EVALUATION OF ALTERNATIVE BOMBING PROGRAMS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78S02149R000100310006-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 8, 2003
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: May 27, 1967
• Content Type: MEMO

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27 Kay 1967
on of Alternative Womb
randum evaluates two alternative bombing progrmme:
egyeA; To concentrate the bombing of North
on the lines of communication in the Panhandle
Area (Route Packages 1, IX, and III) and to terminate
bombing it, the remainder of North Vietnam unless there
occurred reconstruction of important fixed targets
which have been destroyed by prior raids or unless new
military activities appeared.
Ap.teMpttlie B: TO terminate the bombing of fixed targets
not directik associated with LOC's in Route Packages Vla
and VIb and simultaneously expand the armed reconnaissance
operations in those sectors by authorizing strikes on all
WC's, excepting only those in an eight-mile circle around
the center of Haiphong. This program would include con-
tinuous strikes against NIG aircraft on all airfields.
Further, the program would involve two variations;
1* A program which prohibits strikes against ports
and port facilities.
2. A program which includes everr effort to deny
importation from sea.
2. The evaluation considers these alternative prograna to assess
xtent to which;
a* they Will reduce the flow of men and. materiel to the
South,
b. they will affect the losses of US pilots and aircraft,
c. they will affect the Atilt of increased military or political
pressure from the Soviet Union and/or Red China.
?veet of,Men and Supplies to South Vtetnam
either of the proposed bombing programs can be expected to reduce
the flow of men and supplies to the South. Alternative A would undoubtedly
increase the costs of maintaining the logistic system and would result in
some further degrading of its capacity. But the effects would be so slight
that no reduction in the flow of supplies below their present levels could
be expected. Alternative B would apparently diminish the interdiction
ffOrt against the logistics target system in Route Packages I, II, and
II so it would be counter-productive in terms of reducing the flow of men
and supplies to the South.
NSA review completed
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The judwaent that interdiction campaigns cannot reduce significantly
North Vietnam's capability to support its forces in the South is based
on the results of the Rolling Thunder to date and the nature of the logis-
tic. target gystem.
During the period January 1966-April 1967, the logistics target system
included in Route Packages I, II, and III has been on the receiving end
of about 70 percent of the attack sorties flown in the Rolling Thunder
program. Despite the intensity of the attack, the North Vietnamese now
have a greater capacity to move men and supplies than they did when the
bombing started.
We estimate, based an performance to date, that the actual movement
of supplies fram North Vietnam into Laos and South Vietnam during the
1966-1967 dry season will be greater than it vas during the 19651966
dry season. The volume of supplies moved by trucks through the Mu Gia
Pass route alone 1411 exceed that moved last season. In addition, the
North Vietnamese are moving supplies along Routes 137/912. There is no
roadweteh reporting on this movement, but if the route is being used to
the same proportion of Its capacity as the Mu Gia route, the volume of
supplies available for stockpiling in Laos or for movement to South Vietnam
during the current dry season could be as much as 15,000 tons or about
four times greater than the amounts to South Vietnam through loos 1965-
1966 dry 'mason.
The email expectations associated with the interdiction campaign are
more evident when actual traffic is compared to route =peaty. During
the 1965-1966 dry season, truck traffic on Route 15 through Mu Gia pass
averaged 28 trucks dal/yea-about 85 tons of supplies a day. At this
level of traffic the route vas being used to leen than 20 percent of its
capacity of 450 tons a day. Since the 1965-1966 dry season the capacity
of Route 15 has been increased to about 750 tons a day. Traffic during
the current dry season amounts to an average of 23 trucks a day or about
70 toes of supplies. This level of traffic in less than 10 percent of the
current capacity of Route 15.
The ability of North Vietnam to maintain and to Improve its logistic
ntwork is impressive. The route capacities of almost all the major
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highways in military Region IV (MBIV)* have increa
as Shown in the following tabulation:
ed.
e past year
Dry Season/Wet Season Capacity
ber In Ohort Timis or ray
August
May
1967
lA
900/100
960/120
15
450/100
740/250
101
610/120
610420
137
450/100
00n.o0
1966 the North Vietnamese also were able to build 3140 miles of
alternate routes in MR IV to augment routes lk and 15.
The routes in, Laos have not been maintained as well as those in
North Vietnam. The capacity of Rotate 121 which leads franift Gla Pass
has been reduced by about 25 percent as compared to the last dry **aeon
and the capacity of Route 23 has been reduced by 40 Percent. Despite
duction, the capacity of other roads has been maintained and in
s increased, and the logistic network has been improved overall.
During for example, more than 400 miles of new road were constructed
in Laos e than doubling the road network. During the first three
months of 1967 at least 30 by-pass roads and 38 truck parks or refueling
seas were constructed in Laos. The net result is that the Borth Vietenmese
have retained the same capacity they had last year to move at least 400
tone of supplies a day to the end of the motorable routes along the border
of South Vietnam.
It is difficult to predict the extent to which the interdiction program
proposed under Alternative A could reduce the capacity of the road system
in Route Packages I, II, and III. A case study of our bombing in Borth
Vietnam indicates that the maximum reduction achieved in bombing roads was
about 25 percent. Even if a more intensive program were to double this
rate of interdiction, the capacity remaining on the two major routes into
Laos -* 15 and 137 -- would still be teem at least five times greater than
that required to move supplies at the 1966-1967 dry season rates.
accords roughly with Route Packages I and II.
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The ma.jor effect of the program outlined in Alternative A would be
to increase the requirements for nempower and vehicles needed to sustain
the movement of supplies. It is estimated that an intensified interdiction
program would raise the manpover requirement by about 20,000-25,000 persons.
This would be a 30 percent addition to the manpower now used to maintain
logistic routes in MR IV and in Laos. The added burden could be met
eaeily. North Vietnam has an estimated 220,000 full-time and 100,000 to
200,000 part-time workers engaged in repair, reconstruction, dispersal
and transport programs. An imknown but significant stare of these workers
could be relocated an the bombing program proposed in Alternative A would
lessen the manpower requirement in other areas of North Vietnam.
North Vietnam presently aloes an estimated 2,000 tracks to handle
the entire logistic effort based in NR IV for the forces around DO,
the forces in Northern Laos-, the forces in the Panhandle of Laos and the
forces in South Vietnam. Lest: than 00 trucks are used to move supplies
in Laos to the border of South Vietnam. Even if the interdiction program
Were to double, the rate at which vehicles are destroyed or damaged, these
jarnaks,
losses could be replaced from the existing inventory/estimated. at 12 000
13,000 vehicles,or by increased imports from Communist couaLries. During
the past 16 =ratio) imports of trucks totaled at least 4,00 vehicle* and
estimated looms to air attack were about 3,400. Thus_ the truck inventory
increased by about 1,000 vehicles during the period.
In summary, the excees capacity on the road networks in houte Packages
and III provides such a deep cuehion that it is almoet certain that
no interdiction program can neutralize the logistics target system to the
extent necessary to reduce the flow of men and supplies to South Vietnam
below their present levels.
;pg. Mr9lent,of OuRplies to North Vicetam
Alternative B is a bombing program designed to neutralise the
by anoi-
I4
offiEvortA of
Iiphong areal insofar as it is North Vietnam's principal logishcal base, 1
war supporting materials. The program is presented in two variants: (1) a
program concentrating on the land LOC's in Route Packages Rea and TlIb
with strikes against all airfields; and (2) the same program expanded to
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include strikes against ports and port facilities and the
porta.
tive B is taken literally, it has two major de
of the
Firs attacks against the Hanoi - Lao Cal rail line, and the
p*ralle3. road systems in the northwest (Route Package V). Second, it
would preclude restrikes against military and industrial fixed targets
other than airfielde.
Neither of the programs proposed under Alternative could obstruct
or reduce the import of military or war-supporting materials suffie ently
to degrade North Vietnam's ability to carry on the war. This is true even
if the programs wl,sassumed to include attacks on lines of communications
in the Northwest,
North Vietnam now has the capacity to move about 1t,OQO tons of goods
a day on its major rail, sea road and inland water import routes. It hes
been estimated previously that an optimum program against all means of
land and water transportation could interdict at most 70 percent of North
Vietnam's transport capacity to import, reducing it from 14,000 tons u day
at present to about 3,900 tons. Interdiction to this extent would reduce
the present level of goods imported by about 25 percent1North Vietnam
presently imports an average of 5,300 tons of ods daily. If imports
were kept to manageable levels by eliminating all but essential military
and economic goods, daily imports would average about 3,000 tons a day.
This amount of traffic could be handled even if the capacity of North Vietnam
transport system were reduced by 70 percent.
Imports at this level would not be sufficient to contin
of odern industrial plants or to restore operation of those which have
received extensive bomb damage. The economy would be reduced to its essen
tial subsistence character, but those modern sectors such as transportation,
construction, cczauunicationa and other elements essential to support the
military establishment in North Vietnam and in the South could be sustained.
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The concentration of bombing in Route Packages I, II, and 111, as
outlinea in Alternative Al would, in the short term, be less costly in
texme of losses of US pilots and aircraft. This is apparent in the
statiatics for combat losses of aircraft during the first four nonths of
1967. A total of 80 US aircraft were lost during this period. Only 18
aircraft, or 22 percent of the total, were lost in combat over Route ftokages
and Ill although about 70 percent of all attack sorties are flown
over this area.
When it becomes apparent to the North Vietnamese that the bombing is
being concentrated in Route Packages I, II, and III and that a virtual
sanctuary exists in most other parts of the country, they can be expected
to increase their air defenses and to move more SAlits into the region.
A greater defense would increase US aircraft looses although this are
probably would never be as heavily defended as Route Padkages Via and Vlb.
Alternative B? particularly in the variant calling for attacks on
port facilities and other targets In the Haiphong area, would be the most
costly in terns of losses of US pilots and aircraft. A total of 28 air-
craft or 35 percent of the total, were lost in combat during attacks against
targets located in Route Package VI daring January-April 1967. The exten-
sion of the Rolling Thunder program to attacks in the Hanoi-Haiphong area
has milted in an extremely high loss rate. During January-April 1967,
the US air forces operating over all of North Vietnam experienced a loss
rate of 0.33 percent. During the period 20 April-14 May 1967 the forces
attacking targets in the immediate Hanoi-Haiphong area had a loss rate
of 3.6 percent.
In addition to resulting in greatly increased aircraft losses, the
concentration of attack on the Hanoi-Haiphong area will result in a sharp
decline n the recovery of downed pilots because of the heavy defenses
and greater population in the area. Although statistics on recovery of
downed pilots by Route Package area are not available, the recovery rate
has declined markedly as the air campaign extended into the Hanoi-Haiphong
area. Luring 1966 the recovery rate was 4or percent. During the first
four months of 1967 the recovery rate declined to 28 percent.
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