 tons -- would result
from the neutralization of most production facilities and, second,
North Vietnamese ports and the inland waterway system would be closed,
or nearly closed, by mining. Under these circumstances, the remain-
ing rail and road connections to Communist China would be forced to
operate at -- or virtually at -- capacity. An analysis of North Viet-
nam's transport capabilities leads to two conclusions:
(a) The uninterdicted capacity of the roads
and the rail lines, allowing sufficient time to
organize the necessary truck transport, would
probably be sufficient to transport the required
daily tonnages in full to North Vietnam, even
if the ports were mined.
(b) Given a successful interdiction cam-
paign, the net capacity of the roads and the rail
lines would be insufficient to satisfy the maxi-
mum daily requirement and, therefore, some
reduction in the desired levels of supplies
would take place.
See Appendix E.
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If an unlimited interdiction program were highly success-
ful, the regime would encounter increasing difficulty and cost in main-
taining the flow of some of their most essential military and economic
goods. In the long term the uncertainties and difficulties resulting
from the cumulative effect of the air campaigns would probably cause
Hanoi to undertake a basic reassessment of the probable course of
the war and the extent of the regime's commitment to it.
2. Other Potential Targets
In addition to industrial-economic targets, there are a
number of military facilities presently on the JCS target list whose
neutralization would be of importance in blunting the military capa-
bilities of North Vietnam. The most prominent of these are 11 air-
fields. There are also a number of barracks and smaller military
supply depots widely dispersed throughout North Vietnam. In an
unlimited campaign these facilities presumably would be taken under
attack.
Other potential targets include such varied installations
as a number of primary radio communications centers, the six plants
constituting North Vietnams pharmaceutical industry, transport re-
pair facilities, textile plants, food-processing plants, and fertilizer
plants. Neutralization of these targets would cause further disruption
of economic and military activity in North Vietnam. But the principal
gain to be expected by taking them under attack is that their neutraliza-
tion would increase North Vietnam's import requirements and aggravate
further their difficult problems in logistics and distribution.
Air attacks on the miscellaneous industrial and repair
facilities in the "unlimited" package would probably bring only mar-
ginal additional pressure on Hanoi unless the attacks significantly
impeded the flow of essential war-supporting supplies and equipment
currently flowing in from the USSR, China, and other Communist coun-
tries.
F. Restriction of Rolling Thunder to Route Packages 1 and 2
and Laos"
About 60 percent of all airstrikes in North Vietnam and Laos
during 1966 were carried out against targets in the "logistic funnel"
which comprises Route Packages 1 and 2 in North Vietnam and the
road network through the Laotian Panhandle. The total effort in these
See Appendix F.
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three areas during the first 11 months of 1966 amounted to about 68, 000
attack sorties delivering about 112, 000 tons of ordnance to the target
area. Despite this effort, the level of supplies currently needed to
support the VC/NVA forces fighting in the South has continued.
Concentration of all air attack forces on the "logistic funnel"
would increase by about 60 percent the bombing program in this area,
raising the level of ordnance expended from 10, 000 tons to around
16, 000 tons per month. In a short time the North Vietnamese would
respond to the intensified bombing by increasing the size of the labor
force engaged in repair work. The estimated requirement of a 30
percent increase in repair and reconstruction manpower could be
drawn from areas of North Vietnam no longer being bombed and would
be made up of experienced repair crews. Moreover, their air defenses
in the "funnel" also would be strengthened to aid in countering the in-
tensified bombing program.
If the Rolling Thunder program were cut back to an interdic-
tion campaign against Route Packages 1 and 2 plus Laos, Hanoi would
regard the limitation as a clear victory. They would see it as evidence
that political pressures on the United States as a result of the reaction to
propaganda claims about civilian casualties inflicted further north. had
been effective. The regime would be encouraged in its belief that
the United States will ultimately tire of the war and that its policy
was forcing the United States to retreat.
A similar program to reduce the logistic capacity of the Com-
munists, called Operation Strangle, was carried out during the Korean
War with only limited effectiveness. A strip across North Korea
60 nautical miles in depth was bombed day and night for 11 months
in an attempt to cut off supplies needed by the Communist armies. By
means of a system of countermeasures very similar in scope to those
now being carried out by the North Vietnamese, the Communists greatly
reduced the effectiveness of the US bombing program while at the same
time continuing to provide the necessary supplies for their war effort.
G. Estimated Casualties Resulting from Alternative Rolling
Thunder Programs',
The alternative Rolling Thunder programs examined in this
report would tend to yield casualties at a significantly higher rate than
that observed in 1966. This arises principally because these programs
tend to be centered on targets located in the more heavily populated
See Appendix G.
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areas of North Vietnam. Specific numbers of casualties could not be
estimated for every aspect of each campaign, particularly armed
reconnaissance programs. A rough. approximation indicates, however,
that total casualties resulting from attacks on fixed targets could range
from 15, 000 to 20, 000. Approximately one-third of these would be
civilian casualties, most of whom would have been engaged in war re-
lated activities. Casualties in this amount -- if they were all sustained
in 1967 -- would be at a level from two to three times higher than that
obtained by attacks on fixed targets in 1965 and 1966 combined.
Armed reconnaissance in 1966 accounted for about 95 percent
of total casualties. If the alternative bombing programs are carried
out by cutting back significantly on armed reconnaissance programs in.
the areas south of Hanoi, there probably would be a marked decline in
the number of casualties from this source. In this event the total
casualties resulting from the alternative programs might not be signifi-
cantly greater than the total casualties inflicted during the 1966 campaign.
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ECONOMIC DAMAGE
MILLION US DOLLARS
1965
36.2
1966
94.3
BRIDGES
11.0
& Exports)
9.4
INDIRECT
LOSSES
(Agriculture, Fish i ng
PETROLEUM 1.6
MANUFAC
RAILROAD YARDS 0.1/ "MARITIME PORTS 0.7
BRIDGES
12.1
INDIRECT
LOSSES
(Agriculture, Fishing
& Exports)
36.9
POWER PLANTS
6.3
TRANSPORT
EQUIPMENT
5.9
PETROLEUM
5,2
RAILROAD YARDS 1.2
MARITIME PORTS 0.8
SECRET
Figure 1. Value of Economic Damage in North Vietnam, by Sector, 1965 and 1966
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MILITARY DAMAGE
MILLION US DOLLARS
1965
33.6
COMMO SITES 1.8
MISC. ARMED RECCE 0.7
NAVAL BASES 1.2
\AIRFIELDS 0.4
1966
35.6
AMMO DEPOTS 0.2
''-SUPPLY DEPOTS
0.6
-MISC. ARMED RECCE
2,3
RADAR and
COMMO SITES 1,0
NAVAL BASES 0.4
SECRET
65561 1-67 CIA
Figure 20 Value of Military Damage in North Vietnam, by Sector, 1965 and 1966
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11-
W
W
IAA
z
0
J
LL
V'#
w
0
Figure 3. Index of Sorties Flown in Southeast Asia and Relative Amounts in Each
Area, 1965 and 1966
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