THE STATE OF CIVILIAN MORALE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78S02149R000100270009-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 30, 2003
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: December 8, 1966
• Content Type: REPORT

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Project No. 30.4998
8 December 1966
The State of Civilian Morale
.The initial response of North Vietnam's civilian population to the US/GVN
air attacks was characterized by a high degree of patriotic enthusiasm which
apparently has been dampened little by the stepped-up bombing program since
the end of June 1966. The air attacks in large measure have been a strong
force for unifying the population in its resistance to the "US aggressors".
Although a careful observer may detect a waning of enthusiasm among the
population as the war continues, there has been no evident diminution of the
determination of the regime to continue the war and there seemingly has been
no reduction in the policy options the regime may use to achieve its objectives.
Almost every segment of the civilian population of North Vietnam has been
forced to make some sacrifice in its standard of living as the result of the
bombing. Much of the sacrifice and hardship is centered in the evacuation of
part of the population from urban centers, splitting of families, reductions
in the quality of consumer goods and services, increases in work hours largely
without additional compensation, and losses of income resulting from transfers
from normal jobs to lower paying defense-related tasks. None of these hard-
ships appears to have hurt seriously the level of morale.
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Discussion of civilian mobilization in North Vietnamese publications
during 1966 indicate that the regime is encountering difficulties in effectively
employing those already mobilized. Appeals from the regime prior to June 1966
brought response from over 3 million youths (ages 16-30) and 1.7 million
women, or about 50 percent of the working age population. These groups were
to provide active support for the war effort by performing various essential
economic and paramilitary tasks under the "three readies" and the "three
responsibilities" movements.
the participants
in the movements were highly motivated to contribute to the war effort.
Civilian mobilization supposedly increased after the "partial mobilization"
order of Ho Chi Minh on 17 July 1966. The difficulties encountered in the
mobilization program were blamed largely on the lower level cadres in both the
government and the party who did not seem to have the managerial ability to
carry out the mobilization and evacuation orders of the regime. Managerial
inefficiencies have proliferated since air strikes began in February 1965,
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and have prevented an orderly reallocation of the labor force. The lack of
good management in the evacuation program has certainly contributed to a
decline in the level of morale.
In an effort to stimulate patriotic fervor the regime's propaganda makes
clear the direct connection between North Vietnamese support for the war in
the South and the bombing of North Vietnam.
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civilians in North Vietnam do in fact see the bombing as a
direct consequence of the support furnished by North Vietnam to the Viet Cong.
They, moreover, take great pride in their country's achievements in downing
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Despite the regime's propaganda on the success of the "liberation forces'
in the south, the population in North Vietnam is probably increasingly aware
that the war is not going well and that heavy casualities are being suffered
by North Vietnamese troops who have been sent south. North Vietnamese
soliders who have been captured or who have defected in South Vietnam reveal
that some indication of the hardships, sickness, and injuries suffered by
infiltrated troops is provided the people at home through letters and by eye-
witness reports from wounded veterans who have returned home. If these
casualties mount and the morale of the North Vietnamese troops in South Vietnam
drops seriously, there is likely to be a comparable drop in the morale of the
civilian population. Knowledge of military reverses in the field rather than
the effect of bombing at home was a major factor in the decline of popular
morale in Japan and Germany in World War II.
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Agricultural difficulties -- resulting from the mobilization effort and
bad weather -- have affected both the fifth month and the tenth month harvests
in 1966, intensifying the already tight food situation in North Vietnam.
pressure on food supplies, other strains on civilian living standards will
probably increase. The regime aware that these strains exist has been urging
production of consumer goods by cooperatives on a handicraft basis and has
been attempting to organize local markets to make the evacuation process more
palatable. Thus, civilian living standards will decline further unless current
shortfalls in production are filled by imports from other Communist countries.
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Project No. 30.4998
8 December 1966
Manpower
The manpower problem in North Vietnam will not become critical in the
near future. There are some dislocations and scarcities of particular types
of manpower needed in the war effort, but the regime appears to be able to
cope with the situation. The problem is not scarcity of manpower in general,
but rather scarcity of specialized kinds of manpower. The drain on manpower
resources has been primarily to the build-up of the armed forces, to military
support activities, and to the repair or reconstruction of bomb damaged
facilities. The DRV has had a mobilization program since 1965 to meet its
war-time manpower needs; in addition, in July 1966 a "partial mobilization"
order was issued by Ho Chi Minh. Supposedly, this order mobilized part of
the reserve officers, noncommissioned officers, men of the Vietnamese People's
Army, and part of the citizens belonging to the reserves of the army.
According to reporting at the time thousands of men and women applied for
enlistment. There has been no evidence that these "volunteers" have been
placed on active duty. Perhaps, in part, the July order was designed to
rally the people more intensively behind the war effort.
Agricultural workers, students, and women are the major sources from
which the regime may draw additional manpower to meet war-time needs.
Agricultural workers have been the main source of manpower needed for repairing
lines of communication. The regime has claimed that about 60 percent of its
agricultural labor force is composed of women; this claim was made both before
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and after mobilization. Probably, the percentage of women in the agricultural
labor force has increased. In reality, the agricultural labor force, while
a potential source of supply of manpower for the war effort, cannot be tapped
heavily without hurting agricultural production. In an attempt to maintain
agricultural production while siphoning off agricultural labor, the regime
has advocated increased mechanization of agriculture and the return of some
persons to farm work at crucial times, such as planting and harvesting.
These efforts have had only minor effect, judging from the fact that North
Vietnam has been experiencing agricultural production difficulties growing
out of manpower and weather problems for the past two years.
If the number of students presently enrolled in DRV educational
institutions in foreign universities is used as an indicator, the manpower
problem cannot considered critical. School enrollments in the 1965-66
school year, of the 14+-21 age group, were reported by the regime to be double
the level of the previous year. In October 1966 Ho Chi Minh announced that
3 million pupils are in school in the 1966-67 school year, and the universities
and professional schools have an enrollment of 100,000. In September 1966
the regime announced that four new colleges had been established, suggesting
that the war effort has not seriously handicapped the educational policy of
the regime.
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Women have traditionally been a source of labor supply for agriculture
and the handicraft industries. Shortly after the bombing was stepped up in
June 1966 the regime urged the increased use of women, particularly in the
agricultural cooperatives and in the militia. In a few provinces the women
were being taught to plow and harrow and some were being placed in managerial
positions in the agricultural cooperatives. The regime also urged that
special training courses in the militia for women be established. In recent
months there has been no confirmation of either of these programs.
The two major problems in the manpower situation are the scarcity of a
skilled labor force and the lack of managerial ability among the cadres. The
regime has been emphasizing technical training by establishing technical
institutes in the DRV and by sending the students to other Communist countries
for technical education. The regime has tried to solve the managerial
problem by making extensive pronouncements about the failures of the cadres
in carrying out the mobilization and evacuation programs and seems to intimate
that the problem can be solved if the cadres become aware of their political
responsibilities.
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