COMMUNIST REACTIONS TO CERTAIN US COURSES OF ACTION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78S02149R000100290005-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 19, 1999
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: February 2, 1967
• Content Type: MEMO

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C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIWITES
2 February 1967
DRAFT
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: COMMUNIST REACTIDNS TO CERTAIN US COURSES OF ACTION
To estimate the probable reaction of North Vietnam, China
and the USSR to the following air campaigns against North Viet-
nam:
1. A phased course of US actions consisting of:
A. airstrikes against 20 modern industrial targets
in North Vietnam, followed by
B. mining of North Vietnamese harbors to prevent:
(1) use of deep-draft ocean-going ships only
(2) use of both deep-draft and shallow-draft ships
In both cases, we assume intensive armed reconnais-
sance against LOCs and transport targets, followed by
C. airstrites against the levees in the Red River Delta,
GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
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followed by
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D. intensive airstrikes against the transportation
system, the airfields and certain minor military
targets, and miscellaneous industrial and repair
facilities.
II. A restriction of US bombing to the "logistic funnel,"
i.e., Route Packages 1 and 2 and Laos.
None of the above would call for the use of nuclear
weapons or for air strikes any closer to the border of
Communist China than at present.
1. There are a number of general considerations which would
influence the immediate reactions of the Communist countries
concerned and, more important, influence their judgement of US
intentions. How the US explained its policy and intentions would
the
be taken into account. In addition, duration of the campaign,
whether it was a rapid series of air strikes or a more gradual
and prolonged campaign could be quite important in how the Com-
munists would respond. Among the other significant factors
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bearing on Communist reaction would be the general political sit-
uuation at the time the proposed course of action was initiated,
i.e., whether there seemed to be movement toward negotiations of
and
some kind,/ the general state of world opinion and international
2. We think it also important to emphasize that in estimating
the Communist reactions to an involved series of US moves, there
are likely to be unexvected developments which would affect both
the US and the Communist side. We have tried to point out certain;
possible developments such as the intervention of third parties at the UN. In addition, there is the great uncertainty over internal i
developments in China, and the state of Sino-Soviet relations. For
such reasons, the estimated reactions of the Communists near the
last stage of the assumed air campaign are highly tenuous. By
that time a number of events could have occured which might per-
suade the Communists to make some quite different responses than
we foresee.
3. We have not tried to judge the affect on Hanoi's will
every
to persist at/ stage of this campaign, mainly because after
the mining of the harbors, the effect on life in North Vietnam
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would be a cumulative process. When and if the regime would judge
that morale and the disruption of public order was a serious
problem cannot be foreseen. Thus, it is not possible to say that
at any given point in the campaign Vietnamese will to persist
will crack. In general, however, we believe that if Hanoi does
not change its policy after the full impact of the mining is
apparent, then the subsequent US actions would probably not prove
decisive.
II. CCMIUNIST REACTIONS TO A PHASED STEP-UP IN US ACTIONS
A. Air strikes Against Selected Industrial Targets
4. General. All of the Communist powers would interpret
the US action as an important change of US policy. They have
apparently been unsure of which direction the US planned to move
in the bombing campaign -- whether to escalate or to keep it
limited. The airstrikes would convince them that the US had
opted for escalation, though they would not be sure of how much
or how soon. In any case, they would probably conclude that the
US interest in a negotiated settlement was waning. As in the case
of the previous strikes against the POL, theme would be a barrage
of propaganda denouncing the US move; the civilian nature of the
targets and civilian casualties would be exploited as would the
attacks in the areas of Hanoi and Haiphong.
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5. North Vietnam. North Vietnam has probably already
discounteathe effect of an attack on the country's industrial base.
The North Vietnamese reaction would be attenuate fact
that its industry is not essential for the country's survival
because of the basically agrarian nature of its economy. More-
over, Hanoi would assume --,,almost certainly correctly,-- that
much of theAeffect of the US action could be offset by increased
imports from the USSR and Communist China, and that the supplies \w V PIft
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necessary to keep the economy going and to sustain the war effottj%,-
could be obtained. At this stage of the war, we believe that t,
North Vietnam would be willing to accept the destruction of its
industrial facilities in order to continue the war and that the
US action would not have any decisive effect on the North
Vietnamese will to persist.
6. North Vietnam would probably use its : (96 MIG-
15s and 17s, and 18 MIG-21s) in attempting1 to defend its industrial
plants, particularly thosetar--gets1 in the/Hanoi-Haiphong area.
This plus the use of already heavy SAM and AAA air defenses in
the area could lead a substantial step up in. the air war over
North Vietnam. Thus, it is possible that the stepped up North
Vietnamese air reaction would confront the US with the question
of whether to destroy the airfields.
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7. China. Despite the present turmoil in Communist
China, we are reasonably confident that the US action would
not trigger any significant change in Peking's position
concerning the war in Vietnam. China would step up its economic
aid to North Vietnam as well as providing additional air defense
equipment. Peking would almost certainly be willing to increase
the number of anti-aircraft and logistic troops it has in North
Vietnam; currently estimated at 25,000 t'~. o men.
S. The The Soviet Union would besomewhat)concerned
that the US action marked the beginning of a new and more dangerous
phase of the war, which, as it unfolded, would confront the USSR
with increasingly difficult problems and decisions. At this
point, the Soviets would be mainly I to meet whatever
new requirement Hanoi levied for economic and military aid.
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B. Mining of the Harbors
9. General. The Communist countries would consider the
mining, as a considerably more provocative and dangerous course
of action, particularly if it followed soon after the airstrikes
against industrial targets. They would see the LUSaction as proof
It ,, / ,
that thearj was rapidly escalating, and they would probably assume
that the US was no longer interested in a compromise and was intent
on the war to a complete victory whether by negotiations
or not. US protestations to the contrary would not be believed.
In the hope of increasIng world pressure on the US for a unilateral
de-escalation of its activities in the war, Communist propaganda
would stress the dangerous turn of events and the increased
possibility of a confrontation between the major powers. At this
stage the Vietnamese problem would probably be taken to the UN,
either by neutrals or by the USSR and East Europeans.
10. North Vietnam. Hanoi has already begun to prepare its
citizens for the possibility that its harbors will be mined.
Nevertheless) the actual mining would be a jolt and would increase
fears that the ultimate aim of the US was to destroy the North
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Vietnamese regime. There is little that Hanoi can do to prevent
the mining: it has no capacity to deal with the mines themselves.
It is likely, however, that North Vietnam would commit its aircraft
against the US mining effort. But Hanoi's main concern would be to
improvise alternative means by which to maintain the flow of supplies
into the country.
11, The North Vietnamese leaders would -probably estimate that
they and their Communist allies could find ways to continue the
flow of essential military and economic goods, although with far
more difficulty and disruption. If the mining were effective against
some or all shallow draft shipping, then the rail lines would have
Na
to operate at maximum capacities, and would thus be highly vulnerableJtt'
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to air strikes, Thus, the US action could considerably increase
Hanoi's problems in prosecuting the war. In the near term,'
we do not believe Hanoi would be forced to abandon the war in South
Vietnam.
12. It is possible that at this point,
decide that it could not simply absorb the US moves without a
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major response. In these circumstances, North Viethan might attempt
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some highly demonstrative action of its own, e.g., attacking a
US carrier or attempting an airstrike against South Vietnam.
We believe that such actions are unlikely since Hanoi would
probably calculate that they would only draw an even greater
US reaction in response. , it is likely that the VC would
try to make a sustained attempt to close the channel into Saigon.
13. China. We doubt that the mining would automatically A
produce any significant change in Chinese policy toward Vietnam.
There would be a round of propaganda. At a minimum,
China would attempt to increase substantially the amount of
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over the rail lines out of China might be disrupted by the
I % the rail lines out of China might be disrupted by the
internal convulsions there. But the present upheaval in China
makes it almost impossible to predict with confidence Peking's
reaction to the mining. There would be some chance that China
would react strongly, perhaps even going so far as to directly
intervene in the air over Vietnam, though we consider this unlikely.
If requested, Peking would augment its forces in North Vietnam.
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supplies sent to North Vietnam, although the flow of supplies
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14. The USSR. The US action would confront the USSR
with a more direct challenge, since the Soviets supply much j,C;
of North Vietnam's economic requirement by sea (estimated at [,- -
$150 million last year). The Soviets would be embarrassed by
their inability to prevent or counter the US move. Moreover,
unless they were prepared to take new risks they would be
immediately vulnerable to Chinese taunts. And, of course, the ,,.-.y
military and civilian, would be at the sufferance of Peking
11,?
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(particularly, if the mining made it too dangerous to offload
shipments onto small vessels). To cover this embarrassing situ-
ation, the Soviets would resort to a considerable verbal escala-
tion hoping to force the US to retreat. And they would probably
allow "volunteers" to go to North Vietnam if Hanoi asked for
them.
15. But from a practical point of view the Soviets would !
have little choice but to accept the situation. We assume that If
ateA J
the Soviet experts wo ~l e. t. _mines. would be too
difficult to sweep and, in any case, could be easily replaced.
In uch circumstances we be ieve the USSR would not be willing to
take the risk of bringing down the ships and aircraft that would 6
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probably be necessary to keep the sea lanes open to North Vietnam.
The Soviets could use the situation as an excuse to disengage
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from the Vietnam war by charging Chinese obstructionism and so(
forth. But the Soviets almost certainly consider the option
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politically infeasible, The net result, however, would be that
as China's role in the delivery of essential supplies increased
there would probably be a loss of Soviet influence in Hanoi,
at least as long as Hanoi was determined to persist in the war.
16. The Soviets would be likely to strike back at the
US in their bilateral relations. Any ongoing US efforts to begin
a dialogue on East-West issues would be frozen. The Soviets
would exploit the US action with the European states by charging
was
that the US/no longer concerned with Europe and was irresponsible
and aggressive in its world relations. For a number of reasons,
including presenting themselves as a reasonable nation, the
Soviets wouldbe unlikely to increase pressures in Berlin. The
USSR would probably move to have the UN condemn the US for the
mining. In addition, they might recall the Soviet ambassador
from Wasningtcn in a public display of anger. These possibilities
would be greatly strengthened if the mining operations were carried
out without warning or with some serious damage to Soviet ships.
How long this freeze in US-Soviet relations would continue would
depend on subsequent events.
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17. The USSR and China. The US action could come at a
time when Sino-Soviet relations are particularly tense. But to
offset fully the closing of North Vietnam's ports, a much
greater degree of Sino-Soviet cooperation would be required. If
the shallow draft mining compelled the Soviets to find other
routes, they would be forced to obtain Peking's approval for
transhipment across China.- A Soviet airlift could be attempted,
but the quantities of supplies that could be airlifted would be
small unless staging rights could be acquired in China.
18. Though North Vietnam would insist on keeping supplies
moving, the US action would probably not force any significant
improvement in Sino-Soviet cooperation. China would argue that
the Soviets should confront the US on the high seas, while the
obstinacy
USSR would counter that Chinese/ hindered joint efforts
to support Hanoi. Thus, to some extent, politics would probably
interfere with Communist efforts to offset the mining of the ports.
U1ng 19666, about 120 Soviet ships delivered about
530,000 tons of goods to North Vietnam. This was
comprised of 99 dry-cargo vessels carrying 327,800
tons of supplies and 23 tankers which delivered
203,000 tons of POL.
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C. Attacks on the Red River Delta Levees
19. General. Coming after the two actions discussed
above, the bombing of the levees would be viewed by the
Communists as proof that the US was engaged in a campaign
to destroy North Vietnam in an attempt to end the war. The
Communists would calculate -- almost certainly correctly
that adverse reaction to the US move would be widespread and
they would exploit such sentiment, emphasizing that the prime
target was the civilian population of North Vietnam. However,
the US willingness to accept expected criticism would probably
be sobering for the Communists. It would tend to convince them
ry
that there was little, if anything, that the US might not dEo,.t
eventually do or risk to impose its will in Vietnam,, including
the possibility of direct invasion of the North.
20. North Vietnam. We believe that Hanoi would feel
compelled to respond vigorously to the attack on its dikes. If
Hanoi had not already begun an intensive air war to protect the
LOCs after the mining, at this point they almost certainly would.
Thus, as already noted, the US might have to decide the question
of bombing the air fields. Moreover, the odds would increase at
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This stage that Hanoi would attempt some major retaliation of
its own against the US either in South Vietnam or in the Tonkin
Gulf, They would probably calculate that the US was determined to
widen its air attacks and that there was little to be gained by
restricting
their response. It is also possible that the VC in
South Vietnam would significantly step up their terroristic
activities directed at US personnel in response to the bombing
even though this might cause heavy losses'--id expenditure of
their assets.
21. The bombing would force North Vietnam to increase
substantially its food imports, especially if the dikes were
hit during the high-water period from mid-July to mid-August
when destruction of cropland would be the greatest. Coupled
with the increased need for imports imposed by the US mining
program, the food imports would tax the overland routes from China
to North Vietnam to almost their full capacity. This would
inevitably lead to delays, and given the current US bombing
program against these routes, it is highly doubtful that the total
amount of through traffic would fully meet the demands imposed
by both the mining and the bombing. Thus Hanoi would probably
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be forced to establish priorities between the military and economic
goods that it receives from its Communist allies. Nevertheless,
we believe that enough supplies would get through to keep North
Vietnam going and to allow it to continue the warrior some time
to come
22. At about this stage, however, we feel that the North
Vietnamese would have to make some basic choices, either taking
whatever steps seemed necessary to cause the US to stop the
bombing, or accepting the possibility of more damage and
perservering. They might also decide the time had come to
reconsider whether they could continue the war without significant
escalation of their own or had to widen it by calling in the
Chinese and Soviets or by spreading it to Laos.
23. I'fliich option the North Vietnamese might choose would depend
on how they viewed several factors. Of first importance would be
the general state of North Vietnam, and the regimes judgment as
to whether it could maintain morale anddiscipl:int despite the US
air attacks. Secondly, would be the advice andassistance they
received from China dnd the USSR. They would certainly want to know
how far these two countries would go if requested to intervene.
Finally, the military and political situation in South Vietnam would
be an important factor.
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24. They might calculate these factors and conclude that
their objectives in South Vietnam were more remote and that the
damage to the North was becoming far too costly. They could
reason that only minimal political concessions could cause the
US to desist. And they might decide that the alternative of
continuing the war would make Hanoi far too dependent on Chinese
assistance and troops, thereby gradually losing control over the
25. On the other hand, they could conclude the opposite.
They could decide that, barring ground invasion, the US had
done its worst and that North Vietnam could sustain further
damage without having to abandon the war. They might also
conclude that the Communist side could escalate in such a way
as to force the US eventually to retreat from the bombing.
14
26. We cannot be very confident which course the North r4~-14
Vietnamese would choose, and, of course, they might simply p
crastinate. But we think that at this stage they would be
unlikely to reverse their policies and seek a way out of the
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