THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE AIR CAMPAIGN AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T02095R000300070001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 134
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 26, 2006
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 1, 1966
• Content Type: IM

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75
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
The Effectiveness of the Air Campaign
Against North Vietnam
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
NAVY review(s) completed. ARMY JCS, OSD and USAF
review(s) completed.
`~` Y
TOP SECRET Al"'
MOPI/ DF Pages 1-2
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declossificolion
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WARNING
This document contains classified information affecting the national security
of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, US Code
Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798.
OROUP 1
IICGDDBD BOAC AUTOMATIC
DOWNORADSNO AND
DLCLA86IFICAT1ON
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FOREWORD
This memorandum presents a detailed analysis of the Rolling
Thunder program during the period 1 January-30 September 1966, It
follows a preliminary report, The Effectiveness of the o ling Thunder
Program in North Vietnam published in
November 1966. Theo um ry in is memorandum is essentially that
presented in the earlier paper, except for two major changes, resulting
from additional analysis, and some changes in detail. We now find that
the costs of the program in 1966 have been much higher, as compared
with the dollar value of the destruction achieved, than we had estimated
in the preliminary report. * In addition, our assessment of the interdic-
tion campaign indicates that its reorientation to the high.-yield target
systems in the northern part of North Vietnam would make Rolling
Thunder a more effective program both in terms of maximizing the
costs to the enemy and of reducing his capability to recuperate.
The present memorandum presents comprehensive analyses of some
subjects not covered in the preliminary report. Among these are:
(1) Third country attitudes toward the Rolling
Thunder program;
(2) A study of the consequences of mining the
port of Haiphong;
(3) A detailed re-assessment of the interdic-
tion aspects of the bombing programs in North
Vietnam and Laos, including an estimate of the
potential of a revised interdiction program; and
US and allied costs include only direct operating costs -- aircraft
losses and sortie overhead and ordnance costs. The damage to North
Vietnamese installations is valued by estimating the cost to North
Vietnam of restoring attacked installations; these costs are then con-
verted to dollars. The ratio of the two is a statistical measure of
the direct cost of inflicting a dollar's worth. of damage in North Viet-
nam through Rolling Thunder attacks. It should not be interpreted as
a monetary expression of the total effectiveness of Rolling Thunder,
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(4) A preliminary examination of North Viet-
namese industry to determine the extent to which
its evolution toward a war-supporting industry may
influence future targeting programs.
These and other analyses are summarized in the body of the memo-
randum and are supported and documented in seven appendixes not
previously provided. We have not reproduced from the preliminary
report the analysis of the manpower situation in North Vietnam, the
civil defense program in North Vietnam, and some of the details on
North. Vietnamese political reactions to the Rolling Thunder program.
In all other respects, this memorandum supersedes the November
report.
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CONTENTS
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I. Introduction . . ? ? ? ? ? ? . . ? . .
II. Rolling Thunder Operations, January-September 1966 .
A. Scale of Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
8
. 8
B. Ordnance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
C. Losses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ? . 9
D. Cost of Operations . . . . . . . . . . . .
III. Effects of the Rolling Thunder Program . . . . . . .
A. Physical Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
B. Civilian and Military Casualties . . . . . . . . . 13
15
C. Political Reactions . . . . . . . . . . . . .
17
IV. Assessment of North Vietnam as a Target System . .
17
A. General Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
B. The Role of External Military and Economic Aid 19
C. The Logistics Target System . . . . . . . . .
1. The Interdiction Campaign . . . . . . . . . 19
2. Countermeasures . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3. The Prospects for Interdiction . . . . . . . 22
D. North Vietnam's Industry
Appendixes
Appendix A. Air Operations in Southeast Asia, A-1
1 January 1965 - 30 September 1966 . . .
1. All Areas of Operation in Southeast Asia A-1
II. North Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-5
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Appendix B. The Effects of the Rolling Thunder Program . B-1
I. Physical Damage . . . . . . . . . . . B-1
II. Civilian and Military Casualties . . . . . B-33
Appendix C. Selected Third Country Attitudes Toward the
Bombing of North Vietnam . . . . . . . . C-1
I. The Far East . . . . . . . . . .
II. Neutral States Outside the Far East
III. Major US Allies . . . ? . . . . . . . .
IV. The Six-Nation Survey . . . . . . .
V. Soviet Reaction to the Bombings . . .
VI. Chinese Communist Reaction to the
C-3
C-7
C-13
C-19
C-21
Bombing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-25
Appendix D. The Role of External Economic and Military
Aid to North Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . D-1
I. Economic Aid . . . . . . . . . . . . . D-1
II. Trade with the Communist Countries . . . D-7
III. Military Assistance . . . . . . . . . . D-9
Appendix F. Interdiction of the Logistics Target System . . E-1
I. The Interdiction Program . . . . . . . . E-1
II. Communist Countermeasures to the Inter-
diction Campaign . . . . . . . . . . . E-12
III. The Prospects for Effective Interdiction E-17
Appendix F. Consequences of Mining the Seaports
of North Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . F-1
I. The Dimensions of North Vietnam's
Foreign Trade . . . . . . . . . . . . F-2
II. Impact of Mining Under the Present
Rolling Thunder Program . . . . . . . F-6
III. Impact of Mining Under an Intensified
Rolling Thunder Program . . . . . . . F-13
IV. Political Reactions . . . . . . . . . . F-15
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Appendix G. The War-Supporting Role of North Vietnam's
Industry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-1
1. Current Activity in North Vietnamese
Manufacturing Facilities . . . . . . . . G-l
II. Capability of North Vietnamese Manu-
facturing Industries to Support the War G-4
III. Communist Aid to North Vietnam in
Machinery and Equipment . . . . . . . G-7
Appendix A
Al . Sorties and Ordnance Delivered in Southeast Asia,
by Service, 1965 and January-September 1966 . . . A-9
AZ . Sorties Over All Areas of Operation in Southeast
Asia, by Mission and Nationality, 1965 and
January-September 1966 . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-11
A3 . Sorties Over South Vietnam by Mission and A_12
Nationality, 1965 and January-September 1966 . .
A4 . United States Sorties Over Laos, by Mission, 1965 A-13
and January-September 1966 . . . . . . . . . .
A5 . Ordnance Delivered by Air in Southeast Asia, by
Month, March-December 1965 and January-
September 1966 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-14
A6 . Distribution of US Sorties from Each Launch Base
to Target Areas in Southeast Asia, January-
September 1966 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-15
A7 . Aircraft Losses in Southeast Asia, by Area of
Operation, Nationality, and Type of Loss,
January-September 1966 . . . . . . . . . . . . A-16
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A8 . Cost of Air Operations in Southeast Asia, January-
A9 Sorties Over North. Vietnam, by Mission and
Nationality, 1965 and January-September 1966 , A-18
A10. Sorties Against North Vietnam, by Program and by
Service, 1965 and January-September 1966 A-19
All, Distribution of Sorties to Each Target Country, by
Launch Base in Southeast Asia, January-September
A12, Distribution of Sorties Over North Vietnam, by Route
Package, January-September 1966 . . . .. . . A-21
A13, Ordnance Delivered by Air on North Vietnam, by
Month. and by Program, March_December 1965 and
January-September 1966 . ~ x A-22
A14, Ordnance Delivered on North Vietnam, by Month and
by Service, March 1965-September 1966 . . I _ ? A-23
A15. Aircraft and Personnel Losses in Attacks on North
Vietnam, by Service, 1.965 and January-September
1966 . . ,
A16. Losses by Model of Aircraft in Operations Against
North Vietnam, 1965 and January- ,September 1966 A-25
A17. Direct Operational Costs Related to Costs of Damage
to the Economy of North Vietnam, January 1965 =
September 1966 ,. . A-26
A18, Attack on JCS Fixed Targets in North Vietnam, 1965
and January-September 1966 F . . . .
A19T Comparison of Strikes on Major JCS Fixed Target
Systems in North Vietnam, 1965 and January-
SentemhPr 1 QAc
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A20. Comparison of Sorties and Ordnance on Major JCS
Fixed Target Systems in North Vietnam, 1965
and January-September 1966
A21. Statistical Summary of Attacks on Airfields in North
Vietnam, 1965 and January-September 1966 A-31
A22. Statistical Summary of Attacks on Bridges in North
Vietnam, 1965 and January-September 1966 . . . . A-32
A23. Statistical Summary of Attacks on Railroad Yards
and Shops in North Vietnam, 1965 and January-
September 1966 . I . . . . . . . . . . . A-33
A24. Statistical Summary of Attacks on Barracks, Supply
Depots, Ammunition Depots, and Military Complexes
in North Vietnam, 1965 and January-September
1966 ., . . . . . . . . . . . A-34
A25. Statistical Summary of Attacks on Petroleum Storage
in North Vietnam, 1965 and January-September
1966 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A26. Statistical Summary of Attacks on Ports and Naval
Bases in North. Vietnam, 1965 and January-
September 1966 . . . . . . . _ ? . . , ? .
A27. Statistical Summary of Attacks on Radar Sites in
North Vietnam, 1965 and January-September 1966 A-37
A28. Statistical Summary of Attacks on Powerplants in
North Vietnam, 1965 and January-September 1966 A-38
Appendix B
B1 Petroleum Storage Facilities Attacked Under the
Rolling Thunder Program, 1965 and January-
September 1966 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-3
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B2 . Electric Powerplants Attacked Under the Rolling
Thunder Program, 1965 and January-September
1966.
B3 . Manufacturing Facilities Attacked Under the Rolling
Thunder Program, 1965 and January-September
B4 . Railroad Yards Attacked Under the Rolling Thunder
Program, 1965 and January-September 1966 B-12
B5 , Maritime Ports Attacked Under the Rolling Thunder
Program, 1965 and January-September 1966 . . . , B-14
B6 . Barracks Attacked Under the Rolling Thunder Pro-
gram, January-September 1966 . , . . . , , . . B-19
B7 . Airfields Attacked Under the Rolling Thunder Pro-
gram, 1965 and January-September 1966 . . . . . B-21
B8 . Naval Bases Attacked Under the Rolling Thunder
Program, 1965 and January-September 1966 m . r B-24
B9 Inventory of Miscellaneous Damage by Armed
Reconnaissance Sorties, :L965 and January-
September 1966 . . . . . , ,
?. - . B-32
Appendix D
D1 Economic Credits and Grants Extended by Communist
Countries to North Vietnam, 1955-64 . . . . . . . D-2
D2 Credits and Grants Extended by the Communist
Countries to North Vietnam, January 1965 -
October 1966 . . , . .. . . . . .
D3 . North Vietnam's Trade with Communist Countries,
1962-65 . . . . ,
D4 , Commodity Composition of North. Vietnam's Trade
with the USSR, 1962-65
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D5 . Soviet and Chinese Communist Deliveries of Military
Equipment to North. Vietnam, 1953 - October 1966 D-11
D6 . Soviet Military Aid to North Vietnam, 1953 -
October 1966 . . . D-13
D7 . Chinese Communist Military Aid to North. Vietnam,
1953 - October 1966 . . . . . . . . . . . . D-14
Appendix E
El North Vietnam: Air Strikes Against JCS-Targeted
Bridges, 1965 and January-September 1966 E-2
E2 North Vietnam: Estimated Total Length of Time
Railroad Lines Were Interdicted for Through Rail
Service, 1965 and January-September 1966 E-2
E3 Comparison of Railroad Bridges Destroyed or
Damaged,by Railroad Line, 1965 and January-
September 1966 . . . . . . . . . E-3
E4 Reported Losses of Transport Equipment as a Result
of Bombing in North Vietnam, 1965 and January-
September 1966 . . . . . ? . . . . . . . . . . E-5
E5 Incidents of Destruction and Damage to Targets in
Laos Reported by Pilots, January-September 1966 . E-9
E6 Estimated Restoration Cost, by Month, of Targets
Reported Destroyed or Damaged by Pilots in Laos,
January-September 1966 . . . . . , . . E-10
>E7 Construction and Improvement on Road and Railroads E_ 13
in North Vietnam, 1965 - 30 September 1966 . .
E8 . Total Bridges Damaged or Destroyed and Types of
Countermeasures Used on Transportation Routes
in North Vietnam, 1965 - 30 September 1966 E-14
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E9 . JGS-Targeted Bridges on the Hanoi - Dong Dang
Railroad Line, June 1966 . . . . . . . . . . . . E-21
Appendix F
Fl . North Vietnam: Identified Seaborne Foreign Trade,
1964, 1965, and January-September 1966 . . . . . F-3
Appendix G
G1 . Photographic Analysis of Major Manufacturing Plants
In North Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-2
G2 Reported Machinery Produced in North Vietnam,
1957 -66 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-6
G3 . North. Vietnam: Imports of Machinery from the
USSR, 1959-65 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
G4 . Major North Vietnamese Imports of Machinery from
the USSR, by Type, 1964-65 . . . . . . . . . . . G-10
G5 . Analysis o Information on North Viet-
namese Imports of Machinery, by Type, 1964-66 G-12
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North Vietnam: Road and Railroad Developments,
1 Jan 65 - 30 Sep 66 (frontispiece)
Figure 1. North Vietnam: Major JCS Targets in
1965 and 1966 (map) . . . . . .
Appendix A
Figure Al . Index of Sorties Flown in Southeast
Asia and Relative Amounts in Each
Area, 1965 and January-September
1966 (chart) . . . . . . . . . . .
A-2
Figure A2 . Index of Ordnance Delivered in South-
east Asia and Relative Amounts in
Each Area, 1965 and January-
September 1966 (chart) . . . . .
Figure A3 . Estimated Direct Operational Cost
of US/ GVN Operations in Southeast
Asia, January-September 1966
(chart) . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A-4
Figure A4 . Statistical Summary of Ordnance
Delivered and Sorties Flown in
North. Vietnam, 1965 and
January-September 1966 (chart) . .
A-6
Figure A5 . Statistical Summary of Aircraft Lost
and Personnel Lost and Recovered
in North Vietnam, 1965 and
January-September 1966 (chart)
Figure A6 . Monthly Summary of Sorties Flown in
North Vietnam, by Service and by
Program, 1965 and January-
September 1966 (chart) . . . . . .
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Figure A7 North Vietnam: Average
of US Sorties, by Route
January-September 196
Distribut
Package,
6 (map) ,
io
,
n
.
A-6
Figure A8 Monthly Summary of Ord
nance De-
livered. on North Vietna
m, by
Service and by Program
1965 - September 1966 (
, March
chart) ,
,
r
A-8
Figure A9 Estimated Direct Operational Cost of
US/GVN Air Operations in North
Vietnam and Cost of Economic and
Military Damage to North Vietnam,
1965 and January-September 1966
(chart).. . . . . , . . A-8
Figure A10, Estimated Direct Operational Cost of
US/ GVN Air Operations in North
Vietnam and Cost of Economic and
Military Damage to North Vietnam,
by Month, 1965 and. January-
September 1966 (chart)
Appendix B
Figure B1 . Value of Economic and Military
Damage in North Vietnam, 1965
and January-September 1966
(chart) . , . n . , .
Figure BZ Value of Economic Damage in North
Vietnam, by Sector, 1965 and
January-September 1966 (chart) B-2
Figure B3 Value of Military Damage in North
Vietnam, by Type, 1965 and
January-September 1966 (chart) B-2
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Figure B4 . Value of Economic and Military
Damage in North Vietnam, by
Month, 1965 and January-
September 1966 (chart) . . . . . . B-2
Appendix E
Figure El , North Vietnam: Cost of Permanent
and Temporary Repairs of Bridges
and Actual Expenditures, by Month,
September 1965 September 1966
(chart) . . . . . . . . . .
Figure E2 . North Vietnam: Man-Days Required
for Total Bridge Repairs and Man-
Days Actually Expended, by Month,
January-September 1966 (chart) . , E-14
Appendix F.
Figure Fl . North Vietnam and South China:
Capacity of Selected Transporta-
tion Lines, August 1966 (map)
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There is no evidence that the manufacturing section of North,
Vietnam has converted to the direct production of military hardware.
The manufacturing industries in North Vietnam most capable of provid-
ing significant assistance to the military effort are the machine building
industry and, to a lesser extent, the chemical industry. The chemical
industry manufactures small quantities of tires, pharmaceuticals, and
some chemicals used in the production of munitions. A new nitrogen
fertilizer plant is already or soon will be in operation. The explosives
industry, however, provides only a fraction of the country's current military
needs. The machine building industry makes an important contribution to
maintenance of the transportation system. The production of spares and
the general maintenance of locomotives and construction equipment is the
present priority task of North Vietnam's machine building industry.
Imports of machinery and equipment have played an especially
important role in the support of the transportation system of North.. Viet-
nam and in the improvement of the military communications capability.
Along with transportation equipment, the Communist countries have in-
creased deliveries of spare parts, machinery for the repair and main-
tenance of transport equipment, and construction equipment for the re-
construction and repair of lines of communication. Such imports have
supplemented an already existing capability in the North Vietnamese
machine building industry for the production of spare parts and simple
machinery, The sharp increase in the import of telecommunications
equipment almost certainly reflects an effort to upgrade military com-
munications.
The increased program of aid associated with the military
effort, however, has not been at the expense of economic aid in general.
The number of Communist aid projects has actually increased signifi-
cantly, and, although, some of these projects such as machine building
shops clearly have a potential military role, others -- mining, glass,
and food products -- are just as clearly non-military in nature.
Neutralization of selected machine building plants in North
Vietnam -- the Hanoi Engineering Plant, for example -- would delay
recovery from the damage inflicted by the Rolling Thunder program.
Destruction of North Vietnam's few major manufacturing facilities
outside of the machine building sector and the Haiphong cement plant
would be of little value, other than from the standpoint of reducing
enemy morale, in the reduction of the North Vietnamese military capa-
bility. Even the destruction of the large machine building plants would
not be crucial inasmuch as much of the repair capacity is already dis-
persed. Furthermore, the apparent scope of recent aid agreements
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suggests that the Communist countries will continue to provide North
Vietnam both with replacements for essential damaged equipment
and with equipment enabling North Vietnam to continue its own repair
and maintenance.
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AIR OPERATIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
1 JANUARY 1965 30 SEPTEMBER 1966
I. All Areas of Operation in Southeast Asia
During the first nine months of 1966, US/GVN forces flew nearly
315, 000 sorties and delivered about 350, 000 tons of ordnance on all
areas of operation in Southeast Asia. US aircraft flew 92 percent of the
sorties and carried 93 percent of the ordnance. About 70 percent of
the sorties were attack sorties and 30 percent were support sorties,
approximately the same proportion that prevailed during 1965. The
ratio of attack sorties to support sorties did not, however, remain
constant for the various individual areas of attack. In North Vietnam,
attack sorties rose from 47 percent of total sorties in 1965 to 56 per-
cent in 1966, whereas in South Vietnam attack sorties represented
a smaller percentage of total sorties in 1966 than in 1965. The per-
centages of attack and support sorties in each area are shown in the
following tabulation:
North Vietnam
South Vietnam
Laos
All Areas
of Operation
in Southeast Asia
Year
Attack
Sorties
Support
Sorties
Attack
Sorties
Support
Sorties
Attack
Sorties
Support
Sorties
Attack
Sorties
Support
Sorties
1965
47
53
85 a/
15 /
68
32
70 a/
30 a/
1966
56
44
77 J
23 J
67
33
70
30
1966
8o J
20 b/
a. US sorties only. Distribution of sorties by South Vietnamese Air Force in 1965
is not available.
b. All US/GVN sorties.
For a summary of sorties and ordnance delivered on all areas of
operation in Southeast Asia, by delivering service, see Table Al.
x Including strike and flak suppression sorties, and sorties inclose
air support of ground operations, plus the major carriers of ordnance.
A monthly distribution of sorties over all areas of operation in
Southeast Asia, by mission and nationality, during 1965 and the first
nine months of 1966 is presented in Table A2.
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The following tabulation shows that nearly half of the sorties, and some-
what over half of the ordnance delivered, was on South Vietnam with the
larger share of the remaining half of the effort being directed against
North Vietnarn
January-Septemer 1966
Area of Operation
Number
Percent
Tons
Percent
Laos
57,060
18
59,750
17
North Vietnam
105,970
34
91,770
27
Laos and North Vietnam combined.
163,030
52
151,520
44
South Vietnam
151,640
48
195,700
.56
Total Southeast Asia
314,670
100
347,220
100
Since mid-1965 the increase in sorties flown over South Vietnam has
been approximately parallel to the increase in sorties flown over North
Vietnam and Laos combined, and since the beginning of 1966 the in-
crease in sorties flown over North Vietnam* has been roughly propor-
tional to the decrease in sorties flown over Laos (see Figure Al).
The amount of ordnance delivered monthly by air on Southeast
Asia remained fairly constant during 1966. It was a little over
38, 000 tons in January, increased to over 44, 000 tons by August, and
was a little over 39, 000 tons in September. Similarly, the amount of
ordnance delivered monthly on South Vietnam also remained fairly con-
stant, fluctuating within the range of 18, 000 to 26, 000 tons. The
amount of ordnance delivered monthly on North Vietnam, however, in-
creased substantially, while the ordnance delivered on Laos declined
sharply. (see Table A5 and Figure A2). The amount of ordnance
delivered on North Vietnam in September 1966 was nearly four times
* For a presentation of sorties flown monthly over South Vietnam and
Laos in 1965 and the first nine months of 1966, see Tables A3 and A4.
The comparable data pertaining to North Vietnam are presented in
Table A9.
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SORTIES FLOWN
z
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J J A S 0 N D J F M A M J J A S
1Y05 10AA
Figure A-1? Index of Sorties Flown in Southeast Asia and Relative Amounts
in Each Area, 1965 and January-September 1966
January rYOO total tor Laos, North Vietnam, and South Vietnam
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 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000300070001-9
ORDNANCE DELIVERED
SECRET
Apr. May June July Aug. Sept.
1966
*January 1966 total for Laos, North Vietnam, and South Vietnam.
Figure A-2. Index of Ordnance Delivered in Southeast Asia and
Relative Amounts in Each Area, January- September 1966
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 Approved For Rel,26/jU,rQ
70001-9 25X1
ETI
the amount delivered in February, the first complete month of bombing
during the year, and was more than three times the amount delivered in
September a year ago, the peak month of 1965. The amount delivered
on Laos in September 1966, on the other hand, was less than 9 percent
of the amount delivered in January.
The US air effort in Southeast Asia was carried out by aircraft
stationed in South Vietnam and Thailand as well as by aircraft from US
Navy carriers in the Gulf of Tonkin and in the South China Sea. The
US Air Order of Battle in the area as of 26 October 1966 was as follows:
Aircraft
Launch Base
Air Bases
USAF US
E
USMC
USA a/
al
Total
South Vietnam
30
723
9
438
1,985
3,155
Thailand,
7
422
0
0
0
422
Naval carriers
2 to 3
0 151
41
0
192
Total aircraft
1,1+5 160
6
1
985
3
769
,
,
a. US Army aircraft, mostly helicopters and light observation air-
craft, have not been considered, in this report.
Approximately 55 percent of all US sorties flown in Southeast
Asia originated from bases in South Vietnam, 30 percent from aircraft
carriers, and 15 percent from bases in Thailand. During the first
nine months of 1966, about 70 percent of all US sorties flown from
South Vietnam struck targets in South Vietnam, 20 percent were flown
over Laos, and 10 percent over North Vietnam. Approximately
65 percent of the sorties from Thailand were flown over North Viet-
nam and 35 percent over Laos. To avoid violation of Cambodian air
space, no sorties were flown from Thailand over South Vietnam.
About 55 percent of the sorties from the Navy aircraft carriers during
the first nine months of 1966 were flown over North Vietnam.,25 per-
cent over South Vietnam, and 20 percent over Laos.
=C The distribution of sorties from each of these launch bases to the
three target areas in Southeast Asia is shown in Table A6.
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 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-R 0 00070001-9
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More than 405 planes were lost in the air war over Southeast Asia
during the first nine months of 1966. Of the 405 aircraft, 330, or
approximately 81 percent, were reported as combat losses, due to
hostile action, and 75, or about 19 percent, were reported as opera-
tional losses. Sixty-two percent of total losses were in operations
against targets in North Vietnam, 24 percent against targets in South
Vietnam, and 14 percent: against targets in Laos. The number of planes
lost per month, and more significantly, per 1, 000 sorties, remained
relatively constant for all areas of operation in Southeast Asia. >x~, The
average number of combat losses per 1, 000 attack sorties during the
first nine months of 1966 was 1. 5 for all of Southeast Asia, compared
with 3. 7 for North Vietnam, 0. 5 for South Vietnam, and 1. 3 for Laos.
The direct operational cost of the air operations in Southeast Asia
during the first nine months of 1966 is estimated to be more than
$2 billion -- approximately $950 million in operations over North Viet-
nam, $820 million over South Vietnam, and $310 million over Laos.
These costs include only the production cost of aircraft lost, sortie
overhead expenses, which vary directly according to the number of
hours flown, and the cost of ordnance expended. They make no allow-
ance for such indirect overhead as the cost of maintaining air bases
or keeping aircraft carriers on line, or logistic support. *** The
value of damage done to the economy of North Vietnam by air opera-
tions during 1966 has been estimated at about $100 million. The
restoration cost of targets reported as destroyed or damaged by
pilots over Laos is estimated to be about $11 million. It is impossible
to estimate the economic cost to the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong
of 4 irstrikes within South Vietnam. The cost of inflicting a dollar's
worth of damage in North Vietnam was about $9. 50, up about 42 per-
cent from an estimated cost of approximately $6. 70 in 1965. The cost
of incting a dollar's worth of damage by sorties carried out over
Laos in 1966 has been about $28.80. The disparity between the unit
cost to the United States of doing damage in North Vietnam compared
with damage in Laos reflects the more capital intensive nature of
targets in North Vietnam. The figure for both areas, however,
_,= This figure does not include losses by the US Army.
=plc Monthly aircraft losses in Southeast Asia are presented by area
of operation, nationality, and type of loss in Table A7.
The estimated direct operational costs of air operations in South-
east Asia are summarized in Table A8 and Figure A3.
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 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000300070001-9
COST OF AIR OPERATIONS
LAOS NORTH SOUTH
VIETNAM VIETNAM
Figure A-3 , Estimated Direct Operational Cost of US/GVN Operations in
Southeast Asia, January-September 1966
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 Approved For RelTtj.P6/1$ Fgp777T02095R000300g70001-9 25X1
makes it evident that the relative cost and value of the air war in South-
east Asia must be measured in military, political, and psychological
terms, rather than economic.
During the first nine months of 1966, a total of 105, 970 sorties
was flown against North Vietnam, nearly twice the total of 55, 210 flown
during 1965. * In 1966, as in 1965, US aircraft flew 99 percent of the
sorties, and aircraft of the South Vietnamese Air Force flew the re-
maining 1 percent. The share of attack sorties in the total increased
from 47 percent in 1965 to 56 percent in 1966, while the share of sup-
port sorties declined from 53 percent to 44 percent. Thus the number
of ordnance-carrying sorties increased, relative to the total.*" Sorties
flown over North Vietnam in 1966 represented 34 percent of total sorties
flown in Southeast Asia, compared with 30 percent in 1965. Sorties
flown against fixed targets from the JCS target list, which in 1965 ac-
counted for 25 percent of total sorties, represented only about 2 percent
of total sorties in 1966. Armed reconnaissance sorties not carried out
as restrikes of JCS fixed targets increased from 75 percent of total
sorties in 1965 to 98 percent in 1966. The US Air Force, which flew
44 percent of all sorties against North Vietnam in 1965, increased its
share to 52 percent in 1966, while the share of the US Navy declined
from 53 percent to 44 percent. The US Marine Corps increased its
share from 2 percent in 1965 to 3 percent in 1966, and the share of the
South Vietnamese Air Force remained constant at 1 percent.
46
30
By USMC
3
21
10
By VNAF
L
16
Total
20
83
1+0
From Thailand
By USAF
36
0
30
From naval carriers
By USN
30
Total
100
100
100
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 Approved For 0Q.E/ 1i 0 P
Distribution of Sorties over North Vietnam,
by Route Package J
January-September 1966
th
Mo
I
II
III
IV
V
VI
Unknown
Total
n
January
17
18
30
4
3
28
100
February
31
24
15
3
5
22
100
March
34
31
13
5
11
6
100
April
37
29
17
3
6
3
5
100
May
30
19
26
10
6
4
5
100
June
49
19
14
8
1
4
5
100
July
47
18
12
5
4
8
6
100
August
35
16
11
9
1
12
16
100
September
39
16
12
17
5
8
3
100
Nine-month
average 39 19 15 9 4 7 7 100
a. North Vietnam is divided.,for operations, into six geographic
areas, known as Route Packages. For the location of Route Package
areas, see Figure A7.
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 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP78T02095R000300070001-9
Table A13
Ordnance Delivered by Air on North Vietnam, by Month and by Program
March-December 1965 and January-September 1966
On JCS Fixed Targets On Armed Reconnaissance Total
By Armed
Year Total on JCS By Fixed Reconnaissance Armed Reconnaissance
and Month Fixed Targets Target Strikes Strike Not on Fixed Targets
Col. 2 & 3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1965
March
April
May
June
July
August
N September
October
November
1,130 1,130
1,830 1,620
1,420 1,420
1,9oo 1,900
1 Lon 1 ),10
1,470 1,280
1,790 1,780
700 590
620 480
450 350
Total i2,8oo 11, 960
Total
on Armed Reconnaissance Total
Col. 3 & 4 (Col. 1 & 4)
0 0 0 1,130
210 430 640 2,260
0 380 380 1,800
0 1,430 1,430 3,330
80 1,980 2,060 3,470
190 3,200 3,390 4,670
10 3,730 3,740 5,520
110 110 4,390 4,500 5,090
3,900 4,040 4,520
100 2,060 2,160 2,510
840 21,500
January 0 0 0
February 270 0 270
March 220 0 220
April 460 80 380
May 220 0 220
June 280 190 9o
July 440 60_ 380
August 460 40 420
September 260 0 260
Total 2,610 370 2,240
270
4,510
7,520
8,580
7,330
10, 680
15,900
16,870
17,500
89,160
22,340
34,300
270 270
4,780 4,780
7,740 7,740
8,960 9,040
7,550 7,550
10,770 10,96o
16,280 16,340
17,290 17,330
17,760 17,760
91,400
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 Approved For IrtYPIONEICk r
Table A14
Ordnance Delivered on North Vietnam,
by Month and. by Service
March 1965-September 1966
Year and. Month
USAF
USN USA'tC
VNAF
Total
March
540
280
310
1,130
April
1,280
800
180
2,260
May
1,100
540
160
1,800
June
1,990
1,150
190
3,330
July
1,780
1,590
100
3,470
August
2,780
1,830
60
4,670
September
3,790
1,700
30
5,520
October
3,520
1,56o
10
5,090
November
2,810
1,690
20
4,520
December
1,680
810
20
2,510
Total
21,270
11,950
1,o8 0
34,3o 0
1966
January
60
210
0
0
270
February
3,220
1,550
10
0
4,780
March
5,090
2,610
30
10
7,740
April
4,860
3,960
Negl.
220
9,040
May
2,710
4,760
0
80
7,550
June
7,190
3,450
0
320
10,960
July
10,710
4,860
530
240
16,340
August
10,160
6,090
1,070
10
17,330
September
10,170
6,400
1,190
Negl.
17,760
Total
54,170
33,890
2,830
880
91,770
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25X1
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 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP 00070001-9
TOP SECRET
Aircraft and. Personnel Losses in Attacks on
North Vietnam, by Service
1965 and January-September 1966
Service
Aircraft
Lost
Recovered
196 5
USAF
77
62
USN
86
76
USMC
0
0
Total
171
144
62
1966
USAF
142
132
70
USN
1o4
68
60
USMC
3
8
1.
VNAF
0
0
C>
249 J 208 1._
a. Including 222 combat and 27 operational losses.
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 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP78T02095R000300070001-9
Losses by Model of Aircraft in Operations Against North Vietnam
1965 and January-September 1966
1965 January-September 1966
Losses as a Percent Losses as a Percent
Aircraft Number Total Sorties Flown of Total Sorties Flown Number Total Sorties Flown of Total Sorties Flown
Model of Aircraft Lost by this Model Aircraft by this Model Aircraft of Aircraft Lost by this Model Aircraft by this Model Aircraft
F105
F4
Al
F8
F8
A6
RF101
EA1
RF8
EAl
F104
PA3
KA4
HA5
A3
'y
B57
0130
F100
HU16
RB66
Rc47
EF10
KC130
SH3A
54 9,217
19 6,203
26 3,546
29 8,951
15 3,600
3 506
6 299
6 364
1 726
0 696
0 26
0 701
3 141
0 log
1 149
0 51
5 418
0 0
0 288
0 0
0 455
0 4
3 6
171 36,456 J
a. Including only sorties by aircraft models for which losses occurred in either 1965 or 1966.
b. Including 222 combat losses and 27 operational losses.
49,635 J
0.6 86 12,537 0.7
0.3 33 8,437 0.4
0.7 24 4,845 0.5
0.3 47 12,175 0.4
0.4 15 4,897 0.3
0.6 8 687 1.2
2.0 11 406 2.7
1.6 6 495 1.2
0.1 2 987 0.2
0 3 946 0.3
0 1 36 2.8
0 1 953 0.1
2.1 2 191 1.0
0 1 147 0.7
0.7 1 203 0.5
0 1 69 1.4
1.2 1 610 0.2
0 1 N.A.
0 2 391 0.5
0 1 N.A.
0 1 618 0.2
0 1 5 20.0
50.0 0 0 0
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 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP 00070001-9
TOP SECRET
Direct Operational Costs Related to Costs of Damage
to the Economy of North Vietnam
January 1965-September 1966
US GVN Operational Costs
Year and Month
Aircraft
Losses
Sortie
Overhead
Ordnance
Total
Cost to
North Vietnam
1965
January
0
0
0
0
0
February
0
0.4
N.A.
0.4
0
March
18.8
1.4
1.7
21.9
1.7
April
23,.3
5.1
3.6
32.0
3.6
May
14 ,. 6
7.6
3.9
26.1
4.4
June
18..8
6.9
5.7
31.4
9.7
July
45..0
11.0
5.1
61.1
11.6
August
34..5
13.0
8.6
56.1
1.0.9
September
39,0
14.8
10.6
64.4
6.7
October
39.4
14.4
5.8
59.6
7.1
November
27.2
13.1
7.4
47.7
7.0
December
145..2
10.3
3.8
59.3
6.4
hotal
305.8
98.0
56.2
460.0
69.1
1966
January
4.8
9.2
1.6
15.6
3.1
February
23?2
16.4
10.9
50.5
6.1
March
37.6
22.7
19.8
80.1
5.7
April
67,2
23.9
25.3
116.4
10.4
May
48.,1
16.5
18.3
82.9
8.5
June
49.4
29.0
30.4
108.8
14.9
July
81?7
35.3
41.7
158.7
20.8
August
99.,0
37.7
38.4
175.1
1.7.0
September
75.8
43.2
44'.7
163.7
13.3
Total
486?8
233.9
231.1
951.8
99.8
Tt.F' SECRET
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Approved For 00070001-9
 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000300070001-9
Table A18
Attack on JCS Fixed Targets in North Vietnam
1965 and January-September 1966
Ordnance
Total Delivered
Year and Program Strike and Flak Suppression Support Number Percent Tons Percent
1965
Fixed target
Armed reconnaissance
Total
January-September 1966
Fixed target
Armed reconnaissance
Total
6,930 4,130 11,060 80 11,960 93
1,78o 1,050 2,830 20 84o 7
8,710 5,180 13,890 100 12,800 100
210 150 360 18 370 14
1,310 340 1,650 82 2,240 86
1,520 490 2,010 100 2,610 100
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 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000300070001-9
Table A19
Comparison of Strikes on Mayor JCS Fixed Target
Systems in North Vietnam
1965 and January-September 1966
Number of Targets Struck
Number Targeted
JCS Fixed Target System As of Restruck New Strike
30 September 1966 Struck 1965 Januar -Se tember 1966 January-September 1966
Airfields (11) 11 4
1
Bridges
26
Railroad yards and shops 61 5 47 J
6
Locks 8 1 1 1
Lines of communication (74)
1 0 1
depots military complexes 91 70 25
Petroleum storage J 1 13 4 Ports and naval bases 15 4 3 7
Communication facilities 5 2 3 2
Radar sites 0 0 5 SAM support facilities 1 1 1 - 3 1
SAM sites / 0 1 0 0
2 0 ,
Military installations (130)
Barracks/supply depots ammunition
Industrial installations (27)
Electric power facilities 19
Manufacturing and explosives plants 8
3 2
0
Total 242 153 e/ 65
22 J
x
arg List.
d. Includes 2 SAM sites struck in 1965 and 1 in
- et 1966 tht have
e. Includes 15 targets dropped from the JCS Fixed Target List.
f. Includes 1 target dropped from the JCS Fixed Target List.
a. Includes 2 bridges dropped from JCS Fixed Target List.
b. Includes 4 barracks and 1 barracks/supply area dropped from JCS Fixed Target List.
c. Includes 6 radar sites dropped from JCS Fi
d T
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 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP78T02095R000300070001-9
Comparison of Sorties and Ordnance
on Major JCS Fixed Target Systems in North Vietnam
1965 and January-September 1966
Barracks/supply depots/ammunition depots
Attack sorties
Ordnance (tons)
Attack sorties
Ordnance (tons)
Powerplants
Attack sorties
Ordnance (tons)
Manufacturing and explosives plants
1965 January-September 1966 Total
4,290 260 4,550
7,300 390 7,690
130 340 470
120 500 620
230 4o 270
370 140 510
Attack sorties 20 N.A. 20
Ordnance (tons) 90 N.A. 90
Attack sorties 420 40 460
Ordnance (tons) 330 100 430
Bridges
Attack sorties 2,420 610 3,030
Ordnance (tons) 3,200 1,120 4,320
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 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP78T02095R000300070001-9
Comparison of Sorties and Ordnance
on Major JCS Fixed Target Systems in North Vietnam
1966 and January-September 1966
(Continued)
JCS Fixed Target System
1965
January-September 1966
Total
Attack Sorties
620
30
650
Ordnance (tons)
680
30
710
Naval bases, railroad yards, and ports
Attack sorties
4o0
200
600
Ordnance (tons)
46o
330
790
8,530 J
1,520
10,050
12,550 J
2,610
15,160
a. Excluding 180 attack sorties and 250 tons of ordnance on railroad shops, locks, fer-
ries, communications facilities, and surface-to-air missile support facilities.
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 Approved For TI?s OQ /, 6$kE. 78TO2095ROOP300070001-9 25X1
Statistical Summary of Attacks on Airfields
in North Vietnam
1965 and January-September 1966
1965 1966 Total
Number of JCS fixed targets
JCS fixed targets struck
4
1
Percent of national capacity destroyed
19
19
Sorties
Attack
420
40
460
Support
130
10
140
tal
T
550
~0
600
o
Ordnance delivered. (tons)
330
1
00
430
Cost to the United States
(million $)
Aircraft lost
0
0
0
Operational cost of sorties flown
0.48 0
.11
0.59
Ordnance delivered
0.40 0
.1
3
0.53
Total
0.88 0
.2
4
1.12
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 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP7aTnqnqSRn 0070001-9
TOP SECRET
Statistical Summary of Attacks on Bridges
in North Vietnam
1965 and January-September. 1966
965
1966
Total
Number of JCS fixed targets
61
61
JCS fixed targets struck
47
32
Percent of national capacity destroyed
49
51
Sorties
Attack
2,420
610
3,030
Support
1,710
250
1,960
Total
4,1w
860
4,99o
Ordnance delivered (tons)
3,200
1,120
4,320
Aircraft lost
37
5
42
Personnel lost
35
3
38
Personnel recovered.
9
1
10
Unknown
Cost to the United States
(million $)
82.2
11.4
93.6
Operational cost
of sorties flown
0.2
1.4
1.6
1+.1
1.3
5.4
TOP SECRET
866 14.1 100.6
Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000300070001-9
 Approved For l' 05relat
Statistical Summary of Attacks on Railroad
Yards and Shops in North Vietnam
1965 and January-September 1966
1
965 19
66 Total
Number of JCS fixed targets
5 5
JCS fixed. targets struck
1 2
Percent of national capacity destroyed.
5.2 10
.3
Sorties
Attack
80 100
180
Support
40 Nc
g 1
40
Total
120 100
220
Ordnance delivered (tons)
70 140
210
Aircraft lost
2 1
Personnel lost
1 1
Personnel recovered.
1 0
Cost to US (million dollars)
Aircraft lost
2.40 3
.0
0
5.40
Operational cost of sorties flown
0.13 0
.1
6
0.29
Ordnance delivered,
0.04 0
.1
7
0.21
Total
2.57 3
.3
3
5.90
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 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-R 9 00070001-9
TOP SECRET
Table A24
Statistical Summary of Attacks on Barracks, Supply
Depots, Ammunition Depots, and Military Complexes
in North Vietnam
1965 and. January-September 1966
1965
1966
Total
JCS fixed targets struck
70
26
Percent of national capacity destroyed
Sorties
N.A.
N.A.
Attack
41290
260
4, 550
Support
1,730
20
1,750
Total
6,020
280
6,300
Ordnance delivered (tons)
7,300
390
7,690
Aircraft lost
15
1
16
Personnel lost
8
status unknown
Personnel recovered
7
status unknown
(million $)
Aircraft lost
Operational cost
23.1 3.9 27.0
of sorties flown 11.2 0.5 11.7
9.1. 0.5 9.6
)4 ?1E 4.9 ?8 .l
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25X1
 Approved For "PsPIOQfRM&-,Fi9 9 00070001-9 25X1
Statistical Summary of Attacks on Petroleum Storage
in North Vietnam
1965 and. January-September 1966
1965 1966 Total
Number of JCS fixed targets
JCS fixed. targets struck 4
10
Percent of national capacity destroyed 17
60
Sorties
Attack 1
3
0
340
470
Support 1
20
180
300
Total 2
50
520
770
Ordnance delivered (tons) 1
20
500
620
Aircraft lost
1
5
6
Personnel lost
0
2
2
Personnel recovered
1
1
1
Unknown
0
2
2
Cost to the United States
(million $)
Aircraft lost
1
.3
8.20
9.50
Operational cost of sorties flown
0
.3
0.85
1.15
Ordnance delivered
0
.2
0.99
1.19
Total
1
.8
10.04
11.84
A-35
TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRE
Statistical Summary of Attacks on Ports and.
Naval Bases in North Vietnam
1965 and January-September 1966
1266
Total
_
12
15
JCS fixed. targets struck
4
5
Percent of national capacity destroyed
Sorties(-,:
N.A.
N.A.
Attack
320
100
420
Support
110
20
130
Total
430
120
550
Ordnance Delivered (tons)
390
190
580
Aircraft lost
Personnel lost
Personnel recovered
Cost to US (million dollars)
Aircraft lost
5.30
0.00
5.30
Operational. cost of sorties flown
0.60
0.14
0.74
Ordnance delivered.
0..40
0.23
0.63
Total
6.30
0.37
6.67
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 Approved Fo~rrRee 2
~j~li:~ l AJ? 95 00070001-9
ll l 25X1
Statistical Summary of Attacks on Radar Sites
in North Vietnam
1965 and January-September 1966
19
65
~
966
Total
_
_
Number of JCS fixed targets
5
5
JCS fixed targets struck
10
4
Percent of national capacity destroyed
58
Sorties
6
20
30
650
Attack
Support
3
50
Negl.
350
970
30
1,000
Total
Ordnance delivered (tons)
680
30
710
11
0
Aircraft lost
3
0
Personnel lost
Personnel recovered
Cost to the United States
(million $)
Aircraft lost
Operational cost
of sorties flown
Ordnance delivered
TOP SECRET
N.A. 0
N.A. ,.uti
o.o6
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 Approved For Re~6~06/QJL2i,;~CnIA~~ 0070001-9
Table A28
Statistical Summary of Attacks on Powerplants
in North Vietnam
1965 and January-September 1966
1965
1966
Total
Number of JCS fixed targets
JCS fixed targets struck
18
19
Percent of national capacity destroyed
Sorties
Attack
27
32
Support
2
0
40
?70
Total
26
0
0
?60
49
0
40
530
Ordnance delivered (tons)
Aircraft lost
37
0
140
510
Personnel lost
4
0
4
Personnel recovered
Cost to the United States
(million $)
Aircraft lost
Operational cost
of sorties flown
Ordnance delivered
TOP SEd URET-
4.4 0 4.4
0.9 0.075 0.975
0.7 0.@7O 0.770
6`o 0.145 6.145
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 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP78T02095R000300070001-9
TOP SECRET
APPENDIX B
THE EFFECTS OF THE ROLLING THUNDER PROGRAM
I. Physical Damage
The cost of reconstruction or repair of the economic and military
facilities in North Vietnam which have been attacked under the Rolling
Thunder program from January 1965 through September 1966 is esti-
mated at $170 million (see Figure B1). About 65 percent of the damage
was inflicted on economic targets and 35 percent on military targets.
The damage inflicted during the first three quarters of 1966 represents
$100 million of the total.
Damage to the economy accounts for more than 7.0 percent of the
total in 1966, whereas in 1965 economic loss represented only about
50 percent. Destruction and damage to transport equipment accounted
for slightly more than a third of the total economic damage in 1966
(see Figure B2). An equal amount was accounted for by indirect losses
caused by shortfalls in agriculture, fishing, and exports. Bridges,
powerplants, and petroleum storage sites were the principal categories
of targets responsible for the remainder.
More than 80 percent of all military damage in 1966 resulted from
attacks on aircraft, naval craft, and SAM sites, but in 1965 the damage
from such attacks amounted to less than 20 percent of the total. Damage
to barracks made up almost one-half of the total damage to military
targets in 1965 but only a small portion of the total during 1966 (see
Figure 133).
The greatest amount of damage inflicted in 1966 occurred in the
months of June through September, with the peak month being July
(see Figure B4). During these months the attacks on bulk petroleum
storage began, and major losses in naval craft, aircraft, and transport
equipment occurred. Damage to bridges also reached a peak in July.
Indirect losses were at their highest point in June. During 1965 the
monthly trend in physical damage was similar to that in 1966.
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TOP SECRET
A. Economic
1. Petroleum Storage
On 1 January 1965 there were 13 fixed (JCS) petroleum
storage targets with a combined storage capacity of almost 128, 000
tons.: During 1965, nine airstrikes were made against four of these
fixed targets -- three were completely destroyed and the facility at
Vinh, which was damaged during the limited retaliation following the
Gulf of Tonkin incidents in 1964, ** suffered further damage. About
26, 000 tons of capacity -- about 20 percent of the total capacity on
1 January 1965 -- was destroyed .n these attacks. The value of the
tankage and contents and the related support facilities destroyed is
estimated at $1. 6 million.
During the first nine months of 1966, 57 airstrikes were
mounted against eight of the fixed petroleum storage targets. About
73, 000 tons of capacity -- 56 percent of the total existing on 1 January
1965 (72 percent of the total on 1 January 1966) -- were destroyed.
The value of the tankage and contents and the :related support facili-
ties destroyed is estimated at between $4. 4 million and $5 million
(see Table BI).*-.',:*
The total residual capacity at the nine fixed petroleum
storage targets remaining on 30 September 1966 was about 29, 000 tons,
no single site having sufficient capacity to accept the cargo of a fully
loaded 10, 000--ton tanker. There was no indication that any of the
attacked sites was being restored or reconstructed as of 30 September
1966. Recent photography revealed that cannibalization of moderately
damaged tanks at Haiphong was under way.
In addition to the capacity of the JCS targeted facilities, the
North Vietnamese since 1 January 1965 have developed additional
capacity in dispersed tank sites. By 30 September 1966, more than
There was additional tankage of about 5, 400 tons which existed on
1 January 1965 but which was subsequently removed, but the present
whereabouts of this tankage is unknown. This tankage was not affected
by bombings, is not now carried as usable capacity, and therefore is
excluded from all calculations.
The capacity of the tankage destroyed at Vinh in 1964 -- about
4, 000 tons -- is not included in the total capacity shown for 1 January
1965.
The range in value is necessary to reflect the possible range in
the amount of petroleum in the tankage that was damaged (or destroyed).
B-?2
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VALUE OF DAMAGE
Military
7 Indirect
Economic<
Direct
SECRET
TOTAL
1965 and 1966
Figure B-1, Value of Economic and Military Damage in North
Vietnam, 1965 and January-September 1966
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 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000300070001-9
ECONOMIC DAMAGE
MILLIONS US DOLLARS
BRIDGES
10.5
1965
35.6
INDIRECT
LOSSES
(Agriculture & Exports)
9.4
POWER
PLANTS
1966
71.7
4.7
MANUFACTURING FACILITIES .7
MARITIME PORTS .6
POWER PLANTS
6.3
TRANSPORT
EQUIPMENT
5.9
,PETROLEUM 1.6
MARITIME PORTS .7
TRANSPORT
EQUIPMENT
24.5
MISC. ARMED RECCE 1.1/
Figure B-2. Value of Economic Damage in North Vietnam, by Sector,
1965 and January-September 1966
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MILITARY.DAMAGE
MILLIONS US DOLLARS
MISC. ARMED. RECCE .7
'RADAR and
AIRCRAFT COMMO SITES 1.7
3.4
NAVAL BASES 1.2
'SAM SITES .6
AIRFIELDS .4
SUPPLY
DEPOTS
3.0
AMMO DEPOTS .2
and AIRFIELDS NEGL.
Figure B-3. Value of Military Damage in North Vietnam, by Type,
1965 and January-September 1966
NAVAL
CRAFT
2.0
AMMO
DEPOTS 4.5
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VALUE OF DAMAGE
20
10
Z 25
0
20
1965
1966
Military
Economic
D
15
SECRET
Figure B-4. Value of Economic and Military Damage in North Vietnam,
by Month, 1965 and January-September 1966
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 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP78T02095R000300070001-9
Petroleum Storage Facilities Attacked Under the Rolling Thunder Program
1965 and January-September 1966
JCS
Target
Number
Name
Target
As a Percent of
JCS Targeted Capacity
Dates of Attack
Percent
of Facility
Destroyed
Percent
of JCS Targeted
Total Capacity
Cost
of Restoration
(Thousand US $)
Value
of Petroleum
Destroyed
(Thousand US $)
Negl.
6 Nay 65
6
24, 26 may 65
34
2
120
70
11, 15 Sep 65
34
2
120
70
6 Oct 65
17
1
60
30
50.12
Nam Dinh
9
2, 4 Jul 65
100
9
500
270
50.16
Phu Qui
6
18 May 65
100
6
340
0
Subtotal for 1965
20
1,180
460
48.00
Haiphong
32
29 Jan 66
46
14
84o
300 to 460
7 Jul 66
32
10
600
190 to 310
2 Aug 66
11
4
200
44 to 81
49.00
Hanoi
24
29 Jun 66
50.00
Vinh b/
30 Jul 66
7, 8 Aug 66
6 Sep 66
51.00
Nguyen Khe
6
30 Jun 66
10
Negl.
36
13 to 20
19 Jul 66
0
0
0
0
17, 18, 22 Aug 66
0
0
0
0
4 Sep 66
0
0
0
0
51.11
Par Giang
2
30 Jun 66
31
Negl.
31 Jul 66
11 Aug 66
14 Sep 66
51.13
Do Son
2
29 Jun 66
3 Jul 66
51.14
Viet Tri
1
30 Jun 66
0
0
0
0
19 Jul 66
3
Negl.
2
1 to 2
14 Aug 66
0
Negl.
0
0
5 Sep 66
0
Negl.
0
0
9
3,294
1,105 to 1,760
76 +
4,474
1,565 to 2,220
a. The facility at Vinh was attacked in August 1964, prior to the Rolling Thunder program.
b. See the estimate for 1965.
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 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP 0070001-9
TOP SECRET
I I-
100 such sites, with a total estimated capacity of between 25, 000 and
30, 000 tons, had been identified.
Additional storage capacity is represented by the ".55-
gallon" drums dispersed throughout the country. It is estimated that
by mid-1966 about 130, 000 drums, representing a capacity of 22, 000
tons, had arrived in North Vietnam. There have been 1, 200 strikes
against 400 dispersed petroleum storage sites, including either or both
small tanks and drums, between April and October 1966. These strikes
may have resulted in the loss of as much as 5, 000 tons of storage
capacity. The monetary value of these dispersed sites is small, how-
ever, and no attempt has been made to estimate the cost of their re-
placement.
2. Powerplants
Attacks on North Vietnam's facilities for producing electric
power started in April 1965, and a. total of eight powerplants have been
struck. Three of the six plants attacked in 1965 were restruck iri, .1966,
and two additional plants were attacked for the first time this year.
The total number of strikes against each installation has ranged from
10 against Thanh Hoa to one against Viet Tri. During 1966, air opera-
tions against electric powerplants in North Vietnam were fairly evenly
distributed throughout the country. Seven out of 13 strikes occurred
in the northern part of the country, whereas during 1965 17 out of 21
strikes against powerplants took place in the southern part of North
Vietnam. Total power-generating capacity in North Vietnam has been
reduced by 32 percent. The total cost of restoration is estimated at
$11. 9 million, of which $5. 6 million was accumulated during 1966
(see Table B2).
Some 12, 000 kilowatts (kw) of previously undamaged
operating generating capacity were destroyed during 1966. An addi-
tional 24, 000 kw of new generating, capacity, which were being installed
at the Uong Bi powerplant but which were not yet in operation, were
denied. Moreover, 24, 000 kw of capacity temporarily damaged at the
Uong Bi plant in 1965 and restored. to operation during 1966 were again
put out of operation, this time for at least a year. In terms of the loss
of output, the attacks on powerplants have been more effective in 1966
than in 1965. About 47, 000 kw of capacity were put out of operation in
1965, but only about 23, 000 kw remained out of operation at the end of
the year; in 1966 some 36, 000 kw of operating capacity and an addi-
tional 24, 000 kw of new capacity have already been denied to North
Vietnam.
SECRET
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 Approved For F [ uP OiJk&7&I Q
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0 'd
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 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RD P 0070001-9
TOP SECRET] T
Although US air strikes have put out of operation about
one-third of the generating capacity in North Vietnam's electric power
industry, the losses of power-generating capacity probably have had
only a minor effect on the economy and on the ability of North Vietnam
to conduct military operations. Remaining capacity has been adequate
to supply most industrial consumers and probably even to supply mini-
mal nonindustrial demands. There have been reports of occasional
power shortages in Hanoi and Haiphong involving nonindustrial con-
sumers, but no reports concerning restrictions on power supplied to
industry. The major part of modern industry in North Vietnam is
concentrated in and around these two cities. Shortages in the Hanoi-
Haiphong area probably have made it necessary to discontinue service
only to nonessential users during peak-load periods. The most severe
shortages of power to industry are estimated to have occurred at Nam
Dinh, Thanh Hoa, and Ben Thuy. Power supply to Nam Dinh probably
has fluctuated during the past year, depending on whether the Uong Bi
powerplant was in or out of service. Damage to powerplants in the
vicinity of Thanh Hoa and Ben Thuy has virtually eliminated the supply
in these areas for more than one year, but the effect on the national
economy must have been slight in view of the small contribution to
national product made by those localities.
The margin of reserve generating capacity available prior
to the beginning of airstrikes apparently has been eliminated. Industrial
demands probably could be generally fulfilled even if an additional 10
percent of generating capacity were lost. However, staggering work
shifts and eliminating nonessential consumption by residential-commercial
users, public lighting, and transportation probably would become neces-
sary. Any additional losses of generating capacity would almost cer-
tainly reduce the power supply for industry.
The most important powerplants still operating in the
Hanoi-Haiphong Power System are located at Thai Nguyen, Viet Tri,
Hon Gai, and Bac Giang. Destruction of these plants would deny over
one-half of remaining power-generating capacity. Hanoi would be
forced to rely on a local powerplant which, in view of its age and
generally poor condition, probably could supply no no re than 40 to
50 percent of demand, and even this level of supply probably could
not be sustained for long periods. Roughly the same deficit would
occur in Haiphong which also would have to rely on two small, old
powerplants that are in poor condition. Successful attack on the four
important powerplants remaining would greatly reduce the power sup-
ply for heavy industry. The effects on light industry and agriculture
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would be less severe. The attacks would have little or no immediate
effect on military capabilities, although they might have a minor
effect in the long run.
North Vietnam has made some slow progress in restor-
ing damaged power facilities. Repair work at Nam Dinh had progressed
to a stage in August that indicates possible partial operation of this
plant by the end of 1966. Restoration under way at the Thanh Hoa and
Ben Thuy plants was either set back or nullified by airstrikes during
September and October. There has been no attempt to repair the
damaged powerplants at Co Dinh or at Ban Thach since mid=1965.
The Uong Bi powerplant was put back into service after the strikes
of December 1965 and April 1966, and work toward restoration appar-
ently has been started again since the heavy destruction inflicted in
August 1966.
The persistence of efforts to restore damaged power
facilities underlines the importance of these plants to North Vietnam
and strongly suggests that no suitable alternative to central generating
plants has been found. Mobile generating units imported by the hun-
dreds during the past 18 months apparently have failed to offset the
loss of central generating facilities. From the sizes and total capacity
of mobile units imported thus far, however, significant reliance on
such units for industrial power supply is highly unlikely.
The history of the attack on powerplants during 1965 and
1966 indicates that they can be put out of operation for long periods
of time only if the main buildings sustain direct hits; near-misses
have produced a negligible effect. It is also clear that a number of
restrikes were carried out against plants that already were out of
operation. Finally, it seems probable that airstrikes against large
powerplants in the main power system, such as Thai Nguyen, Viet
Tri, Hon Gai, and Bac Giang -- had they been carried out -- would
have produced far greater effect than the strikes actually made on
the four small isolated powerplants in the area of Thanh Hoa and Ben
Thuy.
3. Manufacturing
Only four manufacturing facilities of any significance have
been attacked under the Rolling Thunder program, two in 1965 and two
in 1966 (see Table B3). Although restoration costs are estimated to
be comparatively small for damage to these plants in either year ($1. 2
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Table B3
Manufacturing Facilities Attacked
Under the Rolling Thunder Program
1965 and January-September 1966
JCS
Target
Number
Target
as a Percent of
Name National Capacity
47.2 Lang Chi Explosives
Plant
Cam Pha Coal Treat-
ment Plant
Viet Tri Paper Mill
Subtotal for 1966
Total
Percent Percent Cost
of Target Capacity of National Capacity of Restoration
Dates of Attack Destroyed Destroyed or Inactive (Thousand US $)
100 24 Jul 65
7, 8 Aug 65
Cotton spinning:
70 to 75
Cotton weaving: 28 Jul 65
50
5 Weaving inactive: 40 8oo
19, 24 Apr 66
80 Mid-Jul 66 100
6oo
675
1,845
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 Approved ForlJ6)52WV3$DG fl
million in 1965 and $700, 000 in 1966), losses in production from these
plants appear to be considerably more significant.
The two plants attacked in 1965 were the Lang Chi Ex-
plosives Plant (JCS No. 47. 2) and the Nam Dinh Textile Plant, which
is not targeted. Neither plant has been restored, and presumably
greater imports are compensating for the loss in production from
these plants. The Lang Chi plant is the only known explosives plant
in North Vietnam. The Nam Dinh Textile Plant, although only slightly
damaged unintentionally by a strike in late July 1965, is operating
with only a small percent of its capacity, if at all. As a result, about
60 percent of the national spinning capacity and 40 percent of the weav-
ing capacity have remained inactive for over a year. Inadequate or
fluctuating electric power supply may be the major reason for this
plant being inactive, rather than damage to the plant itself.
In 1966 the Cam Pha Coal Treatment Plant was attacked twice
in April (as part of the attacks on the Cam Pha Port complex, JCS No. 68. 0)
and the Viet Tri Paper Mill (not targeted) was attacked in July. Damage
at Cam Pha, although slight, resulted in a considerable reduction in
coal exports, amounting to about $3.7 million through September 1966.
It is estimated that the major machinery at the Viet Tri Paper Mill was
destroyed, and, if so, the plant will be inoperable for a long time.
Work has begun to repair the roof of the plant. This plant represents
80 percent of the national capacity for paper production.
4. Bridges
The total number of bridges confirmed by photography
to have been damaged and destroyed by the Rolling Thunder attack
in 1966 (January through September) was about equal to that obtained
in 1965. The estimated cost of complete restoration and temporary
repairs to the bridges also was about equal in the two years -- $10. 5
million in 1965 and $9. 7 million in 1966.
a. JCS-Targeted Bridges
Although the total number of bridges attacked in
January through September 1966 was about equal to the number in
1965, attacks against JCS-targeted bridges decreased. In 1966, at
least 133 strikes were carried out against 32 bridges, some of which
had been attacked in 1965, compared with 144 strikes and restrikes
against 47 JCS-targeted bridges in 1965. Almost all of the strikes
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 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP7 070001-9
TOP SECRET
against JCS bridges in 1966 were conducted under armed reconnais-
sance. As in 1965, most of the bridges struck were located in the
southern part of the country. The number of strikes against highway
bridges on the JCS target list decreased during 1966, whereas strikes
against JCS bridges on the rail lines increased. Seventy-seven strikes
were made against 31 highway bridges in 1965, compared with only
37 strikes against 16 bridges during the first nine months of 1966. On
the railroads, 67 strikes were made against 16 bridges in 1965, com-
pared with 96 strikes against 16 bridges during January-September 1966.
b. Armed Reconnaissance Bridge Targets
Aerial photography has confirmed the destruction
or damage of 359 bridges since the start of the bombing, including
those bridges on the JCS target list. About 150 of these bridges were
struck initially since 1 January 1966. A total of 83 railroad, combina-
tion railroad/highway, and railroad bypass bridges have been confirmed
as destroyed or damaged on all rail lines in the country. About one-
half of these bridges were initially struck during January-September
1966, as shown in the following tabulation:
Initially Struck
Total Struck
Rail Line During January-September 1
66
h
2
T
roughout Bombin
Hanoi - Dong Dang 2>
-
Hanoi - Lao Cai
5
H
i
17
ano
- South
S
19
pur and bypass 10
10
Total 4o
83
In addition, aerial photography has confirmed the destruction or damage
of almost 280 highway bridges, about 110 of which were struck initially
in 1966.
Pilots have reported destroying or damaging about
1, 900 bridges during January-September 1966, for a total of about
2, 560 bridges throughout the bombing. These figures undoubtedly
contain considerable double counting and overstatement of the damage
inflicted. Excluding JCS-targeted bridges, a total of only 306 bridges
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 Approved For p 2 TQ Qb C
are confirmed by photography to be destroyed or damaged. This figure
probably understates somewhat the number of smaller bridges damaged
or destroyed, however, because photography may not be available for
some of these bridges. A comparison of the two sets of data is given
in the following tabulation:
Destroyed or Damaged
Photographic :evidence
Pilot Reports
Railroad and combinations
63
92
Highway
243
2,467
Total
306
2,559
5. Railroad Yards
Many small railroadyardsand sidings have been attacked
by armed reconnaissance, and at least five comparatively important
yards have been struck during the Rolling Thunder program. But the
principal yards in the country, particularly those on the Hanoi-
Haiphong and Hanoi-Dong Dang lines, have not been attacked. The
yard at Thai Nguyen is the only relatively important yard attacked for
the first time during 1966 (see Table B4). In addition, the yards at
Vinh and Yen Bai were restruckin.1966. The Vinh Classification Yard NW
has been hardest hit by air attacks, with 75 percent of its capacity
destroyed as of September 1966. This yard was struck at least three
times in 1965 and six times in 1966. The Hanoi.--Vinh rail line has
been interdicted for through service during most of the time since the
bombing began, however, and the yard generally has been used only
in support of shuttle service.
The cost of restoration of the damaged rail yards amounted
to $400, 000 in 1966, compared with only $70, 000 in 1965. Most of
these costs stem from the need to repair railroad stations and other
buildings, rather than yard track. The strikes have resulted in only
temporary disruption to rail service during both years, and rail service
at these yards has usually been restored within a few days.
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Railroad Yards Attacked Under the Rolling Thunder Program
1965 and January-September 1966
JCS
Target
Number Name Dates of Attack
Vinh Classification 26, ~ 0i7 May i
65
Yard N.W. 1 Jun 65
Nam Dinh Yard 2, 4 Aug 65
Damage g to switching wye,
rail sid-
in s, tracks and buildings
Yen Bai Yard 11, 13, 14 Jul 65 Damage to rolling stock; lines inter-
dicted in numerous places
Subtotal for 1965
Vinh Classification 18 Feb 66 75 percent of capacity destroyed as
Yard N.W. 4, 24 Apr 66 of September 1966
1, 22 May 66
9 Jul 66
TO
21.11 Thai Nguyen 29 Apr 66 20 percent of capacity destroyed as
5, 8, 22 May 66 of September 1966 400
10 Jun 66
2 Aug 66
Yen Bai Yard 23 Apr 66 Cratered
Thanh Hoa Yard 12, 19 May 66 Cratered
1, 23 Jun 66
22 Jul 66
18 Aug 66
Subtotal for 1966
Cost
of Restoration
(Thousand US $)
iiaiii iine interdicted in four places;
four sidings interdicted
470
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Six North Vietnamese ports representing 88 percent of
the country's total maritime cargo-handling capacity have been selected
as JCS targets. Under the Rolling Thunder program for the first nine
months of 1966, the port of Ben Thuy was restruck twice and Cam Pha
port was attacked for the first time. Approximately 60 percent of the
cargo-handling capacity at Ben Thuy was destroyed as a result of the
attacks in 1965 and 1.966 and approximately 20 percent at Cam Pha.
In 1965 the only other JCS-targeted port attacked was Ham Rong, a
minor port near Thanh Hoa. Damage to port facilities from 1.966
strikes will cost about $570, 000 to restore, compared with about
$660, 000 from 1965 strikes (see Table B5).
The impact of this damage in itself on North Vietnam's
economy is not significant, but significant export losses have resulted.
Ben Thuy represents only 4 percent of the nation's maritime cargo-
handling capacity and Ham Rong only 1 percent. Both serve the
southern provinces, which are largely rural. While Cam Pha is a
major North Vietnamese port, representing 16 percent of the country's
maritime cargo- capacity, the $160, 000 damage against it is nominal.
During the attack against it, however, the coal-washing machinery and
the rail facilities were also hit. The damage to these facilities has
already resulted in a coal export loss of about $3. 7 million.
Haiphong and Hon Gai, the two other most important
ports, have not been subjected to attack. The Haiphong port complex
represents, 50 percent of the country's maritime port capacity and
handles most of the import and export trade. Hon Gai., representing
16 percent of national cargo-handling capacity, handles primarily coal
exports. These ports, representing 66 percent of the nation's cargo-
handling capacity, are the only other significant deepwater ports in
addition to Cam Pha in North Vietnam.
The cost of restoring the petroleum terminal at Haiphong --
damaged during the airstrikes against petroleum bulk storage -- is
included in the cost of replacing the support facilities to the Haiphong
petroleum installation (see 1, above).
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Table B5
Percent Percent
JCS of National Maritime Percent of National Cost
Target Cargo-Handling of Target Capacity Cargo-Handling of Restoration
Number Name Capacity Dates of Attack Destroyed Capacity Destroyed (Thousand US $)
May 71.0 Ben Thuy 4 5
6
8 Jun 65
,
,
9, 10, 11, 17, 19, 21 Jul 65
71.13 Ham Rong 1 14, 16, 18 Jul 65
71.0 Ben Thuy 4 1 Feb 66
rP
l , ~
Maritime Ports Attacked.
Under the Rolling Thunder Program
1965 and January-September 1966
.,., a to 24 Apr bb
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Only one attack was carried out against locks and dams
in North Vietnam during 1966, and it was unsuccessful. Only two of
the eight targeted locks on the' inland waterways have been attacked.
The Bich Phuong Lock No. 3, located in Thanh Hoa Province on the
Song Chu Canal, was attacked in August 1965 and was heavily damaged.
By 30 October 1965, temporary repairs had been made and the site of
the lock had been coffer dammed. Water-level control was restored,
and navigation continued, although it is interrupted at the site of the
lock. Qua Nhue Ha Lock No. 2 on the same canal was attacked in
1966, but the lock continued to function after the attack.
Three of the targeted locks that have not been struck
are located on the Song Thuong Canal, part of the inland water net-
work that links Thai Nguyen with Hanoi and the seaport at Haiphong.
Disruption of traffic on this waterway would create some transporta-
tion problems because a significant portion of the freight moved in the
Delta region is transported by inland water. This waterway serves as
an alternative to rail and road transport in the area, and thus the locks
must be destroyed if disruption of transport routes in the Delta is to be
achieved. The destruction of the four targeted locks that are still
functioning in Thanh Hoa and Nghe An Provinces would present problems
to canal traffic operating in the area. These canals have become sig-
nificant routes for the transportation of supplies within Military Region IV.
8. Agriculture
Although agricultural production in North Vietnam has
not been a direct target of the US/GVN airstrikes against that coun-
try, these attacks have had a significant indirect effect on the agricul-
tural segment of the economy. It is impossible, however, to isolate
the indirect effect of the bombings on agricultural production from
other influences -- such as weather.
The bombing attacks have been associated with a decrease
in agricultural production during the period 1965 through September
1966 which is valued at an estimated $21 million. Of this amount, $17
million is attributed to a shortfall of rice harvested during the spring
of 1966. This shortfall was caused by poor weather and by the bombing
attacks. A decrease in the salt water fish catch -- caused by the bomb-
ing attacks -- is responsible for the remaining estimated decrease in
production. This decrease is valued at $4 million.
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The shortfall in the 1966 spring rice crop was at least
200, 000 tons below the 1961-65 average of about 1. 7 million tons for
spring rice. Since this crop was planted in late 1965. $3. 5 million
of the loss was somewhat arbitrarily judged to have occurred in 1965
and $13. 5 million during the first six months of 1966.
While poor weather in the last half of 1965 and in the
first half of 1966 undoubtedly contributed to the poor performance of
agriculture, the disruptive effects of the bombing attacks were con-
siderable. Even before the bombing attacks, agriculture in North
Vietnam had experienced difficulties -- partly because of the unde-
pendable weather and partly because of management problems on
agricultural cooperative-s associated with the socialization of agricul-
ture. The war has brought such additional problems as manpower
shortages -- particularly skilled manpower -- the disruption of normal
farming schedules, and the interruption of electrically powered irriga-
tion systems and of the production and distribution of fertilizers. The
efforts of the North Vietnamese to counter the disruptive effects of the
bombing attacks -- including the importing of diesel generators to power
the irrigation systems and of increased amounts of chemical fertilizers -
have not been completely successful.
The bombing attacks have resulted in serious interruption
of fishing activities -- particularly offshore fishing -- in the three
southern provinces of North Vietnam: Quang Binh, Ha Tinh, and Nghe
An. It is estimated that this has been responsible for a loss in the salt
water fish catch valued at $4 million, (a with approximately $1. 7 million
worth of this shortfall occurring in 1965 and $2, 3 million in 1966, The
intensive fishing season in North Vietnam -- when most of the offshore
fishing takes place -- is in the three-month period of September to
There was no shortfall in rice production in 1965. Although the
1965 spring rice crop was above-normal, the poor 1965 fall rice crop
canceled out this surplus, giving about an average harvest. The spring
rice crop normally makes up about one-third of the annual harvest and
the fall crop most of the remainder.
Information on salt water fish catch in North Vietnam is limited.
It is estimated that the three southern provinces are responsible for
about one-third of the annual catch and that about one-third of this is
caught offshore where most of the loss occurred. This suggests that
the total salt water fish catch was down by about 10 percent. If the
fish were valued at 1. 50 dong per kilo -- a price that is between the
wholesale and retail price of the various kinds of fish -- this loss
would amount to $4 million.
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November. Air attacks on fishing installations in these southern prov-
inces appear to have been extensive, and some damage has been in-
flicted on these installations. The value of this damage, however, is
believed to be minor.
The agricultural shortfall, the disruptive effects of the
bombing attacks on agriculture and fishing activities, together with
the increased requirements for the war, have contributed to food
shortages -- particularly in rural areas. Food supplies in the larger
cities such as Hanoi have been maintained at adequate levels, however,
and there have been no indications of critical food shortages or cases
of malnutrition. The continuation of the bombing attacks will further
aggravate the tight food situation in North Vietnam. The self-sufficient
nature of the agricultural economy and the availability of food imports --
particularly from Communist China -- suggest, however, that food
supplies are not likely to become critical.
Export Losses
From 1 April 1965 to 30 September 1966, measurable
export losses attributed to direct and secondary effects of the Rolling
Thunder program totaled $12. 9 million, of which $4. 2 million occurred
in 1965 and $8. 7 million in 1966. Reduction in exports of apatite and
coal accounted, respectively, for 61 percent and 28 percent of the total.
Losses in seaborne exports of apatite resulted from repeated inter-
dictions of the rail line connecting the apatite mines at Lao Cai with
the port of Haiphong. Coal shipments were retarded by airstrikes
against coal-processing facilities at Cam Pha in April 1966. Although
production of cement is believed to have been unhindered, the remainder
of the losses is accounted for by an apparent reduction*k* in seaborne
exports of cement since the initiation of the Rolling Thunder program.
* Out of seven sea product agencies -- local fish storage and process-
ing units -- which allegedly have been bombed, only one has been iden-
tified in photographic intelligence. It is estimated that the replacement
cost for damage inflicted on the sea product agency in Thach-kim
village, Ha Tinh Province, is about $60, 000. Even if all of the other
six sea product agencies had received similar damage -- available
information indicates that this is not the case -- total damage would
be less than one-half million dollars.
It is possible that undetected increases in exports of cement to
China have been made on Chinese Communist ships.
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The decline is attributable in part, at least, to increased internal con-
sumption of cement as a consequence of the bombing. The quarterly
totals of these losses are presented in the tabulation below:
1965
2nd quarter
3rd quarter
4th quarter
Subtotal
1966
1st quarter
2nd quarter
3rd quarter
Subtotal
Total
B. Military
Apatite
Cement
Coal
Total
665
192
858
1,043
324
1,367
1,554
395
1,949
3,262
11
4,174
1,554
205
1,759
1,554
40
1,476
3,071
1,457
244
2,192
3,893
4,565
4~8
3,668
8,723
7,827
1,400
3,668
12,897
Although about 35 strikes were made against at least 15
JCS-targeted barracks during January-September 1966, no significant
additional loss resulted. All but one of the barracks had been struck
in 1965, and more than half of them appeared to have been inactive at
the end of 1965. The attacks in 1966 increased the percent of barracks
capacity destroyed to about 23 percent of the total national capacity,
compared with a little more than 18 percent destroyed at the end of
1965. The cost of restoration of the damage done in 1966 is estimated
at about $1. 5 million, compared with about $16 million in 1965 (see
Table B6).
Before the beginning of the Rolling Thunder program,
North Vietnam had barrackscapacity for about 443, 000 men. The 63
targeted barracks accounted for about 180, 000 men. Thus far, about
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Table B6
Barracks Attacked. Under the Rolling Thunder Program a
January-September 1966
'y
JCS
Target
Number Name
26.00 Dien Bien Phu Barracks and
Storage Area
O 39.3
25.0 Son La Barracks Hq., MR
North 'West
IV 39.2 Vinh Linh Barracks Cent.
NE
39.25 Vinh Son Barracks S
39.12 Dong Hoi Barracks Cit.
39.27 Vinh Barracks NNE
39.24 Sam Son Barracks W
39.46 Bien Son Barracks NNE
33.00 Dong Hoi Barracks WNW
39.21 Yen Phu Barracks NE
39.14 Badon Barracks
Percent
of Targeted
National Capacity
o.8
0.6
0.6
0.3
1.9
of Targeted Capacity Destroyed for Damage
Inflicted During 1966
Dates of Attack During 65 As of 30 Sep 66 (Thousand US $)
18 Feb 57 (inactive) 57 (inactive)
Cost of Restoration
19, 20, 21 Feb 52 87 (inactive) 800
1, 9, 10, 17 Feb 74 (inactive) 74 (inactive) 0
22 Mar 39 (inactive) 52 (inactive)
27 Apr
9, 15 Mar
26 Apr
9, 10, 22 May
6 Jun
4 Apr
4 Apr
12 May
23 Jun
1, 5, 12 Jul
N.A.
20, 21 Aug
28 Aug
3, 12 Sep
31 Jan
31 (inactive) 31 (inactive) 0
52 (inactive) 52 (inactive) 0
77 (inactive) 77 (inactive) 0
43 51 (inactive) 40
56 (inactive) 100
82 82 (inactive)
51 (inactive) 51 (inactive)
30 (inactive) 99 (inactive) 100
100 (inactive) 100 (inactive)
0
1,540
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45 of the targeted barracks have been attacked, with a loss of capacity
for about 100, 000 men. Other nontargeted barracks in outlying areas
have been attacked by armed reconnaissance, but it is believed that
the total capacity destroyed to date represents for the most part only
excess or unused capacity. Most of the important barracks are located
in the Hanoi-Haiphong complex and have not been attacked. The mili-
tary strength in this area far exceeds that in outlying areas already
struck. The order of battle strength of the North Vietnamese army
is currently estimated at slightly over 300, 000. Thus North Vietnam
has sufficient capacity remaining to house the military forces.
The lack of barracks capacity in the areas where the
destruction took place is, however, undoubtedly causing much incon-
venience. Most of the barracks attacked are :Located in the southern
part of the country, along the border of Laos, and in the northwestern
provinces. These areas are particularly significant for infiltration
of South Vietnam and military operations in Laos. Barracks in these
areas have not been repaired. Apparently, troops are being quartered
with civilians in nearby towns, in tents, and in other makeshift shelters
in surrounding areas.
Very little change has occurred in North Vietnam's air-
field capability as a result of attacks on airfields during 1966 (see
Table B7). North Vietnam has 23 airfields, of which 11 are targeted
and considered to have economic and military significance. Four of
the targeted fields were attacked in 1965, resulting in the destruction
of about 20 percent of the total targeted airfield capacity. Although
each of the bombed airfields had facilities left standing, the runways
were heavily cratered and the fields were unable to receive air traffic.
During the first nine months of 1966, there were only two strikes against
Dien Bien Phu Airfield, one of the four attacked in 1965. The attacks
took place in February with only slight additional damage to the runway,
which had not been repaired. It is estimated that restoration of this
additional damage would cost only about $2, 000, compared with a total
of $380, 000 in restoration costs estimated for attacks on airfields dur-
ing 1965. Recent observation of the Dien Bien Phu Airfield revealed
that a portion of the runway is serviceable for light aircraft,
The damage inflicted on airfields thus has continued to
have only limited secondary military and economic effects. Air trans-
port and passenger service is virtually nonexistent in North Vietnam.
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JCS
Target
Number Name
5.0 Vinh
1.0 Na San
25X1 2.0 Dien Bien Phu
Subtotal for 1965
2.0 Dien Bien Phu
Subtotal for 1966
Total
Airfields Attacked. Under the Rolling Thunder Program
1965 and January-September 1966
Percent
Target as a Percent of of Target Utility
National Targeted Capacity Destroyed
Percent of National Cost
Targeted Capacity of Restoration
Dates of Attack Destroyed or Inactive (Thousand US $)
6 53 (inactive) 30 Mar 65 6 50
6 Jun 65
1 Jul 65
17, 22, 23 Sep 65
6 10 (inactive) 8 May 65 6 43
30 Jun 65
1 Jul 65
4 45 (inactive) 25 Jun 65 4 144
3
19
3
23 Sep 65
24 oct 65
94 (inactive) 2, 8 Jul 65 3 143
19 94 6, 11 Feb 66 3 380
2
2
JL2
19 i2
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During 1966, North Vietnamese fighter aircraft have become more
active outside of the sanctuary area surrounding Hanoi. The four
airfields attacked during 1965 and 1966 do not have runways long
enough to support jet fighters fully, and their vulnerable locations
limit their usefulness as operating bases.
The three most important airfields in North Vietnam
(Hanoi/Gia Lam, Haiphong/Cat Bi, and Phuc Yen) are located in the
Hanoi-Haiphong area. These fields have full jet-handling capability
and account for about 60 percent of the targeted capacity. The Kep
airfield also has full jet-handling capability and accounts for an
additional 10 percent of the capacity. At least three new airfields
are under construction. These fields are located at Yen Bai, at Hoa
Lac near Hanoi, and at Bai Thuong near Thanh Hoa. They will rep-
resent a significant addition to total airfield capability.
3. SAM Sites
From January through September 1966, 75 airstrikes
were carried out against 60 SAM sites. The North Vietnamese are
believed to be limited to about 25 SAM firing units (battalions), most
of which have exhibited a high degree of mobility. Therefore, although
144 SAM sites had been identified as of 30 September, not more than
20 to 25 of them are believed to have been occupied at any one time.
Considerable damage was reported for the SAM facili-
ties attacked, as indicated in the following tabulation:
Des
troyed. Damaged
Sites
25 25
Fan Song radars
19
Missile transporters
3
Insufficient post-strike photography prevents making an accurate
assessment of the amount of damage actually sustained by these SAM
facilities in 196.6. Damage reported by pilots could. have totaled at
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least $14 million*; however, photography indicated only that equip-
ment valued at some $900, 000 was destroyed. ** The actual amount
of damage in 1966 probably lies closer to $5 million. *** Damage to
SAM facilities in 1965 was estimated at about $630, 000.
During this period, approximately 660 missiles (valued
at about $20 milliont) were fired against Allied targets, resulting in
the destruction of 22 planes and 14 drones.
By the end of September 1966, airstrikes against naval
bases had destroyed almost one-fifth of the naval support facilities.
The damage is estimated to have amounted to about $1. 2 million during
1965 and about $400, 000 during January-September 1966 (see Table
B 8).
Most of the increased destruction during 1966 resulted
from restrikes on naval facilities at Quang Khe and Phuc Loi, two
bases that had been hit during 1965. The only additional base attacked
in 1966 was the Bai Chay Naval Complex located in the Hon Gai port
area. One strike on this base in August resulted in the destruction of
about 14 percent of its capability but represented only a relatively
small cost of reconstruction. Possibly as another result of the strike,
however, some of the command responsibilities for naval operations
in the area have been shifted from the Bai Chay headquarters to the
newly constructed command post at Binh Dong in the Haiphong area.
It is doubtful that the damage to the bases has seriously
affected the operations of the small North Vietnamese navy. The
major base accounting for 40 percent of the targeted capacity is located
It is assumed that all of the sites reported destroyed were occupied
when struck and that most of the major equipment was destroyed: spe-
cifically, the Fan Song radar, cabling, and an average of five launchers
and three missiles. No attempt has been.made to assign a value to the
"damaged" category.
** Two missiles on launchers, six launchers without missiles, and
two sets of guidance and control equipment.
Cost computations are based on estimated production costs of re-
placement equipment; inasmuch as at least some of the equipment is
believed to be older models not now in active service in the USSR,
these computations probably overstate their true present value.
t This cost is not included in the estimated costs of physical damage
resulting from the Rolling Thunder program.
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Na-al Paces t ticked. Under the Rolling Thunder Program
1965 and January-September 1966
Target
Target as a Percent
of National Naval a/
Percent Percent of National
of Base Utility Naval Base Support
Cost
of Restoration
Number
Name
Base Support Capacity Dates of Attack
Destroyed Capacity Destr
ed
(Th
d US $
oy
)
ousan
y
74-1
Quang Khe Naval
15 2 Mar 65
47 7
400
C
Base
28 Ma
65
It
y
21 24, 27
~~,
'Q
Sep
10 20 May 65
78 8
12 Sep 65
15
?^'
74.l
Quang Khe Naval
I 5 26 Apr 66
7
25Xt!Lj N
Base
71.1
Phuc Loi
10 4, 5 Apr 66
78 (inactive) 10
230
69.0
Bai Chay
17 6 Aug 66
14 2
Subtotal for 1966
Total
1,573
a. Dates of attack indicate only assigned strikes; in certain instances more attacks have been launched against a specific
target than is indicated above.
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in the Haiphong port area and has not been attacked. The other targeted
base not yet struck is Port Wallet, located about halfway between Hon
Gai and the Chinese border. In addition to these five targeted bases,
North Vietnam has naval support facilities in ten other ports. Restora-
tion of the damaged bases can be accomplished quickly and with local
materials, with the exception of replacing or repairing machinery that
may have been destroyed or damaged.
North Vietnam has 50 known radar sites, of which five
coastal sites were targeted because of their strategic location. Dur-
ing 1965-66, these five targeted sites were attacked. Two sites (Hon
Matt and Hon Nieu) were totally destroyed and two (Vinh Son and Bach
Long) were damaged. The extent of damage to the remaining site (My
Duc) is unknown. Damage or destruction of targeted sites amounted to
an estimated $1. 7 million during 1965 and to slightly over $900, 000 in
1966 for a total of $2. 6 million. Details of the types of radar damaged or
destroyed and their estimated value are shown in the following tabulation:
1965
Destroyed
Total Value or Damaged
(Thousand US $) (Thousand US $)
Vinh Son
1 Track Dish - fire control
245
245
2 SCR-270 - early warning
270
270
3 Firecan - fire control
1 Cross Slot - early warning
1,000
135
645
1 Spoonrest A - early warning
135
Hon Matt
2 Cross Slot - early warning
270
270
Hon Nieu
1 Cross Slot - early warning
135
135
My Duc
1 Cross Slot - early warning
135
N.A.
1 Rus-2 - early warning
135
N.A.
1 SCR-270 - early warning
135
N.A.
Subtotal for 1965
1,700
Vinh Son
1 Spoonrest A - early warning
135
135
1 Firecan - fire control
335
335
2 Firecan - fire control
670
1 SCR-270 - early warning
135
374
1 Cross Slot - early warning
135
Hon Matt
Hon Nieu
None
None
Subtotal for 1966
Total 1965 and 1966
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924
2,624
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Except for the radar destroyed at the Hon Matt and Hon
Nieu sites in 1.965, radar at the three remaining targeted sites have
been repaired or replaced as necessary, thus permitting the sites to
continue operations. Air defense coverage for the Hon Matt and Hon
Nieu area is provided by radar located at Vinh Lin and Hong Doi.
The overall air warning capab ility of North Vietnam has
not been affected by bombing of targeted radar sites during 1965-66.
During the period of the Rolling Thunder program, the number of radar
deployed at sites throughout North Vietnam has increased.
North Vietnam has at least 35 major high-frequency (HF)
radio centers and several hundred small HF radio stations. Five of
the centers are JCS targets, only two of which have been struck, both
in 1965. These two facilities, the Chanh Hoa and Muong Sen radio
centers (JCS Nos. 67.3 and 39. 19), represent 20 percent of the tar-
geted capacity In addition, a
nontargeted center at Quang Khe was destroyed in 1965, and the center
at Dien Bien Phu, although not bombed, was dismantled. The other
JCS targets are located in the Hanoi area, and a fair number of the
nontargeted centers are also located in that area. Those centers
attacked or dismantled in 1965 were all located some distance south
or west of Hanoi. Restoration of the damage inflicted on HF radio
centers in 1965 is estimated at about $75, 000.
The full extent of physical damage to the wireline sys-
tem of North Vietnam cannot be estimated. The wireline system has
not been specifically targeted for destruction and the damage sustained
has been a collateral effect of the bombing of rail and road facilities,
which are generally paralleled by open wirelines.
There is
a strong possibility that wireline damage has been extensive but it is
not being picked up by intelligence collection media. Cumulative mone-
tary damage to the open wireline system since the beginning of Rolling
Thunder is estimated very roughly at $100, 000, of which $80, 000
probably occurred during 1966.
Although the cost of the damage inflicted on communica-
tions is nominal, indirect costs in this field resulting from the Rolling
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Thunder program appear to be substantial. Damage inflicted on other
sectors of the economy in North Vietnam has produced a considerable
increase in domestic communications requirements. The establish-
ment and expansion of new communications networks have become an
especially urgent need for units assigned to the repair, maintenance,
and augmentation of transportation and logistics facilities. In order
to service these new requirements, North Vietnam has been forced
to seek sizable quantities of communications equipment from foreign
suppliers and to construct new telecommunications transmission media..
In the spring of 1966, North Vietnam imported one hundred 15-watt
radiotransceivers and ten 1-kilowatt transmitters at an estimated cost
of $270, 000. Currently, Hanoi is attempting to procure 30, 000 kilo-
meters of military field wire at a cost that could exceed $1 million if
purchased in the West. Additional telecommunications equipment in
smaller quantities -- including tele-typewriters, radiobroadcast re-
ceivers, and multiplexing gear for the open wire line system -- also
has been imported. Since at least February 1966, photography has
identified construction activity on at least six new open wireline routes
in North Vietnam. Although it is impossible to distinguish precisely
between communications requirements induced as a direct result of
bomb damage and those generated by the expansion of North Vietnam's
military establishment, it is clear that the Rolling Thunder program
has been an important, if not the prime, force in increasing the com-
plexity of Hanoi's communications problems. On balance, however,
it appears that the operational efficiency of the telecommunications
system of North Vietnam has not been seriously impaired, and if the
present trend continues, North Vietnam will have significantly increased
telecommunications capacity.
7. Supply and Ordnance Depots
Ten of the 17 targeted supply depots have been attacked
under the Rolling Thunder program. Restrikes on a few depots in
1966 resulted in insignificant damage and only slight additional loss of
national capacity. Restoration of damage inflicted in 1966 will cost
about $130, 000, and that in 1965 will cost at least. $3 million.
North Vietnam had a total s~brage capacity at all known
installations of about 10. 6 million square feet before the'beginning of
the Rolling Thunder program. The total storage capacity of the 17
targeted installations is about 3. 4 million square feet. Detruction
of targeted installations represents about 15 percent of the national
capacity. Most of the destroyed installations are located in the southern
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provinces and along the: Laotian border. Except for the Vinh Supply
Depot (serving Military Region IV) and the Yen Bai Ordnance Depot
(serving the area northwest of Hanoi), the depots struck are of rela-
tively minor importance to the North Vietnamese army. The largest
supply depots, located in the Hanoi area and at Thai Nguyen, have not
been attacked.
8. Ammunition Depots
Information available indicates that airstrikes have been
carried out against only two JCS-targeted ammunition depots so far in
1966 -- the Xom Bang (JCS No. 64. 00) and Xom Rung (JCS No. 47. 18)
depots, both of which had been attacked in 1965 and were inactive at the
end of the year. The attacks in 1966 resulted in slight additional
damage, the restoration of which will cost only about $200, 000. At-
tacks in 1965 against 13 depots resulted in damage amounting to about
$4. 5 million.
North Vietnam had storage capacity for about 112, 600
tons of ammunition at the beginning of 1965, exclusive of storage in
barracks and headquarters complexes. It is believed that attacks
carried out through September 1966 have destroyed about one-fourth
of this capacity. There is no indication that the depots resumed
activity after being attacked.
The destruction of the depots probably has caused tem-
porary delays in distribution and inconvenience but has not caused
shortages of ammunition in the areas where they are located. Four
of the depots destroyed are located north or northwest of Hanoi and
could have been used for the receipt of ammunition from Yunnan
Province in China. The other depots are important for regional sup-
port of the North Vietnamese troops and for supplying the Communist
forces in Laos and South Vietnam. Other depots not yet attacked, lo-
cated in the Hanoi -Haiphong area, are much more significant in the
system for importing ammunition from China, distributing it internally,
and arranging for its infiltration into neighboring countries.
9. Naval Craft
A total of 10 North Vietnamese naval craft have been
destroyed by TJS aircraft through September 1966. In 1965, three
Swatow-class gunboats were sunk while in waters near Haiphong and
Hon Gai, and a fourth was destroyed while in tow at sea. In 1966,
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three PT boats were sunk while at sea, and two SO-1 subchasers and
one Swatow-class gunboat were destroyed while moored near Cac Ba
Island.
According to the North Vietnamese Naval Order of Battle
as of 15 September 1966, the loss of the five Swatow-class gunboats
has deprived North Vietnam of almost one-third of the operational gun-
boat fleet, the loss of the three PT boats leaves North Vietnam with
only nine operational craft of this type, and there are now only two
subchasers operational.
The estimated restoration cost of these naval craft totals
$8. 1 million. The loss incurred during 1966 accounts for $6. 1 million.
North Vietnamese aircraft losses increased significantly
during the first nine months of 1966 as a consequence of air engage-
ments with US aircraft. Three supersonic MIG-21's and 14 MIG-17's
were destroyed, compared with only five MIG-17's in 1965. These cumu-
lative losses represent nearly 20 percent of the MIG-21 inventory (16)
and more than 40 percent of the in-country MIG-15/17 inventory (45) in
the Air Order of Battle of North Vietnam as of 3 November 1966. An
additional 50 MIG-15/17's of the North Vietnamese are known to be
held in China.
Almost all of the MIG's were destroyed during strikes
against fixed targets. The destruction in 1965 occurred in June and
July. In 1966, MIG losses were greatest in April, with five, June,
with four, and July and September, with three each. The estimated
cost of this loss is $3. 4 million in 1965 and $12.4 million in 1966.
During 1966, Rolling Thunder became almost exclusively an
armed reconnaissance program directed primarily against the North
Vietnamese lines of communication and transport targets. The effect
of the attack on lines of communication and other fixed targets was
discussed in an earlier section of this appendix. The armed recon-
naissance attack on the logistics target system is discussed in detail
in Appendix E.
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1. Transport Equipment;
Destruction and damage of all types of transport equip-
ment by airstrikes increased considerably during the first nine months
of 1966 compared with 1965. The following tabulation, which is based
primarily on pilot reports and includes some duplication and exaggera-
tion, provides a general indication of the increase in damage inflicted,
by type of equipment.
1,965
January-September 1966
Type of Equipment
Destroyed
Damaged
Destroyed
Damaged
Locomotives
6
6
10
13
Railroad freight cars
227
592
1,061
850
Trucks
318
1+87
1,617
1,x+79
Ferries
53
56
61+
118
Barges
263
1+87
1,813
2,977
Other water craft
11+1+
210
816
1, 255
11011
1,838
5,381
6,692
The estimated cost to the North Vietnamese of destroyed and damaged
transport equipment increased from $5, 9 million in 1965 to $24. 5 mil-
lion in 1966.
In spite of the significantly higher level of damage in-
flicted during 1966, there has been no evidence of serious transport
problems resulting from shortages of equipment. Imports of loco-
motives and trucks have been sufficient to maintain inventories at the
1965 level. Reported losses of freight cars have included a signifi-
cant number of small, makeshift cars used on the rail lines south of
Hanoi which have not been included in the inventory of mainline freight
cars. Although this mainline inventory has decreased by about 35 per-
cent during 1966, there has been no indications of serious shortages
of freight cars. If a high rate of utilization is assumed for the re-
maining freight cars, the September 1966 inventory is sufficient to
handle the decreased volume of rail freight carried. Furthermore,
Communist China probably has loaned or given North Vietnam all the
freight cars needed to compensate for any shortages. Although some
watercraft and motors for water craft have been imported, most of the
watercraft needed to compensate for losses apparently have been con-
structed domestically. Sightings of watercraft indicate that there has
.,* This factor was then expanded to cover all of the
six Route Packages in North Vietnam. Modifying indexes were calcu-
lated to reflect the varying population densities and sorties flown in the
respective Route Packages in 1966. The adjusted daily casualty figures
for each Route Package were then multiplied by the number of days of
air operation in the specific Route Package.
For an explanation of the term Route Package, see Figure A7.
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Average daily casualties for the 30-day period were
2. 2 killed by air and 6. 7 wounded b air. Because
prisoner-of-war reports, and r. eflecte ces
to the bombing of schools and ospita s, a factor for these inadvertent
attacks was also included in the daily casualty figures. The final daily
casualty rates for civilians as a consequence of the armed reconnaissance
were estimated to be 3. 5 killed and 8. 0 wounded in Route Package II.
b. Military Casualties
The problems encountered in deriving a credible esti-
mate of military casualties inflicted by armed reconnaissance were
insoluble.
risoner-o -war repor s n al e' ers were a so
o marginal value. A methodology employing the results of the armed re-
connaissance program weighted the number of trucks or other facilities
destroyed and damaged with DIA. estimates of casualties per truck and
per other facility in the following tabulation:
Number
Destroyed
or._ Damaged
Weight
Military Casualties
Barracks
80
0.1
10
Supply warehouses
138
0.1
10
Misc. buildings
4,640
0.1
46o
Radar Com.
78
0.1
10
Truck parks
92
0.1
10
AAA sites
568
0.1
60
Trucks
3,096
0.5
1,.550
Watercraft
2,071
0.5
1,.040
RR cars
2,234
0.1
220
3,,100 a/
a. Because of rounding, components may not add to the total shown.
In two specific categories, trucks and watercraft,
the casualty weights were decreased to reflect the information gained
from prisoner-of-war reports It should be pointed
out, however, that at best this method represents a very crude approx-
imation of military casualties.
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SELECTED THIRD COUNTRY ATTITUDES
TOWARD THE BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM
There harss been a wide variety of popular and official reactions in
the Free World to the bombing of North Vietnam. A study of selected
Free World countries indicates, on the one hand, that there is consider-
able support for the US action. Most important in producing this support
has been the fear of further Communist aggression should the United
States fail in its defense of South Vietnam. There also appears to be
more popular and official backing in countries which are partially or
wholly dependent on the United States for economic and/or military
assistance.
There is very strong popular opposition to US policy on Vietnam,
including the bombing of the north, in some of the major neutral nations
and countries allied with the United States. This opposition, which
stems primarily from fear that the war will escalate into a worldwide
conflict, or from the view that the United States is guilty of "aggression"
against a weaker, Asian state, has definitely limited official support
for US policy in some countries. In a few instances, there has been
a definite growth in popular opposition as the US air war escalated. In
most cases, however, popular and official attitudes have remained
relatively static since the start of the sustained air attacks, or else
the opposition to the raids has tended to moderate.
The moderation has resulted from several factors. For one thing,
the populace in some countries has tended to become inured to the war
and has lost interest in the actions of both sides. There has also been
a demonstrable return from the indications of US willingness to end the
bombing if the other side will take reciprocal de-escalatory action.
The intransigence of the Vietnamese Communists in the face of US
bombing pauses has definitely cost them some Free World support.
A major escalation of the air war in the future, especially if
accompanied by substantial civilian casualties, is likely to produce
a significant intensification of opposition to the bombing in some coun-
tries. Stronger denunciations of the United States, independent action
in the United Nations, and other political protest activities might be
forthcoming. It is unlikely, however, that any Free World country
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will take retaliatory action in its bilateral relations with the United
States or that any Free World country will change its policy to the
point of offering significantly greater political or material support to
the Vietnamese Communists.
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There is considerable popular and official support in the Far East
for U'S policy in Vietnam. The majority of government leaders are
fearful of Chinese Communist aggression and are convinced that US
defense of South Vietnam is essential to preserve freedom in the area.
In general, support for US policy extends to approval or acquiescence
in the US bombing of North Vietnam. Since the inception of the raids,
there have been only minor changes in official, and popular attitudes in
the Far East toward the air attacks. Those that disapproved, remain
opposed; those who approved, still do, although in some cases more
reluctantly than before. Among the countries that generally support
the United States on the air attacks are Australia, Malaya, New Zealand,
Japan, Thailand, South Korea, and Taiwan.
In some of the countries which officially oppose the attacks, there
is an underlying ambivalence in attitudes on the war that has tended to
dampen active opposition to the raids. This can be seen, for example,
in Indonesia where there is a deep distrust of policies identified with
imperialism, but also a strong anti-Communist and anti-Chinese
sentiment. Some Indonesian military officers and some key civilian
leaders have quietly let the United States know that Djakarta understands
and supports the US position but is likely to hedge its public statements
because of strong popular opposition. There is widespread sympathy
for Hanoi in its fight to gain "independence" of the West.
Significant opposition in the Far East to the US air attacks has also
come from Cambodia and, to a lesser extent, from Burma, where
there is official understanding of the US position, but considerable
popular disapproval.
It is clear that the persistent indications of US willingness to end
the air raids if the Vietnamese Communists take reciprocal action
have helped maintain popular and official support for the United States
throughout much of the Far East. Overall support in the Far East
has, in fact, increased in the wake of the US peace efforts made since
late 1965. This change can be readily seen in Japan, where the develop-
ment of popular and official attitudes on the air raids has been fairly
typical of independent Asian opinion.
The Japanese Government has approved of American efforts to
hold the line in Southeast Asia since the initial US involvement in the
Vietnam war. However, negative attitudes on the war among the
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Japanese people have compelled Tokyo to refrain from professing
unqualified support for Washington. In public, Japanese leaders have
tended to explain their support in terms of the US-Japan security rela-
tionship rather than in terms of Japan's own national interest. The
Japanese press, the socialists, and labor have been highly critical of
US policy and have attempted to marshal public opinion against the air
attacks. There was some fear among the Japanese public, even prior
to the beginning of the sustained bombings in late February 1965, that
the escalation of hostilities might involve Japan.
The Japanese Foreign Minister told the Diet on 10 August 1964 that
the government believed the Tonkin. Gulf crisis had been initiated by the
North Vietnamese. However, a large segment of the public apparently
felt that the United States had over-reacted against its tiny adversary
and was uneasy about the possibility of a larger conflict.
The Japanese Government supported the program of sustained US
airstrikes in North Vietnam which began early in 1965, but its leaders
were clearly uncomfortable over their policy. During Diet interpella-
tions on 8 February, Prime Minister Sato stated that he considered
the airstrikes limited in scope and hoped the war would not be expanded.
Japanese press and radio reactions were generally negative.
Sato continued to cautiously support US policies in Vietnam follow-
ing the renewal of the airstrikes after the May 1965 pauses. However,
many of his party members privately expressed strong reservations
about the effectiveness of the strikes. By early summer, criticism of
US Vietnam policies was very widespread and acerbic. The B?-52
strike by Okinawa-based planes on 28 July sharpened fears that Japan
would become involved in the war as a result of its defense ties with
the United States.
The situation began to change somewhat during the last few months
of 1965. There was a slow but steady improvement of Japanese public
attitudes toward the US involvement in Vietnam during the autumn,
partly as a result of US efforts to publicize its objectives in Vietnam.
The December--January pause in the bombing produced an even sharper
shift of popular opinion in favor of the United States. Japanese officials
were sympathetic to the resumption of the airstrikes, which they felt
had been prompted by the Communists' failure to respond to US peace
initiatives. The restrained manner in which the bombing was re-
sumed together with the continued American diplomatic offensive for
negotiations tended to counter adverse reactions. During 1966,
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Japanese popular attitudes toward US policy in Vietnam remained greatly
improved, compared with early 1965. Fears that the war might expand
into a major US=China conflict seemed to have subsided somewhat as
confidence in US restraint and moderation increased.
Japanese officials publicly minimized the prospect that the US bomb-
ing of the petroleum installations near Haiphong and Hanoi would result
in a general expansion of US military action in Vietnam. Prime Minister
Sato stated his belief that the raids had been limited to military targets
and that the United States would not deviate from this policy. Popular
protests over the POL attacks came almost entirely from leftist groups.
The modest impact of the Hanoi-Haiphong strikes on the general public
was apparently attributable to popular boredom with the war. Press
comment was more regretful than condemnatory in tone and reiterated
hopes for a negotiated settlement.
The reaction in Japan and the situation in other Far Eastern coun-
tries suggest that a continued gradual escalation of the air war in North
Vietnam, so long as it involves primarily military or related economic
targets and does not result in demonstrably high civilian casualties,
will probably not cause a significant change in current official and
popular attitudes in the Far East.
A representative selection of popular opinion on US policy in
Vietnam in major cities of the Far East in July 1965 is given in the
following tabulation:
City -
Manila
Seoul
Bangkok
Kuala Lumpur
Singapore
Tokyo
Approve
Disapprove
No Opinion or Unaware
49
3
48
47
4
49
45
8
47
19
12
69
10
6
84
6
38
56
This sampling probably represents the high point of the opposition to
the raids since, as indicated above, there has been some moderation
in opinion during 1966? These questions were asked: ''Do you approve
* No representative sampling of popular opinion specifically on the
raids against North Vietnam is available. The sampling above was ob-
tained by USIA and is taken from its publication US Standing in World-
wide Public Opinion, 1965. A similar sampling for 1966 is not avail-
able.
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