LOGISTIC REQUIREMENTS STUDY OF THE VIET CONG AND NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY IN SOUTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78S02149R000200130005-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 36
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 14, 2002
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: April 27, 1967
• Content Type: REPORT

1 % J
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27 April 1967
Eastern Area Office
OF TTry
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SUMMARY
The extent and adequacy of the data base pertaining to VC/NVA
logistic requirements in South Vietnam has improved greatly since
the preparation of earlier studies and has provided valid documen-
tation in almost all areas of the problem.
Although there are no indications that lack of supplies or
materiel have seriously or widely curtailed enemy operations, the
VC/NVA forces in South Vietnam are increasingly dependent on
externally provided supplies. This dependency is attributed to
the introduction of major NVA units with a resultant increase in
the technical sophistication of enemy forces and a significant
change in the ability of the Communists to meet their ration
(food) requirements from in-country sources. The throughput
capacity of the enemy LOC's appears adequate to meet external
supply requirements.
Based on the data available and the methodology developed
for this study, it is estimated that communist forces in South
Vietnam require 165-185 Short Tons per Day (STPD) to meet their
total logistical requirements and that the external requirement
is 50-70 STPD.
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Page
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logistical significance of enemy force
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PROBLEM
To develop methodology applicable to the determination of
enemy logistic requirements and to arrive at an estimate of the
current logistic requirements of the VC/NVA forces in South
Vietnam.
ASSUMPTIONS
1. That VC/NVA combat and combat support units and personnel
are the only enemy elements requiring significant logistical support
from outside South Vietnam.
2. That due to the nature of the combat in South Vietnam and
the organization and tactics of enemy forces, POL (Class III) and
Chemical and Engineer (Class II and IV) requirements are negligible
logistically and need not be computed in this study.
3. That the Viet Cong are capable of manufacturing large
quantities of mines and grenades and some mortars and rocket
launchers but are not producing more sophisticated weapons or
ammunition.
FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM
1. NVA units infiltrated into South Vietnam do not retain their
standard Tables of Organization and Equipment ( TO/E) and VC units
are not consistently organized under any standardized TO/E.
2. The amount and types of supplies available to the VC/NVA
in caches in South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia cannot be established
with any degree of certainty.
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3. Weapons in the hands of the Viet Cong are increasingly of
Chinese and Soviet origin with a decline in the proportion of U.S.,
French and "other country" manufactured ordnance.
4. The force level of the combatants and the level of combat
increased significantly in 1966 (the period generally under review)
over 1965.%
CONCLUSIONS
1. The present logistic study is based primarily on data from
interrogation reports, captured enemy documents and studies prepared
by other agencies. It is considered signficantly more valid than
earlier efforts. There are still portions of the study, however,
wherein the data base has proven inadequate to provide necessary
depth and detail of information. This is notable in. the factors
involving enemy medical and signal requirements, the level of
combat activity of enemy units and the amount of ammunition expended
in combat engagements. Certain major conclusions pertaining to VC/
NVA logistics have become apparent as the study progressed. These
%* Based on numerous indicators of varying credibility, some of which
require considerable caveating. The following factors, however, are
either demonstrable or well-substantiated:
1965
1966
% Increase
US/RVN/FWF Infantry-type Bns in SV
178
257
44%
VC/NVA Infantry-type Bns in SV
98
149
50%
VC/NVA Casualties (KIA only)
35,436
55,524
56%
US/RVN/FWF Casualties (KIA and WIA)
49,823
70,400
41%,
Weapons lost by VC/NVA forces
11,695
18,606
59%
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a. Although there are no indications that supply problems
have widely or seriously curtailed enemy operational plans, the VC/
NVA forces are increasingly dependent upon external resupply intro-
duced over multiple and frequently interdicted or threatened LOC's.
b. A significant portion of the VC/NVA external supply
requirements are in Class I (rations) resulting from enemy inability
to move sufficient rice from the Delta area to forces deployed in the
South Vietnamese highlands.
c. The increased dependency on external supply is attribut-
able to the major injection of NVA units into the area with a resultant
increase in the technical sophistication of enemy forces, and the
increase in Free World Force strength and ground and air action.
d. The throughput capacity of enemy LOC's is apparently
adequate to meet external supply requirements with land routes
providing the most significant contribution.
e. Enemy logistical problems vary from unit to unit and
area to area depending upon access to in-country rice supplies and
proximity to terminal points of the LOC's.
2. Following are the logistic estimates determined by this
study and expressed in Short Tons per Day (STPD):
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a.
Determination by Class of Supply and level of combat.
1:15
1:30
1:45
Combat Level
Combat Level
Combat Level
Total
External
Total
External
Total
External
Class I
(Rations)
121.92 T
29.45 T
121.92 T
29.45 T
121.92 T
29.45 T
Class II & IV
(Signal, Med-
ical and
Weapons
31.41 T
11.06 T
31.41 T
11.06 T
31.41 T
11.06 T
Class V
(Ammunition)
31.04 T
31.04 T
15.52 T'
15.52 T
10.34 T
10.34 T
TOTAL.
184.37 T
71.55 T
168.85 T
56.05 T
163.67 T
50.85 T
b. Determination of the level of combat or the extent to which
the enemy forces are engaged in any given period of time (discussed in
detail in Annex C) is one of the most difficult and one of the most
critical factors in a logistic study. It is dependent upon a decision,
based inevitably on imprecise data, as to the number of contacts with
the enemy, the size of the enemy unit involved and the time span of
the engagement. NIE 14.3-66 was prepared based on an assumption of
one-day-in-thirty (1:30), i.e., each enemy unit involved in combat,
for an average of one day in each thirty. Using the factors and
methodology employed in the present study, a figure of 1:15 was
developed. Recognizing the lack of exact data involved, however,
computations are shown above for 1:15 and also for 1:30 and 1:45.
This estimative range would place the VC/NVA
logistic requirement at 50-70 STPD.
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DISCUSSION
1. General. Communist forces in South Vietnam have passed-
from the early stages of classic guerrilla warfare to the employment
of main force combat units in coordinated attacks and ambushes through-
out the country. Their logistical problems, however, are still largely
those of a semi-isolated military force with tenuous and frequently
threatened or disrupted lines of communications. The means and
techniques employed to alleviate this situation prior to mid-1965
are now less dependable. Free World Force ground and air action in
base areas and in areas containing vital overland communication
routes have reduced the enemy's sanctuary or war zone security in
which to plan operations and also to-reorganize and resupply his
units. LOC's in North Vietnam and Laos have been interdicted aid
rolling stock lost, the internal supply system has been disrupted,
more weapons are now captured from the VC/NVA than are lost to them,
caches have been seized, the extent of control of the civilian popula-
tion has decreased and the movement of supplies both into and within
South Vietnam has become increasingly difficult. Despite the impact
of these developments on logistics, there is no acceptable evidence
that supply shortages have seriously or widely curtailed enemy plans
or operations. It must be assumed, however, that logistics is a
matter of growing concern to the VC/NVA and that increasing effort
and manpower are being devoted to the resupply of communist forces
in South Vietnam.
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2. Concept and limitations. This study addresses itself to the
logistical requirements of VC/NVA forces in South Vietnam. Since
there are no indications that inadequate logistics are seriously
restricting enemy operations, it is assumed that communist forces,
through a combination of in-country procurement, existing caches
and resupply from external sources, are meeting their present logis-
tical needs. It is the enemy?s external requirements rather than
the means and routes through which they are obtained that is of
primary concern in this study, although note will be made of the
latter.
The development of the factors, methodology and computations
for the VC/NVA logistical requirements has been restricted by a
lack of precise data. Determination of exact logistical computa-
tions is dependent upon standardized basic loads, a standardized
logistical resupply system and known expenditure rates. NVA forces
entering South Vietnam apparently undergo a mission modification of
their TO/E, Viet Cong units do not conform to a standardizated TO/E,
the enemy's logistical resupply system is effective but improvised
and the nature of the combat precludes an exact determination of
expenditures. Although appropriate note will be made of the depth
and adequacy of data base on various points, the facts noted above
are cited as an over-all caveat for the development and acceptance
of this study.
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Nevertheless, it is believed that considerable progress has been
made over previous logistical studies. The data base has increased in
volume and detail and there is more tangible evidence on which to base
estimates of food consumption, enemy basic loads of ammunition and to
arrive at acceptable TO/E's. Interrogation reports and translations
of captured enemy documents as well as data and studies produced by
various commands and agencies have been examined in the compilation
of material for this study. The methodology employed has been kept
relatively simple, since only with the development and acceptance of
more precise data can the methodology become more sophisticated and the
computations more exact.
3. Internal resupply. Two factors have contributed to the
increased dependency of the communist forces in South Vietnam on
external sources of supply. The first is the entry of NVA regular-
force units into the conflict and, coincident with this, the increased
technical sophistication of enemy forces. Although classic guerrilla
warfare is still practiced by irregulars and guerrilla tactics are
frequently employed by major force units, the Communists are no
longer capable of maintaining their stocks primarily by guerrilla-
style in-country seizure and coercion. NVA units brought with them
their own family of weapons, and VC main force elements are increasingly
armed with Chinese and Soviet manufactured equipment. Since U.S.
manufactured 7.62-mm ammunition is not compatible with communist
weapons, this as well as other types of Class V (ammunition) must
be introduced from external sources to supply both enemy forces.
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Despite the requirement for external materiel by their.Main
Force units, the VC continue to maintain an in-country capability
for limited types of military items. Of particular importance to
Local Force and irregular elements are the regional workshops which
are able to produce mortars, rocket launchers, mines and grenades.
Medical supplies are also obtainable to a large extent in-country.
The tonnage of medical items required is not great and the Viet
Cong are capable of satisfying most of their needs through purchase,
theft or capture. Some signal equipment or components for the
manufacture of crude but effective signal equipment are also obtain-
able in the same manner.
The second factor which has notably increased the tonnage of
supplies required from external sources is the increased difficulty
faced by the enemy in internal movement of rice from the Delta area
to troops in the rice-deficit north. Although within South Vietnam
as a whole there are probably sufficient rice and supplementary
rations for the VC/NVA, Free World Forces have disrupted the internal
supply route capabilities through interdiction and movement control
enforcement from south to north. Within the Delta area the enemy is
self-sustaining through taxation and seizure of rice. The inland
waterways in the area provide a network of interprovincial supply
routes over which the Communists are capable of moving foodstuffs
relatively unhampered. Because of the lack of waterways control
there is no way of estimating the quantity or frequency of supply
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movement on the waterways. This movement may be either surreptious or
under cover of normal civilian marketing channels.
Local food shortages reported in the two northern corps areas
have been alleviated by importation of rice from Cambodia. South
Vietnam's neighbor to the west is ideal to meet communist require-
ments to augment their need for rice. The 700 mile border is lightly
inhabited and poorly controlled. The southern half is marshland
laced with waterways and north of Tay Ninh the border area is
heavily forested. The nature of the border makes surveillance
and control extremely difficult for Free World Forces in South
Vietnam. With the arrival of NVA units in South Vietnam and a
threatened ration shortage in the highlands, the Communists
turned to Cambodia. Both smuggling and private traffic are. normal
between Cambodia and South Vietnam. The sharply increased demand
for rice for communist forces in South Vietnam was met initially by
official and private purchases. Sihanouk authorized an official
sale of 20,000 and possibly 30,000 tons of rice for delivery to the
communist forces in 1966. Although the extent to which the sale
was implemented is not known for certain, it is estimated that the
total amount actually shipped to the Communists in the highlands of
South Vietnam and the Laotian Panhandle in 1966 could. have reached
20,000 tons and possibly more. This would have provided the enemy
with approximately 55 to:s per day for the period. Cambodian rice
is thus believed. to have provided a solution to one of the Communists
most serious logistical problems. In addition, it has largely freed
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the supply routes from North Vietnam through Laos for the movement
of other classes of supply. The actual transit of rice from Cambodia
into the South Vietnamese highlands is accomplished. by the use of the
numerous roads, trails and waterways in the area. During the past
two years the Cambodian government has been improving its road
network in the remote ciortheastern area. Although this is part
of a long range plan to provide access to the border and support
isolated military outposts, it also facilitates the flow of
Cambodian rice to the Communists in Laos and the South Vietnamese
highlands.
4. Supply routes. In order of importance, highways, inland
waterways and coastal LOC's are the most important and most exten-
sively used transportation routes to infiltrate men and supplies
from North Vietnam into the combat area. The rail line south of
Vinh provides no through capacity. All major LOC's have suffered
from air strikes and armed reconnaissance and the enemy has resorted
to various means to counteract the effects of the strikes. These
include increasing the capacities of bypass facilities on land
LOC'sj regulating craft concentrations and camouflaging craft,
locks and transshipment facilities on inland waterway arteries;
utilizing flange wheel trucks on the rail line south of Vinh;
and dispersing transshipment points and vessels, and constructing
crude earthen piers and other temporary devices at transshipment
points for coastal LOC operations.
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a. Hi hwys. Five major routes in North Vietnam and
Laos are directly associated with the movement of men and supplies
into South Vietnam and it is estimated that approximately 90% of
the logistic support (throughput capacity) travels via overland
routes. Highway throughput capacities in the area range from 50
to 500 STPD, depending on the season, the immediate capacity of
bottlenecks, the number of vehicles or other means available for
a particular operational movement, the amount of recuperative
effort applied, and the intensity and level of interdiction. The
number of vehicles required to use these routes to full capacity
would total 20,000 in NVN and 4,800 in Laos. These figures include
an estimate of the number of vehicles required to carry the tonnage
forward plus an equal number of empties returning on a continuous
basis. Of the estimated 3,800 vehicles available in the NVN
panhandle, approximately 2,000 are engaged in supply support.
Based on this estimate, only 10% of the over-all available
uninterdicted capacity is now being used. The Laotian vehicle
estimate is 300-400, as compared to the 4,800 required for full
use of the routes. Both air strikes and armed reconnaissance
have been frequent and effective in slowing down or hampering
vehicular traffic and forcing the enemy to resort to slower and
more primitive transport means. The Communists, however, have
resorted to new and varied techniques in improving bypass facilities
to counteract the effects of the air strikes.
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b. Inland waterways. Waterways serve as supplementary,
alternate or feeder routes for the land-based LOC's since none of
the streams in the area provide through movement from North Vietnam
and Laos into South Vietnam. The most heavily used waterway is the
intracoastal route. The north-south oriented routes permit direct
utilization in support of southward movements. In addition, the
east-west routes reaching the coast facilitate internal movement
between interior road arteries. Waterway capacities, when uninter-
dicted, range from about 50 STPD on the Se Bang Hieng in Laos to
2,000 STPD on the Song Ca in North Vietnam. It is estimated that
under present conditions waterway capacities could be maintained.
A large inventory of shallow-draft native craft permits effective
and simultaneous utilization of almost all of the waterway net at
estimated capacities. NVN efforts to counteract the effects of
the air strikes have been directed toward regulating waterway
traffic to avoid craft concentrations, night utilization of
inland waterways and the use of camouflage.
c. Coastal waterways. Due to Sea Dragon and Rolling
Thunder activities north of the DMZ and. Market Time operations
south of the DMZ, coastal infiltration is less secure than over-
land lines of communication. Steel-hulled ships moving from the
Haiphong area have avoided surveillance by travelling well to
seaward and delivering countraband to points south of the I Corps.
The enemy's use of the steel-hulled trawlers with their cargo
capacity of 100-140 tons is a possible indicator of enemy concern
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over logistic resupply. While it is true that the cargo-carrying
capacity of the trawlers is considerable, they are relatively
easily detected on coastal approach and susceptible to interdiction
and loss. Their use by Hanoi might indicate the pressure of increased
requirements for out-country supply and the decision by the North
Vietnamese to meet this requirement by means which have an inherently
high degree of danger of loss.
Coastal transshipment sites between Vinh and the D1,4X are points
of origin for near-shore coastal infiltration routes which transit
DMZ waters into SVN. The nature of these routes is such that a
practicable upper limit of route capacity cannot be assigned.. It
is estimated, however, that the number of vessels available in this
area imposes, on an average day, a 500 STPD limit on the route system.
However, by diverting more vessels to the system, this limit could
be rapidly increased. For example, during the TET stand-down
600-700 craft made over 800 transits and delivered an estimated
21,000 ST of cargo to the Quang Khe and Dong Hoi transshipment
point,:
d. Rail lines. Since January 1967 the rail line south of
Vinh has been of little importance in terms of throughput capacity
and has played a small role in the support of the NVN infiltration
into South Vietnam.
5. Logistical significance of enemy force dispositions. The
geographical distribution of enemy forces in relation to local
internal supply capabilities and external supply LOC's undoubtedly
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results in logistical situations which vary between units. This is
inherent in an over-all logistical supply system which is dependent
on different sources of supply and numerous LOC's to move these
supplies. Although it is not within the scope of this study to
make a regional analysis of the impact of this situation on the
enemy forces, certain generalizations may be noted. Approximately
60% of the communist strength is located in I and II Corps zones
and is at least partially dependent upon external sources for
their food ration. The same units, however, are more readily
serviced by supply routes emanating from North Vietnam which
provide other classes of supply, notably the critical Class V
(ammunition). Units in the south have relatively little dif-
ficulty in maintaining their stock levels of Class I (rations)
but are farthest removed from the sources of other externally
provided items. Location adjacent to the DMZ, the Laotian or
the Cambodian border will also obviously affect the resupply
situation for individual units. The data presented in this
study has been compiled to arrive at over-all logistical require-.?
ments for enemy forces in South Vietnam and local estimates would
require the introduction of data specific to the area.
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k:"- T A
Ca "ASS I
Lation s )
FACTORS
1. Constu:iption rate. The daily consumption rate for VC/NVA
forces in South Vietnam is estimated at 2 poumds/day/man. Interrogation
reports and captured documents indicate that there are variables
involved including reported differences between combat and administrative
units. The figure of 2 pounds/man/day, however, is considered
reasonably so.-uid and suitable for general application throughout the
area and for all types of units.
2. Strength of enem -y forces in South Vietnam. Strength figures
for enemy forces are taken from periodic :ACV reports. The figures
used in this study are shown as follows:
Fne:;r Strength
4___
VC
N VA
Total
Apr
79,940
23,660
107,603
.:ay
73, 043
35,410
114, 255
Jun
79,450
39,680
119,138
Jul
03,747
42,460
126,207
Aug
53,117
47,400
130s517
Sep
63,667
47,500
131,167
Oct
51,353
45,630
126,930
:~Tov
00,520
47,070
127,650
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e uY' Wt iisatih
r-lonth
VC
JVA
Total
Apr
13o975
20, 660
42,635
May
22,695
32,910
55,605
Jun
22,755
33,410
56,165
Jul
24,1;'0
37,950
62,150
Aug
23,900
42,900
66,500
Sep
22,1660
43,000
65,160
Oct
21,020
40,120
61,140
Nov
20, 440
41,320
61, 740
.3. Internal vs e: ter__ al sources of ration suite. The
determination of the proportion of rations (primarily rice) required
from external sources is influenced more by factors peripheral to
the study than on s, ecific reports from prisoners and docu rents. As
in para 3, DISCUSSION, it is believed that there is probably
sufficient rice in South Vietnam to meet the enemy's basic Class I
require:,.-Lents. The inability of the VC/01A to .rove sufficient
quantities of rice from the groriing areas of the south to the
deficit areas of the north has resulted in shortages in the latter
area. This deficit is met by the introduction of rice from external
sources. Although so Le rice is probably brought into the area from
North Vietnams through the D:I and Laos, the primary source is
believed to be Ca.ioodi.a. The 20,000 tons estimated for 1966 for
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delivery from that country to the South Vietnamese hi ghlaxds and
the Thotian Panhandle is considered adequate to co pensate for
internal shortages. For the purpose of this study it is estimated
that enemy forces in the t-,o northern corps? zones receive one-
half ( 1 pound/ranjday) of their rations from external sources.
This figure is based to some extent on individual reports from. the
area but more directly by an application of the Ca bodian figures
to the enemy strength.
i_I; T 1-I0D0LrnY
Following is the methodology employed in cor:puting Class I
requirements:
Enemy strength x Ration requirements = Total
(2 los,nan/day) requirem ent
Dnemy strength, x Ration requirements = external
(I and II. Corps)
(1 lb/mar./day) requirement
Total Requirements
1ionth
VC
NVA
Total
Apr
78.96 T
28.66 T
107.62 T
Tray
79.85 T
32.90 T
112.75 T
Jun
79.56 T
33.40 T
112.96 T
Jul
83.20 T
42.50 T
125.70 T
Aug
83.12 T
47.40 T
130.52 T
Sep
83.67 T
47.50 T
131,17 T
Oct
81.36 T
45.63 T
126,99 T
Nov
80.58 T
47.07 T
127.65 T
A,T,R.AGS :
81.28 T
1,0.63 T
121.92 T
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External ;:eCiuire:tent3
Month
VC
ITVA
Total
Apr
6.98 T
14.33 T
21.31 T
bray
11.34 T
16.45 T
27.79 T
Jim
11-38,T
16.70 T
28.08 T
Jul
12.10 T
18.90 T
31.00 T
Aug
11.95 T
21.45 T
33.40 T
Sep
11.08 T
21.50 T
32.58 T
Oct
10.51 T
20.06 T
30.57 T
Nov
10.21 T
20.66 T
30.87 T
AVL.AGs.
10.69 T
18.76 T
29.45 T
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 Approved For Release 2002JW t6 h CIA-RDP78SO2149R000200130005-0
CI ASS II . IV
Medical, Si,-nai, Ordnance (.-,'eapons)
FACTORS
The DIA Logistical Study of May 1965 based its computations
for VC/NVA Class II and IV medical and signal requirements on an
application of World War II logistical figures. 'ireapon replacements
were developed by applying a factor of 5' per year require: gent for
the total weapon inventory. It was further assumed that INA forces
were dependent upon external sources for Class Il and IV and that
VC elements obtained r.-most of their signal and medical logistical
supplies in-country by seizure, purchase or manufacture. Despite
detailed research of the DID. data base, it has not been
found possible to develop necessary usable data on basic loads;
expenditures resulting; from capture, loss and normal usage; and the
amount of weapons, medical and signal materiel introduced
from external sources. .-ith the knowledge, therefore that
the presently employed estimative approach requires further
development, the earlier (1965) factors have been applied in this
study. The figures used are .5119 lbs/man/day for ANA forces
and the same for the VC total requirements. The external
requirement for the VC is .0119 lbs/.;:an/day (weapons only).
Strength figures employed are those noted in annex A.
I'L:"THODOLOGY
(See explanation in FACTO: S above)
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COi, UTTAT IOIS
Total geaLlire: casts
External requirements
I~'onth
VC
1 VdA
Total
VC
I STA
Total
Apr
20.21 T
7.33 T
27.54 T
.47 T
7.33 T
7.80 T
Nay
20.44 T
0.87 T
29.31 T
? 48 T
0.87 T
9.3 5 T
Jun
20.34 T
9.95 T
30.29 T
.40 T
9.95 T
10.35 T
Jul
21.40 T
10.70 T
32.10 T
. 40 T
10.70 T
11.10 T
Auk
21.27 T
12.13 T
33.40 T
.49 T
12.13 T
12.62 T
Sop
21.40 T
12.15 T
33.55 T
.49 T
12.15 T
12.64 T
Oct
20.82 T
11.67 T
32.49 T
.4 8 T
11.67 T
12.15 T
iov
20.62 T
12.04 T
32.66 T
.47 T
12.04 T
12.51 T
AVM ,G E :
20. '1 T
10.60 T
31.41 T
.46 T
10.60 T
11.06 T
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 Approved For Release 2002/08/16: CIA-RDP78S02149;R00020Q1'30005=0
ANNEX C
CLASS V
Ammunition
FACTORS
1. Strength of enemy forces. See Annex A.
2. TO/E for VC and NVA units in South Vietnam. The TO/E's
employed in this study are based on data obtained from interrogation
reports and captured enemy documents. Since NVA units entering South
Vietnam are modified for infiltration and Viet Cong units do not
conform to a standard TO/E, analysis of numerous source documents
has been required to arrive at a usable TO/E for the two enemy
forces. Enclosures 1 and 2 show the organization, strength and
weapons of the VC and the NVA as determined by this evaluation
and employed in this study.
3. "Type" VC/NVA Battalion Weapons and Ammunition List. Since
in many combat actions in South Vietnam the enemy is reported as
"unknown," it is not considered practical to select specifically the
VC or the NVA TO/E as a basis for computations for each individual
action. A Weapons Allowance and Basic Ammunition List has been
prepared which is a synthesis of the weapons and ammunition carried
by VC and NVA battalions. This list (enclosure 3) is applied for
each combat engagement regardless of whether the enemy force is
reported as "unknown" or identified as VC or NVA.
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 Approved For Release 20D2/08116 CIA-RDP78'S02149R000200130005-0
4. Basic load. The Basic Load of a "type" VC/NVA battalion
is shown in enclosure 3 as part of the Weapons Allowance aid Basic
Ammunition List. It is based on interrogation reports and captured
enemy documents available in the Washington area. A considerable
variation was found among the various sources and the figure used
represents an average of the reported basic loads in the more
credible and detailed documents. The weight per round was
multiplied by the basic load of rounds per weapon. The total
weight of the basic load of the "type" battalion has been computed
as 2.5 T and this figure is employed in the Class V computations.
5. Battalion slice. The concept of a battalion slice is used
as a means of factoring-in the basic load and expenditure for non-
battalion elements of regiment and division. Concurrently with
combat action by an infantry battalion, it is assumed that a portion
of the available ammunition of support elements of the division and/
or regiment is also expended. Using the weapons and the ammunition
basic load shown for the VC and NVA regimental and division elements
(enclosures 1 and 2) and the Weapons and Basic Load List for the
"type" VC/NVA infantry battalion, a battalion slice has been deter-
mined for battalions which are subordinate to and supported by
both regimental and division elements. These are identified in
the study as "division-type battalions." In addition, separate
computations have been made for nondivisional battalions which are
assumed to have the equivalent of regimental-level combat and
administrative support.
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The battalion slice is determined by dividing the total tonnage
of the major unit, i.e., division or regiment, by the number of
infantry battalions it contains. This battalion-slice then repre-
sents ammunition available for expenditure by the infantry battalion
itself plus a proportionate share of the Class V load of the support-
ing division and/or regimental units. The methodology and figures
for these computations are shown as follows:
a. Basic ammunition load. (Derived from TO/E's enclosures
1 and 2 and "Type" VC/NVA Battalion Weapons and Ammunition List
enclosure 3.)
"Type" Infantry Battalion .....
2.5 T
Regimental Headquarters
3.92 T
NVA Division Headquarters .....
16.31 T
VC Division Headquarters ......
4.32 T
b.
Unit tonnage.
Infantry Regiment ..............
11.42 T
(2.5 T x 3 Inf Bns +
3.82 T Regt Hq)
NVA Infantry Division ..........
50.57 T
(11.42 T x 3 Inf Regt +
16.31 T Div Hq)
VC Infantry Division ...........
38.58 T
(11.42 T x 3 Inf Regt +
4.32 T Div Hq)
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C. Battalion-slice.
NVA Division-type battalion .... 5.62 T
(50.57 T - 9 divisional
infantry battalions)
NVA non-Divisional battalion ... 3.8 T
(11.42 T - 3 battalions)
VC Division-type battalion .... 4.28 T
(38.58 T - 9 divisional
infantry battalions)
VC non-Divisional battalion ... 3.8 T
6. Battalion equivalents. In computing the level of combat
it is necessary to know the
number of battalions (confirmed,
probably and possible) and also the number of battalion equiva-
lents represented by the strength of the separate companies and
platoons in the VC force. The latter figure is arrived at by
dividing the total personnel strength of VC separate companies
and platoons by a figure of 460 representing an average battalion
strength. A total of the NVA battalions, the VC battalions and the
VC battalion equivalents provides the number of battalion/battalion
P
equivalents in South Vietnam.
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Following are figures used for this study:
Month
VIVA Battalions
VC Battalions
VC Battalion
,c-'?ivaJ.?n,1 - ..
~
Total VC/NVA
Battalion Equivalents
Apr
50 +
89 +
74 =
213
May
60 +
93 +
77 =
230
Jun
63 +
95 +
77 =
235
Jul
73 +
94 +
83
250
Aug
81 +
95
82 =
258
Sep
82 +
96 +
80 =
258
Oct
86 +
94 +
82 =
262
Nov
92 +
93 +
81 =
266
7. Level of combat.
a. The frequency of engagement or level of combat is one of the most
difficult factors to determine with any acceptable degree of accuracy. For
the purpose of this study the C0,':7-JSi?MACV Monthly Evaluation Reports were
selected since they contain both J2 and J3 information in some detail on
monthly combat activity. Use of this information has required considerable
evaluation and judgement in arriving at the necessary number of days of
combat for each battalion equivalent in South Vietnam for each month. In
some instances the size of the enemy unit is listed, i.e., regiment, battalion,
etc., but frequently the enemy is "unknown." In this case an evaluation is
required based on the reported number of enemy KIA, prisoners, weapons
captured, etc., to estimate the size of the enemy unit confronted. The days
of combat for each action also require an evaluation since there is no
precise means of determining whether an action covering a week's duration
actually consisted of seven c'.ays o_ conti:iuous conflict or days of active
combat int r~sd*o le~0611bW' % 2 &-R d 6214 9,14666206f 566I0gb the
 Approved For Release 2002/08/16 =CIA-RDP78S02149R000200130005-0
information available, an estimate was made of the number of days
of combat reflected for each reported action in the COMUSMACV
Monthly Evaluation report. When assessmentshad been made on each
action, a total of days of combat for enemy forces was compiled
for the month.
b. The number of days of combat for the month is divided
by the number of battalion equivalents in South Vietnam during the
period to arrive at the average number of days'of combat for each
enemy battalion/battalion equivalent:
VC/NVA Battalion
Average days of
Month
Days of Combat
for the month*
VC/NVA Battalion
Equivalents
combat for each
battalion
Apr
235 days
213 =
1.10.days
May
319 days +
230 =
1.38 days
Jun
486 days
235 =
2.06 days
Jul
559 days
250 =
2.23 days
Aug
437 days
258 =
1.69 days
Sep
761 days
258 =
2.94 days
Oct
1,609 days
262 =
6.14 days
Nov
928 days
266 =
3.48 days
Based on analysis of MACV Monthly Evaluation Reports (see
para 7.a. above.)
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A further division using 30 (days/month) provides the level of
combat as indicated:
s of
da
A
th
s/month
Da
y
verage
combat for each
battalion
Level of combat
Mon
y
Apr
30
1.10 days
=
1:27
May
30
1.38 days
=
1:21
Jun
30
2.06 days
=
1:14
Jul
3U
2.23 days
=
1:14
Aug
30
1.69 days
=
1:18
Sep
30
2.94 days
-=
1:10
Oct
30
6.14 days
=
1:5
Nov
30 +
3.48 days
=
1:9
Average:
1:15
c. Based on the procedure and the figures indicated above,
it was determined that the average VC/NVA level of combat for the
eight months examined was one-day-in-fifteen (1:15). It is realized,
however, that this figure-is based on less than satisfactory in-put
data and should, if possible, be refined employing more precise
information. For this reason, additional factors of 1:30 and 1:45
have also been computed to indicate the effect this would have on
the enemy's ammunition consumption and on the total externally
supplied requirements for VC/NVA forces. It is noteworthy, however,
that the computations above reflect a marked and relatively consis-
tent trend toward an increase in the level of combat for the period
examined. This same increase is suggested by analysis of other
factors as noted previously.
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8. Expenditure of Class V Per engagement. Research of data base
documents and studies available in DIA has failed to provide sufficient in-
formation to develop an improved estimate of the portion of the enemy's
basic load expended in a day of combat. For the purpose of this study
an expenditure rate of 1/3 the basic load for each day of combat has been
employed. This factor was used in earlier studies on this subject.
METHODOLOGY
For the purpose of review and reference, following is the methodology
described above and employed in the computation of
Battalion days of Number of battalion
combat for given equivalents
month
Days of combat for 30 (days/month)
given month for each
battalion equivalent
Number of NVA X Battalion slice
Division-type
Battalions
Number of NVA non- x Battalion slice
Division Battalions
Number of VC X Battalion slice
Division-type
Battalions
Number of VC non- x Battalion slice
Division Battalions
Sum of tonnage x Expenditure of Class
(preceeding four V per engagement
steps)
Tonnage expended per : Level of combat
day of combat
Class V requirements:
Days of combat for
given month for each
battalion equivalent
Level of combat for
given month
NVA Division-type
tonnage
NVA non-Division
tonnage
VC Division-type
tonnage
,VC non-Division
tonnage
Tonnage expended per
day of combat
Daily Class V
expenditure
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ThC __.na' ~.' t~ ...~ ~?l i:... _ 0 ` t~_~. ..!-. ~.:v J.l7~nt ~'r +~l'n"_ ~.: 'l'J .~..
e
~r:a _ orse'+ c, as in Short Tons:
5." 3
]o x 5. 2 T = 3j ,7 i 2' x 3 T _ _. m
59 x - =
7 r. T ~ x ~. ~ 1 1V2. T
b 1
U- 5. X62 T = 357. ( =t 20 x 3.S T = 1JJ.4 T
L.-i,.S 3_1C? Div 10=?
2,7 3
_U x
J ' : SAc2 _ 2_4.1 T 16 3 3 T
J. 1_ 56 5 a ' 3 L 1 7= 6j /
s?s
Sep
Oct s
:.Q ~r
i'.oath
70 :
Ay?
42 x
Lay
41 _C
J"-ll
45 x
Jul
43 x
Au
45 x
Sep
45 .~
Oct
45 x
5ev
45
n 1,1C--A1_1
70
no-- En
is
4.l = 179,767 47 x 3r T =
4.26?=175.4_T 52 _C 38'=
4.28T = 192.60? 50 .-L ?r3 .v~. 37 =
4.21T = 104,047 21 x 3.37 =
4.2= 192.'OT 50 3.CT =
4.x'1' 19 2,40T 51
j.OT =
4.23T = 192.637 49 3.31 =
4.28,-_ = 172. =''O T 4,y 3
.1:` no: non- iota
r'I
253.7 1
VC non-
Div 10:1
r n .
3 n
L'.I". Slice
7
Ton
Tot- 1
4S 1onri..;;c
170.607
74 3.OT =
261.207
63 ~/
197 6 0 i
77 x 3.6T =
292,60T
'665.62 .7
1c~?O 0^-,
r.J1
77 x3.CT=292.L0T
-75.20 T
193
00
.
1;0.00
82 x 3. 'T = 311.60T
694.20 7
1~ 00
82 x 3.67 =
311.63
595,00 T
15',20
82 _x 3.1i' =
311.60?
'9'.~.LO i
102.40
C1 ._ 3.51 =
337 33
62.
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 Approved For Release 24Q21Q8N~ _; CIA-F DP78s0Z149R000200130005-0
L -L
ic -7 "c 1,
pe-l
c
p?~., r7 rr .~._ r C/ r' '0 26
li3
T
Ju: 321,.9 T lo -00 . 13 1 1/3
Jul 37 9.3 1 ' vU )...: 1-6 fro T x 3_/3
ttl,.G ( - /r_.a :.. .. 1 - 1i_,J. iJ i x 1.~ .~
Sc- 413 .5 1/3
Oct 43 !b 1 2 7 1 /3
1 L:
Lio.r !,UL ! 1 J~e~v 1 = l7%}r\pCr~ it Y 1/3
)7.'75 ,1
321ra5?
333.36 T
J
35!=.9c;
/ m
367.9- 1
370, 50
374.3=4 T
rn
382c,~ 1
S?iPD. Class
n
An- 297.75 1 i 1:27 11.03 , 3713
32 .59 '1 1:21 = 15.1;7 ST-PD
333 ` T 14 23.
J L'- 354.90 T 1:11 = 25.35 STIR
P n/ rr,. n PD
.ti~ :1:> = 20
37 .1:' ST- PD
Sep 370.50 T 1:13
= 37.05 STFD
Oct 374.30 T 1:5 = 74.9 ST -PD
,10V 382.96 T
4 1:9 =
...55 UT?
2
AVE A0" . 31.,n-)4
i or t "no re,.,.,.,e'.'i the a'; -vra"e d? 11;'
alas 31.04
??~ __ ...ti. - _ ,.... ~. 17.72
these i~. 1:33 ?~ ~ '-? -C1. ~.~~ , -~ _
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f
,30 ''
 Approved For Release 2002/08/16 : CIA-RDP78SO2149R000200130005-0
DIVISION
Easic Ammunition load:
NVA - 16.31 T + 3 regts (11.42 T ea)
= 50.57 T
VC - 4.32 T + 3 regts (11.42 T ea)
= 38.58 T
500 I 1
Trans 1
30 Pistols
30 SI'G
25_x? ~~al.__.._ 300
120 mm Engineer l Signal
20 Pistols 10 Pistols 12 Pistols 50 SM~`G
20 5MG 50 SI. G 40 S ' G 60 Rifle s
10 Rifles 60 Rifles 40 Rifles
3A.
18 120mrn
I Io rtar
25 Pistols
50 SI'G
50 Rifles
390
r__ , 2710-!J
12.7m AA
12 Pistols 12 Pistols
30 SM?iG 20 S"D Basic load of
20 Rifles 45 Rifles Class V =
3 AR 9 AR 1l.42 ; ea
18 75mm TILIZ 27 12.7AAA
-1 12 Pistols
82 mm 35 SING
Mortar 40 Rifles
!., ._.. _- 18 8?:im Mortar
82 mm Mortar Bn replaces the 120 mm Mortar Bn in VC units.
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REGD %T
30 #._ ,,...a
90
[ 120
75mm RR 7 12.7 mm AA!
4 Pistols
12 SI-D
12 Rifles
6 75 rm RR
0
0
4 Pistols
9 SIi`G
15 Rifles
3 AR
9 12.7 in%
AAA I'D
105 1
6 Pistols
35 SIIG
35 Rifles
82 mm 12 SI G-
:Iortar J 12 Rifles
6 82 mm
Mortars
5 Pistols
11 Rifles
JiG
18 SI. t
25 Rifles Basic Load
Class V: 2.5 T
ea
Basic a.-munition load of the Regiment: 3.92 tons for
regimental headquarters units plus 7.5 tons for the
three infantry battalions equals 11.42 tons for the
regin.ent. Total personnel strength: 2710
32
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10 Pistols
10 SIMIG
94._-R_ .150
Signal Trans
8t Pistols 2 Pistols
18 Si G 15 SID
18 Rifles 18 Rifles
Engineer
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WEAPONS ALLG;IAN'iCE AND BASIC X12,7,JNITION LIST
TI[JI123ER
ROUNDS
WEIGHT
BASIC lOAD
TYPES OF I EAPONS
OF
PER
PER
PER I'SAPON
, EAPONS
WEAPON
ROUND
Pistol
25
35
0.3 oz
16 , 40 lb s
Carbine
188
40
0.6 oz
282.00 lbs
Rifle
0.6 oz
420.70 lbs
Rifle, assault
17
650
0.6 oz
414.40 lbs
Gun, submachine
100
180
0.3 oz
337.50 lbs
Gun, light machine
17
650
o.6 oz
414.40 lbs
Gun, heavy machine 12.71=41
2
1800
4.5 oz
1012.50 lb s
launcher, rocket 40-xn
12
8
4.0 lbs
384.00 lbs
Mortar, 60-:m
_3.0 lbs
660.00 lbs
Mortar, 81/82-;-,rim
7.6 lbs
760.00 lbs
Rifle, recoilless,57-m-n
12.0 lbs
288.00 lbs
TOTAL:
4989.90 lb s
(2.5 ST)
NOTE: The list excludes weapons infrequently reported and
some items such as hand grenades due to vagueness of
of reporting on expenditures.
Enclosure 3
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