INFORMAL COMMENTS ON INTERDICTION STUDY PREPARED FOR THE DD/S&T

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78S02149R000200200007-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 29, 2002
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: March 21, 1966
• Content Type: MF

21 March 1966
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Research and Reports
THROUGH
FROM
SUBJECT Informal Comments on Interdiction Study Prepared for the
DD/S&T
1. The information included in the Statement of the Problem on sup-
plies needed is not clear. The figures given are estimated of total supply
requirements under various conditions for VC and NVA forces, not North
Vietnam forces, as stated. The 70 ton figure is made up of 58 tons sup-
plied from sources within South Vietnam and 12 tons supplied from sources
outside of South Vietnam under the assumption that each of the 111
battalions is engaged in combat once in every 35 days - the estimated
current rate of combat. The 120 ton figure is made up of about 56 tons
supplied from sources within South Vietnam and 64 tons supplied from
sources outside of South Vietnam under the escalated scale of combat wherein
each of the 111 battalions is engaged in combat once in every seven days.
The 256 ton figure is made up of 85 tons supplied from sources within South
Vietnam and 171 tons supplied from sources outside of South Vietnam under
an assumption that VC and NVA forces will be, expanded to 155 battalions
and that each of these battalions engages in combat once in every three
days. The tonnages that might be required to move through the passes for
forward movement to South Vietnam, therefore, should be 12, 64+ and 171
rather than 70, 120 and 256 as implied in the Statement of the Problem.
These amounts do not included the supplies required by the Communist forces
in the Laotian Panhandle, or an additional amount of possibly 30 tons that
currently must be moved through the passes.
2. The same misunderstanding of supply requirements is perpetuated
in the final paragraph under Background. It states: Present predictions
are that this flow will increase from the current 70-120 tons a da, to
on the order of 256 tons per day. Apart from the error in the numbers,
this statement does not take into account that some supplies are probably
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moving to South Vietnam by sea and through Cambodia. Moreover, the present
flow of supplies through the Mu Gia Pass area based on reports from road
watch teems is in the order of 70 to 90 tons per day. This flow includes
supplies for current use and stockpiling not only for Communist forces in
South Vietnam but also for Communist forces in the Laotian Panhandle.
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