SOUTH VIETNAM: ESTIMATE OF COMMUNIST LOSSES 1965-1967

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Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP78S02149R000200300015-0
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RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
5
Document Creation Date: 
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date: 
October 22, 2003
Sequence Number: 
15
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CHART
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PDF icon CIA-RDP78S02149R000200300015-0.pdf290.69 KB
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25X1 Approved For KIA Seriously Wounded. Captured "Chieu Hoi (military) Deserters South Vieth . 4stinite of CC uniet Losses 7 1965 1966 35,000 19,000-300 6,300 9,500 57,000 l9,ooo 11,500 9,500 11,500 00-90, 3 000-137,0 0 1 O,tlO5-150 0 o u c h V etz z; A l l o c a t i o n o ' Comunl.st Losses 4 'lay ri o , Cad 29,000--35,00 0 31t.,000-39,000 55,0-63,000 167 50,000-60,000 35,000-t0,000 000-50,000 25X1 Approved For Releo Approved For as high as 5 m people. Depending on the extent of VC' access to contested ax most of whom live in the delta, region. About 500,000 physically fit young males are contained in the contra: Each year an additional 30,000 1965 the VC recruited an 5' 0 youths become d 80,000 personnel and. Probably will from 7,000 to 10,000 per month in 1966, which is close to their rnaximu. capability. The refugee problem has little effect on the VC recruitment effort,, because the m lority of refugees are coming from areas other than the delta and include fwT lstion amounts to at During 1966 the VC will have to make up for their estimated losses of 90,E ;o increase their force they attempting )ut 5,000 troops. in addition they may ?provide replacements for e losses, although total infiltration from North Vietnam of 70,000 to 90,000 troops ,ugh to expand the 1A troop level by an most *TVA losses. At any rate the total VC military ed 49, 3f o t at least 100,000 - 110. ,000 is near the upper level of VC apabil.ities. During 1967 the recruitment and training capebil.iti.ee of the VC will not be adequate to cover cted casualty rate of 130,000 - 150,000. North Vietn n: will thus have to shoulder more of the r npoFrer burden and 25X1 Approved For ion 25X1 Approved For ReleaO North-Vietnam We estimate that North Vietna has ample manj quantitative to o support substantial increases in its ax ,n.g essential civil/econc activities. Despite such factors as of the increased use of women in the agricultural see Vietnm still has large eno ervea of labor in the ff the service industries, and in sectors where la employed. to more than spective demands. This reservoi. elude a large supply of skilled labor, much sue" irhieh has siphoned off to tak ng the allocation of probably persons have been called into military service in North Vietnam in 1965 and thus far in 1966 to support the wur effort in South Vietnam to reach and maintain a total strength slightly in many as 95,000 North Vietnamese troops may have been infiltrated 70, 0in 1966 alone -- both as replacements and troops lost as a result of the fighting and as additions to force levels or discharged probably is n at tsent. Total conscription in No 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/11/05 : CIA-RDP78S02 49R000200300015-0 in -~mr associated activities; and the regi asud. that the troops moving south and those retiring because replaced. The actual number of persons being retired :r Resources 25X1 Approved For Rel r' b y has approachel the number of pbysica of 18 in 1965 -66. resorted to full mobilization, with 1.7 million -Am-on ready to replace men in the labor force. At less and women now serving in the militia probably are already devoting about half of lita -49 rho are phys ce. A large share of this pool vroule 'uly 1966 Ho Chi Minh iseu el to e t North Vietnam had been mobilized on a selective bay July order supposedly mobilized additional mobilization has become available, hmieve mobilization" order. Although mobilization served merely as a propagandistic e aortatton to the North Vi people and acti fleeterl call-ups already initiated. The propaganda benefits i ere Immediate, with thousands of men and women reportedly applying for enlistment; but, again, there is no evidence that even these volunteers have been 25X1 placed on activ Approved For Release 2003/11/05 : CIA-RDP78SO2149R000200300015-0 er, a large number of persons still ching the 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/11/05 : CIA-RDP78SO2149R000200300015-0 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2003/11/05 : CIA-RDP78SO2149R000200300015-0