TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR STUDY ON THE STRENGTH CAPABILITIES AND STRATEGIC INTENTIONS OF THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T02095R000300040001-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 22, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 1, 1966
• Content Type: REPORT

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TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR STUDY ON THE STRENGTH
CAPABILITIES AND STRATEGIC INTENTIONS OF
THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS
Taking the DRV, the PAVN and the Viet Cong movement
in South Vietnam as component parts of a single whole
directed and controlled by the Politburo of the Lao Dong
Party in Hanoi, and within this conceptual framework:
(1) To assess the Vietnamese Communists' total
military and political strength;
16
(2) To assess their capabilities for sustaining
' theira dgmpafgn of -~ insiurgen,t pressurd-- in Sbiith: Vi:et-
G nam against
(a) Present levels of U.S., allied and
GVN force commitment;
(b) Increased U.S., allied and GVN force
commitments presently planned or programmed;
(3) Assess the Vietnamese Communists' intentions
in the broad sense of gauging their will or deter-
mination to persevere in their present strategy of
armed insurrection involving the extensive applica-
tion of military force;
(4) To identify those areas of physical vulner-
ability or attitude--i.e., "pressure points"--which
could affect the Vietnamese Communists' overall will
or determination to persevere in the struggle.
The purpose of this study is to frame an assessment
of the struggle in South Vietnam as it is seen in Com-
munist eyes to serve as the basis for an assessment of
the Communist strategic intentions and their degree of
confidence in their present strategy. In essence, the
study will constitute an effort to compile the best
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
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possible body of factual evidence and interpretive analysis
to clarify the central issue of Communist morale, will and
determination at all levels--from all echelons of the
PAVN/VC force structure engaged in combat in South Viet-
nam to the Lao Dong Politburo in Hanoi.
This study will focus on Communist intentions and
attitudes through the late spring of 1967, i.e., from
the present time through one complete campaign cycle.
This study will be complementary to and will draw
on the findings of three other works presently in
train:
(1) NIE 14.3-66: "North Vietnamese Military
Potential for Fighting in South Vietnam," due for
USIB consideration by mid-June 1966.
(2) A CIA/ORR analysis of "Enemy Logistics
Within South Vietnam" which will be completed in
time for its results to be incorporated in this
study.
(3) A CIA/ORR analysis of "The Present
Functioning and Mobilization Potential of the
North Vietnamese Economy," which also will be
completed in time for its results to be incor-
porated in this study.
QUESTIONS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM
Resources and Capabilities
1. What are the total resources (manpower, economic,
hardware, etc.) available to the Vietnamese Communists
for commitment to their insurgency campaign?
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a. Resources available within North Vietnam.
b. Resources available in Laos.
c. Resources available to the Communists
within South Vietnam.
d. Resources not available within North or
South Vietnam but presently supplied by Communist
allies (e.g., SAMs, aircraft, 7.62 mm ammunition,
etc.).
2. What Communist resources have already been
committed to the insurgency campaign?
3. Resource requirement analysis:
a. Net marginal availability of required
resources.
b. Net marginal resupply capability (with
analysis adjusted to account for stockpiles and
caches).
c. Net in-country (South Vietnam) resupply
and support capability.
4. What are the combat capabilities of Vietnamese
Communist forces?
a. What will be the influence on such
capabilities of--or the limits imposed by such
capabilities on--variations in the level or
intensity of combat?
b. How.will these capabilities be affected
by variations in the size or strength of opposing
forces (U. S., allied and GVN)?
5. What are the Communists' capabilities for
political subversion in South Vietnam?
a. Indigenous manpower resources available.
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b. Potency of Communist propaganda themes.
c. Effectiveness of the Communist political
apparatus.
d. The extent and nature of Communist in-
fluence over the South Vietnamese rural population.
e. The net political effect of urban ferment
and unrest and degree of Communist participation
therein.
Other Factors
6. What is the influence and net effect of the
Soviet and Communist Chinese involvement with the
Vietnamese Communists' campaign?
7. How do the Vietnamese Communists assess the
effect on their plans and capabilities of such factors
as the international political climate, U. S. domestic
politics, Cambodian attitudes, and the public posture
of the National Liberation Front?
8. What is the Vietnamese Communists' overall
assessment of where they now are in their campaign
compared with where (in, say, 1959) they wanted or
expected to be in the spring of 1966? How are they
influenced by comparisons made with or lessons learned
from the Franco-Viet Minh war of 1946-1954?
9. What is the Vietnamese Communists' near term
political and military strategy? What are their goals
and objectives during the remainder of 1966? During
the first half of 1967?
10. What is the state of Vietnamese Communist
morale? How is the course of the war regarded and what
strategic or policy differences or frictions exist within
the Vietnamese Communist movement at all levels including:
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a. Viet Cong sympathizers in South Vietnam.
b. Viet Cong partisans and irregulars.
c. Viet Cong village and district forces.
d. Viet Cong provincial forces.
e. Viet Cong regional forces.
f. PAVN forces in South Vietnam.
g. The PRP hierarchy in South Vietnam.
h. The NLF hierarchy in South Vietnam.
i. The Communists' major tactical headquarters
(COSVN--and, perhaps, MRV) in South Vietnam.
j. The PAVN in North Vietnam.
k. The Lao Dong apparatus, in North Vietnam.
1. The North Vietnamese people.
M. The Lao Dong Politburo.
11. At what physical or psychological points are the
Communists most vulnerable to externally applied pressures?
This would include an analysis of the total effect and
implications of:
a. Casualties.
c. physical damage (e.g., to North Vietnamese
industrial installations).
d. Stockpiles and weapons losses.
e. Denial or interdiction of infiltration/
logistic routes.
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12. Taking all factors and available evidence into
account, what conclusions can be drawn or estimates made
concerning the Vietnamese Communists' strategic inten-
tions, their confidence in victory, and their determina-
tion to persevere?
APPENDIX
Attached to the main study and its supportirg statistical
analyses and tables will be an historical appendix reviewing
the Asian (particularly Chinese) Communist attitude and.
practice on negotiations. This will include an analysis
of the fight/talk/fight/talk sequence of the Communists'
relations with the Nationalists (KMT) during the 1930's
and 1940's and a detailed examination of the Korean
experience in 1952 and 1953 and the Vietnamese experience
in 1954. The focus of this study will be a quest for
indicators: objective elements in a politico/military
situation which, in the past, have impelled the Communists
to negotiate;,and signals emitted when they are on the
verge of adopting a negotiating tactic.
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