COMMENTS ON ADAMS MEMORANDUM, 'THE COMMUNISTS' COMBAT STRENGTH IN CAMBODIA,' 11 APRIL 1972

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T02095R000100080004-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 12, 2005
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: April 21, 1972
• Content Type: MF

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21 April 1972
MLZJORANDUN FOR Assistant Deputy Oirector for Intelligence
SUBJECT
Coatments or Adams Memorandum, The
Communists Combat Strength in Cama)odia,"
11 April 1972
1. The princia,a1 new issue probably is the 20,000
VC/VA troops Sam judges to be missing from the combat OB.
Part of. this quantity (5,000) is attributed to units
carried understrengtn. Sam provides no evidence on this,
but we believe we have made adequate provision for unit
strengths. (See comments on infiltration below.)
2. The larger portion of the difference (15,000) is
based on his estimate that large numbers of battalion-size
and smaller units are omitted from the OB. I would doubt
that any omissions involve considerably fewer personnel than
Sam auggests and, in any event, will have :ake a
look at the evidence, as he did at the time of am's attack
on his RC estimate.
3. I think Sam errs by not properly analyzing the
structure and missions of various portions of tae OB. For
example, he shows quite an array of combat units (7 battalions
and others) subordinate to MR C-20 where we don't carry any.
Our analyst was inclined to the view that the evidence ano
logic aointed to a support role for C-20. Just today, a
document snowing one of Sam's missing combat battalions to
Lie a transport unit arrived. Both C-10 and C-20 are likely
s,n.,port organizations given their areas of responsibility.
4. Aggregate numbers aside, Sam nas also icnorod the
ocuaaizatIonal structure of tae Vietnamese Communist forces
4hen he defines the NVA threat to South Vietnam from Cambodia
o, Paraa 2. Thi2, he quantifies as more than 75,000 composed
of the 30,000-35,000 in our OB, his 20,000 add on, plus
25,000 of the infiltrators as though men deployed an fought
in hoards rather than units. Whatever we mignt add to the
OE from Sam's eviecnce on battalions and small units would
not ;;e a part of the mobile strike forces now attacking
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South Vietnam but local security forces protecting the rear.
Sam provides no evidence at all that our estimates of these
strike forces are not sound.
5. As far as the local and regional security functions,
including the need to worry about FANK, are concerned, Sam
exnibits a woefully inadequate treatment of the evidence
and uncierstanaing of capabilities when he said that tac KC
"probably aave more than enough men to mina the store in
Cambodia, even if most VC/NVA soldiers cross the border."
Out of their much needed resources, the VC/NVA have built a
series of regional regimental structures to back up the
local forces wno arer:g_w_a?lisome VC/NVA cadre. This we
explain carefully in paper. Our treatment of the
OB has been shown to e correct during the current offensive.
The mobile strike forces we describe are the ones attacking;
the regional and local forces are performing their security
functions as expected.
6. The question of the impact on OB of infiltration groups
sent to COSVN needs illumination. Adams suggests that 25,000
of the 33,000 troops estimated to be destined for COSVN are
combat troops which should be added to the combat OB. Even if
we accept the notion that 25,000 are combat troops, his
assumption that all would be destined for Cambodia-based
units ignores the fact that COSVN infiltrators are allocated
not only to Cambodia but GVN 1.10s 3 and 4 as well. He also
assumes that combat infiltrees should be immediately added to
the OB -- in tais case, even prior to the arrival of some of
them. This ignores the dynamics of the OB and infiltration
metnodologies, the former developing CN post estimates and
the latter ex ante prediction. Even after an infiltration
group has arrived at its eestination, it will not be counted
in the combat 03 unless it is part of a new organic unit. Same
of the combat filler troops move fairly quickly ineo combat
units to replace losses incurred during the erevious dry season
and some are held in recovery/replacement regiments to cover
anticipated losses.
7. During the current dry season, nevertheless, we have
already accounted for an increase of 10,000 in the Cambodia-
based VC/NVA combat OB owing to infiltration. The deployment
of the 271st Inuependent Regiment through the infiltration
pii,eline caused a 5,000 increase in the OB weich was inclueeei
in the OLH paper. This rather "fat" increase for the regiment
Was partly intended to reflect additional regular group
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infiltration. Since the paper was prepareCi, we hove, in effect,
increased the VC/NVA Cambodia OB by adding 5,000 to the GVN
FR 3 OB to account for Cambodia-based forces decicying into
South Vietnam -- without reuucin the Cambodia OB. This was
done to refloct the continuing high level if infiltration to
COZVW. With 10,000 uf these 25,000 already accounted for
in the 03, tne diposition of the remaining 15,000 is as yet
unclear. Because of tne high level of casualties in the
current fighting, the 15,000 may well vanish as far as OB is
concerned.
Chief
South Vietnam Branch
Indochina Division .
;27*.
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