(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78S02149R000100340020-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 30, 2002
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: June 11, 1965
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2002/08/16 : CIA-RDP78S02149R000100340020-
S-i1;-C-R-E-T
25X1 25X1
1. Nature of the Economy and. its Vulnerabilities
The North Vietnamese economy is basically one of subsistence
agriculture with only a small modern industrial sector concentrated
in a few centers, including Hanoi, Haiphong, Nam Dinh, Viet Tri, and
`.Thai Nguyen. This small industrial sector is heavily dependent on
imports of machinery and raw materials, primarily from Communist China
and the USSR; on the other hand, North Vietnam generally imports little
food, depending very largely on domestic production to feed its
population of about 18 million. The main transportation links with
other countries are via the port of Haiphong and the rail line to
China via Dong Dang, North Vietnam's capacity for producing military
items, many of which are crudely fashioned, is restricted to grenades,
mines, mortars, and ammunition for small arms. All of North Vietnam's
heavy military equipment and most of its small arms and ammunition
are obtained by imports from Communist countries.
Hence, the Viet Cong military effort is not primarily dependent
upon the North Vietnamese economy for equipment and supplies. Nor
are Viet Cong operations in South Vietnam significantly dependent
upon the major military installations in the north, such as airfields
and military headquarters. The Viet Cong logistic requirements
are. relatively small; it obtains food and some military supplies in
South Vietnam.
Approved For Release 2002/08/16 : CIA-RDP78SO2149R000100340020-1
25X1
 Approved For Release 2002/08/16 : CIA-RDP78SO2149R000100340020-1
Potential vulnerabilities, translated into possible target systems,
are discussed below and in the annexe: appended to this report. The
neutralization of key industrial, transport and military targets
could constitute a serious blow to the Hanoi regime and adversely
affect its determination to carry on the present conflict in the face
of mounting escalation of the conflict. Of the potential target
systems discussed, we note that uric crippling of the key transport
and military facilities (discusser in Part III of Annex 1 and in
Annex 2) would complicate the problems of contiriuazlogistic support
for large-scale operations in South Vietnam, reduce North Vietnam's
defensive capabilities (particularly air defense) and markedly slow
down the level of operations of the modern industrial sector in
North Vietnam.
However, we have not been able to identify a target system in
North Vietnam which, if successfully attacked, would carry with it
a higher degree of assurance of crippling the effectiveness of Viet
Cong ground forces presently deployed in South Vietnam.
2. Potential Industrial and Transport Target Systems
Electric power generating facilities, heavy industry, transportation,
petroleum storage depots, and the port of Haiphong are discussed as
possible target systems in Annex 1. The principal conclusions are:
a. Eight powerplants account for nearly 80 percent of electric
generating capacity and serve about 90 percent of North Vietnam's
Approved For Release 200 /08/16 : CIA-RDP78SO2149 000100340020-1
25X1
25X1
 Approved For Release 2002/08/16 : CIA-RDP78S02149R000100340020-1
industry. Severe damage to se
long lasting effect on industrial Production and would impair
operations at the port of Haiphong.
b. Five heavy industry plants account for North Vietnam's steel
capacity (presently under construction), virtually all cement and
fertilizer output, and the only large modern machine building
capacity. All of these facilities represent key Soviet or Chinese
aid projects and they have military significance apart from their
symbolic value.
c. Six rail/highway bridges and the port of Haiphong are the
major transportation targets ,sccause the flow of supplies from China
and the USSR flows over theso routes. Interdiction of the key
bridges together with the entrance to the port of Haiphong would not
only slow down the importation of military supplies, but also greatly
reduce imports of those raw materials on which North Vietnamese
industry depends. There is also a major petroleum storage area in
Hanoi and one in Haiphong. Loss of POL stocks and severe damage
to the country's largest storage facilities would curtail motor,
air and water transportation and could therefore. affect military
activities as well as the operation of the economy.
3. Potential Military Targets
There are four major air`-'i.cld.s in North Vietnam which normally
accomodate military aircraft i,:410 fighters and 1L-28 bombers) as
well as transports for millt.,cy and civilian use. Effective
Approved For Release 2002/08/16 : CIA-RDP78S02149R000100340020-1
~-C-R-E-7
25X1
 Approved For Release 2002/08/16 : CIA-RDP78SO2149R000100340020-1
25X1
neutralization of these facilit. s and aircraft would temporarily
cripple the North Vietnamese tactical and air transport capability,
as well as their ability to strike targets in South Vietnam. Replacements
could be provided by the USSR a Ld/or Communist China; after repair
a fighter defense and bomber offense could be reconstituted quickly.
Hence, repeated interdiction would be required. (See Annex 2)
Neutralization of airfiel,
,the Hanoi SAM sites and other key
military facilities would have two predictable effects: (1) It
would serve notice of U.S. detcrnination to attack military targets
anywhere in North Vietnam, and i,2) It would reduce U.S. and South
Vietnamese aircraft losses it -,'G llow-up air attacks were planned
on key industrial or transport -targets, since most of these key
installations are in the Hanio-Haiphong area.
4. Vulnerability of Rice Crop to Flooding
The probable consequences of attacking North Vietnamese rice
supplies by flooding the Tonkin delta as a consequence of breaching
its levees is considered in Annex 3. We have not made a study of
the operational feasibility of breaching the levees in the Red River
(Tonkin) delta. However, a si._n:cessful attack might severely flood
as much as half a million hecnres,* and losses could run to
A hectare is 2.11-71 acres.
25X1
Approved For Release 2002/08/16 : CIA-RDP78SO2149R000100340020-1
 Approved For Release 2002/08/16 : CIA-RDP78SO2149R000100340020-1
three quarters of a million tons of rice. If only the main levees
were breached, and the secondary levee system remained, rice losses
probably would be on the order o' 200,000 tons. We believe the
Communist Chinese could make up this deficit from their own
production of 75-80 million tons of rice and supply their own
people by additional imports of ti ,iheat. Wheat is freely available
on the world market, and the Chinese (as well as the Russians)
have ample foreign exchange to purchase the quantities required
by North Vietnam.
If a completely successful ,.'L-:.ack were to achieve a significant
,-: duction in rice supplies in :hc?-~ ;h Vietnam, which the Chinese or
Soviets were unsuccessful in inakig good for some unknown reason,
t .,e Hanoi regime would undoubted-. impose selective rationing.
The military forces and essential industrial and government workers
would continue to be fed adequatcLy. It would be the least important
sectors of the population, such .c the old people, who would suffer
deprivation. Hence, an attack on the rice crop by flooding the
Tonkin delta would be unlikely to achieve a significant military
impact. Further, it would almosu certainly incense world public
opinion against the United State., as the perpetrator of an inhuman
act, and could strengthen the determination of the North Vietnamese
co resist.
Approved For Release 20
2/08/16: CIA-RDP78SO21 9R000100340020-1
25X1
25X1
 Approved For Release 2002/08/16 : CIA-RDP78SO2149R000100340020-1
5. Other Target Studies
Annex 4 is a brief annotated bibliography of other target studies
on North Vietnam, including po:>sible sabotage targets. Additional
details on certain potential ta-,et systems are available in these
studies, particularly the 7 pr l 1965 analysis entitled, Location
and Significanceof Electric Potirplants in the Hanoi-Haiphong Power
Network of North Vietnam.
Kil June 1965)
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2002/08/16 : CIA-RDP78SO2149R000100340020-1
 Approved For Release 2002/08/16 : CIA-RDP78SO2149R000100340020-1
TRANSMITTAL SLIP
DATE
TO:
ROOM NO.
I BUILDING
REMARKS:
f
j
FROM: .
ROOM NO.
I
BUILDING
EXTENSION
NO- 5 1)4 REPLACES FORM 36-8
I RM 5
FEB
WHICH MAY BE USED.
STATINTL
Approved For Release 2002/08/16 : CIA-RDP78SO2149R000100340020-1