ORR COMMENTS ON NIE STAFF MEMORANDUM, 5-66, 21 MARCH 1966

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78S02149R000100280005-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 1, 1999
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: March 21, 1966
• Content Type: SUMMARY

2-7 -
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ORR Comments on NIE Staff Memorandum, 5-64, 21 March 1966
THE PROGRAM
Second Paragraph 2nd sentence revise:
This is to be continued as long as required and would be
accompanied by sustained harassment of traffic movements and repair
activities on the LOCs in the southern regions of North Vietnam and
Laos.
Part I
Line 4 ". . fewer-than 4,000 attack and flak suppression
sorties. Spread over a two week period this would be under 2,000 a
week, or 40 percent higher than the peak level of 1965. The location
and nature of the targets are more sensitive than those attacked in
1965, and the program will obviously reflect a new escalation of the
US air offensive particularly since air operations against LOC's in
the southern regions would continue. This escalation would mark an
end to the sanctuary status of the Hanoi/Haiphong area, the Northeast,
andthe 30-mile strip along the Chinese border, and mining the major
ports would introduce a new element with broader international implica-
tions.
Paragraph 2
Most observers would see this program as a strong demonstration
of US will to prevail in the conflict. This escalation would be seen
as more or less dangerous in individual Free World and Communist
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countries. The nature of their reaction will be tempered in most
cases by US policy statements on the limits and objectives of the
campaign. Only those countries in extreme opposition to the US
would proclaim the program to be a dangerous step toward further
escalation at a later stage.
Paragraph 5, line 7 this factor
Paragraph 6, delete sentence "If the bombing . . ." and substitute:
The likelihood of the casualties resulting from this program
reaching "opinion-shocking" levels is remote principally because of
the DRV programs of evacuation and shelter and the methods of
executing the attack. Moreover, those injured by the attacks will
for the most part be principally workers engaged fairly directly in war
supporting activities -- e.g., transport and government services.
Page 14, Paragraph 2, change last sentence to read:
We therefore conclude that the conducting of a maximum and
sustained air defense of North Vietnam by Chinese aircraft operating
from Chinese bases would mean that the Chinese were willing, if
necessary to take the succeeding steps toward war with the US.
Page 14+, Paragraph 3.b - add to last sentence
. . . precise and limited, and accompanied by a "no sanctuary"
statement by a senior US official in the event of Chinese air involve-
ment.
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Page 18
Sub Para 4 -- "... would not be directly restricted..."
Add to sub para 8: The diversion of manpower to defense and logistic
activities and the disruption of interior lines of communication could
result in increasing although localized food shortages. As these
shortages become widespread, there is an increasing probability of
popular alienation from the regime.
Page 21, Para F. b --
Substitute: Peking probably will increase its efforts to maintain
the:Elow of essential military and logistic materials to North Vietnam
although movement of these goods would become increasingly difficult
and costly.
Page 22, Para 4. a --
Add to sentence: They would also fear other military measures
such as a naval blockade of the Chinese coast which by denying imports,
particularly grain, would generate enough starvation and unrest to com-
pound political control.
Page 23, line 2 --
Delete "almost imperceptible."
Specify the reasons Peking and Hanoi wish to avoid China's becoming
the chief antagonist.
3
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Pale 25-26, Para 3
Delete sentence "They might feel compelled to try to break the port
closure." S stitute: "The risk of direct confrontation with the US
would lead the Soviets to reject any attempt by them to break the port
clo,sure."
Penultimate sentence: Change to read:
We cannot estimate what new measures the DRV, USSR and China
would agree on. While US-Soviet relations would almost certainly be
worsened, we believe the USSR would find it most difficult to become
more deeply involved in the war without assuming risks which to us seem
unacceptably high.
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