THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE AIR CAMPAIGN AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM

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CIA-RDP78T02095R000300070001-9
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September 26, 2006
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1
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December 1, 1966
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Approved For R_lee 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP78T02095R000300070001-9 75 INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM The Effectiveness of the Air Campaign Against North Vietnam DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE NAVY review(s) completed. ARMY JCS, OSD and USAF review(s) completed. `~` Y TOP SECRET Al"' MOPI/ DF Pages 1-2 GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declossificolion Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP78T02095R000300070001-9 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP78T02095R000300070001-9 WARNING This document contains classified information affecting the national security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798. OROUP 1 IICGDDBD BOAC AUTOMATIC DOWNORADSNO AND DLCLA86IFICAT1ON Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP78T02095R000300070001-9 Approved For Release 2008 Sp1t8 FOREWORD This memorandum presents a detailed analysis of the Rolling Thunder program during the period 1 January-30 September 1966, It follows a preliminary report, The Effectiveness of the o ling Thunder Program in North Vietnam published in November 1966. Theo um ry in is memorandum is essentially that presented in the earlier paper, except for two major changes, resulting from additional analysis, and some changes in detail. We now find that the costs of the program in 1966 have been much higher, as compared with the dollar value of the destruction achieved, than we had estimated in the preliminary report. * In addition, our assessment of the interdic- tion campaign indicates that its reorientation to the high.-yield target systems in the northern part of North Vietnam would make Rolling Thunder a more effective program both in terms of maximizing the costs to the enemy and of reducing his capability to recuperate. The present memorandum presents comprehensive analyses of some subjects not covered in the preliminary report. Among these are: (1) Third country attitudes toward the Rolling Thunder program; (2) A study of the consequences of mining the port of Haiphong; (3) A detailed re-assessment of the interdic- tion aspects of the bombing programs in North Vietnam and Laos, including an estimate of the potential of a revised interdiction program; and US and allied costs include only direct operating costs -- aircraft losses and sortie overhead and ordnance costs. The damage to North Vietnamese installations is valued by estimating the cost to North Vietnam of restoring attacked installations; these costs are then con- verted to dollars. The ratio of the two is a statistical measure of the direct cost of inflicting a dollar's worth. of damage in North Viet- nam through Rolling Thunder attacks. It should not be interpreted as a monetary expression of the total effectiveness of Rolling Thunder, - iii - TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000300070001-9 Approved For Release 21Q9/ 6K 78T02095R 00300070001-9 (4) A preliminary examination of North Viet- namese industry to determine the extent to which its evolution toward a war-supporting industry may influence future targeting programs. These and other analyses are summarized in the body of the memo- randum and are supported and documented in seven appendixes not previously provided. We have not reproduced from the preliminary report the analysis of the manpower situation in North Vietnam, the civil defense program in North Vietnam, and some of the details on North. Vietnamese political reactions to the Rolling Thunder program. In all other respects, this memorandum supersedes the November report. TOP SECRE 25X1 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-R DP78T02095R000300070001-9 Approved For Rl~~a 2000 W12 - 020958000300070001-9 CONTENTS Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I. Introduction . . ? ? ? ? ? ? . . ? . . II. Rolling Thunder Operations, January-September 1966 . A. Scale of Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 8 . 8 B. Ordnance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 C. Losses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ? . 9 D. Cost of Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . III. Effects of the Rolling Thunder Program . . . . . . . A. Physical Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 B. Civilian and Military Casualties . . . . . . . . . 13 15 C. Political Reactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 IV. Assessment of North Vietnam as a Target System . . 17 A. General Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 B. The Role of External Military and Economic Aid 19 C. The Logistics Target System . . . . . . . . . 1. The Interdiction Campaign . . . . . . . . . 19 2. Countermeasures . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 3. The Prospects for Interdiction . . . . . . . 22 D. North Vietnam's Industry Appendixes Appendix A. Air Operations in Southeast Asia, A-1 1 January 1965 - 30 September 1966 . . . 1. All Areas of Operation in Southeast Asia A-1 II. North Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-5 - v - TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP78T02095R000300070001-9 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP78 _mnrl 300070001-9 TOP SECRETJ~~_-_] Page Appendix B. The Effects of the Rolling Thunder Program . B-1 I. Physical Damage . . . . . . . . . . . B-1 II. Civilian and Military Casualties . . . . . B-33 Appendix C. Selected Third Country Attitudes Toward the Bombing of North Vietnam . . . . . . . . C-1 I. The Far East . . . . . . . . . . II. Neutral States Outside the Far East III. Major US Allies . . . ? . . . . . . . . IV. The Six-Nation Survey . . . . . . . V. Soviet Reaction to the Bombings . . . VI. Chinese Communist Reaction to the C-3 C-7 C-13 C-19 C-21 Bombing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-25 Appendix D. The Role of External Economic and Military Aid to North Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . D-1 I. Economic Aid . . . . . . . . . . . . . D-1 II. Trade with the Communist Countries . . . D-7 III. Military Assistance . . . . . . . . . . D-9 Appendix F. Interdiction of the Logistics Target System . . E-1 I. The Interdiction Program . . . . . . . . E-1 II. Communist Countermeasures to the Inter- diction Campaign . . . . . . . . . . . E-12 III. The Prospects for Effective Interdiction E-17 Appendix F. Consequences of Mining the Seaports of North Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . F-1 I. The Dimensions of North Vietnam's Foreign Trade . . . . . . . . . . . . F-2 II. Impact of Mining Under the Present Rolling Thunder Program . . . . . . . F-6 III. Impact of Mining Under an Intensified Rolling Thunder Program . . . . . . . F-13 IV. Political Reactions . . . . . . . . . . F-15 TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP78T02095R000300070001-9 Approved ForTeelleaas 2OQG1Q$ - T02095R000300070001-9 Appendix G. The War-Supporting Role of North Vietnam's Industry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-1 1. Current Activity in North Vietnamese Manufacturing Facilities . . . . . . . . G-l II. Capability of North Vietnamese Manu- facturing Industries to Support the War G-4 III. Communist Aid to North Vietnam in Machinery and Equipment . . . . . . . G-7 Appendix A Al . Sorties and Ordnance Delivered in Southeast Asia, by Service, 1965 and January-September 1966 . . . A-9 AZ . Sorties Over All Areas of Operation in Southeast Asia, by Mission and Nationality, 1965 and January-September 1966 . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-11 A3 . Sorties Over South Vietnam by Mission and A_12 Nationality, 1965 and January-September 1966 . . A4 . United States Sorties Over Laos, by Mission, 1965 A-13 and January-September 1966 . . . . . . . . . . A5 . Ordnance Delivered by Air in Southeast Asia, by Month, March-December 1965 and January- September 1966 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-14 A6 . Distribution of US Sorties from Each Launch Base to Target Areas in Southeast Asia, January- September 1966 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-15 A7 . Aircraft Losses in Southeast Asia, by Area of Operation, Nationality, and Type of Loss, January-September 1966 . . . . . . . . . . . . A-16 TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000300070001-9 Approved For Release 2006/09/OP SECRETO 0070001-9 Page A8 . Cost of Air Operations in Southeast Asia, January- A9 Sorties Over North. Vietnam, by Mission and Nationality, 1965 and January-September 1966 , A-18 A10. Sorties Against North Vietnam, by Program and by Service, 1965 and January-September 1966 A-19 All, Distribution of Sorties to Each Target Country, by Launch Base in Southeast Asia, January-September A12, Distribution of Sorties Over North Vietnam, by Route Package, January-September 1966 . . . .. . . A-21 A13, Ordnance Delivered by Air on North Vietnam, by Month. and by Program, March_December 1965 and January-September 1966 . ~ x A-22 A14, Ordnance Delivered on North Vietnam, by Month and by Service, March 1965-September 1966 . . I _ ? A-23 A15. Aircraft and Personnel Losses in Attacks on North Vietnam, by Service, 1.965 and January-September 1966 . . , A16. Losses by Model of Aircraft in Operations Against North Vietnam, 1965 and January- ,September 1966 A-25 A17. Direct Operational Costs Related to Costs of Damage to the Economy of North Vietnam, January 1965 = September 1966 ,. . A-26 A18, Attack on JCS Fixed Targets in North Vietnam, 1965 and January-September 1966 F . . . . A19T Comparison of Strikes on Major JCS Fixed Target Systems in North Vietnam, 1965 and January- SentemhPr 1 QAc TOP SECRE 25x1 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP070001-9 Approved For Relemp{7&KE Page A20. Comparison of Sorties and Ordnance on Major JCS Fixed Target Systems in North Vietnam, 1965 and January-September 1966 A21. Statistical Summary of Attacks on Airfields in North Vietnam, 1965 and January-September 1966 A-31 A22. Statistical Summary of Attacks on Bridges in North Vietnam, 1965 and January-September 1966 . . . . A-32 A23. Statistical Summary of Attacks on Railroad Yards and Shops in North Vietnam, 1965 and January- September 1966 . I . . . . . . . . . . . A-33 A24. Statistical Summary of Attacks on Barracks, Supply Depots, Ammunition Depots, and Military Complexes in North Vietnam, 1965 and January-September 1966 ., . . . . . . . . . . . A-34 A25. Statistical Summary of Attacks on Petroleum Storage in North Vietnam, 1965 and January-September 1966 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A26. Statistical Summary of Attacks on Ports and Naval Bases in North. Vietnam, 1965 and January- September 1966 . . . . . . . _ ? . . , ? . A27. Statistical Summary of Attacks on Radar Sites in North Vietnam, 1965 and January-September 1966 A-37 A28. Statistical Summary of Attacks on Powerplants in North Vietnam, 1965 and January-September 1966 A-38 Appendix B B1 Petroleum Storage Facilities Attacked Under the Rolling Thunder Program, 1965 and January- September 1966 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-3 TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2006109128: CIA- 000300070001-9 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP 0300070001-9 TOP SECRET Page B2 . Electric Powerplants Attacked Under the Rolling Thunder Program, 1965 and January-September 1966. B3 . Manufacturing Facilities Attacked Under the Rolling Thunder Program, 1965 and January-September B4 . Railroad Yards Attacked Under the Rolling Thunder Program, 1965 and January-September 1966 B-12 B5 , Maritime Ports Attacked Under the Rolling Thunder Program, 1965 and January-September 1966 . . . , B-14 B6 . Barracks Attacked Under the Rolling Thunder Pro- gram, January-September 1966 . , . . . , , . . B-19 B7 . Airfields Attacked Under the Rolling Thunder Pro- gram, 1965 and January-September 1966 . . . . . B-21 B8 . Naval Bases Attacked Under the Rolling Thunder Program, 1965 and January-September 1966 m . r B-24 B9 Inventory of Miscellaneous Damage by Armed Reconnaissance Sorties, :L965 and January- September 1966 . . . . . , , ?. - . B-32 Appendix D D1 Economic Credits and Grants Extended by Communist Countries to North Vietnam, 1955-64 . . . . . . . D-2 D2 Credits and Grants Extended by the Communist Countries to North Vietnam, January 1965 - October 1966 . . , . .. . . . . . D3 . North Vietnam's Trade with Communist Countries, 1962-65 . . . . , D4 , Commodity Composition of North. Vietnam's Trade with the USSR, 1962-65 TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-R 00300070001-9 Approved For Rel .fie ftf f I -RDP78TO2 958000300070001-9 Page D5 . Soviet and Chinese Communist Deliveries of Military Equipment to North. Vietnam, 1953 - October 1966 D-11 D6 . Soviet Military Aid to North Vietnam, 1953 - October 1966 . . . D-13 D7 . Chinese Communist Military Aid to North. Vietnam, 1953 - October 1966 . . . . . . . . . . . . D-14 Appendix E El North Vietnam: Air Strikes Against JCS-Targeted Bridges, 1965 and January-September 1966 E-2 E2 North Vietnam: Estimated Total Length of Time Railroad Lines Were Interdicted for Through Rail Service, 1965 and January-September 1966 E-2 E3 Comparison of Railroad Bridges Destroyed or Damaged,by Railroad Line, 1965 and January- September 1966 . . . . . . . . . E-3 E4 Reported Losses of Transport Equipment as a Result of Bombing in North Vietnam, 1965 and January- September 1966 . . . . . ? . . . . . . . . . . E-5 E5 Incidents of Destruction and Damage to Targets in Laos Reported by Pilots, January-September 1966 . E-9 E6 Estimated Restoration Cost, by Month, of Targets Reported Destroyed or Damaged by Pilots in Laos, January-September 1966 . . . . . , . . E-10 >E7 Construction and Improvement on Road and Railroads E_ 13 in North Vietnam, 1965 - 30 September 1966 . . E8 . Total Bridges Damaged or Destroyed and Types of Countermeasures Used on Transportation Routes in North Vietnam, 1965 - 30 September 1966 E-14 TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2006109/28: CIA- 8000300070001-9 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RD. 0300070001-9 TOP SECREJ I Page E9 . JGS-Targeted Bridges on the Hanoi - Dong Dang Railroad Line, June 1966 . . . . . . . . . . . . E-21 Appendix F Fl . North Vietnam: Identified Seaborne Foreign Trade, 1964, 1965, and January-September 1966 . . . . . F-3 Appendix G G1 . Photographic Analysis of Major Manufacturing Plants In North Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-2 G2 Reported Machinery Produced in North Vietnam, 1957 -66 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-6 G3 . North. Vietnam: Imports of Machinery from the USSR, 1959-65 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G4 . Major North Vietnamese Imports of Machinery from the USSR, by Type, 1964-65 . . . . . . . . . . . G-10 G5 . Analysis o Information on North Viet- namese Imports of Machinery, by Type, 1964-66 G-12 TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RD Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-R 000300070001-9 TOP SECRETT Following Page North Vietnam: Road and Railroad Developments, 1 Jan 65 - 30 Sep 66 (frontispiece) Figure 1. North Vietnam: Major JCS Targets in 1965 and 1966 (map) . . . . . . Appendix A Figure Al . Index of Sorties Flown in Southeast Asia and Relative Amounts in Each Area, 1965 and January-September 1966 (chart) . . . . . . . . . . . A-2 Figure A2 . Index of Ordnance Delivered in South- east Asia and Relative Amounts in Each Area, 1965 and January- September 1966 (chart) . . . . . Figure A3 . Estimated Direct Operational Cost of US/ GVN Operations in Southeast Asia, January-September 1966 (chart) . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-4 Figure A4 . Statistical Summary of Ordnance Delivered and Sorties Flown in North. Vietnam, 1965 and January-September 1966 (chart) . . A-6 Figure A5 . Statistical Summary of Aircraft Lost and Personnel Lost and Recovered in North Vietnam, 1965 and January-September 1966 (chart) Figure A6 . Monthly Summary of Sorties Flown in North Vietnam, by Service and by Program, 1965 and January- September 1966 (chart) . . . . . . TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000300070001-9 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP 0300070001-9 TOP SECRET Following Page Figure A7 North Vietnam: Average of US Sorties, by Route January-September 196 Distribut Package, 6 (map) , io , n . A-6 Figure A8 Monthly Summary of Ord nance De- livered. on North Vietna m, by Service and by Program 1965 - September 1966 ( , March chart) , , r A-8 Figure A9 Estimated Direct Operational Cost of US/GVN Air Operations in North Vietnam and Cost of Economic and Military Damage to North Vietnam, 1965 and January-September 1966 (chart).. . . . . , . . A-8 Figure A10, Estimated Direct Operational Cost of US/ GVN Air Operations in North Vietnam and Cost of Economic and Military Damage to North Vietnam, by Month, 1965 and. January- September 1966 (chart) Appendix B Figure B1 . Value of Economic and Military Damage in North Vietnam, 1965 and January-September 1966 (chart) . , . n . , . Figure BZ Value of Economic Damage in North Vietnam, by Sector, 1965 and January-September 1966 (chart) B-2 Figure B3 Value of Military Damage in North Vietnam, by Type, 1965 and January-September 1966 (chart) B-2 TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-R 8000300070001-9 Approved For ReleaF%(df1 Following Page Figure B4 . Value of Economic and Military Damage in North Vietnam, by Month, 1965 and January- September 1966 (chart) . . . . . . B-2 Appendix E Figure El , North Vietnam: Cost of Permanent and Temporary Repairs of Bridges and Actual Expenditures, by Month, September 1965 September 1966 (chart) . . . . . . . . . . Figure E2 . North Vietnam: Man-Days Required for Total Bridge Repairs and Man- Days Actually Expended, by Month, January-September 1966 (chart) . , E-14 Appendix F. Figure Fl . North Vietnam and South China: Capacity of Selected Transporta- tion Lines, August 1966 (map) TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-R DP78T02095R000300070001-9 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000300070001-9 SECRET---- Koc 16 g 6 1%.., Ching-hsi .. .~~ 4 Bao Lac. CHINA ~?~? ^ ' ~, : H-a ' Giang ~ prty 4/2 ., qoo Cai Bang / 4 ~' Bac Can. 3 ? ?~ ? Lai Chau 22..- ~ - _ Nmg- ng -- - -- 22 4 ~ n 7 n B L S :J r7 Sy al 1 i \ Yen Ba t 3A 2 ang t u hai Tho 3 tae a Mong i Dien Bien Son Phu ?? Phu Yen So Tay ac Giang x See Appendix G. - 23 - TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP78T02095R000300070001-9 Approved For Release 200fff 8?19 There is no evidence that the manufacturing section of North, Vietnam has converted to the direct production of military hardware. The manufacturing industries in North Vietnam most capable of provid- ing significant assistance to the military effort are the machine building industry and, to a lesser extent, the chemical industry. The chemical industry manufactures small quantities of tires, pharmaceuticals, and some chemicals used in the production of munitions. A new nitrogen fertilizer plant is already or soon will be in operation. The explosives industry, however, provides only a fraction of the country's current military needs. The machine building industry makes an important contribution to maintenance of the transportation system. The production of spares and the general maintenance of locomotives and construction equipment is the present priority task of North Vietnam's machine building industry. Imports of machinery and equipment have played an especially important role in the support of the transportation system of North.. Viet- nam and in the improvement of the military communications capability. Along with transportation equipment, the Communist countries have in- creased deliveries of spare parts, machinery for the repair and main- tenance of transport equipment, and construction equipment for the re- construction and repair of lines of communication. Such imports have supplemented an already existing capability in the North Vietnamese machine building industry for the production of spare parts and simple machinery, The sharp increase in the import of telecommunications equipment almost certainly reflects an effort to upgrade military com- munications. The increased program of aid associated with the military effort, however, has not been at the expense of economic aid in general. The number of Communist aid projects has actually increased signifi- cantly, and, although, some of these projects such as machine building shops clearly have a potential military role, others -- mining, glass, and food products -- are just as clearly non-military in nature. Neutralization of selected machine building plants in North Vietnam -- the Hanoi Engineering Plant, for example -- would delay recovery from the damage inflicted by the Rolling Thunder program. Destruction of North Vietnam's few major manufacturing facilities outside of the machine building sector and the Haiphong cement plant would be of little value, other than from the standpoint of reducing enemy morale, in the reduction of the North Vietnamese military capa- bility. Even the destruction of the large machine building plants would not be crucial inasmuch as much of the repair capacity is already dis- persed. Furthermore, the apparent scope of recent aid agreements -24- TOP SECRE Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-R DP78T02095R000300070001-9 Approved For f ss CIA-RDP 8T02095R000300070001-9 suggests that the Communist countries will continue to provide North Vietnam both with replacements for essential damaged equipment and with equipment enabling North Vietnam to continue its own repair and maintenance. TOP SECRET 25X1 25X1_ Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP78T02095R000300070001-9 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RD 00070001-9 TOP SECRET AIR OPERATIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 1 JANUARY 1965 30 SEPTEMBER 1966 I. All Areas of Operation in Southeast Asia During the first nine months of 1966, US/GVN forces flew nearly 315, 000 sorties and delivered about 350, 000 tons of ordnance on all areas of operation in Southeast Asia. US aircraft flew 92 percent of the sorties and carried 93 percent of the ordnance. About 70 percent of the sorties were attack sorties and 30 percent were support sorties, approximately the same proportion that prevailed during 1965. The ratio of attack sorties to support sorties did not, however, remain constant for the various individual areas of attack. In North Vietnam, attack sorties rose from 47 percent of total sorties in 1965 to 56 per- cent in 1966, whereas in South Vietnam attack sorties represented a smaller percentage of total sorties in 1966 than in 1965. The per- centages of attack and support sorties in each area are shown in the following tabulation: North Vietnam South Vietnam Laos All Areas of Operation in Southeast Asia Year Attack Sorties Support Sorties Attack Sorties Support Sorties Attack Sorties Support Sorties Attack Sorties Support Sorties 1965 47 53 85 a/ 15 / 68 32 70 a/ 30 a/ 1966 56 44 77 J 23 J 67 33 70 30 1966 8o J 20 b/ a. US sorties only. Distribution of sorties by South Vietnamese Air Force in 1965 is not available. b. All US/GVN sorties. For a summary of sorties and ordnance delivered on all areas of operation in Southeast Asia, by delivering service, see Table Al. x Including strike and flak suppression sorties, and sorties inclose air support of ground operations, plus the major carriers of ordnance. A monthly distribution of sorties over all areas of operation in Southeast Asia, by mission and nationality, during 1965 and the first nine months of 1966 is presented in Table A2. TOP SECRE Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP78T02095R000300070001-9 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RD 0 0070001-9 TOP SECRETJ I The following tabulation shows that nearly half of the sorties, and some- what over half of the ordnance delivered, was on South Vietnam with the larger share of the remaining half of the effort being directed against North Vietnarn January-Septemer 1966 Area of Operation Number Percent Tons Percent Laos 57,060 18 59,750 17 North Vietnam 105,970 34 91,770 27 Laos and North Vietnam combined. 163,030 52 151,520 44 South Vietnam 151,640 48 195,700 .56 Total Southeast Asia 314,670 100 347,220 100 Since mid-1965 the increase in sorties flown over South Vietnam has been approximately parallel to the increase in sorties flown over North Vietnam and Laos combined, and since the beginning of 1966 the in- crease in sorties flown over North Vietnam* has been roughly propor- tional to the decrease in sorties flown over Laos (see Figure Al). The amount of ordnance delivered monthly by air on Southeast Asia remained fairly constant during 1966. It was a little over 38, 000 tons in January, increased to over 44, 000 tons by August, and was a little over 39, 000 tons in September. Similarly, the amount of ordnance delivered monthly on South Vietnam also remained fairly con- stant, fluctuating within the range of 18, 000 to 26, 000 tons. The amount of ordnance delivered monthly on North Vietnam, however, in- creased substantially, while the ordnance delivered on Laos declined sharply. (see Table A5 and Figure A2). The amount of ordnance delivered on North Vietnam in September 1966 was nearly four times * For a presentation of sorties flown monthly over South Vietnam and Laos in 1965 and the first nine months of 1966, see Tables A3 and A4. The comparable data pertaining to North Vietnam are presented in Table A9. TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP78T02095R000300070001-9 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000300070001-9 SORTIES FLOWN z SECRET J J A S 0 N D J F M A M J J A S 1Y05 10AA Figure A-1? Index of Sorties Flown in Southeast Asia and Relative Amounts in Each Area, 1965 and January-September 1966 January rYOO total tor Laos, North Vietnam, and South Vietnam Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000300070001-9 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000300070001-9 ORDNANCE DELIVERED SECRET Apr. May June July Aug. Sept. 1966 *January 1966 total for Laos, North Vietnam, and South Vietnam. Figure A-2. Index of Ordnance Delivered in Southeast Asia and Relative Amounts in Each Area, January- September 1966 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP78T02095R000300070001-9 Approved For Rel,26/jU,rQ 70001-9 25X1 ETI the amount delivered in February, the first complete month of bombing during the year, and was more than three times the amount delivered in September a year ago, the peak month of 1965. The amount delivered on Laos in September 1966, on the other hand, was less than 9 percent of the amount delivered in January. The US air effort in Southeast Asia was carried out by aircraft stationed in South Vietnam and Thailand as well as by aircraft from US Navy carriers in the Gulf of Tonkin and in the South China Sea. The US Air Order of Battle in the area as of 26 October 1966 was as follows: Aircraft Launch Base Air Bases USAF US E USMC USA a/ al Total South Vietnam 30 723 9 438 1,985 3,155 Thailand, 7 422 0 0 0 422 Naval carriers 2 to 3 0 151 41 0 192 Total aircraft 1,1+5 160 6 1 985 3 769 , , a. US Army aircraft, mostly helicopters and light observation air- craft, have not been considered, in this report. Approximately 55 percent of all US sorties flown in Southeast Asia originated from bases in South Vietnam, 30 percent from aircraft carriers, and 15 percent from bases in Thailand. During the first nine months of 1966, about 70 percent of all US sorties flown from South Vietnam struck targets in South Vietnam, 20 percent were flown over Laos, and 10 percent over North Vietnam. Approximately 65 percent of the sorties from Thailand were flown over North Viet- nam and 35 percent over Laos. To avoid violation of Cambodian air space, no sorties were flown from Thailand over South Vietnam. About 55 percent of the sorties from the Navy aircraft carriers during the first nine months of 1966 were flown over North Vietnam.,25 per- cent over South Vietnam, and 20 percent over Laos. =C The distribution of sorties from each of these launch bases to the three target areas in Southeast Asia is shown in Table A6. TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RD 070001-9 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-R 0 00070001-9 TOP SECRET More than 405 planes were lost in the air war over Southeast Asia during the first nine months of 1966. Of the 405 aircraft, 330, or approximately 81 percent, were reported as combat losses, due to hostile action, and 75, or about 19 percent, were reported as opera- tional losses. Sixty-two percent of total losses were in operations against targets in North Vietnam, 24 percent against targets in South Vietnam, and 14 percent: against targets in Laos. The number of planes lost per month, and more significantly, per 1, 000 sorties, remained relatively constant for all areas of operation in Southeast Asia. >x~, The average number of combat losses per 1, 000 attack sorties during the first nine months of 1966 was 1. 5 for all of Southeast Asia, compared with 3. 7 for North Vietnam, 0. 5 for South Vietnam, and 1. 3 for Laos. The direct operational cost of the air operations in Southeast Asia during the first nine months of 1966 is estimated to be more than $2 billion -- approximately $950 million in operations over North Viet- nam, $820 million over South Vietnam, and $310 million over Laos. These costs include only the production cost of aircraft lost, sortie overhead expenses, which vary directly according to the number of hours flown, and the cost of ordnance expended. They make no allow- ance for such indirect overhead as the cost of maintaining air bases or keeping aircraft carriers on line, or logistic support. *** The value of damage done to the economy of North Vietnam by air opera- tions during 1966 has been estimated at about $100 million. The restoration cost of targets reported as destroyed or damaged by pilots over Laos is estimated to be about $11 million. It is impossible to estimate the economic cost to the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong of 4 irstrikes within South Vietnam. The cost of inflicting a dollar's worth of damage in North Vietnam was about $9. 50, up about 42 per- cent from an estimated cost of approximately $6. 70 in 1965. The cost of incting a dollar's worth of damage by sorties carried out over Laos in 1966 has been about $28.80. The disparity between the unit cost to the United States of doing damage in North Vietnam compared with damage in Laos reflects the more capital intensive nature of targets in North Vietnam. The figure for both areas, however, _,= This figure does not include losses by the US Army. =plc Monthly aircraft losses in Southeast Asia are presented by area of operation, nationality, and type of loss in Table A7. The estimated direct operational costs of air operations in South- east Asia are summarized in Table A8 and Figure A3. TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000300070001-9 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000300070001-9 COST OF AIR OPERATIONS LAOS NORTH SOUTH VIETNAM VIETNAM Figure A-3 , Estimated Direct Operational Cost of US/GVN Operations in Southeast Asia, January-September 1966 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP78T02095R000300070001-9 Approved For RelTtj.P6/1$ Fgp777T02095R000300g70001-9 25X1 makes it evident that the relative cost and value of the air war in South- east Asia must be measured in military, political, and psychological terms, rather than economic. During the first nine months of 1966, a total of 105, 970 sorties was flown against North Vietnam, nearly twice the total of 55, 210 flown during 1965. * In 1966, as in 1965, US aircraft flew 99 percent of the sorties, and aircraft of the South Vietnamese Air Force flew the re- maining 1 percent. The share of attack sorties in the total increased from 47 percent in 1965 to 56 percent in 1966, while the share of sup- port sorties declined from 53 percent to 44 percent. Thus the number of ordnance-carrying sorties increased, relative to the total.*" Sorties flown over North Vietnam in 1966 represented 34 percent of total sorties flown in Southeast Asia, compared with 30 percent in 1965. Sorties flown against fixed targets from the JCS target list, which in 1965 ac- counted for 25 percent of total sorties, represented only about 2 percent of total sorties in 1966. Armed reconnaissance sorties not carried out as restrikes of JCS fixed targets increased from 75 percent of total sorties in 1965 to 98 percent in 1966. The US Air Force, which flew 44 percent of all sorties against North Vietnam in 1965, increased its share to 52 percent in 1966, while the share of the US Navy declined from 53 percent to 44 percent. The US Marine Corps increased its share from 2 percent in 1965 to 3 percent in 1966, and the share of the South Vietnamese Air Force remained constant at 1 percent. 46 30 By USMC 3 21 10 By VNAF L 16 Total 20 83 1+0 From Thailand By USAF 36 0 30 From naval carriers By USN 30 Total 100 100 100 TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP78T02095R000300070001-9 Approved For 0Q.E/ 1i 0 P Distribution of Sorties over North Vietnam, by Route Package J January-September 1966 th Mo I II III IV V VI Unknown Total n January 17 18 30 4 3 28 100 February 31 24 15 3 5 22 100 March 34 31 13 5 11 6 100 April 37 29 17 3 6 3 5 100 May 30 19 26 10 6 4 5 100 June 49 19 14 8 1 4 5 100 July 47 18 12 5 4 8 6 100 August 35 16 11 9 1 12 16 100 September 39 16 12 17 5 8 3 100 Nine-month average 39 19 15 9 4 7 7 100 a. North Vietnam is divided.,for operations, into six geographic areas, known as Route Packages. For the location of Route Package areas, see Figure A7. TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-R?P78T02095R000300070001-9 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP78T02095R000300070001-9 Table A13 Ordnance Delivered by Air on North Vietnam, by Month and by Program March-December 1965 and January-September 1966 On JCS Fixed Targets On Armed Reconnaissance Total By Armed Year Total on JCS By Fixed Reconnaissance Armed Reconnaissance and Month Fixed Targets Target Strikes Strike Not on Fixed Targets Col. 2 & 3 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 1965 March April May June July August N September October November 1,130 1,130 1,830 1,620 1,420 1,420 1,9oo 1,900 1 Lon 1 ),10 1,470 1,280 1,790 1,780 700 590 620 480 450 350 Total i2,8oo 11, 960 Total on Armed Reconnaissance Total Col. 3 & 4 (Col. 1 & 4) 0 0 0 1,130 210 430 640 2,260 0 380 380 1,800 0 1,430 1,430 3,330 80 1,980 2,060 3,470 190 3,200 3,390 4,670 10 3,730 3,740 5,520 110 110 4,390 4,500 5,090 3,900 4,040 4,520 100 2,060 2,160 2,510 840 21,500 January 0 0 0 February 270 0 270 March 220 0 220 April 460 80 380 May 220 0 220 June 280 190 9o July 440 60_ 380 August 460 40 420 September 260 0 260 Total 2,610 370 2,240 270 4,510 7,520 8,580 7,330 10, 680 15,900 16,870 17,500 89,160 22,340 34,300 270 270 4,780 4,780 7,740 7,740 8,960 9,040 7,550 7,550 10,770 10,96o 16,280 16,340 17,290 17,330 17,760 17,760 91,400 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP78T02095R000300070001-9 Approved For IrtYPIONEICk r Table A14 Ordnance Delivered on North Vietnam, by Month and. by Service March 1965-September 1966 Year and. Month USAF USN USA'tC VNAF Total March 540 280 310 1,130 April 1,280 800 180 2,260 May 1,100 540 160 1,800 June 1,990 1,150 190 3,330 July 1,780 1,590 100 3,470 August 2,780 1,830 60 4,670 September 3,790 1,700 30 5,520 October 3,520 1,56o 10 5,090 November 2,810 1,690 20 4,520 December 1,680 810 20 2,510 Total 21,270 11,950 1,o8 0 34,3o 0 1966 January 60 210 0 0 270 February 3,220 1,550 10 0 4,780 March 5,090 2,610 30 10 7,740 April 4,860 3,960 Negl. 220 9,040 May 2,710 4,760 0 80 7,550 June 7,190 3,450 0 320 10,960 July 10,710 4,860 530 240 16,340 August 10,160 6,090 1,070 10 17,330 September 10,170 6,400 1,190 Negl. 17,760 Total 54,170 33,890 2,830 880 91,770 TOP SECRET 25X1 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000300070001-9 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP 00070001-9 TOP SECRET Aircraft and. Personnel Losses in Attacks on North Vietnam, by Service 1965 and January-September 1966 Service Aircraft Lost Recovered 196 5 USAF 77 62 USN 86 76 USMC 0 0 Total 171 144 62 1966 USAF 142 132 70 USN 1o4 68 60 USMC 3 8 1. VNAF 0 0 C> 249 J 208 1._ a. Including 222 combat and 27 operational losses. TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000300070001-9 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP78T02095R000300070001-9 Losses by Model of Aircraft in Operations Against North Vietnam 1965 and January-September 1966 1965 January-September 1966 Losses as a Percent Losses as a Percent Aircraft Number Total Sorties Flown of Total Sorties Flown Number Total Sorties Flown of Total Sorties Flown Model of Aircraft Lost by this Model Aircraft by this Model Aircraft of Aircraft Lost by this Model Aircraft by this Model Aircraft F105 F4 Al F8 F8 A6 RF101 EA1 RF8 EAl F104 PA3 KA4 HA5 A3 'y B57 0130 F100 HU16 RB66 Rc47 EF10 KC130 SH3A 54 9,217 19 6,203 26 3,546 29 8,951 15 3,600 3 506 6 299 6 364 1 726 0 696 0 26 0 701 3 141 0 log 1 149 0 51 5 418 0 0 0 288 0 0 0 455 0 4 3 6 171 36,456 J a. Including only sorties by aircraft models for which losses occurred in either 1965 or 1966. b. Including 222 combat losses and 27 operational losses. 49,635 J 0.6 86 12,537 0.7 0.3 33 8,437 0.4 0.7 24 4,845 0.5 0.3 47 12,175 0.4 0.4 15 4,897 0.3 0.6 8 687 1.2 2.0 11 406 2.7 1.6 6 495 1.2 0.1 2 987 0.2 0 3 946 0.3 0 1 36 2.8 0 1 953 0.1 2.1 2 191 1.0 0 1 147 0.7 0.7 1 203 0.5 0 1 69 1.4 1.2 1 610 0.2 0 1 N.A. 0 2 391 0.5 0 1 N.A. 0 1 618 0.2 0 1 5 20.0 50.0 0 0 0 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP78T02095R000300070001-9 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP 00070001-9 TOP SECRET Direct Operational Costs Related to Costs of Damage to the Economy of North Vietnam January 1965-September 1966 US GVN Operational Costs Year and Month Aircraft Losses Sortie Overhead Ordnance Total Cost to North Vietnam 1965 January 0 0 0 0 0 February 0 0.4 N.A. 0.4 0 March 18.8 1.4 1.7 21.9 1.7 April 23,.3 5.1 3.6 32.0 3.6 May 14 ,. 6 7.6 3.9 26.1 4.4 June 18..8 6.9 5.7 31.4 9.7 July 45..0 11.0 5.1 61.1 11.6 August 34..5 13.0 8.6 56.1 1.0.9 September 39,0 14.8 10.6 64.4 6.7 October 39.4 14.4 5.8 59.6 7.1 November 27.2 13.1 7.4 47.7 7.0 December 145..2 10.3 3.8 59.3 6.4 hotal 305.8 98.0 56.2 460.0 69.1 1966 January 4.8 9.2 1.6 15.6 3.1 February 23?2 16.4 10.9 50.5 6.1 March 37.6 22.7 19.8 80.1 5.7 April 67,2 23.9 25.3 116.4 10.4 May 48.,1 16.5 18.3 82.9 8.5 June 49.4 29.0 30.4 108.8 14.9 July 81?7 35.3 41.7 158.7 20.8 August 99.,0 37.7 38.4 175.1 1.7.0 September 75.8 43.2 44'.7 163.7 13.3 Total 486?8 233.9 231.1 951.8 99.8 Tt.F' SECRET Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RD Approved For 00070001-9 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000300070001-9 Table A18 Attack on JCS Fixed Targets in North Vietnam 1965 and January-September 1966 Ordnance Total Delivered Year and Program Strike and Flak Suppression Support Number Percent Tons Percent 1965 Fixed target Armed reconnaissance Total January-September 1966 Fixed target Armed reconnaissance Total 6,930 4,130 11,060 80 11,960 93 1,78o 1,050 2,830 20 84o 7 8,710 5,180 13,890 100 12,800 100 210 150 360 18 370 14 1,310 340 1,650 82 2,240 86 1,520 490 2,010 100 2,610 100 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000300070001-9 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000300070001-9 Table A19 Comparison of Strikes on Mayor JCS Fixed Target Systems in North Vietnam 1965 and January-September 1966 Number of Targets Struck Number Targeted JCS Fixed Target System As of Restruck New Strike 30 September 1966 Struck 1965 Januar -Se tember 1966 January-September 1966 Airfields (11) 11 4 1 Bridges 26 Railroad yards and shops 61 5 47 J 6 Locks 8 1 1 1 Lines of communication (74) 1 0 1 depots military complexes 91 70 25 Petroleum storage J 1 13 4 Ports and naval bases 15 4 3 7 Communication facilities 5 2 3 2 Radar sites 0 0 5 SAM support facilities 1 1 1 - 3 1 SAM sites / 0 1 0 0 2 0 , Military installations (130) Barracks/supply depots ammunition Industrial installations (27) Electric power facilities 19 Manufacturing and explosives plants 8 3 2 0 Total 242 153 e/ 65 22 J x arg List. d. Includes 2 SAM sites struck in 1965 and 1 in - et 1966 tht have e. Includes 15 targets dropped from the JCS Fixed Target List. f. Includes 1 target dropped from the JCS Fixed Target List. a. Includes 2 bridges dropped from JCS Fixed Target List. b. Includes 4 barracks and 1 barracks/supply area dropped from JCS Fixed Target List. c. Includes 6 radar sites dropped from JCS Fi d T Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP78T02095R000300070001-9 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP78T02095R000300070001-9 Comparison of Sorties and Ordnance on Major JCS Fixed Target Systems in North Vietnam 1965 and January-September 1966 Barracks/supply depots/ammunition depots Attack sorties Ordnance (tons) Attack sorties Ordnance (tons) Powerplants Attack sorties Ordnance (tons) Manufacturing and explosives plants 1965 January-September 1966 Total 4,290 260 4,550 7,300 390 7,690 130 340 470 120 500 620 230 4o 270 370 140 510 Attack sorties 20 N.A. 20 Ordnance (tons) 90 N.A. 90 Attack sorties 420 40 460 Ordnance (tons) 330 100 430 Bridges Attack sorties 2,420 610 3,030 Ordnance (tons) 3,200 1,120 4,320 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP78T02095R000300070001-9 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP78T02095R000300070001-9 Comparison of Sorties and Ordnance on Major JCS Fixed Target Systems in North Vietnam 1966 and January-September 1966 (Continued) JCS Fixed Target System 1965 January-September 1966 Total Attack Sorties 620 30 650 Ordnance (tons) 680 30 710 Naval bases, railroad yards, and ports Attack sorties 4o0 200 600 Ordnance (tons) 46o 330 790 8,530 J 1,520 10,050 12,550 J 2,610 15,160 a. Excluding 180 attack sorties and 250 tons of ordnance on railroad shops, locks, fer- ries, communications facilities, and surface-to-air missile support facilities. Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP78T02095R000300070001-9 Approved For TI?s OQ /, 6$kE. 78TO2095ROOP300070001-9 25X1 Statistical Summary of Attacks on Airfields in North Vietnam 1965 and January-September 1966 1965 1966 Total Number of JCS fixed targets JCS fixed targets struck 4 1 Percent of national capacity destroyed 19 19 Sorties Attack 420 40 460 Support 130 10 140 tal T 550 ~0 600 o Ordnance delivered. (tons) 330 1 00 430 Cost to the United States (million $) Aircraft lost 0 0 0 Operational cost of sorties flown 0.48 0 .11 0.59 Ordnance delivered 0.40 0 .1 3 0.53 Total 0.88 0 .2 4 1.12 TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000300070001-9 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP7aTnqnqSRn 0070001-9 TOP SECRET Statistical Summary of Attacks on Bridges in North Vietnam 1965 and January-September. 1966 965 1966 Total Number of JCS fixed targets 61 61 JCS fixed targets struck 47 32 Percent of national capacity destroyed 49 51 Sorties Attack 2,420 610 3,030 Support 1,710 250 1,960 Total 4,1w 860 4,99o Ordnance delivered (tons) 3,200 1,120 4,320 Aircraft lost 37 5 42 Personnel lost 35 3 38 Personnel recovered. 9 1 10 Unknown Cost to the United States (million $) 82.2 11.4 93.6 Operational cost of sorties flown 0.2 1.4 1.6 1+.1 1.3 5.4 TOP SECRET 866 14.1 100.6 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000300070001-9 Approved For l' 05relat Statistical Summary of Attacks on Railroad Yards and Shops in North Vietnam 1965 and January-September 1966 1 965 19 66 Total Number of JCS fixed targets 5 5 JCS fixed. targets struck 1 2 Percent of national capacity destroyed. 5.2 10 .3 Sorties Attack 80 100 180 Support 40 Nc g 1 40 Total 120 100 220 Ordnance delivered (tons) 70 140 210 Aircraft lost 2 1 Personnel lost 1 1 Personnel recovered. 1 0 Cost to US (million dollars) Aircraft lost 2.40 3 .0 0 5.40 Operational cost of sorties flown 0.13 0 .1 6 0.29 Ordnance delivered, 0.04 0 .1 7 0.21 Total 2.57 3 .3 3 5.90 TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000300070001-9 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-R 9 00070001-9 TOP SECRET Table A24 Statistical Summary of Attacks on Barracks, Supply Depots, Ammunition Depots, and Military Complexes in North Vietnam 1965 and. January-September 1966 1965 1966 Total JCS fixed targets struck 70 26 Percent of national capacity destroyed Sorties N.A. N.A. Attack 41290 260 4, 550 Support 1,730 20 1,750 Total 6,020 280 6,300 Ordnance delivered (tons) 7,300 390 7,690 Aircraft lost 15 1 16 Personnel lost 8 status unknown Personnel recovered 7 status unknown (million $) Aircraft lost Operational cost 23.1 3.9 27.0 of sorties flown 11.2 0.5 11.7 9.1. 0.5 9.6 )4 ?1E 4.9 ?8 .l TOP SECURE Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000300070001-9 25X1 Approved For "PsPIOQfRM&-,Fi9 9 00070001-9 25X1 Statistical Summary of Attacks on Petroleum Storage in North Vietnam 1965 and. January-September 1966 1965 1966 Total Number of JCS fixed targets JCS fixed. targets struck 4 10 Percent of national capacity destroyed 17 60 Sorties Attack 1 3 0 340 470 Support 1 20 180 300 Total 2 50 520 770 Ordnance delivered (tons) 1 20 500 620 Aircraft lost 1 5 6 Personnel lost 0 2 2 Personnel recovered 1 1 1 Unknown 0 2 2 Cost to the United States (million $) Aircraft lost 1 .3 8.20 9.50 Operational cost of sorties flown 0 .3 0.85 1.15 Ordnance delivered 0 .2 0.99 1.19 Total 1 .8 10.04 11.84 A-35 TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2006/09128: CIA-R 0070001-9 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RD TOP SECRE Statistical Summary of Attacks on Ports and. Naval Bases in North Vietnam 1965 and January-September 1966 1266 Total _ 12 15 JCS fixed. targets struck 4 5 Percent of national capacity destroyed Sorties(-,: N.A. N.A. Attack 320 100 420 Support 110 20 130 Total 430 120 550 Ordnance Delivered (tons) 390 190 580 Aircraft lost Personnel lost Personnel recovered Cost to US (million dollars) Aircraft lost 5.30 0.00 5.30 Operational. cost of sorties flown 0.60 0.14 0.74 Ordnance delivered. 0..40 0.23 0.63 Total 6.30 0.37 6.67 TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000300070001-9 Approved Fo~rrRee 2 ~j~li:~ l AJ? 95 00070001-9 ll l 25X1 Statistical Summary of Attacks on Radar Sites in North Vietnam 1965 and January-September 1966 19 65 ~ 966 Total _ _ Number of JCS fixed targets 5 5 JCS fixed targets struck 10 4 Percent of national capacity destroyed 58 Sorties 6 20 30 650 Attack Support 3 50 Negl. 350 970 30 1,000 Total Ordnance delivered (tons) 680 30 710 11 0 Aircraft lost 3 0 Personnel lost Personnel recovered Cost to the United States (million $) Aircraft lost Operational cost of sorties flown Ordnance delivered TOP SECRET N.A. 0 N.A. ,.uti o.o6 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000300070001-9 Approved For Re~6~06/QJL2i,;~CnIA~~ 0070001-9 Table A28 Statistical Summary of Attacks on Powerplants in North Vietnam 1965 and January-September 1966 1965 1966 Total Number of JCS fixed targets JCS fixed targets struck 18 19 Percent of national capacity destroyed Sorties Attack 27 32 Support 2 0 40 ?70 Total 26 0 0 ?60 49 0 40 530 Ordnance delivered (tons) Aircraft lost 37 0 140 510 Personnel lost 4 0 4 Personnel recovered Cost to the United States (million $) Aircraft lost Operational cost of sorties flown Ordnance delivered TOP SEd URET- 4.4 0 4.4 0.9 0.075 0.975 0.7 0.@7O 0.770 6`o 0.145 6.145 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000300070001-9 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP78T02095R000300070001-9 TOP SECRET APPENDIX B THE EFFECTS OF THE ROLLING THUNDER PROGRAM I. Physical Damage The cost of reconstruction or repair of the economic and military facilities in North Vietnam which have been attacked under the Rolling Thunder program from January 1965 through September 1966 is esti- mated at $170 million (see Figure B1). About 65 percent of the damage was inflicted on economic targets and 35 percent on military targets. The damage inflicted during the first three quarters of 1966 represents $100 million of the total. Damage to the economy accounts for more than 7.0 percent of the total in 1966, whereas in 1965 economic loss represented only about 50 percent. Destruction and damage to transport equipment accounted for slightly more than a third of the total economic damage in 1966 (see Figure B2). An equal amount was accounted for by indirect losses caused by shortfalls in agriculture, fishing, and exports. Bridges, powerplants, and petroleum storage sites were the principal categories of targets responsible for the remainder. More than 80 percent of all military damage in 1966 resulted from attacks on aircraft, naval craft, and SAM sites, but in 1965 the damage from such attacks amounted to less than 20 percent of the total. Damage to barracks made up almost one-half of the total damage to military targets in 1965 but only a small portion of the total during 1966 (see Figure 133). The greatest amount of damage inflicted in 1966 occurred in the months of June through September, with the peak month being July (see Figure B4). During these months the attacks on bulk petroleum storage began, and major losses in naval craft, aircraft, and transport equipment occurred. Damage to bridges also reached a peak in July. Indirect losses were at their highest point in June. During 1965 the monthly trend in physical damage was similar to that in 1966. TOP SECRE71 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP78T02095R000300070001-9 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP7 TOP SECRET A. Economic 1. Petroleum Storage On 1 January 1965 there were 13 fixed (JCS) petroleum storage targets with a combined storage capacity of almost 128, 000 tons.: During 1965, nine airstrikes were made against four of these fixed targets -- three were completely destroyed and the facility at Vinh, which was damaged during the limited retaliation following the Gulf of Tonkin incidents in 1964, ** suffered further damage. About 26, 000 tons of capacity -- about 20 percent of the total capacity on 1 January 1965 -- was destroyed .n these attacks. The value of the tankage and contents and the related support facilities destroyed is estimated at $1. 6 million. During the first nine months of 1966, 57 airstrikes were mounted against eight of the fixed petroleum storage targets. About 73, 000 tons of capacity -- 56 percent of the total existing on 1 January 1965 (72 percent of the total on 1 January 1966) -- were destroyed. The value of the tankage and contents and the :related support facili- ties destroyed is estimated at between $4. 4 million and $5 million (see Table BI).*-.',:* The total residual capacity at the nine fixed petroleum storage targets remaining on 30 September 1966 was about 29, 000 tons, no single site having sufficient capacity to accept the cargo of a fully loaded 10, 000--ton tanker. There was no indication that any of the attacked sites was being restored or reconstructed as of 30 September 1966. Recent photography revealed that cannibalization of moderately damaged tanks at Haiphong was under way. In addition to the capacity of the JCS targeted facilities, the North Vietnamese since 1 January 1965 have developed additional capacity in dispersed tank sites. By 30 September 1966, more than There was additional tankage of about 5, 400 tons which existed on 1 January 1965 but which was subsequently removed, but the present whereabouts of this tankage is unknown. This tankage was not affected by bombings, is not now carried as usable capacity, and therefore is excluded from all calculations. The capacity of the tankage destroyed at Vinh in 1964 -- about 4, 000 tons -- is not included in the total capacity shown for 1 January 1965. The range in value is necessary to reflect the possible range in the amount of petroleum in the tankage that was damaged (or destroyed). B-?2 TOP SECRET 25X1 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RD f8 1 00070001-9 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000300070001-9 VALUE OF DAMAGE Military 7 Indirect Economic< Direct SECRET TOTAL 1965 and 1966 Figure B-1, Value of Economic and Military Damage in North Vietnam, 1965 and January-September 1966 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000300070001-9 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000300070001-9 ECONOMIC DAMAGE MILLIONS US DOLLARS BRIDGES 10.5 1965 35.6 INDIRECT LOSSES (Agriculture & Exports) 9.4 POWER PLANTS 1966 71.7 4.7 MANUFACTURING FACILITIES .7 MARITIME PORTS .6 POWER PLANTS 6.3 TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT 5.9 ,PETROLEUM 1.6 MARITIME PORTS .7 TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT 24.5 MISC. ARMED RECCE 1.1/ Figure B-2. Value of Economic Damage in North Vietnam, by Sector, 1965 and January-September 1966 SECRET Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000300070001-9 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000300070001-9 MILITARY.DAMAGE MILLIONS US DOLLARS MISC. ARMED. RECCE .7 'RADAR and AIRCRAFT COMMO SITES 1.7 3.4 NAVAL BASES 1.2 'SAM SITES .6 AIRFIELDS .4 SUPPLY DEPOTS 3.0 AMMO DEPOTS .2 and AIRFIELDS NEGL. Figure B-3. Value of Military Damage in North Vietnam, by Type, 1965 and January-September 1966 NAVAL CRAFT 2.0 AMMO DEPOTS 4.5 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP78T02095R000300070001-9 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000300070001-9 VALUE OF DAMAGE 20 10 Z 25 0 20 1965 1966 Military Economic D 15 SECRET Figure B-4. Value of Economic and Military Damage in North Vietnam, by Month, 1965 and January-September 1966 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000300070001-9 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP78T02095R000300070001-9 Petroleum Storage Facilities Attacked Under the Rolling Thunder Program 1965 and January-September 1966 JCS Target Number Name Target As a Percent of JCS Targeted Capacity Dates of Attack Percent of Facility Destroyed Percent of JCS Targeted Total Capacity Cost of Restoration (Thousand US $) Value of Petroleum Destroyed (Thousand US $) Negl. 6 Nay 65 6 24, 26 may 65 34 2 120 70 11, 15 Sep 65 34 2 120 70 6 Oct 65 17 1 60 30 50.12 Nam Dinh 9 2, 4 Jul 65 100 9 500 270 50.16 Phu Qui 6 18 May 65 100 6 340 0 Subtotal for 1965 20 1,180 460 48.00 Haiphong 32 29 Jan 66 46 14 84o 300 to 460 7 Jul 66 32 10 600 190 to 310 2 Aug 66 11 4 200 44 to 81 49.00 Hanoi 24 29 Jun 66 50.00 Vinh b/ 30 Jul 66 7, 8 Aug 66 6 Sep 66 51.00 Nguyen Khe 6 30 Jun 66 10 Negl. 36 13 to 20 19 Jul 66 0 0 0 0 17, 18, 22 Aug 66 0 0 0 0 4 Sep 66 0 0 0 0 51.11 Par Giang 2 30 Jun 66 31 Negl. 31 Jul 66 11 Aug 66 14 Sep 66 51.13 Do Son 2 29 Jun 66 3 Jul 66 51.14 Viet Tri 1 30 Jun 66 0 0 0 0 19 Jul 66 3 Negl. 2 1 to 2 14 Aug 66 0 Negl. 0 0 5 Sep 66 0 Negl. 0 0 9 3,294 1,105 to 1,760 76 + 4,474 1,565 to 2,220 a. The facility at Vinh was attacked in August 1964, prior to the Rolling Thunder program. b. See the estimate for 1965. Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP78T02095R000300070001-9 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP 0070001-9 TOP SECRET I I- 100 such sites, with a total estimated capacity of between 25, 000 and 30, 000 tons, had been identified. Additional storage capacity is represented by the ".55- gallon" drums dispersed throughout the country. It is estimated that by mid-1966 about 130, 000 drums, representing a capacity of 22, 000 tons, had arrived in North Vietnam. There have been 1, 200 strikes against 400 dispersed petroleum storage sites, including either or both small tanks and drums, between April and October 1966. These strikes may have resulted in the loss of as much as 5, 000 tons of storage capacity. The monetary value of these dispersed sites is small, how- ever, and no attempt has been made to estimate the cost of their re- placement. 2. Powerplants Attacks on North Vietnam's facilities for producing electric power started in April 1965, and a. total of eight powerplants have been struck. Three of the six plants attacked in 1965 were restruck iri, .1966, and two additional plants were attacked for the first time this year. The total number of strikes against each installation has ranged from 10 against Thanh Hoa to one against Viet Tri. During 1966, air opera- tions against electric powerplants in North Vietnam were fairly evenly distributed throughout the country. Seven out of 13 strikes occurred in the northern part of the country, whereas during 1965 17 out of 21 strikes against powerplants took place in the southern part of North Vietnam. Total power-generating capacity in North Vietnam has been reduced by 32 percent. The total cost of restoration is estimated at $11. 9 million, of which $5. 6 million was accumulated during 1966 (see Table B2). Some 12, 000 kilowatts (kw) of previously undamaged operating generating capacity were destroyed during 1966. An addi- tional 24, 000 kw of new generating, capacity, which were being installed at the Uong Bi powerplant but which were not yet in operation, were denied. Moreover, 24, 000 kw of capacity temporarily damaged at the Uong Bi plant in 1965 and restored. to operation during 1966 were again put out of operation, this time for at least a year. In terms of the loss of output, the attacks on powerplants have been more effective in 1966 than in 1965. About 47, 000 kw of capacity were put out of operation in 1965, but only about 23, 000 kw remained out of operation at the end of the year; in 1966 some 36, 000 kw of operating capacity and an addi- tional 24, 000 kw of new capacity have already been denied to North Vietnam. SECRET Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP78T02095R000300070001-9 Approved For F [ uP OiJk&7&I Q 00 f1 hO 0 Z-I P-i rd 0 L 0 O 4, UU ro x o ' Y Y Y V W PU1~ N O\ M[~ NN NMMN W U 0 O 00 00 0 00.-I 0 0 6 H 2 0 003 0 0 Ili o cd Id +)rd I~ 0 0 90 In ~0 Cd a O 7-1 N Pi ~-I rol 0 p4 ?N C U w u td ati0) w 00 U O O 0 0 0 O 10 ~D -ID \DID 1~0 10 10 10 10 to In In in In to In v. to to 0 ba "0,0 10 0 ~O NN(UM NNN .~NNN i~ Y w H x u m H Ry 0 0 O 0 0 0 0 .~ N O O in O O Y o~ H lam- H -~0 W 0, x N C H q ~ H ~ C g~ W U Z m `Di H -+ N N N V N N M 0) 00 TOP SEC..,zZET . 0 N N ttl M U w 0 N m 6 6 d 6 co w +0 H H co N Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-R 0300070001-9 0 'd O Q' x Y H 0 br~I wO N w w O ~ ~~{ N N p N w w O ro ro w s . b 11 1 11 1Cow">0 13 Id 1- N In H M N o o I 'O O ..1 O o n m i Mn NMMM N N N N 0 H V Id 0 0 U] E w 0 x m a u AA H i-7 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RD P 0070001-9 TOP SECRET] T Although US air strikes have put out of operation about one-third of the generating capacity in North Vietnam's electric power industry, the losses of power-generating capacity probably have had only a minor effect on the economy and on the ability of North Vietnam to conduct military operations. Remaining capacity has been adequate to supply most industrial consumers and probably even to supply mini- mal nonindustrial demands. There have been reports of occasional power shortages in Hanoi and Haiphong involving nonindustrial con- sumers, but no reports concerning restrictions on power supplied to industry. The major part of modern industry in North Vietnam is concentrated in and around these two cities. Shortages in the Hanoi- Haiphong area probably have made it necessary to discontinue service only to nonessential users during peak-load periods. The most severe shortages of power to industry are estimated to have occurred at Nam Dinh, Thanh Hoa, and Ben Thuy. Power supply to Nam Dinh probably has fluctuated during the past year, depending on whether the Uong Bi powerplant was in or out of service. Damage to powerplants in the vicinity of Thanh Hoa and Ben Thuy has virtually eliminated the supply in these areas for more than one year, but the effect on the national economy must have been slight in view of the small contribution to national product made by those localities. The margin of reserve generating capacity available prior to the beginning of airstrikes apparently has been eliminated. Industrial demands probably could be generally fulfilled even if an additional 10 percent of generating capacity were lost. However, staggering work shifts and eliminating nonessential consumption by residential-commercial users, public lighting, and transportation probably would become neces- sary. Any additional losses of generating capacity would almost cer- tainly reduce the power supply for industry. The most important powerplants still operating in the Hanoi-Haiphong Power System are located at Thai Nguyen, Viet Tri, Hon Gai, and Bac Giang. Destruction of these plants would deny over one-half of remaining power-generating capacity. Hanoi would be forced to rely on a local powerplant which, in view of its age and generally poor condition, probably could supply no no re than 40 to 50 percent of demand, and even this level of supply probably could not be sustained for long periods. Roughly the same deficit would occur in Haiphong which also would have to rely on two small, old powerplants that are in poor condition. Successful attack on the four important powerplants remaining would greatly reduce the power sup- ply for heavy industry. The effects on light industry and agriculture TOP SECRE 25x' Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RD 00070001-9 Approved Foftp 2 192 4jR 9P78T02095R000 00070001-9 25X1 would be less severe. The attacks would have little or no immediate effect on military capabilities, although they might have a minor effect in the long run. North Vietnam has made some slow progress in restor- ing damaged power facilities. Repair work at Nam Dinh had progressed to a stage in August that indicates possible partial operation of this plant by the end of 1966. Restoration under way at the Thanh Hoa and Ben Thuy plants was either set back or nullified by airstrikes during September and October. There has been no attempt to repair the damaged powerplants at Co Dinh or at Ban Thach since mid=1965. The Uong Bi powerplant was put back into service after the strikes of December 1965 and April 1966, and work toward restoration appar- ently has been started again since the heavy destruction inflicted in August 1966. The persistence of efforts to restore damaged power facilities underlines the importance of these plants to North Vietnam and strongly suggests that no suitable alternative to central generating plants has been found. Mobile generating units imported by the hun- dreds during the past 18 months apparently have failed to offset the loss of central generating facilities. From the sizes and total capacity of mobile units imported thus far, however, significant reliance on such units for industrial power supply is highly unlikely. The history of the attack on powerplants during 1965 and 1966 indicates that they can be put out of operation for long periods of time only if the main buildings sustain direct hits; near-misses have produced a negligible effect. It is also clear that a number of restrikes were carried out against plants that already were out of operation. Finally, it seems probable that airstrikes against large powerplants in the main power system, such as Thai Nguyen, Viet Tri, Hon Gai, and Bac Giang -- had they been carried out -- would have produced far greater effect than the strikes actually made on the four small isolated powerplants in the area of Thanh Hoa and Ben Thuy. 3. Manufacturing Only four manufacturing facilities of any significance have been attacked under the Rolling Thunder program, two in 1965 and two in 1966 (see Table B3). Although restoration costs are estimated to be comparatively small for damage to these plants in either year ($1. 2 TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000300070001-9 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP78T02095R000300070001-9 Table B3 Manufacturing Facilities Attacked Under the Rolling Thunder Program 1965 and January-September 1966 JCS Target Number Target as a Percent of Name National Capacity 47.2 Lang Chi Explosives Plant Cam Pha Coal Treat- ment Plant Viet Tri Paper Mill Subtotal for 1966 Total Percent Percent Cost of Target Capacity of National Capacity of Restoration Dates of Attack Destroyed Destroyed or Inactive (Thousand US $) 100 24 Jul 65 7, 8 Aug 65 Cotton spinning: 70 to 75 Cotton weaving: 28 Jul 65 50 5 Weaving inactive: 40 8oo 19, 24 Apr 66 80 Mid-Jul 66 100 6oo 675 1,845 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP78T02095R000300070001-9 Approved ForlJ6)52WV3$DG fl million in 1965 and $700, 000 in 1966), losses in production from these plants appear to be considerably more significant. The two plants attacked in 1965 were the Lang Chi Ex- plosives Plant (JCS No. 47. 2) and the Nam Dinh Textile Plant, which is not targeted. Neither plant has been restored, and presumably greater imports are compensating for the loss in production from these plants. The Lang Chi plant is the only known explosives plant in North Vietnam. The Nam Dinh Textile Plant, although only slightly damaged unintentionally by a strike in late July 1965, is operating with only a small percent of its capacity, if at all. As a result, about 60 percent of the national spinning capacity and 40 percent of the weav- ing capacity have remained inactive for over a year. Inadequate or fluctuating electric power supply may be the major reason for this plant being inactive, rather than damage to the plant itself. In 1966 the Cam Pha Coal Treatment Plant was attacked twice in April (as part of the attacks on the Cam Pha Port complex, JCS No. 68. 0) and the Viet Tri Paper Mill (not targeted) was attacked in July. Damage at Cam Pha, although slight, resulted in a considerable reduction in coal exports, amounting to about $3.7 million through September 1966. It is estimated that the major machinery at the Viet Tri Paper Mill was destroyed, and, if so, the plant will be inoperable for a long time. Work has begun to repair the roof of the plant. This plant represents 80 percent of the national capacity for paper production. 4. Bridges The total number of bridges confirmed by photography to have been damaged and destroyed by the Rolling Thunder attack in 1966 (January through September) was about equal to that obtained in 1965. The estimated cost of complete restoration and temporary repairs to the bridges also was about equal in the two years -- $10. 5 million in 1965 and $9. 7 million in 1966. a. JCS-Targeted Bridges Although the total number of bridges attacked in January through September 1966 was about equal to the number in 1965, attacks against JCS-targeted bridges decreased. In 1966, at least 133 strikes were carried out against 32 bridges, some of which had been attacked in 1965, compared with 144 strikes and restrikes against 47 JCS-targeted bridges in 1965. Almost all of the strikes SECRET Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-R DP78T02095R000300070001-9 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP7 070001-9 TOP SECRET against JCS bridges in 1966 were conducted under armed reconnais- sance. As in 1965, most of the bridges struck were located in the southern part of the country. The number of strikes against highway bridges on the JCS target list decreased during 1966, whereas strikes against JCS bridges on the rail lines increased. Seventy-seven strikes were made against 31 highway bridges in 1965, compared with only 37 strikes against 16 bridges during the first nine months of 1966. On the railroads, 67 strikes were made against 16 bridges in 1965, com- pared with 96 strikes against 16 bridges during January-September 1966. b. Armed Reconnaissance Bridge Targets Aerial photography has confirmed the destruction or damage of 359 bridges since the start of the bombing, including those bridges on the JCS target list. About 150 of these bridges were struck initially since 1 January 1966. A total of 83 railroad, combina- tion railroad/highway, and railroad bypass bridges have been confirmed as destroyed or damaged on all rail lines in the country. About one- half of these bridges were initially struck during January-September 1966, as shown in the following tabulation: Initially Struck Total Struck Rail Line During January-September 1 66 h 2 T roughout Bombin Hanoi - Dong Dang 2> - Hanoi - Lao Cai 5 H i 17 ano - South S 19 pur and bypass 10 10 Total 4o 83 In addition, aerial photography has confirmed the destruction or damage of almost 280 highway bridges, about 110 of which were struck initially in 1966. Pilots have reported destroying or damaging about 1, 900 bridges during January-September 1966, for a total of about 2, 560 bridges throughout the bombing. These figures undoubtedly contain considerable double counting and overstatement of the damage inflicted. Excluding JCS-targeted bridges, a total of only 306 bridges TOP SECRET 25X1 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RM 300070001-9 Approved For p 2 TQ Qb C are confirmed by photography to be destroyed or damaged. This figure probably understates somewhat the number of smaller bridges damaged or destroyed, however, because photography may not be available for some of these bridges. A comparison of the two sets of data is given in the following tabulation: Destroyed or Damaged Photographic :evidence Pilot Reports Railroad and combinations 63 92 Highway 243 2,467 Total 306 2,559 5. Railroad Yards Many small railroadyardsand sidings have been attacked by armed reconnaissance, and at least five comparatively important yards have been struck during the Rolling Thunder program. But the principal yards in the country, particularly those on the Hanoi- Haiphong and Hanoi-Dong Dang lines, have not been attacked. The yard at Thai Nguyen is the only relatively important yard attacked for the first time during 1966 (see Table B4). In addition, the yards at Vinh and Yen Bai were restruckin.1966. The Vinh Classification Yard NW has been hardest hit by air attacks, with 75 percent of its capacity destroyed as of September 1966. This yard was struck at least three times in 1965 and six times in 1966. The Hanoi.--Vinh rail line has been interdicted for through service during most of the time since the bombing began, however, and the yard generally has been used only in support of shuttle service. The cost of restoration of the damaged rail yards amounted to $400, 000 in 1966, compared with only $70, 000 in 1965. Most of these costs stem from the need to repair railroad stations and other buildings, rather than yard track. The strikes have resulted in only temporary disruption to rail service during both years, and rail service at these yards has usually been restored within a few days. TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP78T02095R000300070001-9 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000300070001-9 Railroad Yards Attacked Under the Rolling Thunder Program 1965 and January-September 1966 JCS Target Number Name Dates of Attack Vinh Classification 26, ~ 0i7 May i 65 Yard N.W. 1 Jun 65 Nam Dinh Yard 2, 4 Aug 65 Damage g to switching wye, rail sid- in s, tracks and buildings Yen Bai Yard 11, 13, 14 Jul 65 Damage to rolling stock; lines inter- dicted in numerous places Subtotal for 1965 Vinh Classification 18 Feb 66 75 percent of capacity destroyed as Yard N.W. 4, 24 Apr 66 of September 1966 1, 22 May 66 9 Jul 66 TO 21.11 Thai Nguyen 29 Apr 66 20 percent of capacity destroyed as 5, 8, 22 May 66 of September 1966 400 10 Jun 66 2 Aug 66 Yen Bai Yard 23 Apr 66 Cratered Thanh Hoa Yard 12, 19 May 66 Cratered 1, 23 Jun 66 22 Jul 66 18 Aug 66 Subtotal for 1966 Cost of Restoration (Thousand US $) iiaiii iine interdicted in four places; four sidings interdicted 470 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000300070001-9 Approved For ~~ 20Q~9/.4~~~.~q~P78T02095RO Six North Vietnamese ports representing 88 percent of the country's total maritime cargo-handling capacity have been selected as JCS targets. Under the Rolling Thunder program for the first nine months of 1966, the port of Ben Thuy was restruck twice and Cam Pha port was attacked for the first time. Approximately 60 percent of the cargo-handling capacity at Ben Thuy was destroyed as a result of the attacks in 1965 and 1.966 and approximately 20 percent at Cam Pha. In 1965 the only other JCS-targeted port attacked was Ham Rong, a minor port near Thanh Hoa. Damage to port facilities from 1.966 strikes will cost about $570, 000 to restore, compared with about $660, 000 from 1965 strikes (see Table B5). The impact of this damage in itself on North Vietnam's economy is not significant, but significant export losses have resulted. Ben Thuy represents only 4 percent of the nation's maritime cargo- handling capacity and Ham Rong only 1 percent. Both serve the southern provinces, which are largely rural. While Cam Pha is a major North Vietnamese port, representing 16 percent of the country's maritime cargo- capacity, the $160, 000 damage against it is nominal. During the attack against it, however, the coal-washing machinery and the rail facilities were also hit. The damage to these facilities has already resulted in a coal export loss of about $3. 7 million. Haiphong and Hon Gai, the two other most important ports, have not been subjected to attack. The Haiphong port complex represents, 50 percent of the country's maritime port capacity and handles most of the import and export trade. Hon Gai., representing 16 percent of national cargo-handling capacity, handles primarily coal exports. These ports, representing 66 percent of the nation's cargo- handling capacity, are the only other significant deepwater ports in addition to Cam Pha in North Vietnam. The cost of restoring the petroleum terminal at Haiphong -- damaged during the airstrikes against petroleum bulk storage -- is included in the cost of replacing the support facilities to the Haiphong petroleum installation (see 1, above). TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-R?P78T02095R000300070001-9 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000300070001-9 Table B5 Percent Percent JCS of National Maritime Percent of National Cost Target Cargo-Handling of Target Capacity Cargo-Handling of Restoration Number Name Capacity Dates of Attack Destroyed Capacity Destroyed (Thousand US $) May 71.0 Ben Thuy 4 5 6 8 Jun 65 , , 9, 10, 11, 17, 19, 21 Jul 65 71.13 Ham Rong 1 14, 16, 18 Jul 65 71.0 Ben Thuy 4 1 Feb 66 rP l , ~ Maritime Ports Attacked. Under the Rolling Thunder Program 1965 and January-September 1966 .,., a to 24 Apr bb Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000300070001-9 Approved For 0kL-P Only one attack was carried out against locks and dams in North Vietnam during 1966, and it was unsuccessful. Only two of the eight targeted locks on the' inland waterways have been attacked. The Bich Phuong Lock No. 3, located in Thanh Hoa Province on the Song Chu Canal, was attacked in August 1965 and was heavily damaged. By 30 October 1965, temporary repairs had been made and the site of the lock had been coffer dammed. Water-level control was restored, and navigation continued, although it is interrupted at the site of the lock. Qua Nhue Ha Lock No. 2 on the same canal was attacked in 1966, but the lock continued to function after the attack. Three of the targeted locks that have not been struck are located on the Song Thuong Canal, part of the inland water net- work that links Thai Nguyen with Hanoi and the seaport at Haiphong. Disruption of traffic on this waterway would create some transporta- tion problems because a significant portion of the freight moved in the Delta region is transported by inland water. This waterway serves as an alternative to rail and road transport in the area, and thus the locks must be destroyed if disruption of transport routes in the Delta is to be achieved. The destruction of the four targeted locks that are still functioning in Thanh Hoa and Nghe An Provinces would present problems to canal traffic operating in the area. These canals have become sig- nificant routes for the transportation of supplies within Military Region IV. 8. Agriculture Although agricultural production in North Vietnam has not been a direct target of the US/GVN airstrikes against that coun- try, these attacks have had a significant indirect effect on the agricul- tural segment of the economy. It is impossible, however, to isolate the indirect effect of the bombings on agricultural production from other influences -- such as weather. The bombing attacks have been associated with a decrease in agricultural production during the period 1965 through September 1966 which is valued at an estimated $21 million. Of this amount, $17 million is attributed to a shortfall of rice harvested during the spring of 1966. This shortfall was caused by poor weather and by the bombing attacks. A decrease in the salt water fish catch -- caused by the bomb- ing attacks -- is responsible for the remaining estimated decrease in production. This decrease is valued at $4 million. TOP SECRET 25X1 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000300070001-9 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP78T02095R000300070001-9 TOP SECRET The shortfall in the 1966 spring rice crop was at least 200, 000 tons below the 1961-65 average of about 1. 7 million tons for spring rice. Since this crop was planted in late 1965. $3. 5 million of the loss was somewhat arbitrarily judged to have occurred in 1965 and $13. 5 million during the first six months of 1966. While poor weather in the last half of 1965 and in the first half of 1966 undoubtedly contributed to the poor performance of agriculture, the disruptive effects of the bombing attacks were con- siderable. Even before the bombing attacks, agriculture in North Vietnam had experienced difficulties -- partly because of the unde- pendable weather and partly because of management problems on agricultural cooperative-s associated with the socialization of agricul- ture. The war has brought such additional problems as manpower shortages -- particularly skilled manpower -- the disruption of normal farming schedules, and the interruption of electrically powered irriga- tion systems and of the production and distribution of fertilizers. The efforts of the North Vietnamese to counter the disruptive effects of the bombing attacks -- including the importing of diesel generators to power the irrigation systems and of increased amounts of chemical fertilizers - have not been completely successful. The bombing attacks have resulted in serious interruption of fishing activities -- particularly offshore fishing -- in the three southern provinces of North Vietnam: Quang Binh, Ha Tinh, and Nghe An. It is estimated that this has been responsible for a loss in the salt water fish catch valued at $4 million, (a with approximately $1. 7 million worth of this shortfall occurring in 1965 and $2, 3 million in 1966, The intensive fishing season in North Vietnam -- when most of the offshore fishing takes place -- is in the three-month period of September to There was no shortfall in rice production in 1965. Although the 1965 spring rice crop was above-normal, the poor 1965 fall rice crop canceled out this surplus, giving about an average harvest. The spring rice crop normally makes up about one-third of the annual harvest and the fall crop most of the remainder. Information on salt water fish catch in North Vietnam is limited. It is estimated that the three southern provinces are responsible for about one-third of the annual catch and that about one-third of this is caught offshore where most of the loss occurred. This suggests that the total salt water fish catch was down by about 10 percent. If the fish were valued at 1. 50 dong per kilo -- a price that is between the wholesale and retail price of the various kinds of fish -- this loss would amount to $4 million. TOP SECRET 25x1 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA- 0300070001-9 Approved For jg6p2gQ, , 1%1'- i78T02095RM November. Air attacks on fishing installations in these southern prov- inces appear to have been extensive, and some damage has been in- flicted on these installations. The value of this damage, however, is believed to be minor. The agricultural shortfall, the disruptive effects of the bombing attacks on agriculture and fishing activities, together with the increased requirements for the war, have contributed to food shortages -- particularly in rural areas. Food supplies in the larger cities such as Hanoi have been maintained at adequate levels, however, and there have been no indications of critical food shortages or cases of malnutrition. The continuation of the bombing attacks will further aggravate the tight food situation in North Vietnam. The self-sufficient nature of the agricultural economy and the availability of food imports -- particularly from Communist China -- suggest, however, that food supplies are not likely to become critical. Export Losses From 1 April 1965 to 30 September 1966, measurable export losses attributed to direct and secondary effects of the Rolling Thunder program totaled $12. 9 million, of which $4. 2 million occurred in 1965 and $8. 7 million in 1966. Reduction in exports of apatite and coal accounted, respectively, for 61 percent and 28 percent of the total. Losses in seaborne exports of apatite resulted from repeated inter- dictions of the rail line connecting the apatite mines at Lao Cai with the port of Haiphong. Coal shipments were retarded by airstrikes against coal-processing facilities at Cam Pha in April 1966. Although production of cement is believed to have been unhindered, the remainder of the losses is accounted for by an apparent reduction*k* in seaborne exports of cement since the initiation of the Rolling Thunder program. * Out of seven sea product agencies -- local fish storage and process- ing units -- which allegedly have been bombed, only one has been iden- tified in photographic intelligence. It is estimated that the replacement cost for damage inflicted on the sea product agency in Thach-kim village, Ha Tinh Province, is about $60, 000. Even if all of the other six sea product agencies had received similar damage -- available information indicates that this is not the case -- total damage would be less than one-half million dollars. It is possible that undetected increases in exports of cement to China have been made on Chinese Communist ships. SECRET Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000300070001-9 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP 300070001-9 TOP SECRET The decline is attributable in part, at least, to increased internal con- sumption of cement as a consequence of the bombing. The quarterly totals of these losses are presented in the tabulation below: 1965 2nd quarter 3rd quarter 4th quarter Subtotal 1966 1st quarter 2nd quarter 3rd quarter Subtotal Total B. Military Apatite Cement Coal Total 665 192 858 1,043 324 1,367 1,554 395 1,949 3,262 11 4,174 1,554 205 1,759 1,554 40 1,476 3,071 1,457 244 2,192 3,893 4,565 4~8 3,668 8,723 7,827 1,400 3,668 12,897 Although about 35 strikes were made against at least 15 JCS-targeted barracks during January-September 1966, no significant additional loss resulted. All but one of the barracks had been struck in 1965, and more than half of them appeared to have been inactive at the end of 1965. The attacks in 1966 increased the percent of barracks capacity destroyed to about 23 percent of the total national capacity, compared with a little more than 18 percent destroyed at the end of 1965. The cost of restoration of the damage done in 1966 is estimated at about $1. 5 million, compared with about $16 million in 1965 (see Table B6). Before the beginning of the Rolling Thunder program, North Vietnam had barrackscapacity for about 443, 000 men. The 63 targeted barracks accounted for about 180, 000 men. Thus far, about TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000300070001-9 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP78T02095R000300070001-9 Table B6 Barracks Attacked. Under the Rolling Thunder Program a January-September 1966 'y JCS Target Number Name 26.00 Dien Bien Phu Barracks and Storage Area O 39.3 25.0 Son La Barracks Hq., MR North 'West IV 39.2 Vinh Linh Barracks Cent. NE 39.25 Vinh Son Barracks S 39.12 Dong Hoi Barracks Cit. 39.27 Vinh Barracks NNE 39.24 Sam Son Barracks W 39.46 Bien Son Barracks NNE 33.00 Dong Hoi Barracks WNW 39.21 Yen Phu Barracks NE 39.14 Badon Barracks Percent of Targeted National Capacity o.8 0.6 0.6 0.3 1.9 of Targeted Capacity Destroyed for Damage Inflicted During 1966 Dates of Attack During 65 As of 30 Sep 66 (Thousand US $) 18 Feb 57 (inactive) 57 (inactive) Cost of Restoration 19, 20, 21 Feb 52 87 (inactive) 800 1, 9, 10, 17 Feb 74 (inactive) 74 (inactive) 0 22 Mar 39 (inactive) 52 (inactive) 27 Apr 9, 15 Mar 26 Apr 9, 10, 22 May 6 Jun 4 Apr 4 Apr 12 May 23 Jun 1, 5, 12 Jul N.A. 20, 21 Aug 28 Aug 3, 12 Sep 31 Jan 31 (inactive) 31 (inactive) 0 52 (inactive) 52 (inactive) 0 77 (inactive) 77 (inactive) 0 43 51 (inactive) 40 56 (inactive) 100 82 82 (inactive) 51 (inactive) 51 (inactive) 30 (inactive) 99 (inactive) 100 100 (inactive) 100 (inactive) 0 1,540 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP78T02095R000300070001-9 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP 0070001-9 TOP SECRET 45 of the targeted barracks have been attacked, with a loss of capacity for about 100, 000 men. Other nontargeted barracks in outlying areas have been attacked by armed reconnaissance, but it is believed that the total capacity destroyed to date represents for the most part only excess or unused capacity. Most of the important barracks are located in the Hanoi-Haiphong complex and have not been attacked. The mili- tary strength in this area far exceeds that in outlying areas already struck. The order of battle strength of the North Vietnamese army is currently estimated at slightly over 300, 000. Thus North Vietnam has sufficient capacity remaining to house the military forces. The lack of barracks capacity in the areas where the destruction took place is, however, undoubtedly causing much incon- venience. Most of the barracks attacked are :Located in the southern part of the country, along the border of Laos, and in the northwestern provinces. These areas are particularly significant for infiltration of South Vietnam and military operations in Laos. Barracks in these areas have not been repaired. Apparently, troops are being quartered with civilians in nearby towns, in tents, and in other makeshift shelters in surrounding areas. Very little change has occurred in North Vietnam's air- field capability as a result of attacks on airfields during 1966 (see Table B7). North Vietnam has 23 airfields, of which 11 are targeted and considered to have economic and military significance. Four of the targeted fields were attacked in 1965, resulting in the destruction of about 20 percent of the total targeted airfield capacity. Although each of the bombed airfields had facilities left standing, the runways were heavily cratered and the fields were unable to receive air traffic. During the first nine months of 1966, there were only two strikes against Dien Bien Phu Airfield, one of the four attacked in 1965. The attacks took place in February with only slight additional damage to the runway, which had not been repaired. It is estimated that restoration of this additional damage would cost only about $2, 000, compared with a total of $380, 000 in restoration costs estimated for attacks on airfields dur- ing 1965. Recent observation of the Dien Bien Phu Airfield revealed that a portion of the runway is serviceable for light aircraft, The damage inflicted on airfields thus has continued to have only limited secondary military and economic effects. Air trans- port and passenger service is virtually nonexistent in North Vietnam. TOP SECRETO Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000300070001-9 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP78T02095R000300070001-9 JCS Target Number Name 5.0 Vinh 1.0 Na San 25X1 2.0 Dien Bien Phu Subtotal for 1965 2.0 Dien Bien Phu Subtotal for 1966 Total Airfields Attacked. Under the Rolling Thunder Program 1965 and January-September 1966 Percent Target as a Percent of of Target Utility National Targeted Capacity Destroyed Percent of National Cost Targeted Capacity of Restoration Dates of Attack Destroyed or Inactive (Thousand US $) 6 53 (inactive) 30 Mar 65 6 50 6 Jun 65 1 Jul 65 17, 22, 23 Sep 65 6 10 (inactive) 8 May 65 6 43 30 Jun 65 1 Jul 65 4 45 (inactive) 25 Jun 65 4 144 3 19 3 23 Sep 65 24 oct 65 94 (inactive) 2, 8 Jul 65 3 143 19 94 6, 11 Feb 66 3 380 2 2 JL2 19 i2 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP78T02095R000300070001-9 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP7 0070001-9 TOP SECRET During 1966, North Vietnamese fighter aircraft have become more active outside of the sanctuary area surrounding Hanoi. The four airfields attacked during 1965 and 1966 do not have runways long enough to support jet fighters fully, and their vulnerable locations limit their usefulness as operating bases. The three most important airfields in North Vietnam (Hanoi/Gia Lam, Haiphong/Cat Bi, and Phuc Yen) are located in the Hanoi-Haiphong area. These fields have full jet-handling capability and account for about 60 percent of the targeted capacity. The Kep airfield also has full jet-handling capability and accounts for an additional 10 percent of the capacity. At least three new airfields are under construction. These fields are located at Yen Bai, at Hoa Lac near Hanoi, and at Bai Thuong near Thanh Hoa. They will rep- resent a significant addition to total airfield capability. 3. SAM Sites From January through September 1966, 75 airstrikes were carried out against 60 SAM sites. The North Vietnamese are believed to be limited to about 25 SAM firing units (battalions), most of which have exhibited a high degree of mobility. Therefore, although 144 SAM sites had been identified as of 30 September, not more than 20 to 25 of them are believed to have been occupied at any one time. Considerable damage was reported for the SAM facili- ties attacked, as indicated in the following tabulation: Des troyed. Damaged Sites 25 25 Fan Song radars 19 Missile transporters 3 Insufficient post-strike photography prevents making an accurate assessment of the amount of damage actually sustained by these SAM facilities in 196.6. Damage reported by pilots could. have totaled at TOP SECPE Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-R 00070001-9 25X1 Approved For.I aJ 2Q Z L*f+D least $14 million*; however, photography indicated only that equip- ment valued at some $900, 000 was destroyed. ** The actual amount of damage in 1966 probably lies closer to $5 million. *** Damage to SAM facilities in 1965 was estimated at about $630, 000. During this period, approximately 660 missiles (valued at about $20 milliont) were fired against Allied targets, resulting in the destruction of 22 planes and 14 drones. By the end of September 1966, airstrikes against naval bases had destroyed almost one-fifth of the naval support facilities. The damage is estimated to have amounted to about $1. 2 million during 1965 and about $400, 000 during January-September 1966 (see Table B 8). Most of the increased destruction during 1966 resulted from restrikes on naval facilities at Quang Khe and Phuc Loi, two bases that had been hit during 1965. The only additional base attacked in 1966 was the Bai Chay Naval Complex located in the Hon Gai port area. One strike on this base in August resulted in the destruction of about 14 percent of its capability but represented only a relatively small cost of reconstruction. Possibly as another result of the strike, however, some of the command responsibilities for naval operations in the area have been shifted from the Bai Chay headquarters to the newly constructed command post at Binh Dong in the Haiphong area. It is doubtful that the damage to the bases has seriously affected the operations of the small North Vietnamese navy. The major base accounting for 40 percent of the targeted capacity is located It is assumed that all of the sites reported destroyed were occupied when struck and that most of the major equipment was destroyed: spe- cifically, the Fan Song radar, cabling, and an average of five launchers and three missiles. No attempt has been.made to assign a value to the "damaged" category. ** Two missiles on launchers, six launchers without missiles, and two sets of guidance and control equipment. Cost computations are based on estimated production costs of re- placement equipment; inasmuch as at least some of the equipment is believed to be older models not now in active service in the USSR, these computations probably overstate their true present value. t This cost is not included in the estimated costs of physical damage resulting from the Rolling Thunder program. TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-R DP78T02095R000300070001-9 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000300070001-9 Na-al Paces t ticked. Under the Rolling Thunder Program 1965 and January-September 1966 Target Target as a Percent of National Naval a/ Percent Percent of National of Base Utility Naval Base Support Cost of Restoration Number Name Base Support Capacity Dates of Attack Destroyed Capacity Destr ed (Th d US $ oy ) ousan y 74-1 Quang Khe Naval 15 2 Mar 65 47 7 400 C Base 28 Ma 65 It y 21 24, 27 ~~, 'Q Sep 10 20 May 65 78 8 12 Sep 65 15 ?^' 74.l Quang Khe Naval I 5 26 Apr 66 7 25Xt!Lj N Base 71.1 Phuc Loi 10 4, 5 Apr 66 78 (inactive) 10 230 69.0 Bai Chay 17 6 Aug 66 14 2 Subtotal for 1966 Total 1,573 a. Dates of attack indicate only assigned strikes; in certain instances more attacks have been launched against a specific target than is indicated above. Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP78T02095R000300070001-9 Approved For T ( s I0@k 0L2S : E. 1 18 1 02095K 300070001-9 in the Haiphong port area and has not been attacked. The other targeted base not yet struck is Port Wallet, located about halfway between Hon Gai and the Chinese border. In addition to these five targeted bases, North Vietnam has naval support facilities in ten other ports. Restora- tion of the damaged bases can be accomplished quickly and with local materials, with the exception of replacing or repairing machinery that may have been destroyed or damaged. North Vietnam has 50 known radar sites, of which five coastal sites were targeted because of their strategic location. Dur- ing 1965-66, these five targeted sites were attacked. Two sites (Hon Matt and Hon Nieu) were totally destroyed and two (Vinh Son and Bach Long) were damaged. The extent of damage to the remaining site (My Duc) is unknown. Damage or destruction of targeted sites amounted to an estimated $1. 7 million during 1965 and to slightly over $900, 000 in 1966 for a total of $2. 6 million. Details of the types of radar damaged or destroyed and their estimated value are shown in the following tabulation: 1965 Destroyed Total Value or Damaged (Thousand US $) (Thousand US $) Vinh Son 1 Track Dish - fire control 245 245 2 SCR-270 - early warning 270 270 3 Firecan - fire control 1 Cross Slot - early warning 1,000 135 645 1 Spoonrest A - early warning 135 Hon Matt 2 Cross Slot - early warning 270 270 Hon Nieu 1 Cross Slot - early warning 135 135 My Duc 1 Cross Slot - early warning 135 N.A. 1 Rus-2 - early warning 135 N.A. 1 SCR-270 - early warning 135 N.A. Subtotal for 1965 1,700 Vinh Son 1 Spoonrest A - early warning 135 135 1 Firecan - fire control 335 335 2 Firecan - fire control 670 1 SCR-270 - early warning 135 374 1 Cross Slot - early warning 135 Hon Matt Hon Nieu None None Subtotal for 1966 Total 1965 and 1966 TOP SECRET 924 2,624 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000300070001-9 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RD. 718-1 1 7 3 070001-9 TOP SECRET Except for the radar destroyed at the Hon Matt and Hon Nieu sites in 1.965, radar at the three remaining targeted sites have been repaired or replaced as necessary, thus permitting the sites to continue operations. Air defense coverage for the Hon Matt and Hon Nieu area is provided by radar located at Vinh Lin and Hong Doi. The overall air warning capab ility of North Vietnam has not been affected by bombing of targeted radar sites during 1965-66. During the period of the Rolling Thunder program, the number of radar deployed at sites throughout North Vietnam has increased. North Vietnam has at least 35 major high-frequency (HF) radio centers and several hundred small HF radio stations. Five of the centers are JCS targets, only two of which have been struck, both in 1965. These two facilities, the Chanh Hoa and Muong Sen radio centers (JCS Nos. 67.3 and 39. 19), represent 20 percent of the tar- geted capacity In addition, a nontargeted center at Quang Khe was destroyed in 1965, and the center at Dien Bien Phu, although not bombed, was dismantled. The other JCS targets are located in the Hanoi area, and a fair number of the nontargeted centers are also located in that area. Those centers attacked or dismantled in 1965 were all located some distance south or west of Hanoi. Restoration of the damage inflicted on HF radio centers in 1965 is estimated at about $75, 000. The full extent of physical damage to the wireline sys- tem of North Vietnam cannot be estimated. The wireline system has not been specifically targeted for destruction and the damage sustained has been a collateral effect of the bombing of rail and road facilities, which are generally paralleled by open wirelines. There is a strong possibility that wireline damage has been extensive but it is not being picked up by intelligence collection media. Cumulative mone- tary damage to the open wireline system since the beginning of Rolling Thunder is estimated very roughly at $100, 000, of which $80, 000 probably occurred during 1966. Although the cost of the damage inflicted on communica- tions is nominal, indirect costs in this field resulting from the Rolling TOP SEGRETi Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP78T02095R000300070001-9 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-R 0070001-9 25X1 TOP SECRET[ - ----------- T Thunder program appear to be substantial. Damage inflicted on other sectors of the economy in North Vietnam has produced a considerable increase in domestic communications requirements. The establish- ment and expansion of new communications networks have become an especially urgent need for units assigned to the repair, maintenance, and augmentation of transportation and logistics facilities. In order to service these new requirements, North Vietnam has been forced to seek sizable quantities of communications equipment from foreign suppliers and to construct new telecommunications transmission media.. In the spring of 1966, North Vietnam imported one hundred 15-watt radiotransceivers and ten 1-kilowatt transmitters at an estimated cost of $270, 000. Currently, Hanoi is attempting to procure 30, 000 kilo- meters of military field wire at a cost that could exceed $1 million if purchased in the West. Additional telecommunications equipment in smaller quantities -- including tele-typewriters, radiobroadcast re- ceivers, and multiplexing gear for the open wire line system -- also has been imported. Since at least February 1966, photography has identified construction activity on at least six new open wireline routes in North Vietnam. Although it is impossible to distinguish precisely between communications requirements induced as a direct result of bomb damage and those generated by the expansion of North Vietnam's military establishment, it is clear that the Rolling Thunder program has been an important, if not the prime, force in increasing the com- plexity of Hanoi's communications problems. On balance, however, it appears that the operational efficiency of the telecommunications system of North Vietnam has not been seriously impaired, and if the present trend continues, North Vietnam will have significantly increased telecommunications capacity. 7. Supply and Ordnance Depots Ten of the 17 targeted supply depots have been attacked under the Rolling Thunder program. Restrikes on a few depots in 1966 resulted in insignificant damage and only slight additional loss of national capacity. Restoration of damage inflicted in 1966 will cost about $130, 000, and that in 1965 will cost at least. $3 million. North Vietnam had a total s~brage capacity at all known installations of about 10. 6 million square feet before the'beginning of the Rolling Thunder program. The total storage capacity of the 17 targeted installations is about 3. 4 million square feet. Detruction of targeted installations represents about 15 percent of the national capacity. Most of the destroyed installations are located in the southern TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000300070001-9 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP 00070001-9 TOP SECRET provinces and along the: Laotian border. Except for the Vinh Supply Depot (serving Military Region IV) and the Yen Bai Ordnance Depot (serving the area northwest of Hanoi), the depots struck are of rela- tively minor importance to the North Vietnamese army. The largest supply depots, located in the Hanoi area and at Thai Nguyen, have not been attacked. 8. Ammunition Depots Information available indicates that airstrikes have been carried out against only two JCS-targeted ammunition depots so far in 1966 -- the Xom Bang (JCS No. 64. 00) and Xom Rung (JCS No. 47. 18) depots, both of which had been attacked in 1965 and were inactive at the end of the year. The attacks in 1966 resulted in slight additional damage, the restoration of which will cost only about $200, 000. At- tacks in 1965 against 13 depots resulted in damage amounting to about $4. 5 million. North Vietnam had storage capacity for about 112, 600 tons of ammunition at the beginning of 1965, exclusive of storage in barracks and headquarters complexes. It is believed that attacks carried out through September 1966 have destroyed about one-fourth of this capacity. There is no indication that the depots resumed activity after being attacked. The destruction of the depots probably has caused tem- porary delays in distribution and inconvenience but has not caused shortages of ammunition in the areas where they are located. Four of the depots destroyed are located north or northwest of Hanoi and could have been used for the receipt of ammunition from Yunnan Province in China. The other depots are important for regional sup- port of the North Vietnamese troops and for supplying the Communist forces in Laos and South Vietnam. Other depots not yet attacked, lo- cated in the Hanoi -Haiphong area, are much more significant in the system for importing ammunition from China, distributing it internally, and arranging for its infiltration into neighboring countries. 9. Naval Craft A total of 10 North Vietnamese naval craft have been destroyed by TJS aircraft through September 1966. In 1965, three Swatow-class gunboats were sunk while in waters near Haiphong and Hon Gai, and a fourth was destroyed while in tow at sea. In 1966, TOP SEC.RE 25X1 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000300070001-9 Approved For 7'?Yi1 1-0Nr12 kk19 rp-P-M.- - - - " P7 three PT boats were sunk while at sea, and two SO-1 subchasers and one Swatow-class gunboat were destroyed while moored near Cac Ba Island. According to the North Vietnamese Naval Order of Battle as of 15 September 1966, the loss of the five Swatow-class gunboats has deprived North Vietnam of almost one-third of the operational gun- boat fleet, the loss of the three PT boats leaves North Vietnam with only nine operational craft of this type, and there are now only two subchasers operational. The estimated restoration cost of these naval craft totals $8. 1 million. The loss incurred during 1966 accounts for $6. 1 million. North Vietnamese aircraft losses increased significantly during the first nine months of 1966 as a consequence of air engage- ments with US aircraft. Three supersonic MIG-21's and 14 MIG-17's were destroyed, compared with only five MIG-17's in 1965. These cumu- lative losses represent nearly 20 percent of the MIG-21 inventory (16) and more than 40 percent of the in-country MIG-15/17 inventory (45) in the Air Order of Battle of North Vietnam as of 3 November 1966. An additional 50 MIG-15/17's of the North Vietnamese are known to be held in China. Almost all of the MIG's were destroyed during strikes against fixed targets. The destruction in 1965 occurred in June and July. In 1966, MIG losses were greatest in April, with five, June, with four, and July and September, with three each. The estimated cost of this loss is $3. 4 million in 1965 and $12.4 million in 1966. During 1966, Rolling Thunder became almost exclusively an armed reconnaissance program directed primarily against the North Vietnamese lines of communication and transport targets. The effect of the attack on lines of communication and other fixed targets was discussed in an earlier section of this appendix. The armed recon- naissance attack on the logistics target system is discussed in detail in Appendix E. SECRET TOP Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP78T02095R000300070001-9 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP 0070001-9 TOP SECURE 1. Transport Equipment; Destruction and damage of all types of transport equip- ment by airstrikes increased considerably during the first nine months of 1966 compared with 1965. The following tabulation, which is based primarily on pilot reports and includes some duplication and exaggera- tion, provides a general indication of the increase in damage inflicted, by type of equipment. 1,965 January-September 1966 Type of Equipment Destroyed Damaged Destroyed Damaged Locomotives 6 6 10 13 Railroad freight cars 227 592 1,061 850 Trucks 318 1+87 1,617 1,x+79 Ferries 53 56 61+ 118 Barges 263 1+87 1,813 2,977 Other water craft 11+1+ 210 816 1, 255 11011 1,838 5,381 6,692 The estimated cost to the North Vietnamese of destroyed and damaged transport equipment increased from $5, 9 million in 1965 to $24. 5 mil- lion in 1966. In spite of the significantly higher level of damage in- flicted during 1966, there has been no evidence of serious transport problems resulting from shortages of equipment. Imports of loco- motives and trucks have been sufficient to maintain inventories at the 1965 level. Reported losses of freight cars have included a signifi- cant number of small, makeshift cars used on the rail lines south of Hanoi which have not been included in the inventory of mainline freight cars. Although this mainline inventory has decreased by about 35 per- cent during 1966, there has been no indications of serious shortages of freight cars. If a high rate of utilization is assumed for the re- maining freight cars, the September 1966 inventory is sufficient to handle the decreased volume of rail freight carried. Furthermore, Communist China probably has loaned or given North Vietnam all the freight cars needed to compensate for any shortages. Although some watercraft and motors for water craft have been imported, most of the watercraft needed to compensate for losses apparently have been con- structed domestically. Sightings of watercraft indicate that there has .,* This factor was then expanded to cover all of the six Route Packages in North Vietnam. Modifying indexes were calcu- lated to reflect the varying population densities and sorties flown in the respective Route Packages in 1966. The adjusted daily casualty figures for each Route Package were then multiplied by the number of days of air operation in the specific Route Package. For an explanation of the term Route Package, see Figure A7. TOP SECRET 25x1 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RD 70001-9 RQ 070001-9 Approved For F VO ;.$RC .EJA Average daily casualties for the 30-day period were 2. 2 killed by air and 6. 7 wounded b air. Because prisoner-of-war reports, and r. eflecte ces to the bombing of schools and ospita s, a factor for these inadvertent attacks was also included in the daily casualty figures. The final daily casualty rates for civilians as a consequence of the armed reconnaissance were estimated to be 3. 5 killed and 8. 0 wounded in Route Package II. b. Military Casualties The problems encountered in deriving a credible esti- mate of military casualties inflicted by armed reconnaissance were insoluble. risoner-o -war repor s n al e' ers were a so o marginal value. A methodology employing the results of the armed re- connaissance program weighted the number of trucks or other facilities destroyed and damaged with DIA. estimates of casualties per truck and per other facility in the following tabulation: Number Destroyed or._ Damaged Weight Military Casualties Barracks 80 0.1 10 Supply warehouses 138 0.1 10 Misc. buildings 4,640 0.1 46o Radar Com. 78 0.1 10 Truck parks 92 0.1 10 AAA sites 568 0.1 60 Trucks 3,096 0.5 1,.550 Watercraft 2,071 0.5 1,.040 RR cars 2,234 0.1 220 3,,100 a/ a. Because of rounding, components may not add to the total shown. In two specific categories, trucks and watercraft, the casualty weights were decreased to reflect the information gained from prisoner-of-war reports It should be pointed out, however, that at best this method represents a very crude approx- imation of military casualties. TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000300070001-9 Approved For p2gL CCE+I l78T02095R000J00070001-9 SELECTED THIRD COUNTRY ATTITUDES TOWARD THE BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM There harss been a wide variety of popular and official reactions in the Free World to the bombing of North Vietnam. A study of selected Free World countries indicates, on the one hand, that there is consider- able support for the US action. Most important in producing this support has been the fear of further Communist aggression should the United States fail in its defense of South Vietnam. There also appears to be more popular and official backing in countries which are partially or wholly dependent on the United States for economic and/or military assistance. There is very strong popular opposition to US policy on Vietnam, including the bombing of the north, in some of the major neutral nations and countries allied with the United States. This opposition, which stems primarily from fear that the war will escalate into a worldwide conflict, or from the view that the United States is guilty of "aggression" against a weaker, Asian state, has definitely limited official support for US policy in some countries. In a few instances, there has been a definite growth in popular opposition as the US air war escalated. In most cases, however, popular and official attitudes have remained relatively static since the start of the sustained air attacks, or else the opposition to the raids has tended to moderate. The moderation has resulted from several factors. For one thing, the populace in some countries has tended to become inured to the war and has lost interest in the actions of both sides. There has also been a demonstrable return from the indications of US willingness to end the bombing if the other side will take reciprocal de-escalatory action. The intransigence of the Vietnamese Communists in the face of US bombing pauses has definitely cost them some Free World support. A major escalation of the air war in the future, especially if accompanied by substantial civilian casualties, is likely to produce a significant intensification of opposition to the bombing in some coun- tries. Stronger denunciations of the United States, independent action in the United Nations, and other political protest activities might be forthcoming. It is unlikely, however, that any Free World country TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP78T02095R000300070001-9 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-R DP78T02095R000300070001-9 TOP SECRET will take retaliatory action in its bilateral relations with the United States or that any Free World country will change its policy to the point of offering significantly greater political or material support to the Vietnamese Communists. TOP SECRE71 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP78T02095R000300070001-9 Approved For POSEIC R T P There is considerable popular and official support in the Far East for U'S policy in Vietnam. The majority of government leaders are fearful of Chinese Communist aggression and are convinced that US defense of South Vietnam is essential to preserve freedom in the area. In general, support for US policy extends to approval or acquiescence in the US bombing of North Vietnam. Since the inception of the raids, there have been only minor changes in official, and popular attitudes in the Far East toward the air attacks. Those that disapproved, remain opposed; those who approved, still do, although in some cases more reluctantly than before. Among the countries that generally support the United States on the air attacks are Australia, Malaya, New Zealand, Japan, Thailand, South Korea, and Taiwan. In some of the countries which officially oppose the attacks, there is an underlying ambivalence in attitudes on the war that has tended to dampen active opposition to the raids. This can be seen, for example, in Indonesia where there is a deep distrust of policies identified with imperialism, but also a strong anti-Communist and anti-Chinese sentiment. Some Indonesian military officers and some key civilian leaders have quietly let the United States know that Djakarta understands and supports the US position but is likely to hedge its public statements because of strong popular opposition. There is widespread sympathy for Hanoi in its fight to gain "independence" of the West. Significant opposition in the Far East to the US air attacks has also come from Cambodia and, to a lesser extent, from Burma, where there is official understanding of the US position, but considerable popular disapproval. It is clear that the persistent indications of US willingness to end the air raids if the Vietnamese Communists take reciprocal action have helped maintain popular and official support for the United States throughout much of the Far East. Overall support in the Far East has, in fact, increased in the wake of the US peace efforts made since late 1965. This change can be readily seen in Japan, where the develop- ment of popular and official attitudes on the air raids has been fairly typical of independent Asian opinion. The Japanese Government has approved of American efforts to hold the line in Southeast Asia since the initial US involvement in the Vietnam war. However, negative attitudes on the war among the TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP78T02095R000300070001-9 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RC 9 00070001-9 TOP SECRE Japanese people have compelled Tokyo to refrain from professing unqualified support for Washington. In public, Japanese leaders have tended to explain their support in terms of the US-Japan security rela- tionship rather than in terms of Japan's own national interest. The Japanese press, the socialists, and labor have been highly critical of US policy and have attempted to marshal public opinion against the air attacks. There was some fear among the Japanese public, even prior to the beginning of the sustained bombings in late February 1965, that the escalation of hostilities might involve Japan. The Japanese Foreign Minister told the Diet on 10 August 1964 that the government believed the Tonkin. Gulf crisis had been initiated by the North Vietnamese. However, a large segment of the public apparently felt that the United States had over-reacted against its tiny adversary and was uneasy about the possibility of a larger conflict. The Japanese Government supported the program of sustained US airstrikes in North Vietnam which began early in 1965, but its leaders were clearly uncomfortable over their policy. During Diet interpella- tions on 8 February, Prime Minister Sato stated that he considered the airstrikes limited in scope and hoped the war would not be expanded. Japanese press and radio reactions were generally negative. Sato continued to cautiously support US policies in Vietnam follow- ing the renewal of the airstrikes after the May 1965 pauses. However, many of his party members privately expressed strong reservations about the effectiveness of the strikes. By early summer, criticism of US Vietnam policies was very widespread and acerbic. The B?-52 strike by Okinawa-based planes on 28 July sharpened fears that Japan would become involved in the war as a result of its defense ties with the United States. The situation began to change somewhat during the last few months of 1965. There was a slow but steady improvement of Japanese public attitudes toward the US involvement in Vietnam during the autumn, partly as a result of US efforts to publicize its objectives in Vietnam. The December--January pause in the bombing produced an even sharper shift of popular opinion in favor of the United States. Japanese officials were sympathetic to the resumption of the airstrikes, which they felt had been prompted by the Communists' failure to respond to US peace initiatives. The restrained manner in which the bombing was re- sumed together with the continued American diplomatic offensive for negotiations tended to counter adverse reactions. During 1966, TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP78T02095R000300070001-9 Approved For 0)C7`tiR.GTP~ Japanese popular attitudes toward US policy in Vietnam remained greatly improved, compared with early 1965. Fears that the war might expand into a major US=China conflict seemed to have subsided somewhat as confidence in US restraint and moderation increased. Japanese officials publicly minimized the prospect that the US bomb- ing of the petroleum installations near Haiphong and Hanoi would result in a general expansion of US military action in Vietnam. Prime Minister Sato stated his belief that the raids had been limited to military targets and that the United States would not deviate from this policy. Popular protests over the POL attacks came almost entirely from leftist groups. The modest impact of the Hanoi-Haiphong strikes on the general public was apparently attributable to popular boredom with the war. Press comment was more regretful than condemnatory in tone and reiterated hopes for a negotiated settlement. The reaction in Japan and the situation in other Far Eastern coun- tries suggest that a continued gradual escalation of the air war in North Vietnam, so long as it involves primarily military or related economic targets and does not result in demonstrably high civilian casualties, will probably not cause a significant change in current official and popular attitudes in the Far East. A representative selection of popular opinion on US policy in Vietnam in major cities of the Far East in July 1965 is given in the following tabulation: City - Manila Seoul Bangkok Kuala Lumpur Singapore Tokyo Approve Disapprove No Opinion or Unaware 49 3 48 47 4 49 45 8 47 19 12 69 10 6 84 6 38 56 This sampling probably represents the high point of the opposition to the raids since, as indicated above, there has been some moderation in opinion during 1966? These questions were asked: ''Do you approve * No representative sampling of popular opinion specifically on the raids against North Vietnam is available. The sampling above was ob- tained by USIA and is taken from its publication US Standing in World- wide Public Opinion, 1965. A similar sampling for 1966 is not avail- able. l lip S ECRE l Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-R?P78T02095R000300070001-9