ABILITY OF NORTH VIETNAM TO SHIFT CURENT SEABORNE TRADE TO RAILROAD TRANSPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78S02149R000200180009-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 18, 2000
• Sequence Number: 9
• Content Type: PAPER

SECFT/U FOi
Approved For Release 2001/03/03 : CIA-RDP78S0'
4R000200180009-1
Ability of North Vietnam to Shift Current Seaborne
Trade to Railroad Transport
In the event of a total blockade of the sea ports of North Vietnam, the
tonnage of imports that normally arrive in North Vietnam by sea probably
could be moved through the ports of Communist China and thence carried on.
the railroad from Kwa.ngsi Province, China, to Hanoi. In addition the rail-
road could continue to move the volume of freight traffic currently moving
on the line. A conservative estimate of the capacity of the meter-gauge
rail line between P'ing-hsiang, the transloa.ding station in China, and Hanoi
is about 3,000 metric tons* each way per day** or about 1.1 million tons
per year. The connecting railroad in China has a higher capacity. It is
estimated that toward the end of 196+ the volume of goods being moved from
China into North Vietnam was between 1,200 and 1,500 tons per day***, which
amounted to about one-half the estimated capacity of the line. The rail
line, therefore, could carry an additional 1,500 to 1,,800 tons per day into
North Vietnam. The estimated seaborne imports during 1964 amounted to about
61+0,000 tons or about 1,750 tons per day.
Although it is believed that the above estimate of the line capacity
is within a reasonable order of magnitude, the capability of a railroad can-
not be estimated with precision. Actual operation of a railroad is the
only way that its capability can be established. Even then, traffic can be
increased to a higher level within a reasonably short time period and with-
out an excessive expenditure of labor and materials. It must be concluded,
therefore, that in the event North Vietnam could not receive any imports
by sea, the Ping-hsiang - Hanoi railroad would have the capacity to carry
at least the volume of seaborne imports that North Vietnam is estimated to
have received in 1961+.
Possible congestion at the transloading point at Piing-hsiang, where
freight is transshipped between the cars of the narrow gauge railroad of
North Vietnam and the standard gauge railroads of China, might initially
limit the actual tonnage transported to a figure somewhat below the estimated
Metric tons are used throughout this memorandum.
** The capacity of this line is estimated to be 9 trains each way per day,
carrying an average of 20 to 25 freight cars per train. It is estimated that
the average net load per freight car is about 15 tons.
*** Including North Vietnamese imports and Chinese transit traffic moving
between the Chinese provinces of Kwangsi and Yunnan by way of the North
Vietnamese railroad.
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capacity of the line. The transloading facility has been expanded signifi-
cantly in recent years, however, and no significant delays or limitations
on traffic are known to have occurred in the past from the transloading
operation. If continued congestion occurred at the transloading point, it
could be eliminated by further expansion of the transloading facilities,
a. task that could be accomplished rather easily and probably within one
month.
The narrow-gauge rolling stock park probably would not be a limiting
factor in the attainment of the estimated capacity of the Pting-hsiang -
Hanoi line. Although freight cars and locomotives are not plentiful in
North Vietnam, Chinese narrow-gauge rolling stock from the Kunming Railroad
Bureau could be used to supplement a deficiency in the North Vietnamese
rolling stock park if Communist China were to consent to give priority to
the movement of North Vietnamese imports. Furthermore, rolling stock pre-
sently used to move seaborne import and export traffic within North Vietnam
could also be used. Repair and servicing facilities are believed to be
adequate to maintain railroad equipment. The North Vietnamese, however,
probably do not have enough narrow-gauge tank cars for carrying the petro-
leum imports over the longer distances that would be required if all imports
were received from or through China by railroad. In 1964 seaborne petroleum
imports amounted to 142,000 tons. Some petroleum products could be moved
in drums by rail or by motor truck, but these methods would require con-
siderably more time and effort than the rail movement by tank cars. The
inability to divert all petroleum shipments to the rail system for movement
by tank car could be the most serious problem for North Vietnam in the event
of a blockade. If the Chinese were to permit the North Vietnamese to use
the narrow-gauge tank cars normally used to transport petroleum to Yunnan
Province, the North Vietnamese would have sufficient tank cars to transport
the petroleum on the Pting-hsiang - Hanoi line.
Motor vehicle transport can be used to supplement rail transport in the
event of a sea blockade because the roads leading from Communist China to
North Vietnam are capable of supporting considerable truck. traffic. At pre-
sent trucks, gasoline, and spare parts must be imported by North Vietnam
and are scarce items. North Vietnam had about 5,000 civilian trucks at the
end of 1962 in addition to military trucks. In view of the current essen-
tial uses for trucks, the extent to which motor transport could be allocated
to supplement the railroad would depend, therefore, upon the priority that
North Vietnam and China would be willing to give the movement of the imports
of North Vietnam which currently arrive by sea.
It appears, therefore, that if North Vietnam and China are willing to
establish priorities for the movement of the imports which currently arrive
in North Vietnam by sea, sufficient transportation can be found for these
shipments. The added cost of transportation by rail, nevertheless, from
Fort Bayard (Chan-chiang), the closest Chinese port for a rail movement to
consuming areas in North Viethami may be.sufficient to force North Vietnam
* The distance from Port Bayard to Hanoi is about 840 kilometers.
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to dispense with some of the low-value high-volume imports which are cur-
rently received by sea*.
Although the volume of exports shipped to China by rail is not large
currently, the railroad to Ping-hsiang patently does not have sufficient
capacity to move exports at the level of the some 1.6 million tons** which
were shipped by sea in 1964. Moreover, complicated transportation arrange-
ments would have to be established within North Vietnam to move some of
these exports in the event of a blockade. Coal from the ports of Cam Pha
and Hon Gai, for example, would have to move by barge and/or truck and thence
rail. It is probable that the cost of the added rail and/or truck hauls
of the low-value, heavy minerals which represent the bulk of the exports
would not permit them to be competitive in world markets. The chief conse-
quences to North Vietnam resulting from the inability to maintain the volume
of exports would be a reduction in the exploitation of mineral resources
and a failure to earn foreign exchange. Large trade deficits, normally
covered by economic aid from the Communist countries, are characteristic
of the North Vietnamese economy. Reduction in export capability would be
an irritant to the regime, which hopes to increase the self-sufficiency of
the economy and holdings of foreign exchange. Reduction in the exploitation
of minerals and in the volume of exports would, however, free transport
facilities which could be used to transport priority imports and exports
from and to China.
* Seaborne imports during 1964 consisted principally of food grains,
fertilizer, petroleum products, timber, and miscellaneous goods.
** North Vietnamese exports consisted principally of coal, apatitie, and
cement. In addition products of agriculture, forestry, fishing, and handi-
craft earn considerable foreign exchange for North Vietnam.
Approved For Release 7 9R000200180009-1
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