COMMUNIST MILITARY DELIVERIES TO CAMBODIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T02095R000200050001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 56
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 22, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 1, 1970
• Content Type: REPORT

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 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP78T02095R000200050001-1
Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
Communist Deliveries To Cambodia For The VC/NVA
Forces In South Vietnam, December 1966 - April 1969
Secret
ER IM 70-188
December 1970
Copy No.
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP78T02095R000200050001-1
 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000200050001-1
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000200050001-1
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000200050001-1
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
December 1970
Communist Deliveries To Cambodia
For The VC/NVA Forces In South Vietnam
December 1966 - April 1969
Introduction
In September 1970 this Agency published ER
IN 70-126, New Evidence On Military Deliveries To
Cambodia: December 1966-April 1969, which pre-
sented our preliminary analysis of documentary
evidence on the flow of military supplies to VC/NVA
forces via the port of Kompong Som (Sihanouk-
ville). Since the publication of IM 70-126, CIA
has received and made available to the community
more than 12,000 pages of additional documenta-
tion providing detailed and highly reliable data
on the scope and nature of the Communists'
logistic activities carried out through Cambodia
to support VC/NVA forces in South Vietnam.
A special task force set up to exploit these
documents has completed its validation and analysis
of the new evidence, and this memorandum is the
first product resulting from that effort. This
memorandum presents revisions of the estimates
made in IN 70-126 of the volume of military sup-
plies delivered via Sihanoukville from December
1966 to April 1969 as well as new data on some
overland deliveries via Laos. In addition, the
memorandum presents data on the share of these
supplies that the Cambodian Army (FARK) received
Note: This memorandum was produced soZeZy by CIA.
It was prepared by the Office of Economic Research
and was coordinated with the Office of Current
Intelligence, the Office of National Estimates, and
the Director's Special Assistant for Vietnamese
Affairs.
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as its 'cut' from these deliveries. Finally, the
memorandum presents estimates of the delivery of
supplies to border areas where they were turned
over to the Communists.
nesearch currently under way on various aspects
of the Cambodian supply operation will be published
as separate memoranda. These memoranda will deal
with such subjects as the organizational arrange-
ments for the supply operations, the relationship
of deliveries to requirements and stockpiles, the
procurement of non-military supplies, and the finan-
cial costs of the Cambodian supply operation.
Background
1. Beginning in early 1966, Cambodia became
an active participant in Chinese Communist pro-
grams for the provision of supplies to Communist
forces operating in southern II, III, and IV Corps
in South Vietnam. With the cooperation of the
highest officials in government, an extensive
logistical supply system was developed to channel
a broad range of supplies to Communist base camp
areas in Cambodia and food to Communist forces in
southern Laos.
2. In its initial form, the system began
operating in February 1966 and until December of
that year was geared only to the purchase of food-
stuffs, principally salt and rice, on the Cambodian
market for shipment to Communist forces. A second
element of the system was introduced on 9 December
1966 with the influx of 273 tons of Chinese small
arms and ammunition overland via Laos to Stung
Treng for immediate transshipment to VC/NVA base
camps in Cambodia. On 23 December, the Chinese-
flag ship He Ping arrived at Sihanoukville and
discharged 1,567 tons of military cargo. This
shipment, the first of ten deliveries, marked the
opening of the so-called "Sihanoukville Route."
As such it was the cornerstone of what was to be-
come over time an elaborate and sophisticated
logistical system.
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3. The functioning of the Sihanoukville Route
was a model of simplicity and efficiency. Alerted
to the imminent arrival of a Chinese ship, Cam-
bodian officials set in motion procedures to
ensure the rapid unloading of the vessel. Under
FARK supervision, the cargoes were then moved by
truck convoy to a storage depot at Kompong Speu
for eventual transshipment to Communist forces.
Shipments to base camp areas were based on trans-
port plans forwarded to Cambodian authorities by
a VC/NVA official stationed in Phnom Penh. These
transport plans would be revised periodically to
reflect the changing levels of activity supported
by each base camp.
Volume of Chinese Deliveries to Sihanoukville
4. Between December 1966 and April 1969, ten
Chinese Communist ships delivered about 29,900 tons
of cargo to Sihanoukville. As shown in Table 1,
21,600 tons of military supplies and 5,333 tons
of non-military supplies-were for VC/NVA forces.*
Of the remaining 2,960 tons, about 1,679 tons and
459 tons represented the FARK cut of military and
non-military supplies., respectively, and 822 tons
were legitimate aid deliveries to FARK (see
Table 2).** The volume of total cargo excludes
an undetermined amount of ordnance that probably
was delivered aboard the You Yi in July 1969.
Reports from other clandestine sources specify
that this ship delivered over 400 tons of ammuni-
tion for FARK and an equal amount for the VC/NVA.
The new data, however, fail to substantiate this
information.
* Non-military supplies include all items of
food, medicine, and clothing. Military supplies
include all other items and are broken down into
ordnance (including explosives, chemicals, bombs,
weapons, ammunition, napalm, etc.) and non-
ordnance.
** The new evidence clearly shows that the Ji
Ning on its arrival in Sihanoukville on 23 August
1967 carried only foodstuffs. The arms tonnage
attributed to the Ji Ning in IM 70-126 was, in
fact, delivered by the You Yi, which arrived in
Sihanoukville on 23 October 1967.
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