THE ATTRITION STUDY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T02095R000100060003-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 6, 2008
• Sequence Number: 3
• Content Type: MF

Annrnved For Release 2008/1n/n6 ? C;IA-RDP78Tn2n95Rnnn1nnn6nnn3-n
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301
\~1\ THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
-MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
SUBJECT: The Attrition Study
1. The attached study has been prepared by CIA, DIA
and the Joint Staff.
2. The conclusions of the study are:
a. The North Vietnamese'have about 50 thousand
troops in organized units in their existing force
structure which can be sent to South Vietnam (SVN) now.
It is entirely possible that some of this force, which
is the equivalent of four divisions, is already in SVN.
b. Taking what looks like the worst possible
case for the enemy in terms of expected losses in the
South, coupled with the need to maintain eight division
equivalents in North Vietnam (NVN) for defense of the
homeland, NVN can meet total manpower requirements over
the next 24 months. At the end of that, period they will
have an uncommitted manpower reserve of 200 to 250,000
able-bodied military age males over and above the
annual draft class of 120,000.
c. Training will be abbreviated and leadership
will be provided in large part through battlefield
commissions. This should cause a significant degradation
in the quality of fighting units, but it is not possible
to measure precisely what the short'term impact would be.
JCS review completed.
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3.-The following developments or actions could change
the estimate to a point where NVN probably could not meet
the manpower requirement within the two year time frame:
a. A relaxation of restraints governing the
attack of military targets dispersed in populated areas
would cause some additional casualties in the North but
more importantly would create additional requirements
for supply, transport, and damage repair. The attached
estimate does not take into account manpower losses from
sheer inefficiency through dislocation and disruption,
stemming from the bombing campaign, or increases in
population control problems in a security conscious
state.
b. A sharp reduction in Viet Cong (VC) recruiting
in the South, stemming from a marked change in political
attitudes of the population, against the VC.
believes they will pay off. It is simply not credible
that NVN would be able to continue until the last able-
bodied man had been committed. Weighing the costs of
c. Of course, ground operations in NVN would
significantly raise the military attrition rate.
4. Conversely, prolonged cessation of bombing would
release additional troops and the labor force now
involved in anti-aircraft defense, repair activities and
transport. Something like 100,000 to 150,000 able
bodied males would be thus released after essential, repair
and reconstruction activities have been completed.
5. In the absence of actions or developments to
increase attrition, the arithmetic does not support a
hope that a pure attrition battle can be won in two
years. Nevertheless, the prospect of continuing heavy
losses cannot be attractive to the enemy unless he
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 protracted war, it may well be that he intends to bring
the contest to final issue long before two years have
gone by. If this is the case, and there is increasing
evidence to support it, he may have already organized
and trained larger forces than we know from the 1/2
million manpower reserve.available to him now. If this
turns c'-+-- to be the case and if 1968 is the year of
decisiu,. - then long term attrition estimates are not
meaningful except as they may have influenced his
decision to go for the main chance now.
rate which if it continues, would produce losses of
approximately 300,000 men in SVN: This high loss rate
is the consequence of his offensive strategy, the
forward deployment of his main forces and his effort
to achieve a maximum impact in a short period of time.
From a purely military standpoint we do not believe
that he can absorb such losses over'a protracted period
of time and maintain the level of battlefield effective-
ness required to pursue this strategy and attain his
goals. Putting it another way we do not believe he can
maintain unit integrity and effectiveness in forward
exposed offensive action over a protracted period (two
years). Some of the consequences of a 300,000 per
year casualty rate would be:
a. His organized more .or less full time fighters
would suffer something like 100% attrition in the South
each year.
in 1963 - then raw attrition is only one of his
problems. An immediate problem he faces is the
relationship between his.strategy and his losses.
1968 he has been losing men.(both NVA and VC) at a
6. On the other hand if he seeks to retain the
option for protracted war - as a hedge against failure
b. In two years the fighting forces in the
South would beat least 75% North Vietnamese whereas
friendly, forces would be 60% South Vietnamese.
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7.-If he does not throw his entire force into a final
climactic battle, regardless of casualties we believe he
will be forced back into his bases by allied offensive
operations. This process is at least partially underway
now. He will sally forth on a selective basis, but the
basic dile.,uaa he would face in the long run will not
change. If he chooses to withdraw his main mobile
forces from the populated areas Or is forced out by
allied action:
a. Pressure on the GV& will be relieved and it
will continue to gain strength.'
b. Pressure on the RVNAF will be relieved and
it will gain strength and effectiveness.
c. Enemy access to the population will decrease
and his recruiting will fall off.
d. The effectiveness of his cadre will diminish
as he pressure on it increases.
e. His hope for an uprising will disappear.
8. His long term military prospects on the ground
in SVN against allied forces are not good. His best
hope is that through spectacular attacks, even at very
high cost in casualties, he can create the short term
image of success on his side and the image of hopeless-
ness on our side. If, additionally, he can bring about
a collapse of confidence in the GVN through such military
action "or negotiations he will have achieved his: goal.
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~Sgd~ EARLE G. WU LFLER
EARLE G. WHEELER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of.Staff
TOP SEC ET
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THE ATTRITION OF VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST FORCES, 1968-1969
30 MARCH 1968
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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 That recruitment and impressment in South Vietnam will
e adequate to provide manpower at an average monthly rate of.
. ' s4.: - LDA I
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THE ATTRITION OF VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST FORCES, 1968-1969
ASSUMPTIONS
We have approached the complex problem of determining the.
ability of the Vietnamese Communists to withstand manpower attrition
by constructing a hypothetical model of what could reasonably be
viewed as a "worst case" situation for Hanoi. This approach is
based on the fact that if the Communists have adequate manpower
to meet the hypothetical "worst case" requirements during 1968 and
1969, then they can meet any lesser requirement resulting from
the actual course of events. Our assumptions, therefore, are not
offered as estimate judgments of the probable course of events
during 1968 and 1969, but are presented as reasonable structural
components of a "worst case" model.
In accordance with this approach we are basing our calcula-
tions on the following assumptions:
a. That the level of combat will be significantly higher
than that of 1967 but less than that during the first quarter
of 1968. .
b. That manpower requirements must be met completely from
resources within North Vietnam and South Vietnam, with no
manpower. inputs from third countries, e.g., China or volunteers
from other Communist countries.
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~iitraV.-GJ._ __?.~:. .._.".~. .. 17_ ....
r_..._ ;c. by ast:....`1 Dap .c es of he .'i.icn S,' ;i :...
e. ~l+i1G t t'ae Corritiunists :'have an insui'C'ancy base _.^. i..iV
ran of J00,000 persons and that they will attempt to
ma -fain z;na.s assumed base at this level.
f. The level of air attacks against NVN, and he
associated requirement. for air defense will be based on
exp e.'ier.ce in the third quarter 1967.
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The North. Vietnamese are estimated to have about
4T5,000 men in the Armed Forces and another 400.9000 in the
militia/security forces today. Of this force some 115-130,000
are deployed out-of-country. About-300,000 are considered
necessary to provide for defense of the homeland. This defense
force includes basically six infantry divisions, air and coastal
defense forces, and command and logistics elements. Thus, a
I: ?Manpower Requirements
A. Military Forces
(1) North Vietnam
force of about 50,000 or It division equivalents would be available
100, 000 persons.
The North Vietnamese component of this base is from 85,000 to
(3) South Vietnam
VC/NVA forces in South Vietnam have probably developed
a total insurgency base in the general range of 500,000 persons.
for out-of-country deployment during 1968.
(2) Laos
The North Vietnamese military forces in Laos total
about 30,000. They are a part, of the NVA and are counted in the
NVN total. Pathet Lao forces have remained.in Laos and are not
.considered in this analysis.
Civilian Labor Force
The North Vietnamese civilian labor force totals 9.8.,'
shown in our,
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 /-XNNI UvCu rUI RCICQJC LUUO/ I U/UU . l,IP1-RVr 1 0 I U4UV:JR000 I UUUUUUUJ-U
figwres as militia. About 200,000 full-time workers are assigned
to essential war related work such as bomb damage repair, the
maintenance and operation of LOC's, and logistics activities.
Of the remaining 9.2 million people we estimate that 8.7
million are necessary to maintain economic activity at its normal
levels. Thus about 500,000 persons may be regarded as a potential
manpower pool which can be diverted to other activities without
excessive disruption to the economy.
We estimate that the North Vietnamese labor force cdntains
about 1 million males in the,17 to 35 age group that are physically
fit for military service.
are believed to be physically fit for military service. More
North Vietnam also maintains a civilian labor force of
about 20,000 persons engaged in LOC construction and repair
activities in Laos.
II. Manpower Availabilities
North Vietnam has a population of about,18.7 million people
of which about 2.8 million males are believed to.be between the
ages of 17 and 35. Of these draft age males, about 1.5 million
.17, and it is believed that at least 120,000 of these are
than one million of these have yet to be drafted.
In addition every year about 200,000 males reach the age of,,
physically fit for military service.
of. these can be drafted each year.
We have assumed that 100,000
We have previously stated that a total of 500,000 males can
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be drawn from the labor force. If we add to them the 200,000
that can be drafted during 1968 and 1969, a total of 700,000
persons can be diverted to the milit,;.ry service.
III. Manpower Losses
A. South Vietnam
Our calculations postulate that the insurgency base in
South Vietnam will be attrited at a rate of 300,000 a year during
1968 and 1969. This figure' is based on an assumed :Loss of 800
men per day from all causes -- killed, died of wounds, disabled,
died of sickness, deserted, defected and captured. It is a
compromise between the assumed enemy casualties if the enemy
should revert to a 1965-1967 style protracted war, and the
considerably higher casualties.he would sustain if he continued
the forward deployment which he adopted after the failure of the
Tet offensive.
B. In Laos
We have almost no firm knowledge of the attrition ex-'
perienced by enemy forces in ta.6s. For the purpose of this
estimate we have assumed that the forces in Laos will be attrited
at about 15 percent of force levels for annual losses of about
5,000 personnel during 1968 and 1969.
C. In North Vietnam
It is assumed that the North Vietnamese will lose.
approximately 10 percent a year, or 45,000, though normal administra
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? ~~~;c.Ll I I
.D. Summary
South Vietnam
Laos
North Vietnam'
1968
1969
Total
IV. Manpower Replacement
A. South Vietnam
300,000
5,000
45,000
350, 000
350,000
700,000
Capabilities
We are assuming that the Viet Cong will be successful
during 1968 and 1969 in recruiting at'an annual level of 85,000
persons and thus calculate that the remaining 215,000'men
required to replace total enemy manpower losses in South Vietnam
Vietnam. In addition, North
Vietnam must provide an additional 50,000 persons to meet losses
in North. Vietnam and in Laos.
B. North Vietnam
We believe that in addition to its annual population
increments that yield about 120,000 physically fit males of draft
age, North Vietnam has a manpower slack in both its military and
civilian forces.
In the existing military structure there are about 50,000
'troops, or the,equivalent of 4 divisions,. that could be deployed
to the South during 1968 without reducing NVN forces below the
levels necessary for defense of the homeland. Such deployment would
.be a one=shot movement azd could not be duplicated in 1969.-
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We calculate that North Vietnam would have to draw down
the surplus elements of its civilian labor force to makeup any
shortfalls not covered by annual drafts or the movement of
existing military units.
As we see the situation North Vietnam would be able to
obtain manpower to replace losses in the following numbers:
Military Deployment
1968 1969
100,000 100, 000
50, 000 --
Draw-down from Civilian
labor Force 115, 000 165, 000
Total 265,000 265,000
In each year 50,000 of the 265,000 would be required to
replace.losses in North Vietnam and iri Laos, and 215,000 would
have to be infiltrated into South Vietnam.
Our figures indicate that the drain on the civilian labor
force would increase from about 115,000 men in 1968 to 165,000
men in 1969. The cumulative drain of 280,000 men is just over
55 percent of our calculation of surplus labor in North Vietnam.
V. Training
The current national estimate of the North Vietnamese capa-
.. bility to train 75,000 to 100,000 men a year for infiltration was
based on an analysis of reports and all source data of the number
of units associated with this training and'our estimate of their
,.requirements. At that time, the identifiable training base
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consisted of six infantry divisions associated with infiltration
training. Airborne, artillery, officer/NC0 training, and specialists
were trained by other appropriate organizations, schools, and
the basic six divisions. In addition, some of the higher or
would have had some prior basic training.
three months. The two training groups are rated at,6,000 each..
On this basis, 145,000'to l?5,000 recruits can be trained each
year. By shortening the training cycle or expanding the base an
additional 50,000 to 60,000 recruits could be trained.
Replacements for the NVN forces in-country are considered to
be absorbed in the existing units although there may be some
provisions for basic training prior to joining the units. For
instance, replacements taken from the militia or other reserves
specialized training is provided by Communist advisors both in
country and in their homelands.
Subsequently, some of the divisions were redeployed and
they no longer provide infiltration training. An analysis of
the most recent data has revealed that the North Vietnamese-'are
now employing four divisions and two training groups for basic
infiltration training and that, for the most part, they have
.retained the three month training cycle.
It is estimated that each division (2/3 training,-1/3 regular
duties) can assimilate, equip, and train 6,000 to 8,000 recruits every.
The most important manpower problem is the adequacy of-
available leadership. The quality of the leadership,. officer.
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SECELET
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and NCO, has declineasthe cemand has increased. Officer and NCO
schools have been shortened from two years to eight months. The
largest single source of junior officers is now believed to be
from battlefield commissions. The decline in standards and
training, however, is offset to a considerable extent by the type
.organizations being deployed south and the absence of requirements
for more sophisticated equipment. Basically the VC/NVA is an
individual weapon, man pack army which uses equipment easily
adaptable to the individual soldier. In the North, the training
demands generated by more sophisticated equipment have been met
by provision of'foreign training at home and abroad.
Summation
In conclusion, we have examined North Vietnam's
manpower resources under a set of "worst case" assumptions
designed to maximize the attrition of the.enemy's forces.
It.is clear that even under this "worst case", that Hanoi
retains the capability of meeting all of its manpower,
requirements. Since the attrition assumed in our model
is at an unusually high level we believe that the enemy
will be fully capable of meeting the lesser requirements
more likely to'result from the actual course of events.
Thus, we'conclude that manpower is not a factor. limiting
,Hanoi's ability,to continue with the war.
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BACK-UP SHEETS
~(ll,~i?y~-
A. North Vietnamese Order of Battle
B. Insurgency Base
C. Breakdown of Civilian Labor Force
D. War-Related labor Forces
Enemy Losses in South Vietnam DIA
North Vietnamese Personnel Losses in North Vietnam DIA
G. Surplus Labor Force CIA
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 l.' r
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TAB A.
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NORTH VIETI1TAMESE ORDER OF BATTLE
As of 1 April it was estimated that the strength of the regular
North Vietnamese Army was on the order of 475,000 men. The Army
includes the following major forces:
NORTH VIETNAM IN-COUNTRY STRENGTH - 360,000
Infantry Divisions
Artillery Divisions
Anti-Aircraft Artillery Command (12 Regiments)
Infantry Brigades
2
Independent Infantry Regiments.
6
Independent AAA Regiments
85
Armored Command (2 Regiments)
Surface-to-Air Missile Battalions
25-30 .
Plus other Rear Services, support, headquarters, and
miscellaneous support and replacement units.
NORTH VIETNAMESE FORCES IN LAOS
30,000
This figure is broken down into 14,000 combat troops and .16,000
additional personnel engaged in engineer and rear services support
activity as well as the maintenance of infiltration routes'and
stations.
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NORTH VIETNAMESE STRENGTH IN SOUTH VIETNAM - 85,000-100,000
Front Headquarters
2
Divisions
9
Regiments
37
Battalions
144
Total North Vietnamese Force
in NVA Units
73,000*
Within North Vietnam seven of the 10 infantry divisions are
estimated to be at their full TO strength of 12,500 men. These
are the 308th, 312th, 316th, 324th, 325th, 330th, and 350th
Divisions. Two other North Vietnamese Divisions --? the 304th and
320th -- are carried at garrison strengths of 3,000 men each. The
bulk of these two divisions entered South Vietnam in January of this
year. One other division -- the 341st -- is believed to be under-
strength by at least one regiment which recently infiltrated into
South Vietnam. Information available on the 341st Division is of
uncertain validity, however, and its status is currently under study.
* In addition to those forces in North Vietnamese units in South
Vietnam, MACV is estimating that an additional 10-12,000 North
Vietnamese troops are integrated into Viet Cong units. Therefore,
the total NVA force in South Vietnam is on the order of 83-85,000
men. For the purpose of this paper we have assumed that the NVA
force in South Vietnam is on the order of 85-100,000 men. The
additional 15,000 men could be in various support units which have
.not yet been accepted organic to some of the divisions or Merely
in units which may be in country but which cannot be documented
within the criteria established for OB figures...-
~/a.ri+r4y.
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Of the seven infantry divisions above carried at full strength,
two -- the 324th and 325th -- have previously been carried at
garrison strength, but we believe they have now reconstituted their
units to a full TO strength of 12,500 men. The 324th Division, for
example, sent three regiments to South Vietnam in mid-1966. while the
325th Division sent three regiments south in early 1967.
It should be emphasized that the strength of various North
Vietnamese units is an estimate. There is little hard intelligence
information available as to the actual strength of any North
Vietnamese division. Moreover, there is little information available
judge with any degree of confidence-whether such units are manned
at their full TO strength. The same is true for other major
formations of the NVA listed in paragraph 1 above, with the possible
exception of anti-aircraft artillery forces, whose strength is
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themselves open to the threat of an invasion. While they might'hope
'If'the North Vietnamese were to make'such a decision, they would leave,
the political decision to do so be taken. The dispatch of most of
its division size forces would, for example, lead to a greatly
,stepped up enemy war effort along more conventional lines with its
resultant increased casualties, logistic requirements and the like.
capability to reinforce in South Vietnam with regular forces should
RATIONALE FOR NORTH VIETNAMESE HOME DEFENSIVE REQUIREMENTS
It is recognized that the North Vietnamese Army has a significant
estimated primarily on the number of guns counted'in aerial photography.
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that their regional forces and militia would. be able to bear the
initial brunt of such an invasion, they would be unable to contain
an invasion and would probably have to recall sizeable forces from
South Vietnam or invite the Chinese to defend them.
In addition, they would be stripping the North of a major
portion of the Army's training base. The deployment of such
sizeable forces would creat logistical requirements beyond their
capability to sustain them in conventional combat unless the bombing
campaign were stopped.
For the purpose of this paper, therefore, we are assuming that
a prudent North Vietnamese government faced with a threat of a
US invasion would want to maintain at least six divisions in a
position to counter any invasion. In addition, the North Vietnamese
would be prudent to have additional forces available in order to
reinforce as necessary. These forces would be needed to cope with
the threat of an Inchon type landing or an armored thrust north
of the DMZ. These forces are also necessary to provide the NVN
training base. The attached chart shows a breakdown of the forces
that the North Vietnamese would prudently maintain in-country.
The regular army forces total some 301,000 men out of the total
in-country army of some 353,000 NVA estimated to be available. Thus,
some 50,000-odd men or four division equivalents would be available
for deployment to South Vietnam in 1968. We estimate that this.
would be a one-time move on the part of the North Vietnamese'in
1968 and that they would pat~j~ bleto re eat it 1969. Obviously,
however, with their training and de ..e-' n ac and the 25X1
:possibility of reconstituting devloved fnrrps_ ii an?ld be possible
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for. the North Vietnamese to send some additional forces south in
1969 from the regular Army, but they probably could not match a four
division deployment in 1968.
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NORTH VIETNAMESE FORCES FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE
Air Force
4,200
Navy
Army
2,600
COMBAT FORCES
6 Inf.Div, 2 Inf Bde, 6 Inf Regts,
and Arty Div 120,000
AIR DEFENSE
1 AAA Div, 85 AAA Refit,
25-30 SAM Bns 96,500
OTHER
Rear Services, Command and
Administration, Bases & Depots 85,000
301,500
Total Military Forces 308,300
16,500
11 400,000 416,500
724,800
MILITARY FORCES
SECURITY FORCES
Armed Public Security Force
Militia
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ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING AN INSURGENCY BASE OF
500,000 PERSONS
The insurgency base concept includes several categories of
personnel; it includes, of course, the Communists regular military
""`?`* 6 ^` ~~~ y~1 =, . U C -U~U lue.LUU une oiitica1 infrastructure
tl
and other less formally structured groups used to support the
.insurgency.
A large portion of the infrastructure represents some of the
Communists most valuable assets in South Vietnam in term. of
keeping the insurgency alive by providing it with material and
human resources. The concept of the insurgency base includes
.the widest possible range of resources in terms of manpower.
This broad concept was chosen also because members of all
of these elements sustain casualties and must be.considered
against the 800 per day attrition rate, and in South Vietnam
against the recruitment rate.
It should be noted, however, that this model deals with losses
to the manpower base and sources for replacements, and these flows
would be of the magnitude postulated regardless of the size of
.the base,, which is being held constant.
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TAB C
BREAKDOWN OF THE CIVILIAN LABOR FORCE 25X1
,According to US Bureau of the Census estimates there are
presently about 10.4 million North Vietnamese in the 15 to 64 age
group. By excluding from this total the 475,000 in the armed
forces and the approximately 120,000 students of working age,
an estimated labor force of 9.8 million is derived. Such a
figure represents a labor-force growth rate of 2 percent per
year from the officially reported 1960 labor force figure Hof "8.1
million. This 2 percent growth rate appears reasonable in view
of the population growth rate during the period.'.
The following tabulation shows an estimate of the labor force
according to sectors of employment as of 1 ,January 1968?
Transport and communications 400
Industry (including handicrafts) 800
Agriculture 7,000
Services 800
Sector of Employment Thousands Persons
Trade
Construction
Other
Total
These figures were derived from the official 1960 labor
force breakdown figures and various statements and figures'
`announced'by the regime during the last eight years.
,25X1