MATTER OF FACT THE UNTOLD STORY: PANIC

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78S02149R000200100022-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 2, 2002
• Sequence Number: 22
• Publication Date: January 1, 1966
• Content Type: NSPR

Approved For Release 2002/01/29 : CIA-RDP78SO2149R000200100022-4
Matter of Fact . . . .
The Untold Story: Panic
ANYONE wanting an ex-
planation of the strange
course of events in these
last months must begin the
search in
Vietnam, at
about the
end of Octo-
ber or the
beginning of
November.
At that
time, in the
U.S. head-
quarters i n
Saigon, a re-
c a 1 culation
was made, which in turn
made history. The recalcula-
tion took the deceptively
simple form of a revised es-
timate of enemy capabili-
ties.
In order to show why
such a routine event can
have produced great conse-
quences, one must begin by
sketching in the earlier
background. In August
through October, in brief,
the first returns came in on
the large American troop
commitment in Vietnam.
They were remarkably en-
couraging, indeed stirring
returns.
The green American
troops fought like veterans.
The untested American
units regularly won engage.
ments with greatly superior
numbers of the enemy. In
the light of these happy re-
sults, the first experience-
based studies were made of
the enemy's probable ri-
poste to the much more
massive U.S. intervention in
Vietnam.
Initially, the conclusion
was that the Communist ri-
poste would follow the
Communist rule-book. In
other words, the Vietcong
were expected to return to
Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap's
Phase II; to dig in for a
very long pull, and to re-
sume classic guerrilla war-
fare in small formations.
Among the military, Gen.
Westmoreland had grave
doubts about this assess-
ment. His staff, however,
was then more worried
about the tactical difficul-
ties of prolonged "penny
packet war," than about
further large-scale North
Vietnamese invasion of the
South. Somewhat more pes-
simistically, the civilian ana-
lysts meanwhile predicted
the invasion of the South by
one or two additional North-
ern divisions; but even this
was not especially disquiet-
ing.
BRIEFLY, the civilian
forecast gave a maximum
future balance of four
North Vietnamese divisions
plus the equivalent of eight
divisions of Vietcong regu-
lar troops, against six U.S.
divisions, one Korean divi-
sion, and 13 South Vietnam-
ese divisions. Such a bal-
ance would not have been
alarming. But throughout
October, the South was in-
vaded by more and more
North Vietnamese troops,
and the earlier assessment
began to seem more and
more dubious.
This led to the recalcula-
tion already mentioned. It
mainly took the form of
carefully revised estimates
of the numbers of troops
and quantities of supplies
the enemy was capable of
bringing into South Viet-
nam over the Ho Chi Minh
Trail or Geneva Accord
Memorial Highway, as it is
usually called in Saigon.
The new estimates were
pretty formidable.
The 'Vietcong and North
Vietnamese were now cred-
ited with the capabilities of
increasing their strength by
two regiments per month
from November, 1965;
through December, 1966.
The North Vietnamese were
further credited with the ca-
pability of bringing into the
South between 140 and 175
tons of supplies per clay; or
enough to sustain a greatly
expanded invasion.
These-new estimates were
. By Joseph Alsop
then presented to Secretary
of Defense Robert McNama-
ra when he visited Vietnam
in late November. The esti-
mates meant that the enemy
could well increase his
strength by the equivalent
of eight full divisions more
than had been previously
thought likely.
OBVIOUSLY, this in turn
meant that a great many
more U.S. troops would be
needed to redress the bal-
ance. Thus when McNamara
returned to Washington, his
report on the recalculation
in Saigon caused what can
only be described as a near-
panic. Essentially, it was a
political panic. Because of
McNamara's reform of the
armed services, six U.S. divi-
sions could be, and had
been, provided for Vietnam
without undue political
strain. Providing additional
divisions meant a sdvere
strain, however.
The first consequence of
the panic was the peace of-
fensive and the pause. The
President and his advisers
were clearly warned of ex-
tremely negative effects in
both Hanoi and Saigon
(which were duly produced).
Hence one must assume
that domestic-political con-
siderations were the prime
motives of the vast interna-
tional vaudeville which the
President staged.
As it turned out, of
course, the peace offensive
acted, in this country at
least, as a kind of noisy ad-
vertising campaign against
the President's own policy.
Furthermore, as always hap-
pens in such cases, the near-
panic inside the Adminis-
tration seeped outwards,
to the Senate and else-
where. Thus the public dia-
logue came to its present
pass. It remains to be seen
whether such intense con-
cern was justified. But this
must be examined in anoth-
er report.
1966, The Washington Post Co.
Approved For Release 2002/01/29 : CIA-RDP78SO2149R000200100022-4