Assessment of Eritrea

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78S05450A000100140003-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 23, 2002
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: April 28, 1967
• Content Type: TELEGRAM

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HANDLING INDICATOR
ASMARA, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, JIDDA, KHARTQ," MOCADIaCIO,
NAIROBI, CINCSTRIKE FOR POLAD, DOD FOR LANG '
FROM Amembassy ADDIS ABABA
REF Asmara's A-1, July
DATE: April 28;'1967
14, 1964; Asmara's A-53, April 24, 1965
I DEPARTMENT PASS AMBASSADOR HOWE
B. The Eritrean Background
?runn
DCM
POL
ATT
DAO
MAAG
USIS
ECON
D. IEG Assets and Attitu
E. ELF Strategy, Tactics
F. Present IEG Strategy
G. IEG Prospects and Opt
H. Recommended U.S. Poli
GROUP 1
Excluded from automat
and declassification.
62 DS- 323
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AMB/SRGammon:je 4/27/67
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, and Options
and Tactics vs. the ELF
is downgrading
AMB:EMKorry
Clearances:
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Addis Ababa
A. Summary
The insurgency in Eritrea with its separatist design is becoming an ever
more Pressing problem for the Ethiopian Government. The Eritrean
Liberation Front (ELF) has its origin in the areas and Empire's hetero-
genity and, colonial past. It is gathering strength, resources, determination
and sophistication. It is assisted. by military, financial and. political aid
from Moslem and., likely, Communist states, and. is bolstered, by the passivity
if not defections among Christian Eritreans ever more disenchanted with an
uncertain and. ineffectual regime.
The IEG early fumbled, its opportunity to create a basis of true integration on
a community of economic and. political interest. Instead, the IEG's technique
has unvaryingly been one of bribery, intrigue and., when in doubt, coercion.
Thus, Ethiopian ineptness and. insensitivity, growing accord among Moslems
involved. in forging an Eritrean future, Christian disillusion and. foreign
meddling, all compound to threaten the IEG capacity to maintain its hold..
Unless major changes occur in the Eritrean equation in the relatively near
future, there is a distinct possibility of loss of Eritrea to Ethiopia and of.
Kagnew Station to the United. States, of acceleration beyond, the limits of IEG
control of the centrifugal forces elsewhere in Ethiopia, and, of a major and
adverse shift in the balance of power and. influence in the Red. Sea Basin.
United States policy must take these ineluctable elements into full considera-
tion, including the relatively little room for maneuver we have between the .
IEG and. the Eritrean Liberation Front, and, the few resources we can effectively
bring to bear. Within that frame, there 'are actions which we can take, first
to reduce our immediate vulnerability in Eritrea and., second., to move the
IEG away from an overly centralized. approach to a more enlightened and
effective one which will help close the now-growing breach.
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Addis Ababa
B. The Eritrean Background
The development of an active Eritrean separatist movement stems from the
separate development of. Eritrea during 65 years of foreign rule (55 years
of Italian colonial and. 10 years of British military occupations). and from the
centralizing mission of Amhara Emperor Haile Selassie L
Although historically the maritime province had long had an uneasy connection
with Ethiopian rulers, it was a loyal province of the Tigrean Emperor
Yohannes IV prior to the Italians' arrival in the 1880's. In 1952, after 10
years of British military government and. by a characteristic UN compromise
solution ending six years of great-power wrangling, Eritrea was awarded to
Ethiopia -- but not quite. The UN decreed, that the territory be federated with
Ethiopia but enjoy complete internal autonomy, its own flag, and democratic
self-government.
The decade 1952-62 was marked. by the dissipation of the considerable degree
of support for Ethiopia among Eritreans, a change of heart and of mind that
was in large measure stimulated. by the imperfectly the federal solution
of the Emperors representatives who worked to
and to substitute incorporation of Eritrea into the Empire.
While there are those who assume that the Emperor, in keeping. with Moliere's
"un grand seigneur, mechant homme" view of the aristocrats,,,_, had an evil
design on Eritrea from the outset, detailed probing of anti-IEG Eritreans in
the Establishment are persuasive that it was not the case. Indeed., nothing in
Ethiopia of that epoch was ever planned.; it was, and largely is, a wilderness of
happenings and happenstances that provide opportunities to be seized by someone.
The most likely and, to me, acceptable explanation, is that until 1956 the
Emperor did not formulate even the adumbrations of an Eritrean policy beyond
his Federation victory at the UN.
It was his son-in-law, that delightful but rascally incarnation of Moliere's view,
Ras Andargatchew Masai and his Irnp erial spouse, Princess Tenagne Worq,
who i~ad more to do with the Eritrean tragedy than any others. Wherever the
handsome Ras has descended, he has viewed and left the locale like a plague of
locusts. The Ras with his feudal title and Imperial protection looked. upon
Eritrea as a fief to be plundered.. It was inevitable that the then young and
idealistic Tedla Beiru, head of the Unionist party and. the first Chief Minister
of Eritrea, would. challenge the free-wheeling Ras. Tedla took Federation
seriously and meant it to work; unfortunately he chose to challenge the Ras rathe,
than to use the feudal lord's avarice as a funnel for cen development
tvhe nfun ds
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Addis Ababa
the battle and that, in a society built on pillars of loyalty to the throne and.
retribution for disloyalty, he would be swung into limbo by the Ras and his
Lady.
The cunning, ruthless and. grasping Ras was fortuitously served by events in
the Red Sea Basin which aroused. the ever latent suspicions of the Emperor.
Tedla was maneuvered out of his job (and. out of Ethiopia in 1955 as Minister
to Sweden). It was in 1956 that Nasser emerged, as
balance ad tof a he dynamic Arab
unity movement; and. it was this shift in the power
which, taken together with the winds of change sweeping French North Africa
the same year, the independence of Sudan in 1956 and, the promise in 1956 of
independence to Nkrumah that finally converted. the Emperor from an "orientalist"
to his present Africanist policy.
Again, in 1962, when Nasser moved. his army into the Yemen, the Emperor
decided to counter swiftly by finalizing the incorporation of Eritrea; within
weeks, he squeezed the Eritrean Assembly into uttering its "unanimous" vote
of acquiescence.
dfor evelopments
While it woad. be foolish to ascribe to Nasser or to
what occurh ed Red.
Se a BasirltOn the African continent the entire rationale Eritrea, it would be equally mindless to ignore the general foreign political
framework in which Imperial cerebrations grind. It is not only in Eritrea that
these external developments affect Ethiopian policy and attitudes; there is
hardly a reform taken by the Emperor in his 50 years of power that did not
originate from abroad. or was not a reaction to what was ooccuurr~Ta outside
not
Ethiopia's borders. The fear of Islam is congenital among and
without reason or memory.
Whether the Emperor was prophetic or whether he engaged in self-fulfilling
hold.
prophecy is debatable. But he was unwilling to risk a less-than-comp
on Eritrea. after the emergence of Nasser's dynamic and. awakening appeal
to previously apathetic Arab and. Moslem masses throughout the Basin of the
Red Sea. Nor was or is the Emperor unaware of the tenuous Amhara hold on
his congery of minorities in the other peripheral areas of the Empire; an auto-
nor sous Eritrea would only serve as a model for their future. To a monarch
who had spent some 40 years in Centralizing (and secularizing) Ethiopia, a
Federated Eritrea would. be tempting God. and Nasser.
But if the Emperor was once again prescient,
and. ruthlessness, representatives'
serve to fulfill his prophesy.. By deviousness
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Addis Ababa
abrasively on Eritrean sensitiv ities; they spread, the infection of a national
spirit; they unwittingly amplified. the Voice of Cairo. The Emperor's complacent
lifetime belief in and, dependence on the infallibility of trickery and bribery
persuaded. him that the fat sincecures he offered. all of the abliging Assembly's
participants in the "unanimous" vote of union would. be sufficient tokeep a grip
on Eritrea. In reserve, he had a growing army and, police. But as Speaker
Reed. said. of the US acquisition of the Phillipines, "we have bought 10, 000, 000
Malays at two dollars a head. unpicked and nobody knows what it will cost to pick
them. " The Emperor and Ethiopia are now finding the bill for, the acquisition
of Eritrea is mounting.
Eritrean Christians -- nearly 40 percent (according to the Consulate General's
best estimate) of the province's 'population -- are proud, of their separate language,
Tigrinya, which they share with the neighboring province of Tigre, and convinced
of their longer history and, educational and, cultural superiority in the Amharas.
They are disgusted, with the extinction of, their self-government, even though
autonomous Eritrea was far poorer and. finicially less able (although technically
and. educationally far better qualified.) than the IEG, to promote development.
There are therefore very few Eritrean Christians still inEritrea who are
actively loyal to the IEG rule. Most are either completely passive or grumblers
against it.
Eritrean Moslems -- also about 40 percent of the population --. are persuaded.
that Ethiopian Christian rule will never give them an even break. Ethiopian
laws provide for equality of opportunity for Moslems throughout the Empire.
However, not unlike conditions in some parts of the US, these admirable laws
are a long way from being completely effective in assuring genuine equality
and freedom from social, economic and. governmental discrimination to this
large (in Eritrea) minority.
Even if the Ethiopians' performance came to match the words of their laws,
the Moslem population would, take a long time to lose their belief that they are
victimized by the dominant religious and, governing class. As is, they point
to the paucity of Moslem officials in government, dismissing the small number
extant us Tudases. They note the disproportionate scarcity of Moslem children
in the schodo, and. the dearth of secondary schools in the Moslem western and.
Red Sea lowlands, ignoring the semi-nomadic nature of the population there and
the tendency of Moslems generally to approach secular education cautiously.
They point to the requirement that "morals" be taught in the government schools
-- by Ethiopian Orthodox priests -- and to the existence of Orthodoxy as the
established State religion. Although schools in predominantly Moslem areas
are dismissed on Friday as well as Sunday, in other areas Moslem children
must make do on their Friday holy day with being dismissed .an hoer early in
the afternoon. And they ignore the pre-eminent role of Moslems in all Ethiopian
commerce.
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Addis Ababa
The primitive 20 percent pagan population of Eritrea, concentrated in the
southwest corner of the province, is completely a-political and entirely out-
side the economic and social organization of the province. As loyalty to any
government or to anything outside of tribe and family is non-existent.
With an evenly balanced Moslem-Christian population. ratio, with both groups
hostile to the Amhara hegemony, with Cairo and other Arab centers. sounding
the call to nationalism, and with Communist powers perhaps exploiting the
opportunity it is not surprising that in 1961 the group known as the'Eritrean
Liberation Front came into existence. Led by Moslems with one or two
Christian exiles as adherents,, it was established abroad even before remorse-
less erosion of the federal statute had finally destroyed the UN structure. With
the regime in Addis Ababa inured to peripheral problems, with the.new
Africanist directions of his foreign policy occupying more and more of HIM2s
time and efforts, with the dynamics of Red Sea evolution driving Ethiopia into
closer ties with Israel, with developmental efforts almost uniquely concentrated .
in Addis and its environs, with the power magnet of the capital luring more and
more of the Eritrean Christian elites into the central apparab ..-. of government,
and with Yemen, Aden and other stirring Moslem examples, the ingredients
for an insurgency were prepared.
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Addis Ababa
C. The Present Government of Eritrea
The provincial government of Eritrea is unique among Ethiopia's fourteen
provinces. It still possesses a large carryover of qualified civil
servants from Italian and especially British days, and the government
structure is immeasurably more elaborate than in any other province.
(Neighboring provinces have a Governor General, his deputy and a couple
of dozen lesser officials, mostly incompetent.) The Eritrean Government
is a miniaturized IEG, with counterpart departments for most of the Addis
ministries. There are about 10,000 employees on the government payroll
in Eritrea, but three-quarters of these are part-time or low-paid jobs--
police rank and file, messengers, doorkeepers, Janitors, street-sweepers
and the like.
There are some 370 senior civil service positions listed in the Provincial
Government Officials List. Except for 47 third country nationals,.they
are about 80 percent Eritreans (57 percent Christian Eritrean, 23 percent
Moslem Eritrean) and 20 percent Amharas or members of other non-Eritrean
tribes. (The number of Eritreans in higher IEG office outside of Eritrea,
however, far exceeds the number of "carpetbaggers" in Eritrea.) The
Amhara 20 percent are concentrated in centralized IEG agencies' Asmara
branches (IHA, IBTE), in Assab subdivision, and in the Governor General's
office.
In the military, Amharas are concentrated in the Army, Navy, and Air Force,
whose officer and enlisted ranks in Eritrea are overwhelmingly non-Eritrean.
The Police, however, are almost entirely Eritrean.
The Eritrean provincial government, being better staffed and trained than
those in other provinces, engages in more development and welfare projects
than do other provincial establishments. The IEG also provides more
development efforts in Eritrea than in any other province except that of
Shoa which includes Addis Ababa. In the last five years there have been
constructed under government auspices in Eritrea six large schools, several
hospitals, and two substantial development industries--the Massawa cement
plant and the Assab oil refinery. IBTE, EELPA, and IHA have made sub-
stantial improvements in the electrical and communications net and in
highway service and maintenance. Over ten million seedlings for.reforest-
ation have been distributed by the Agriculture Department.
The story is not all roses. The Ethiopian Development Bank has lent 1o
Eritrean-based enterprises only 10 percent of its total loans since it
opened, and these have been chiefly to large Italian-owned industries.
(In 1965 less than one percent of its loati^ for the year went to Eritrea.
1966 figures are not available.) Eighty percent of its total loans have
been in Shoa Province, i.e., Addis Ababa and environs. Similarly the
new Ethiopian Investment Corporation has also devoted only ten percent of
its loans to Eritrea, but most of this amount went to finance the IEG-
owned Massawa cement plant. Again 80 percent of the "sugar" went to sweet
Shoa.
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Addis Ababa
Eritreans, whether Christian or Moslem, believe that their province is
being exploited financially for the benefit of other areas. The province
unquestionably produces more tax and customs revenue thanit consumes.
This revenue may support the central government's expenditures for' itself
and for less prosperous provinces, in the same way that New Yorkers and
Californians help finance both Washington, D. C. and Mississippi. Without
existence of a strong national sentiment, however, this may seem intolerable
to the taxpayers. The problem is not unique to Ethiopia; Yugoslavia and
many others have experienced the North-South imbalance and have sought,
with varying success, to achieve national balance by having the richer
finance the poorer. The Emperor's view that he was compelled to create
a national capital as part of his dual centralizing and Africanist vocations
is justifiable. Indeed, it has been rewarding in both economic and political
terms, in attracting tourists, industry, foreign aid and attention, and in
performing an act of self-resuscitation as the senior statesman of Africa
in the "capital of Africa." But these attainments do not diminish the
bitterness of a province that began the Union far in advance, administratively
and economically, of Shoa.
The Eritrean provincial budget is about Eth.$30,000,000. Land, income,
and excise tax collections in the province total about Eth.$24 million.
Customs collected at the ports of Massawa and Assab are said by the Governor
General to amount to some Eth.$100 million, of which about Eth.$20 million
is from items imported for use in Eritrea. If the Governor General's
figures are correct,*the total revenue of Eritrean origin is Eth.$44 million
(24 + 20) and the Eritrean contribution toward national finances is therefore
on the order of Eth.$14 million a year (44 -'30) or about one-third of
total revenues generated from the province.
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SECRET Addis Ababa
D. IEG Assets and. Attitudes
The central government possesses considerable assets' in. Eritrea. It has
a well developed. governmental and, economic infra-structure on the basis
of which rapid economic development could, be based.. The province has,
after the capital province of Shoa, the largest industrial activity in Ethiopia.
It probably possesses a larger reservoir of educated, or skilled, manpower
thanks to Italian and. British schools and, training efforts. In this respect
Eritrea is not unlike Scotland. on the occasion of its union with England in
1707, and. like Scotland. its best prospect is probably to continue the south-_
ward. export of its ablest manpower, which has already 'begun, in order to
end. up, Scots fashion, running the Empire of which it became a reluctant
part.
A major Ethiopian asset in Eritrea, which is now showing some signs, of
erosion, is the highland. Eritrean Christian population, which shares with
other Ethiopian Christians a deep attachment to the Orthodox Church and. a
profound. distrust and suspicion of Moslems. While these Eritrean Christians
are certainly not pro-Amhara, in the past they have been even less pro-
Moslem. This has provided a safeguard against the efforts of the predomi-
nantly Moslem ELF to bring about the separation of Eritrea and. Ethiopia.
An analysis of Christian Eritrean' attitudes, by profession, indicates that
at present senior government officials are generally loyal to the IEG, although
they are willing to and do compound. with the ELF by financial contributions
to avoid being singled out for assassination and to reinsure their careers
against the possibility of an ultimate ELF success. The Police, being
generally Eritreans, demonstrate the reinsurance phenomenon by a high
rate of leakage of information to the ELF; the policemen also generally
strive to adopt a neutral stance and fire on the ELF only in self-defense.
Middle and lower government officials also try for neutrality, although in
most cases their sentiments lean toward. Eritrean autonomy or independence,
not necessarily by way of the ELF. Teachers appear to be more sympathetic
toward the IEG, owing to strong suspicions of the' ELFts Islamic majority.
Students and. workers are perhaps as much as 75% sympatheti the
Eritrean independence and. to the ELF, which is fighting for it evidence
is that about 25% of government secondary school students in sm are 25X1
active dues-paying ELF members.) On the other hand, the Christian peasantry
is deeply suspicious of,and opposed to the ELF for traditional religious
reasons, except in areas where it has had. the dubious pleasure of encountering
Ethiopian Army tactics of pillaging, raping, and indiscriminate shooting.
Among the peasants, the ELF is car.efully striving to improve its image by .
exhibiting a friendly and, correct attitude.
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Addis Ababa
The Ethiopian government and. people are absolutely convinced, of the
necessity to retain possession of Eritrea. The province contains Ethiopia's
only seacoast and. both of its .seaports, and, current threats to French-occupied
Djibouti by Somalia are "unlikely to reduce this Ethiopian concern. From a
strategic point of view, Ethiopians are aware that their country was invaded
from Eritrea in 1935, 1896, 1876 and. 1867.
The depth of Ethiopian conviction of the necessity for clinging to Eritrea is
strikingly shown by the recent ruckus in the National Union of Ethiopian
University students inAd.d.is Ababa. Composed, of politically active students,
most of whom are political. leftists and therefore impatient of or outright
hostile to the IEG, the organization split violeihtly over the attitude to be
adopted toward. Eritrea. The Amhara (and other Ethiopian) majority bitterly
condemned, their equally radical Eritrean. colleagues for supporting the ELF.
(An Eritrean source reports also that the ELF last January took the position
that it would. be undesirable to assassinate the Emperor on his visit to Eritrea
at the request of the Ethiopian radicals, who hoped. to profit from the Emperorts
demise to reform the IEG radically. In- view of the NUEUS indication of
Ethiopian sentiments about Eritrea, this ELF decision was unquestionably
sound..)
Another factor strengthening the IEG. in Eritrea might be defined. as "the
hidden hand. of history. 11 Eritrea is historically part of the Empire and the
ties of culture, tradition, religion , and linguistic affinity are stronger than
they may appear on the surface. The ramshackle Ethiopian Empire has held.
together a comparatively long time in spite of geographic, linguistic, religious
and. cultaral divisions which would, appear to make it an impossibility. Perhaps
God., rather than being, as alleged, a Brazilian, is really an Ethiopian and. a
Copt as well!
E. ELF Strategy, Tactics. and Options
The ELF insurgent tactics have followed, the classic guerrilla pattern of
harassment of TAG forces over the last several years.. Their.
h and
b
.
us
am
guerrilla units have rarely accepted. open combat even with small units of the
Ethiopian Army or Police. Most of the time these units, which are over 95/0
Moslem lowlanders, have been reasonably careful to avoid. abusing the peasant
o,r nomad population in the predominantly Moslem areas in which they have hitherto
operated. ELF "tax" collections from Eritrean and. foreign businessmen both
there and. in the highland. towns have been scaled, to the ability of the victim to
pay and have in any case been no higher than the legal government's assessments.
The ELF commandos obtain fresh meat and. some grain from Eritrea's populace,
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Addis Ababa
but are supplied, with other needs from the Sudan (tea, sugar, ammunition, and
weapons), which serves as their ultimate safe haven from pursuit and, their R&R
area.
The Sudanese government, notwithstanding the sympathy for Eritrean fellow
Moslems which is endemic among its own population, has generally mad.e reason-
able efforts to avoid. blatantly un-neutral use of its territory by the ELF. (The
exception to this policy was the period. from the fall of the Abboud regime in
September 1964 until the late spring of 1965, when both radical and. conservative
Sudanese political elements courted. the Moslem vote by throwing open the flood.-
gates to supply, training, and. operation of ELF commandos from Sudanese terri-
tory.) Nevertheless, the Sudanese government is probably not efficient enough,
even if it were sufficiently motivated., to be able to prevent its petty officials from
winking at the smuggling of arms to the ELF and. at the travel of known ELF
operatives - generally in civvies - to and. from the Eritrean border. The Sudanese
border town of Kassala is the ELF's field. HDQ, a safe haven and. a depot.
ELF operations obviously require more than a friendly, neutral Sudan. The
ELF's principal benefactor is Syria, which provides Czech weaponry, propaganda,
and. latest guerrilla training for selected. leaders. About 100 Eritreans were
ti recently graduated, from a "special command.o school" in Syria and. 7.00 more.
are entering training there now. Some financial aid, evidently also comes from
the UAR, together with ammunition and, propaganda assistance. Iraq provides
spaces in its military schools for Eritreans and. Cuba is reported. jo have taken
21 Eritreans for guerrilla training. - The Saudi Arabian government provides
financial help only, designating it to be used. for "Moslem" causes. Kuwait and
perhaps other Islamic states also contribute to the ELF fisc. The extent of
Somali assistance is largely political although it may well include a trickle of
funds in addition to provisions of passports to ELF leaders. The GSR is 1000/0
sympathetic to the ELF diversion behind, enemy Ethiopia's left flank. and, in Arab and
Western capitals there is also contact between the two groups.
It should. be noted, that the ELF's Moslem allies and, supporters appear to count
on the inevitable evolution of Ethiopia toward. Islamic status. Certainly in the.
last 100 years Islam has mad.e perceptible inroads in converting both pagan and.
Christian Ethiopians. The Sudan government seems to believe, and the UAR may
share its belief, that a division of Ethiopia into successor state fragments is unne-
cessary if the whole is. destined, to become another Islamic power.
Both the UAR and. Sudan are members of the OAU, both are committed, at least on
paper, not to meddle in other African nations' affairs. ' Both also have an interest
in avoiding open enmity with the Emperor. Sudan fears Ethiopian involvement in
its Southern problem and. the perspective of additional pressures on its fragile
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A d.dis A baba
internal political balance; in brief, Sudan needs tran~rquility. The UAR with
its difficult financial headaches at home and, its pre-eminent current interests
in the Arabian peninsula (Yemen, Aden, Saudi Arabia) plus its continuing
proThans with Syria, Jordan and. Israel, is not anxious to arouse the Ethiopians
with their grip on Africa's leading organization in Ad.d.is.
The Syrians, and, to a lesser extent the Iraqis, see Ethiopia in an Israeli context.
Both inflate Israeli assistance to Ethiopia and. equate it as tantamount, to Israeli-
stimulated. repression by Ethiopians of its Moslems. Neither has an African
vocation to inhibit their actions.
Furthermore it is my long-held, contention that the more extremist Arab states
including Nasser's UAR, have a long-range goal of eliminating or at least
diminishing Western influence in the Red. Sea Basin; Kagnew station in Asmara
is one key component of the U. S. presence. And. in this objective, there is a
congruence of Communist and. Arab Socialist interest.
Estimates of ELF field, strength are imprecise. A ' recent secret assessment by
the Ethiopian army reckons that the ELF has four companies of between 250 and.
300 armed. guerrillas each. Base supply and, hospital camps in the Kassala area
are staffed. by an estimated. 100, In addition the recent 100 graduates will soon
be returning from Syria, probably charged. with the task of organizing another
company or two. The ELF can also draw almost at will from the large numbers of
untrained., nomadic Beni Amer who are available for one operation or even for
a brief campaign. The ELF underground. in Asmara and. other towns includes at
least a couple of hundred. part-time agents, chiefly messengers and. "tax-collectors"
until now, but perhaps assassins as well in the near future. And., of course,' the
ELF operated. in a largely friendly environment in all Moslem areas, having easy
access to provisions, information and, safe havens.
ELF tactics can be characterized, as still in Phase I of Mao's classic schedule
of guerrilla operations. They have progressed. from recruitment, training and.
some arms raids on police stations to the point of being about to enter Phase IT
-
increased. tempo of raids and. attacks on communications, harrying enemy units
when they pause, ambushing supply columns and, capturing weapons. Curiously,
the ELF has made little use of terror thus far except among IEG informers and.
has carried, out few assassinations outside this stratum. (The Eritrean chief of
a Ministry of Interior-operated. informants ring, and. the head of government anti-
guerrilla irregulars, were assassinated. within the last two months'.) Both Amhara
and. Eritrean officials have been largely immune. One possible cause for this
conservative ELF use of assassination at the officials' level is that Ethiopia (and.
foreign business) targets have been willing to pay substantial "protection" to the
ELF to avoid being singled. out. For example, the. Vice Governor General of
Eritrea, a leading IEG "loyalist, " reportedly shelled, out E$50, 000 of IEG funds
to the ELF last year for this kind. of longevity insurance. It is possible that
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recent intensification of IEG punitive use of troops in the Moslem lowlands
may lead. to a change in the ELF is predominantly fiscal approach to the use of
terror.
If the ELF tactics have been soundly based., its strategy is puzzling. Statements
of ELF representatives to various US diplomats indicate that the organization is
relying on :generating enough publicity and, support to persuad.e the United. States
to undo the Ethiopian sabotage of Eritrean autonomy and. to hand. Eritrea its
independence on a platter of resolutions. This hope is obviously a will-of-the-
wisp, given the UNIs usual practice of accepting on its agenda only inter-country
conflicts of both extreme local nastiness and. of unconcern to the big two.
ELF hopes appear really to rest on escalating its guerrilla operation, which to
date have boon more of a nuisance than a. military character, to the Phase II
level and. continuing them ,for a long time, in the hope that the Emperorts ulti-
mate demise may bring a fragmentation of Ethiopia or that the Horn of Africa-
Red, Sea Basin situation may bring about open warfare of a strong neighboring
country against Ethiopia.
An important part of the ELF ts. ability to achieve and, maintain Phase II and a
prerequisite to any faint hopes of reaching Phase III is to achieve a base of
support among Eritrean Christians 'by moving. them from their present suspicion,
passivity, or at most financial aid., to activism. The ELF'S hierarchy signifi-
cantly includes a layering of Christians disproportionate to the number of
Christians among ELF adherents. The accession to the ELF in late February
of former Eritrean unionist leader Tedla Bairu, a Christian (Lutheran rather
than Ethiopian Orthodox), and. his biweekly propaganda broadcasts for it have
been a significant gain.
My Eritrean contacts within the Ethiopian Establishment in Addis state that the
no longer significant Eritrean Liberation Movement (pred.ominently Christian)
is reaching a working agreement with the ELF as a result of Tedlats adherance.
However, they quote Woldo-ab Mariam, the erstwhile head of the ELM, as being
highly critical of Tedla for ignoring Islam as "the greatest threat to Eritrea and
to Ethiopia. " Wold.e-ab has told. his contacts here tat Tedlla defected. to the ELF
because (a) he was bought by the UAR, (b) he is determined to play a role in
Eritrea's future and. (c) he wishes to settle scores with Ras And.ergatchew and.
his spouse. Perhaps there will be a slightly greater flow of activists from the
Christian community to the ELF in the future, but the mass, like Wold.e-ab;
will remain more than reluctant to, align themselves to a predominant Moslem
and. Arab-supported. movement. Wold.e-ab, in the view of some loyal Eritreans,
should. be re'abilitated. by the IEG; I would. not be surprised. if the Emperor did.
soon seek secret contacts with Wold,e-ab who is not without influence in Eritrea.
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There are no indications that the Arab arms and possibly Communist input
to the ELF has yet produced. a Communist or even extremist political program.
If the ELF wishes to exploit Tedla, it will be compelled. to be idiologically
neutral since he has a distaste for political extremism. In any case Communist
influences are probably acting as cautiously with the ELF as with the Algerian
FLN during its rise, to avoid, offending Moslem sympathies.
There has been more than a modicum of curiosity among Western and IEG
officials here in Bulgarian commercial enterprises in Ethiopia. The profligate
expenditures by the Bulgarian RODOPA firm, the unaccountability of million
of dollars (either in. leakages to the ELF and/or to private accounts) and. the
discovery of clandestine Bulgarian arms shipments in Massawa, have raised.
eyebrows, particularly since none of the manifold. 1 talgarian activities in Eritrea
appear to be economically viable. Also in recent months, there has been con-
siderably more Soviet Embassy travel to Eritrea as well as a year by year
escalation of the level of Soviet naval representation at the annual IEN graduation
exercises at Massawa, last year's drawing no less than the Soviet CNO and. a
large ultra-modern electonic missile destroyer. In recent weeks the Bulgars
have found. enough funds in Addis governmental institutions (with bribery?) to
revive their meat operations on a modest scale and, to hire personnel in anti-
cipation of finally starting their long-d.elayed. fish-meal plant at Massawa.
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F. Present IEG Strategy and Tactics Against the .ELF
The Ethiopian government now has no strategy worthy of the name against
Eritrean dissidence. Its policy is to grit its teeth and hang on to the
province by military means and at all costs.
IEG tactics, however, have shown some evolution. In the last several
weeks the IEG has begun using a system of fortified villages or collecting
areas in which to assemble Moslem lowlanders under guard and supervision.
Theoretically, this "pacification" program will enable IEG forces to seize
as suspects any persons other than individual herders found outside the
areas. It is also reliably reported to be clearing a cordon sanitaire
or uninhabited zone of up to fifty miles' width along the Sudanese frontier.
The IEG has also made sporadic attempts to evolve a unified command, ham-
pered by disagreements over tactical doctrine between police and army, and
between the IEG and the Governor-General and has made intermittent use of
aerial strafing and bombing by the LEAF against suspected ELF supply points
and concentrations. At present the Army, under the CG 2nd Division, is
in control of operations and has succeeded in relegating police, including
even three Israeli-trained commando police battalions, to garrison duties
in the towns. Since the Army is in effect a foreign (to Eritrea) occupying
force, with negligible local linguistic capability, its treatment of
E,ritreans, whether suspects or merely local, population, is usually brutal
and its intelligence gathering close to nil. Its "pacification" was in
February 1967.deliberately given free rein in thewestern lowlands. The
consequences may soon be visible in ELF counter-measures.
Apart from its fortified village campaign, IEG employment of its forces
is regularly on a basis of reaction to incidents, interspersed with bat-
talion or larger area sweeps. When a police or army post or patrol is
hit by the ELY, sizeable reinforcements are dispatched as quickly as pos-
sible. Owing to the broken country in most of Eritrea, reinforcements
may be 24 hours or more in arriving. Except for'past police commando
efforts, there is little regular, aggressive patrolling off of the roads
and vehicular trails. Company sized units may sweep the area around an
incident site, probably burning the villages, or at least confiscating
livestock or food supplies. Villagers are regarded as guilty of aiding
the enemy until proved innocent, which is difficult for them to do?--even
Mg-Kin the unlikely event they know Amharic.
In the autumn of 1966, the EI,F moved in some strength into the area of
eastern Acchele Guzai division in. the rugged country lying between the
Asmara-Addis highway and the Red Sea. The Army responded with a four
and one-half battalion sweep of the area, which in three months re-
sulted in heavy damage to the Moslem and Christian population-'-s property
and considerable molesting of their persons, in a half-dozen ELF suspects
killed and a few captured, and in most of the ELF forces leaving the area
to return to the larger, more familiar western lowlands. Numerous com-
plaints at the Army's conduct and demands for redress were made to the
Governor.General by both Christian and Moslem. leaders in the affected
area, with no known result.
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F. Present IEG Strategy and Tactics Against the ELF (Continued)
lEG response to the defection to the ELF of the chief Eritrean architect
of Eritrean-Ethiopian union, TEDLA Bairu, was hasty and ill-judged. Stung
by this loss, the IEG responded with an immediate sarcastic denunciation
of him as a traitor to his Christian (Lutheran) faith. This followed in-
creasingly open allusions which have been made since November 1966 by IEG
local authorities to the religous - - Christians vs. Moslems -- aspect of
the Eritrean dissident movement. Thus at the time when the LEF is stressing
its inter-denominationalism, the IEG is invoking.the phrases of holy war to
rally its surly Christian subjects -- thereby insuring the fuller mobilization
against it of its disaffected Moslem subjects in Eritrea and through the Empire.
In February, 1967, the 2nd Division made its first "rattisage" in Asmara.
From all accounts, the IEG is extremely pleased with the results of this
first docr-to-door sweep of the Moslem quarter which netted arms caches, a
number of influential ELF activists and documents.
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G. IEG Prospects and Options
There is no doubt of the IEG's resolution and determination to hang on to
Eritrea regardless of difficulties. This view is shared by all Amharas
regardless of their political coloration, and by other tribal members of
the establishment and younger elite. If it came to a crunch the IEG would
probably choose to devote its resources to the retention of Eritrea, even
at the cost of seeing the Ogaden escape its clutches, a perspective not
displeasing to Somalia. The real question concerns the IEG's ability, in
the face'of such other threats as Somali irredentism, Galla disaffection,
and Egypto-Islaanic expansionism, to succeed in its aim.
The overwhelming probability is that, without markedly increased economic
development in Eritrea, some degree of restoration of Eritt ~local
autonomy, a marked improvement in conditions in the Red Sea7and greater
political evolution in Ethiopia as a whale, or a combination of these four
factors, the prospects are for a continued worsening of the Eritrean, "ulcer"
in the Ethiopian body politic. In the context of other threats to Ethiopian
security, stability, and unity, the dissolution of the Empire could well re-
sult within the next five years.
There are a. number of courses of action which, if adopted by the IEG,
could reverse this trend. They may be classified as military, economic,
foreign policy, and political measures. All of them would require increased
material resources, and, collectively, the additional resources are undoubt-
edly well beyond the present means of and demands upon the IEG. Some de-
gree of US or other foreign input would thus be required for their adoption
and for their effective application.
Military courses of action which would improve the IEG's position in Eritrea
are based on adoption of an intelligent long-term rather than a ruthless
short-term policy. The IEG should build up its commando police force to
.3,000-5,000 strong in Eritrea and employ these units' cross-country talents
and linguistic and intelligence capabilities as the main anti-guerrilla
striking force. The more ruthless, unwieldy, and alien army while
retaining its primary mission of guarding against aggression, should be
limited to garrison duty, static blocking positions, and use as the anvil
for the striking force to operate on. An important part of this change
would be to indoctrinate both commando police and army to cease alienating
the peasant and nomad populace by pillaging and molesting it, to pay for
requisitioned food and, supplies, and to launch large-scale civic action of-.
forts. An "open arms" amnesty system which should include substantial re-
wards for information and surrendered weapons and a program of effective re-
settlement of ELF defectors should be initiated.
The present army system of fortified village concentrations in the western
lowlands and along the border should be continued, but only with proper
treatment for the affected population to include medical care, schools,and
adequate food supplies.
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G. IEG Prospects and Options (Continued)
One of the greatest deficiencies in present IEG security operations is the
almost total absence of effective intelligence gathering. The IEG now relies
on spies and ELF traitors, who have a high mortality rate. More money and
tighter controls over its employment is necessary to improve and expand the
existing intelligence program. One area in which the ELF is vulnerable is
in its "tax" collections in the towns. It should not be difficult, parti-
cularly among mulcted third country nationals who dominate the Asmara business
community, to obtain identification of the collectors in return for complete
secrecy and the guaranteed refund of any "taxes" paid to the ELF.
Obviously, substantial additional resources would be necessary for the
above improved IEG military measures. Some of them could be obtained from
a better (and greater?) allocation of present Israeli. and German assistance
to the police; but the US.G would at the minimum be required to assist in
retraining the army and in provisioning medical, education, and food supply
programs for the fortified villages.
H.H. ASRATE Kassa, the Governor General of Eritrea claims to have recognized
that the basic component for Eritrean counter-insurgency is in economic de-
velopment rather than military suppression. Asrate has alleged total dis-
interest in this approach on the part of the central authorities in Addis.
But the IEG counters that the Governor General exerts unremitting pressure
on it for still more arms and troops; this latter allegation is supported
by well-placed Eritreans in Addis who complain that the Governor wants more
of everything without defining an overall policy, a Judgment which fits our
experience with the dilletante that Asrate is.
An economic development policy should be adopted for Eritrea. But why Eritrea
alone, ask many of the more progressive minds in the IEG. Is it not equally
true that the Ogaden, not to mention almost every other province, requires
additional resources? Would not a special program for Eritrea only educate
other provinces that overt rebellion is the lever to pry funds out of the IEG?
The Minister of Planning and Development told the Ambassador last week that
it was "politically impossible" to formulate a special program for Eritrea
since every province was now awakening and since he was under great pressure
to draft a five-year plan which would be nationally responsive.
One element contributing to a sensible resolution of this dilemma would, in
our judgment, be a community development program concentrated on water re-
sources in the more arid portions of the province, on public health facilities
and on education particularly and initially in areas where Christian villages
border Moslem nomads. (One of the recurrent complains of Christian Eritreans
is that a net retrogression has occurred in education because standards im-
posed by the Ministry of Education have in fact led to a smaller number of
children attending elementary schools than under the British.) Such a pro-
gram need not be restricted to Eritrea; indeed it could be launched in several
provinces and the Minister of Planning is thinking along such lines.
For the more ad'or ere 1/ : eTAERDPP8f1$ eA,p0 4 and
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G. IEG Prospects and options (Continued)
ment participation in modernizing plantation agriculture is a promising
sector. Italian private entrepreneurs have been moving in this direction;
late last year, the Provincial Government found funds for participation in
the new large Ghinda planation which will be managed by the very successful
Italian firm operating the Elaberet integrated farming operation near Keren
and which will create thousands of jobs.
The Central Government must also rule clearly that it favors investment in
Eritrea,, for reasons that are still unclear but which have had discouraging
impact on those Eritreans who wish their homeland to. remain part of the
Empire, the IEG appears to have blocked the establishment of a Fiat assembly
plant near Asmara. Whether or not the charge is true, the handling of a
matter that could be easily misinterpreted was bobbled badly by the Addis
authorities. If the idea takes even further hold that the lEG is opposed
to Eritrean evolution in the economic field, it will only incite greater re-
sentment and opposition to the Amharas.
Ethiopian foreign policy offers another sector of potential improvement. A
more intensive effort with Saudi Arabia and Sudan to limit the assistance
now reaching the ELF from or through these countries.is essential to the
furtherance of stability. The present Sudanese government has given evidence
of its inclination to cooperate with the IEG, if only because of its vulner-
ability in southern Sudan to possible IEG retaliation and because its aware-
ness of long-term Egyptian interests. Extreme care should be taken by the
IEG not to upset the GOS applecart, since the GOS policy of "neutrality" on
Eritrea is domestically unpopular.
With Saudi Arabia the task is somewhat more difficult since it consists of
persuading Xing Faisal that he would not damage his religious credentials as
the Islamic leader by shutting off financial aid to the F. In this area,
the ELFt s own emphasis of its bi-religious nature might be used against it.
Basically, however, Faisal needs to be sold on the community of Ethiopia and
Saudi. interests as opponents of Nasserist radicalism and southward expansion-
ism. Recent events in Yemen could be exploited by Ethiopia and its friends.
The most important new course of action forthe IEG to adopt, if it is to
reverse the course of Eritrean insurgency, lies in the field of political
concessions. Psychologically it is the most difficult step for an Emperor
whose first 50 years of power have been devoted to centralization. However,
without some concession to Eritreans' desire for local selfiLgovernment, the
loyalty of neither Christian nor Moslem Eritreans is likely to be recovered
or strengthened. The present IEG plan - - still only on the drawing board - -
to establish local self-government at the awra a (county) level would provide
an initial step in the right direction. It should be put into effect n
Eritrea first of all and should be accompanied or flowed closely by re-
creation of a provincial assembly and provincial government with as much
degree of local control over schools, highways, public works, agriculture,,
and public health, as the IEG could be compelled to stomach.
Preceding restoration of some Eritrean political autonomy, the IEG should
give serious consideration to the redrawing of provincial boundaries. There
is no valid reason for the IEG to perpetuate arbitrary colonial frontiers
withi - v*VF@A WMse 2' 02/ftal :1 "I 799 54_AO9g4bff 0662- pf Eritrea,
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G. IEG Prospects and Options (Continued)
belong; by all ethnic and economic sense to the province of Wollo.. North of
Assab to the Port of Kula, the Red Sea coast is more naturally a. part of
Tigre Province whose borders already include most of the Danakil inhabitants.
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II. Rocommend.ed. U. S. Policy
U. S. policy for Eritrea cannot be determined. in isolation. For some years,
I have lamented, the Dcpartmentts unwillingness to view Ethiopia in a non-
African context. In brief, ray argument has been that the Red. Sea Basin
comprises a separate and. distinct area of US interest; that problems such. as
Eritrea and. the Ethio-Somali dispute cannot be detached. from a more important
region that comprises Egyptian, Israeli, Sudanese, Arabian, Ethiopian, Somali
and. Communist - inte'e: ts, and, that there is a con rfuence of Nasserist,
i3aatb i.s t, Soviet and. Somali interests in the eliminati.o or, at the least, signi-
fioant reduction in Western :influence in the Red. Sea area..
Ilapp:i.ly, this repeated. cry of despair has finally been heard. and a review of
this area is now underway by a State-Defense team under the distinguished.
leadership of Ambassador Julius Holmes. In attendance of the results of this
work, only a few tentative conclusions can be offered:
1. As long as Kagnow Station is deemed. strategically indispensable to
the United States, it is preferable for the US to stimulate ,and. support progres-
sive Ethiopian policies designed. to stabilize Eritrea. This preference derives
from my convictions that (a) the US could not maintain Kagnew if the ELF were
to achieve its goal of an independent state since the Nasserist, Soviet, Baathist
ideologies would preclude the presence of a military, "neo-colonialist"
base and (b) our relationship with Ethiopia, not to mention the line-up of forces
in the area, offers such little room for maneuver with the ELF-that we cannot
bid effectively for preeminent influence with the ELF.
2. As lorlci as the US is concrnitted to its present views of J\frican develop=
rrient to support of p1_uralistic ndeties of viable economic dimensions (e. (f.
CCornlo and. NI(leri.a) -- it is necessary to support Eritreats integration in Ethiopia.
The separation of Britrca would in all probability incite other separatism in
'Ethiopia and in other parts of Africa without adding stability or viahilit7 to a
bi-religious, multi- ethnic Eritrea. .
3. Border adjustments between Ethiopia and the Sudan need not -,be pre
elud.ed.. An end to the division of the Beni. Amer by the Ethio-Sudanese border,
for example, could. be contemplated at least in the abstract if a suitable trade-
off of Sudanese territory more compatible with Ethiopia could. be arranged. 1AThile
this prospect is not a propitious one at present, it should. not be excluded. from
all thinking for all, time.
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,!. Any encouragcrrient by US officials to the ELF, any sign of concern
[or the ~afety of Kagjncw and its personnel, will' in all likelihood be interpreted
by its leadership as an incitement to blackmail. Yet we are ill-placed. to Day
and, the amounts available for such purposes would. soon prove insufficient.
On the contrary, while the ELF is still not a very potent force, it is more
advantageous to reiterate our neutrality and. to imply that any attack on Kagnew is
operat:lons, would. probably lead. to greater US support for Ethiopia -- and. thus
greater difficulties for the ELF. (In this connection, the outcome of the Viet-
nam war will., of course, influence ELF thinking; while the US is committed
to defeating the "war of liberation" in Vietnam, our actions there can by inference
serve to deter ELF anti-Ka(lnew planning. It is also possible, if not probable,
that at the present time Soviet tactics are designed to avoid, actions which would
spur greater US involvement in the Red. Sea and. that the Soviets would. prefer
not to risk assaults on Kagnew. It is also possible that the Syrian view of Eritrea
is so focussed. on Israel that it too would. favor Kagnew`s non-involvement
although any statement about the Syrians is an assault on reason.).
b. The US should. seek to maintain the maximum degree of political
neutrality in Eritrea insofar as the ELF is concerned.. The M.AAG presence
should. be kept at its 'present inconsequential level;' Kagnew should be reminded
periodically and. in clear directives that under no circumstances is it to give
cause to be regarded. as aThilitary base" or, as unfortunately was the case in 1' 35,
can it become involved. as a security asset of the IEG and. its Provincial Governor-,
any US material support for the police or for the armed. forces should be scree-,.,ed.
wherever possible by other nation's advisors and..AID/W should. be dissuaded.
from insisting on PSD personnel accompanying any police equipment to Eritrea,
if that is a future US decision.
6. US political influence in Ethiopia (Including Eritrea) should continue
to focus on progressive Measures. most important of these is the liberalizatL'ri
of the ILEG itself since this evolution will produce the kinds of attitudes requi. it=.
to progressive measures in Eritrea. Not the least of these latter measures a
(a) the decentralization law under study by Parliament and. its quickest ;~ss`:cle
implementation in Eritrea and. (b) a greater delegation of authority to Err treans
for Eritrean affairs including the assignment to the province of a significant
number of elite Eritreans now serving in the central government. (I might n, to
that the acceleration of progressive legislation .and. of structural reform is pro-
ceed.ing in Ethiopia for the first time at a rate commensurate with our minimal
hopes and. that the likelihood. of maintaining or increasing the pace is not without
hope although dependent upon many unpredictable factors such as the long, evity
of the Emperor, the degree of external pressures, etc. )
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7. US social and. economic influence must begin to be exerted. in Eritrea.
It was a grievous error for AID to close its. office in Eritrea in early 1963.
While it can be argued. that the IEGts response to Eritrean development needs
has been largely negative, the US action was to give unwitting backing to the
IEG's policies. Community development teams, shadows of the operations
which we have launched. in, say, Thailand northeast, for accelerated. rural
development, should, be initiated. in both Eritreaa d in neighboring Tigre by a
judicious mix of Peace Corps Volunteers and. of AID materials. I am confident
that if carefully prepared, and. executed., even if only on a modest scale at the
beginning, local self-help response will be encouraging. Eventually, if not at
the outset, there will also be an ILG matching response. Title II PL 480 pro;~ran s
could, be very usefully employed. in connection with and. in support of such teams.
I would. specifically recommend. (and, am already. requesting the planning of
emergency expenditures for FY 68, exclusive of Title IT for such programs.
(A t the risk of repeating myself, it is much more in the US interest, in my
view, to use funds for development in Eritrea which is part of a "country of
concentration" in the now US Development Policy for.Af,?ica, than to continue
j unproductive programs elsewhere.)
8. The US, as part of its overall policy to maintain restraints on the
arms race in the Horn and, to disengage the army from anti-civilian actions in
Ethiopia, should, indirectly assist the Emergency Police. I have previously
made the arguments for supplying about US$300, 000 a year in hand, weapons
and. equipment for Emergency Police Units. There is no need. to repeat the
rationale here since it is spelled. out in my memo to Mr. Gaud.-In February.
Since such action would. require a Presidential decision to approve suppo.rtincr
assistance, which is a highly unlikely prospect, we should, find. means to supply
non-weapons equipment in order to permit the Police to buy its weapons corr-
rr ercially. To possible arcjur-tents that the US could. "free" funds by aiding the
regular police, m.y answer is that it would. not liberate monies since the regular
police are in great need of all kinds of equipment and. would. merely absorb
,euppl:ies without af.[ecting the Eritrean emergency. Also, it should. be empha;iz,rnd.
that the West Germans and. Israelis (with whom we have good. relations) are
training the Emergency Police in an effective way; it. is to our political ad.vanLeje
vis a vis the ELF to keep them in front in this sector while deriving benefits
in our relations with the DEG and. from the increased, efficiency of the Emergency
Police. The US should. not supply equipment unless. the IEG adopts policies
for its armed, forces which are compatible with. our current advice and unless
the units are first formed.. My support for the Emergency Police augmentation
is consistent with my belief that while there cannot be security without develop-
ment, there cannot be development without security; and. with my conviction
that the US must use a carrot as well as a stick to persuade the ;_G to adopt
the strategy and, organization we have putforwar. d. for Ethiopiats national
security.
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Addis A baba
9. The US should. support more actively efforts to convince Saudi Arabia,
above all, but other Arab and. Western states (particularly Italy) as well that
it is not in their interest to have Ethiopia dismembered,. Iran could. also play
a more active role inEthiopia if the regional implications were clearly outlined
to the Shah.
10. The US need. not lose Kagnew in a year or two if it were to risk a
Micawber policy in Eritrea; but the odds are that our present masterly inacti-
vity in Eritrea and. towards the insurgency will not only diminish the durability
of Kagnew but also contribute to the dissolution of Ethiopia. Only last week
the value of our relationship with Ethiopia, in an area context, was again
demonstrated. in the evacuation of our nationals from Yemen; it is not over-
stating the case to say that there are not a half dozen countries in the world.
that would have cooperated. so easily and. effectively with the US in a similar
situation. or is it beyond. the arena of predictability to state the study under-
way will conclude that the US does have interests in the lied. Sea Basin and that
the US must be able to look to certain regional components as friendly powers.
E. to use Thomas Hard.y's apt phrase, this is a time of the breaking-up of
nations, " we should. decide whether we are to be spectators of a process dee___e
to be inevitable or participants in an effort adjudged worthy of our conet rust o
inputs.
1% Finally, if we choose to remain Micawbers, there is, in my judge-
ment, no need. for any precipitous action concerning Kagnew. While it is
manifestly unwise to load. unendingly new missions and. more personnel on
Kagnew and. the weak reed. of Eritrea, and while alternatives should be identi-
fied., there is no imperative need. at this time to reduce our use of, Kagnew.
When and. if an active threat manifests itself, our reactions, be they in the
form of reduction of personnel or of dependents or some other direction, will.
affect the attitudes and. plans of both the IEG. and. ELF. Therefore it is a
weapon in reserve for timely and. judicious use,
KORRY
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