A REASSESSMENT OF THE MANPOWER RESOURCES OF THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78S02149R000200300014-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 22, 2003
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: October 27, 1966
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For
A RMSB 3S NNT OF THE
27 October 1966
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South Vietnam
A. Communist Losses
1. Total
The cost of the war to the Co nunists in South Vietnam in terms
human lives is rapidly increasing.
90,000 men in 1965* and that h
estimated that the enemy lost 80,ooo -
losses will be/18.,000 - 13T,000 in 1966
and 130,000 - 150,000 in 1967 (see Table / ). Previoua estimates of losses 7,rere
120,000 in 1966 and 65,
In 1966 about 45 percent of the total los
or the first six months of 1967.
accounted for by those killed
in action, about 30 percent by those seriously wounded, and about 25 percent
those captured and desertin
2. Killed in Action
Battle deaths among C
tt forces have increased from an average of
about 2,900 per month in 1965 to about 4,840 per month in
and they may in-
crease to 5,400 per month in 1967-x. In 1965 about 35,000 enemy troops were killed
in action. Projections of killed in action figures for the first 8 months of
1966 indicate that about 57,000 Communists will probably be killed by the end of
1966.
ounded in Action
In 1965 about 19,000 - 30,000 Communist troops were seriously wounded
Killed aeti.on, seriously wounded, captured, and deserters.
Although obviously subject to wide margins of error, killed in action figures
have been taken as reported.
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in action.* These figures will probably increase to about 30,000 - 49,000 dur
1966. Previous estimates in
that 24,000 - 39,000 enemy troops would be
.ously wounded in 1966. On a monthly basis, the number of troops seriously
wounded and, for all practical purposes, lost indefinitely increased from, 1,6oo
2,500 per month in 1965 to
,5
.n 1966. During 1967 a total of 36,000
- 560000 may be seriously wounded.
Ca Lured
Numbers
.ist troops cape
of 6.300 in
d range
o about 8,000 in 1966, an increase of only 27 percent. A further increase
captured may take place in 1967, however. Previous estimates indicated
the current scale of operatic
tired in 1966,
5- "Chieu Hoi" Returnees and Deserters
Under the GUN "Chieu Rio
ely 7,000 enemy troops would
about 9,500 enemy soldiers defected
during 1965. It was Previously estimated that about 13,000 of the ener. would
defect. during 1966, but current estimates indicate that only 11,500 will actually
do so. Unrecorded desertions are probably at least equal to the number of deefec-
the "Chien Hol
higher.
although it is possibi
6. Allocation of Communist Military Losses
ing
attrition, caused prism rily by the interventio
c,ned in action estimates are based on historical experience in World War II
the experience of allied troops in Vietnam, and POW interrogation reports.
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forced the North Vietnamese to shoulder the increasix c
s estimated that the North Vietnamese troops sustained only
of the total losses in 1965, but that they will sustain 2 and 0 percent
of the total in 1966 and 1967, respectively. North
to an estimated 29,
35,000 in 1966 and Probably
range during 1967 (see Table A ).* Pre
- 30,000 North Vietnamese troops wou
1966 and that an additional 25,
:h Vietnamese basses
he 50,000 - 60,000
icated that about 25, ,000
put out of action in South Vietnam in
0 urould be lost in the first half of 1967.
Gd primarily
serious wounds T'r,.th very few North Vietnamese troops
direct battlefield deaths and
Out 70 percent of the VC losses are caused
defecting to
on, the remainder by desertions and defections. Total V0 losses in 1966 -gill
probab
Approved For Releo
nt to a maxim of 90,000 - 100,000,, with perhaps $0
being lost in 1967. The increased role of the North Vietnamese troops in the South
Vietnamese forces.
neat' detOn the battlefield have been sU cat to N A VC
units on the assump-
on that they were sustained in proportion to their res
e
ti
t
p
c
ve
roop strengths in
the various corps areas as of the end of the first 8 months of 1966. Irregular and
combat Support troops were assumed to engage in combat operations only half as often
as DIVA and IM
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