EXTRACT FROM LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY (C. F. ADAMS) TO THE CHAIRMAN, INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMITTEE, DATED MARCH 22, 1932
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP78S05452A000200090003-7
Release Decision:
RIFPUB
Original Classification:
K
Document Page Count:
2
Document Creation Date:
December 27, 2016
Document Release Date:
January 28, 2013
Sequence Number:
3
Case Number:
Content Type:
MISC
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
![]() | 154.57 KB |
Body:
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/28: CIA-RDP78S05452A000200090003-7
IIP
IP
COPY
COPY
EXTRACT FROM LEIltai FROM TBE SECRETARY OF IBA: NAVY (C. F. ADAMS)
TO THE CHAIRMAN, INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMITTEE, DATED MARCH 22, 1932
If it were possible to create an absolute neutral and unbiased
world-wide international communication organization, such an organi-
zation might prove an excellent and prosperous one, despite the fact
that it would stifle competition and development in the several phases
of communications and would provide no safeguard of the public's
interests. The creation of an international communication company
that will serve all nations with the same degree of impartiality can
never be possible until after the day that nationalism and national
trade rivalries have ceased to exist.
Isz_argr...Qtee quart9rs of a century all of the great powers
of...t.he wor1s..2.1.s2so.p,t the Updtg.-d?agesx. EWITMIIIWIhe TEM777'
importance and advanta es of nati na 1
n the development of their national commerce
policies. To gairtrranaiingn-t07-EFERM-Trom the control of
communications, the great nations built up their own world-wide
systems of submarine cables, and American commerce suffered from
being left at the mercy of these foreign-owned communication systems.
With the advent of radio, the same foreign nations that controlled
the cables of the world set about and were in a fair way to obtain
world-wide control of radio. But the lessons that the United States
had learned from the foreign dominance of the cables and the dangers
from espionage and propaganda disseminated through foreign-owned
radio stations in the United States prior to and during the war
brought about the passage of the Radio Act of 1927, which was intended
to preclude any foreign dominance in American radio, the only field
for international communications that was not already dominated by
foreign interest.
The great nations of the world fully realized the tremendous im-
portance, both to commerce and national defense, of owning and
controlling their awn radio systems. Great Britain, France, Germany,
Russia, and Japan have all built up radio systems controlled either
by the government itself or by strictly national corporations, and
these countries will never consent to the injection of international
influence in their communication organizations.
Considering from a strictly national defense point of view, the
question of international ownership or dominance of American radio
companies, a few of the more salient objections should be emphasized.
? In the event of war between other nations, nationally owned companies
would be expected to scrupulously guard against committing an unneutral
Inclosure 3
COPY
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/28: CIA-RDP78S05452A000200090003-7
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/28: CIA-RDP78S05452A000200090003-7
Copy COPY
act, whereas, an international company would not only lack the same
incentive, but might even find it advantageous to perform unneutral
service. Such stations might easily be employed in espionage work
and in the dissemination of subversive propaganda.
It is not sufficient that the military forces have authority
to assume control of radio stations in war. A certain amount of
liaison between radio company executives and Department officials
responsible for Government communications is required in peace-
time. Familiarity on the part of commercial executives of American
radio companies with communication operating methods, plans and
developments of the military Departments of the Government is cer-
tainly to the best interest of the Nation. Some of these matters
are of a very secret nature. For the Navy Department to initiate
and carry out this important contact with commercial companies,
the divulging of confidential plans to directors is necessary.
This is obviously impossible with even one foreigner on the board.
International companies must have agreements between their
subsidiaries and the parent companies for a free exchange of infor-
mation. Foreign personnel are transferred from one subsidiary to
another so as to obtain intimate knowledge of the methods and
equipment employed by other branches. It is impossible for a mili-
tary service to work in close cooperation with or disclose its new
developments to an organization which has foreign affiliations of
this nature and employs foreign personnel.
With these points in mind - commercial and national defense -
and realizing the foreign dominance in cables, it must be apparent
that no truly international communication system is possible.
Nations will not agree to the relinquishing of their leadership
in any branch of the field when such factors may affect adversely,
their commerce or national defense. National ownership or control
of communication systems will continue to exist and no other prac-
tical plan for the great nations can be foreseen at the present time.
Until world conditions are changed, this Department will look with
apprehension upon any legislation which permits communication com-
panies in this country to be subject to foreign influence. Such
companies must of necessity include international companies.
- 2 -
Inclosure 3
/s/ Charles F. Adams
?
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/28: CIA-RDP78S05452A000200090003-7