POTENTIAL TARGETS IN ELECTRIC POWER, HEAVY INDUSTRY, TRANSPORTATION, PETROLEUM STORAGE, AND THE PORT OF HAIPHONG

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78S02149R000100340021-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 30, 2002
• Sequence Number: 21
• Publication Date: June 10, 1965
• Content Type: REPORT

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Potential Targets in Electric Power, Heavy Industry, Transportation, Petroleum
Storage, and the Port of Haiphong
Introduction.
Industry in North Vietnam in absolute terms is small, and the economy remains
predominantly agricultural. About 80 percent of the labor force is engaged in
agriculture, and it is estimated that in 1964 the value of agricultural production
accounted for almost half of North Vietnam's gross national product (GNP).
The Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) has initiated an industrialization
program that is relatively ambitious in comparison to past efforts and in
comparison to the industrial programs of most other underdeveloped countries in
Asia. New modern industries in North Vietnam include the machine-building
industry, the chemical industry, food processing industries such as rice milling-
and sugar refining, and other light industries such as enamelware, paper, and
soap. Industries that existed in North Vietnam before the Communist takeover,
such as cement and textiles, have been expanded.
North Vietnam's modern industry and transportation facilities -- which have
been rehabilitated and expanded with extensive Sino-Soviet aid -- are concentrated
in a relatively small area and are highly dependent upon imports of machinery
.and raw materials. The interdiction of these facilities would drastically curtail
industrial production ,and would constitute a psychological blow to the regime.
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1. Electric Power
Industry is concentrated within a small rectangular area bounded by the
four cities of Haiphong, Thai Nguyen, Phu Tho, and Nam Dinh. Serious damage to
a few key powerplants could effectively deny the Vietnamese the power that is
essential to industry. The most important targets would be the eight large
interconnected plants that make up the main electric power grid. These eight
powerplants account for about 78 percent of total national electric power capacity
and serve about 90 percent of North Vietnam's industry, including the important
industrial and urban areas of Hanoi, Haiphong, Viet Tri, Thai Nguyen, Nam Dinh,
and Hon Gay - Cam Pha. It would be essential to neutralize all of the plants in
the grid in order to deny effectively electric power to the grid system; other-
wise, those plants still in production could partly. compensate for production
from plants made int7perative. The relative importance of each of the eight plants
to the main grid is indicated below:
Installed Capacity Percentage Contribution
Thermal Powerplant (Thousand Kilowatt to Main Grid
,,.?Hanoi 32.5
,,,-Thai Nguyen 24.o
Viet Tri 16.0
Haiphong Cement Plant 12.0
Uong Bi 24.0
Haiphong 5.5
-~- Hon Gay 13.0
- Nam Dinh
Total 134-15'
J
24
18
12
9
18
4
10
5
100
a. The Uong Bi Thermal Powerplant is still under construction, which could be
accelerated to raise capacity initially to 36,000 kilowatts. in the event of a
power shortage. With a planned total capacity of 48,000 kilowatts, it will be
North Vietnam's largest thermal electric powerplant. ti
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Serious damage to these important electric powerplants would have an
immediate effect in curtailing North Vietnam's industrial production. A brief
description of the individual plants follows:
A. Hanoi Thermal Powerplant
1. Description: Largest operating powerplant in North Vietnam.
Main target area is roughly 550 feet long by 250 to 300 feet
wide$ with an extension of 350 feet consisting of related buildings.
It includes a 5-stack boiler house, other multistory buildings,
8 support buildings, coal yard, possible transformer yard,
auxiliarylr- diesel generator, and POL storage. Served by 3
water lines to the Red River; has a buried 100-ton water
storage tank.
Location: 21-02-35N/105-50-51E; on northern side of city,
within 200 meters of Lake Tay Ho (Ho True Bach) to the west
and inner dike on the south bank. of the Red River to the
north. Railroad about 600 meters distant at nearest point.
Accessible only through city streets, along which normally
dense city settlement exists.
B. Thai Nguyen Thermal Powerplant
1. Description: A new plant which will serve the iron aid steel
plant now under construction. Planned capacity is 36,000 kw,
and present generating capacity is 24,000 k. The plant is
served by a rail spur.
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2. Location: 2l-33-25N/105-52-15E; on South bank of Song Cau near
village of Quang Vinh, about 3 kilometers northwest of Thai
Nguyen. Surroundings consist of hills and basins.
Viet Tri Thermal Powerplant
1. Description: New plant serving rising industrial complex at Viet
Trio Present capacity 16,000 kw; capacity to be expanded to
24,000 kw. Combination one-stack boilerhouse and generator
building. Serves new Viet Tri paper mill, chemical plant, and
sugar refinery, in addition to supplying power to the main grid.
2. Location: 21-17-42N/105-25-30E; within compound of Viet Tri
Chemical Plant, between the railroad and north bank of the Red
River; within 600 meters of the river and about 2 kilometers west
of Viet Tri Railroad/Highway Bridge. Accessible by water from
mountainous region of the Black River basin.
D. Thermal Powerplant at Haiphong Cement Plant
1. Description: Estimated capacity 12,000 kw; serves cement plant
and city. Consists of boilerhouse, generator house, coal
storage, and conveyors.
2. Location: 20-51-50N/106-40-25E; located in southern half of
.cement-plant compound, on the south bank of the Cua Cam. Compound
flanked on east by canal 100 meters wide. Approachable by water
on north and east and by rail spur on west. Surroundings on west
and southwest are moderately built-up, with small ponds, fields,
and paddies interspersed.
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E. Uong Bi Thermal Powerplant
1. Description: New plant planned for 48,000 kw, with present
generating capacity of 24,000 kw, and a third generator under
construction that will raise capacity to 36,000 kw. Will be
largest potential contributor to main power grid, as well as
important supplier to local coal mining and loading facilities.
2. Location: 21-02-OON/106-47-25E; located outside town of Uong
Bi and probably surrounded by discontinuous village-type
settlement. Accessible by boat through network of tidal
channels connecting Uong Bi area with the estuary of Song Da Back,
5 kilometers to the south.
F. Haiphong Thermal Powerplant
1. Description: Present capacity 6,000 kw; essential for local
industrial use and stand-by power. Single L-shaped power house
25,by 50 meters, with coal storage yard, switch and transformer
building, and possible water conduit. Barge pier serving plan
extends about 270 meters across mudflats to Cua Cam channel.
2. Location: 20-52-15N/106-42-50E; on south bank of Cua Can., eastern
edge of Haiphong. Paddy fields on southwest,; area relatively
rural except for riverside industrial strip. Plant probably most
easily accessible from river.
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0. Nam Dinh Thermal Powerplant
1. Description: The Nam Dinh thermal powerplant was enlarged and
rebuilt in 1957 with present capacity at 7,500 kw. It supplies
power to the textile plant and to the surrounding urban area.
Connection with the main power system via 110 kilovolt line that
passes through Phu Ly and extends northward to Hanoi.
2. Location: 20-21+-55N/106-l0-23E; (located on the southeast
side of the textile plant).
H. Hon Gay Thermal Powerplant
1. Description: The Hon Gay thermal powerplant with a capacity of
13,000 kw. supplies power for all coal mining in the area, for
the town of Hon Gay, and for the town and port of Cam Pha. The
high tension line to Can Pha is rated at 35 kilovolts. Connection
with the main power system is believed to be through Uong Bi by
a 110 kilovolt line.
2. Location: 20-56-28N/107-o6-50E-
II. Heavy Industrial Plants
The loss of five major heavy manufacturing plants would seriously impair
the industrial output of North Vietnam. Loss of these plants would have a
psychological impact on the Vietnamese because these modern industrial facilities
are a source of great national pride. In particular, severe damage to the Thai
Nguyen Iron and Steel Plant would frustrate the regime's plans for an iron and
steel industry, a prestige industry that no other country in Southeast Asia yet boasts.
The description of the five plants and of a nitrogenous fertilizer plant under
construction at He Bac is.ag follows:
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1. Description: Modern plant which was a key Soviet aid project.
Work force is about 2,500. This plant is the most important
production and repair facility for precision machine tools and
light mechanical equipment in North Vietnam. This plant carries
considerable prestige among the North Vietnamese as a symbol of
advanced technology, although its products are copies of old
Soviet models of the late 1940's. There has been no evidence
of production of weapons; however, the plant has added 200-300
workhours daily since April 1965. The plant has a potential for
manufacturing small arms such as rifles, bazookas, and recoilless
rifles but not large weapons or armored vehicles.
2. Location: 21-00-02N/105-l+9-07E; located on Hanoi-Ha Dong Road
in suburban semi-agricultural area of high population density
with village adjacent to main compound. Extensive worker housing
A. Hanoi Engineering Plant
area across road from principal installation.
B. Thai Nguyen Iron and Steel Plant
1. Descriptions, This plant now under construction by the Chinese,
is the most. expensive foreign aid project to be built in North
Vietnam. Initial capacity will be 100,000 tons of crude steel.
Two blast furnaces, a coke battery, and sintering plant are now
in operation producing pig iron. By the end of 1965 Thai Nguyen
is expected .to be producing crude steel and some rolled products.
Work force is about 2,000.
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2. Location: 2l-33-25N/105 -52-15E; there is an extensive
construction area, with little village settlement remaining in
the immediately surrounding area. This area is scheduled to
become the primary heavy industrial center of North Vietnam.
Haiphong Cement Plant
1. Description: Rehabilitation of the original French-installed
facilities was completed with Soviet, Chinese, and Rumanian aid.
This is the only significant cement producer in North Vietnam;
supplies nearly all cement for construction activity in the
country and has important export capability.
2. Location: 20-51-50N/106-40-25E; on south bank of Cau Cam River.
Small number of dwellings in immediate vicinity.
D. Viet Tri Chemical Plant
1. Description: This new plant built by the Chinese and East
Germansp produces industrial chemicals and insecticides. The%
plant is the center of the industrial chemical industry in
North Vietnam.
2. Location: 21-10-OON/105-25-10E; compound located between railroad
and north bank of Red River, with two villages nearby.
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Lam Thao Superphosphate Fertilizer Plant
1. Description: New and largest operating chemical fertilizer
plant in North Vietnam, with capacity of 100)000 tons of
superphosphate annually. This plant is a major Soviet aid project,,
and the USSR. is believed to be expanding the plant to 150,000 ton
capacity.
2. Location: 21-20N/105-17E-
F. Ha Bac Nitrogenous Fertilizer Plant
1. Description: Newest chemical fertilizer plant in North Vietnam,
nearing completion and expected to go into operation in 1966.
This plant is a major Chinese aid project, probably exceeding
in investment and complexity any nitrogen plant the Chinese are
known to have built for themselves. Initial capacity is estimated
to be 100)000 tons of ammonium nitrate$ increasing North Vietnam's
total capacity for production of chemical fertilizers by an
0
estimated 40 percent. This plant may be of special importance
not only to agriculture) but also for establishing an explosives
industry in North Vietnam.
2. Location: -Bac Giang - 21-18N/106-12E.
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III. Transportation and Petroleum Storage
The transport system of the DRV is situated and organized in such
a way that neutralization of a few key facilities could effectively interrupt
modern transportation. The rail lines all radiate from one center with no
alternate rail facilities available for any one of the lines. The country
has only one major port for handling large amounts of imports of general car-
go and petroleum in bulk. The road system is poor.and trucks and gasoline
are scarce. The inland water system is underdeveloped and the country has
comparatively few ships for inland and coastal water transportation.
Interference with the modern transport system, which carries the
major portion of the materials moving to and from modern plants, could be
most effectively carried out by the destruction of railroad and highway
bridges. Considerable time and foreign assistance would be required to re-
build the bridges. Destruction of key bridges together with the obstruction
of the entrance to the port of Haiphong, so that large ships could not enter
the port, would do the most damage to the modern transport system. The de-
struction of the petroleum storage areas at Haiphong and Hanoi would re-
strict the use of motor, air, and water transportation to some extent.
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III. Transportation and Petroleum Storage
The transport. system of the DRV is situated and organized in
such a way that neutralization of a few key facilities could effectively
interrupt modern transportation. The rail lines all radiate from one center
with no alternate rail facilities available for any one of the lines. The
country has only one major port for handling large amounts of imports of
general cargo and petroleum in bulk. The road system is poor and trucks and
gasoline are scarce. The inland water system is underdeveloped and the coun-
try has. comparatively few ships for inland and coastal water transportation.
Interference with the modern transport system, which carries the
major portion of the materials moving to and from modern plants, could be
most effectively carried out by the destruction of railroad and highway bridges.
Considerable time and foreign assistance would be required to rebuild these
bridges. Destruction of key bridges together with the obstruction of the
entrance to the port of Haiphong, so that large ships could not enter the '\
port, would do the most damage to the modern transport system. The destruc-
tion of the petroleum storage areas at Haiphong and Hanoi would restrict the
use of motor, air,, and water transportation to some extent.
* It must be borne in mind that the destruction of rail and road bridges
probably would not halt traffic completely for.'more than-a short'period of
time because traffic can be carried around the breaks by the use of ferries
across rivers. Such destruction would, however, seriously impede traffic
until the bridges are repaired.
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Selected transportation facilities whose loss would have the
most detrimental effects on the economy are listed below:
A. Dap Cau Railroad/Highway Bridge* over Song Cau, about 20
miles northeast of Hanoi.
1. Description: Four-span, thru-truss bridge, carries
1 railroad track and 2 highway lanes. Loss of this
550' bridge would interdict rail traffic between
Ping-hsiang in China and all major terminals in North
Vietnam, and would halt highway traffic temporarily. It
would also halt Chinese traffic in transit through
North Vietnam to and from Yunnan Province and would
disrupt wireline facilities on the bridge.
2. Location: 21-12-18N/106-05-46E. Scattered village-type
settlement on both banks, but population density not
great.
B. Hai Duong Railroad/Highway Bridge over Thai Binh, about 37
miles east of Hanoi.
1: Description: Destruction of this 1130' bridge would
interrupt the movement of domestic, import, and export
traffic by rail and road between the port and industrial
center of Haiphong and other areas of the country and
would interrupt Chinese transit traffic between the port
of Haiphong and Yunnan Province. Inland water traffic
In order to halt railroad traffic between the Dap Cau bridge and the Chinese
border it would be necessary to interdict a number of smaller bridges on this
line and possibly to destroy sections of track and moving trains.
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by barge and small craft could continue, however.
2. Location: 20-56-30N/106-21-32E. Located in open rural
area.
C. Viet Tri Railroad/Highway Bridge over the Claire, about 50
miles northwest of Hanoi.
1. Description: Four-span, steel, thru-truss bridge, carried
1 railroad track and 2 highway lanes. Loss of this 970'
bridge would interrupt nearly all road and rail traffic
to and from the newly emerging industrial centers at
Viet Tri and Lam Thao and other areas in the northwest.
It would also interrupt Chinese traffic to and from
Yunnan Province.
2. Location: 21-17-54N/105-26-57E. Riverside rural settle-
ment on both banks of river.
Hanoi Railroad/Highway Bridge over Red River (Doumer Bridge)
1. Description: This is North Vietnam's longest bridge,
about 5510 feet. Loss would isolate Hanoi temporarily
from north and east and would disrupt wireline facilities
on bridge. Psychological reaction might be more signifi-
cant than physical loss of bridge.
2. Location: 21-02-25N/105-51-57E. Urban area on south
bank is built up, but north bank is relatively open.
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E. Ninh Binh Railroad Highway Bridge over. Song Day, about 70
miles south of Hanoi.
1. Description: Loss of this 575' bridge would probably
interrupt all rail traffic to the southern part of the
country and would hamper highway traffic. Military
supplies moving southward from the Hanoi area by rail
would probably be transferred to highways at this point.
Other railroad bridges on this line south of the 20th
Parallel have already been bombed.
2. Location: 20-15-37N/105-59-11E. Located on north side
of small town, with riverside settlement on north side
of bridge.
F. Hanoi Railroad/Highway Bridge over Canal des Rapides, about
6 miles northeast of Hanoi.
1. Description: Loss of this 738' bridge would divide the
rail system into two parts, separating Hanoi and Haiphong
on the south from the railroad lines to China and Thai
Nguyen on the north. It also would isolate the rolling
stock repair facilities located in the Gia lam section
of Hanoi from the railroad lines to the north.
2. Location: 21-04-32N/105-54-58E. Some village-type
settlements near the bridge, but not in immediate proximity.
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. .Haiphong Petroleum-Products Storage Area
1. Description: This petroleum storage facility, with total
capacity of 72,000 metric tons, accounts for about 46 per-
cent of the total petroleum storage capacity in North
Vietnam. The loss of this facility would hamper motor
and
transportation/would impair its ability to be a substan-
tial substitute for rail transportation. Stand-by elec-
trical power would also be reduced.
2. Location: 20-52-25N/106-40-05E; on south bank of Cua Cam
Estuary in western outskirts of Haiphong, about 1 kilometer
west of the Haiphong Cement Plant. Highway No. 5 and the
Haiphong-Hanoi rail line follow along the south side of
the compound.
H. Hanoi Petroleum-Products Storage Area
1. Description: The two petroleum-products storage compounds
being used in the Hanoi area together account for almost
24 percent of total petroleum storage capacity in the coun-
try. The Thanh Am installation is North Vietnam's second
major petroleum storage facility, with an estimated
capacity of 34,000 metric tons. The Bac Mai storage facil-
ity adds another 3,000 metric tons to Hanoi's petroleum
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storage capacity.
2. Location: Thanh Am: 21-03-57N/105-53-48E. Villages
nearby, and military camp on opposite side of adjacent
military storage area. Bac Mai: 21-OON/105-51 E.
I. Port of Haiphong
1. Description: Obstruction of the Channel Maritime leading
to the port of Haiphong, together with damage to lighters
and other small craft* and the interruption of traffic on
the rail line connecting the Chinese border at Ping-hsiang
with Hanoi, would seriously restrict the movement of foreign
trade both by sea and by land. North Vietnam is dependent,
on foreign trade for its industrial development, and denial
of most imports for a period of 2 months or longer would
seriously disrupt the industrialization program and cause
a drastic fall in industrial output. The country imports
all of its petroleum products and steel, practically all
of its railroad rolling stock and vehicles, and most of
its complex machinery and metal manufacture 9, spare parts,
industrial chemicals, chemical fertilizers, and raw cotton.
W Lighters and other small craft available to North Vietnam could probably be
used to move as much as 50 percent of the import trade (except bulk petroleum
and the largest pieces of equipment) from deep-draft vessels anchored out-
side the channel to the port.
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Nearly all of the seaborne imports and nearly all of
seaborne exports, except coal, pass through Haiphong. If
denied use of the port by-blocking the channel and damage
to lighters and other small craft, the regime could shift
nearly all of the commodities previously imported by sea
to South China ports, in particular to Fort Bayard, from
where they could be transported by rail to Hanoi. A pos-
sible exception might be petroleum products which could
be moved by rail only if China were willing to permit
North Vietnam to use tank cars normally employed to trans-
port petroleum to Yunnan Province. If rail transportation,
between China and North Vietnam were also interrupted, the
country then would be deprived of most of its imports.
Other ports capable of accommodating oceangoing vessels,
in particular Cam Pha and Hon Gay, presently lack the port.,
facilities for handling large quantities of any other type
of cargo.than coal, and do not have rail connections with
the main rail system. In addition, neither truck trans-
port on the road systems connecting Fort Bayard and Hanoi
nor North Vietnamese air transport has the equipment, fuel,
or facilities to handle more than a small fraction of the
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volume of goods currently imported by North Vietnam.
Denial of most of the imports of North Vietnam would soon
bring to a halt the construction of industrial projects
currently underway. Manufacturing industries, which ac-
count for more than 70 percent of gross value of modern
industry, probably would be able to continue production
for one or two months on the basis of current stockpiles.
With the depletion of these stockpiles of materials, such
industries as machine-building and textiles would be forced
to curtail production drastically unless imports of steel
and raw cotto) were resumed. The denial of most imports
would not significantly effect production of chemicals and
cement, because they use local materials for production.
2.' Location: 20-52N/106-1+1E.
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