AN APPRAISAL OF THE BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM THROUGH 12 SEPTEMBER 1966

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78S02149R000100170004-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 31, 2005
• Sequence Number: 4
• Content Type: REPORT

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SUMMARY
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AN APPRAISAL OF THE TO.1MKTNG OF NOI TH
VI I'NAM TIIIZOUCII 12 S! '=EMBER .1966
September continued at a high. level with particular emphasis on di.s-
persed POL storage sites, lines of com,nunicat ions (LOCs) and transpor-
tation equipment. The campaign against North Vietnamese POL has
continued to be a slcna and grinding effort to reduce the remaining
bulk and dispersed storage capacity, and this effort has succeeded in
making it more difficult and costly for the North Vietnamese to i.rnport
and distribute POL. Continued discovery of additional dispersed 901,
storage sites indicates that the dispersal program is still in progress
0
and will. probably make it possible :For, North Vietnam to defer any
serious reconstruction of the major bulk facilities. There is no evi.-?
dence yet of any shortage of POL in North Vietnam and stocks on hand,
with recent imports, have been adequate to sustain necessary operatiionts.
Air strikes against all modes of transportation in
North Vietnam increased during the past month, but there is no evidence:
of serious transport problems in the movement of supplies to or. within
North Vietnam. The regime's recent claim that most transportation
routes remain open appears to be valid. The status of the five msjor
rail lines in North. Vietnam. has improved somewhat over last month. Only
two rail lines are known to he interdicted for through service,. although
rail. and truck shuttle service continues between and around interdicted
DIA review(s) completed. EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
REGRADING; DOD DIR 5200.10
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points. Destruction and damage of transport equipment, especially
locomotives, trucks, and barges, continued at a high level during
the past month. A heavy program of road interdiction also continued
in August: and early September, particularly in the North Vietnamese
Panhandle. Nevertheless, a high level of truck traffic continues to
be observed, with the bulk of -vehicle sightings located north of
Thanh Iloa.
y" LLALIL u.ne air strikes have
significantly weakened popular morale. The raids, however, have
caused mounting disruption in the routine of the civil populace, and
lonti_nuing shortages in certain food
li.r strikes continue to depress economic growth and
have been responsible for the abandonment of some plans for economic
development, but essential economic activities continue. The increas-
ing amounts of physical damage sustained by North Vietnam are in large
measure compensated by aid received from the Communist countries. In
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recent weeks, a North Vietnamese mission signed new agreements for
additional unspecified grants of economic and technical assistance
from Communist countries, and probably has or will receive additional
commitments. The measurable damage to the economy caused by the air
strikes now stands at some 125 million dollars, an increase of almost
20 million dollars over those losses recorded a month ago.
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Effects on Military-Targets
-6-1-"OL LNULLn vieznam in August and early
September continued at a high level with particular emphasis on dis-
persed POL storage sites, lines of communication (LOCs) and transpor-
tation equipment. Rainy weather over the northern portion of the
country limited air strikes in that area during the latter part of
August and the first part of September. The campaign against North
Vietnamese POL has continued to be a slow and grinding effort to reduce
the remaining bulk and dispersed storage capacity. This effort has been
effective in making it more difficult and costly for the North Vietnamese
to import and distribute POL. Strikes were made during August against
9 major and over 200 dispersed POL storage sites. As of 12 September
1966, about'78 per cent of the JCS targeted POL storage capacity had
been destroyed. Continued discovery of additional dispersed POL storage
sites indicates that this dispersal program is still in progress and
will probably make it possible for North Vietnam to defer any serious
reconstruction of the major bulk facilities.
-r---Y -1 -u nai1)riong ruL taciiity has been re-
duced to barely 10 per cent of its original level, and the facility is
unusable as an off-loading terminal for oceangoing tankers.. Soviet
tankers, nevertheless, continue to arrive in North Vietnamese waters.
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been noted, and it must be assumed that stocks on hand and recent
imports have been adequate to sustain necessary operations. How long
this condition will. continue is not clear, but high priority activities
such as military transport, SAM support, and aircraft operations will
be sustained at the expense, if necessary, of other POL'consuming
functions.
~ir strikes against all modes of transportation in
North Vietnam increased during the past month, but there is no evidence
of serious transport problems in the movement of supplies to or within
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North Vietnam. The North Vietnamese,
have provided
sufficient transport capacity to meet the essential needs of the
economy and to continue logistic support for the military effort in
the South. The regime's recent claim that transportation routes for
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the most part remain open in spite of fierce bombing and strafing
appears valid. in addition, rail construction continues, almost
200 kilometers of road have been built or reconstructed and inland
waterways are being improved. The regime also claims that mechanized
transport has increased, and that the number of repair shops and plants
for building transport equipment is being doubled.
Rail transportation continues to be the most impor-
tant form of transport in terms of ton-kilometers, although the use of
water and truck transportation appears to be increasing. The status
of the five major rail .lines has improved somewhat over last month.
Only two rail lines (Hanoi-Lao Cai and Hanoi-Vinh) are known to be
interdicted for through service, but rail and truck shuttle service
continues between and around unusable bridges. The remaining three
lines (from Hanoi to Dong Dang, to Haiphong, and to Thai Nguyen)
probably are operable for through service. The important Hanoi-Dong
Dang line appeared to be interdicted at the Dap Cau railroad/highway
bridge during August. Ample time had elapsed for the repair of the
original bridge or for completion of construction of the railroad
bypass bridge in the area, but
original
bridge unserviceable and a. section missing from the bypass bridge.
The North Vietnamese, therefore, may have floated a bridge section
into place at night and removed it during the day, thus providing
limited through service on this critical line.
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ndicates that the original Dap Cau
bridge has now been repaired. Destruction and damage of transport
equipment, especially locomotives, trucks, and barges, continued at
a high level during the past month. Imports of trucks and barges con-
tinue, however
The North Vietnamese freight car inventory may have already been sig-
nificantly supplemented if the use of Chinese standard-gauge rolling
stock has become possible on. part of the Hanoi-Dong Dang line. Suffi-
cient time has elapsed for this rail line to have been converted to
dual-gauge from the Chinese border to the Kep area, although it is not
yet possible to confirm this.
heavy program of road interdiction -- concentrated in
the North Vietnamese Panhandle -- continued in August and early Sep-
tember.
segments indicates that longer delays in restoration are being exper-
ienced. In some instances the North Vietnamese have completely abandoned
cratered segments in favor of alternate routings. Bridge strikes were
well above the high level attained in the previous period.
he employmezt of ferry facilities continues,
however, to be the principal alternate means of restoring service at
the larger interdicted. stream crossings.
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relatively high level of truck traffic continues
to be observed. Nearly 2,250 vehicle sightings were recorded during
August with the bulk of these located in the region south of Thanh
Hoa either in truck parks or moving in small groups along the high-
ways. This current total is greater than the previous high reported
in July'. Although vehicles are still detected along segments of
Route IA, the main north-south coastal route, emphasis on selected
interdiction points has forced the use of inland detours and a shift
of more of the traffic load onto a less capable interior network.
Cumulative vehicle loss totals are shown in Tab A.
he number of watercraft struck during August set a new
record. Significant activity continued on inland water routes west-
ward from Haiphong and southward from Hanoi. Strike activity against
inland water routes was well dispersed over all waterways with the
heaviest effort concentrated on the intra-coastal waterway between
Vinh and Thanh Iloa. Active utilization of southern inland routes
and contiguous coastal waters continued, however, particularly in
the Dong Hoi vicinity and southward.
espite the increased intensity of US air strikes during
this period, Hanoi retains the capability to continue support of
activities in South Vietnam and Laos even at increased combat levels
and force structures. Moreover, the armed forces of North Vietnam
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continue to expand and the infiltration of men and material into
South Vietnam and Laos continues at a high rate. Nevertheless,
it is estimated that the North Vietnamese capability for overt
aggression has been limited by US air actions.
Leadership and Public Reactions
Despite the intensification of the US bombings of
North Vietnam to record levels in the past month, there continues to
be no evidence that the morale of the DRV populace has been affected
to the extent that it could ittfuence the Hanoi leadership's determina-
tion to continue the prosecution of the war. The anniversary of North
Vietnam's national day on 2 September provided the forum for the Hanoi
leadership to reassert its belief in an ultimate Communist victory in
Vietnam. Delivering the major address at a rally marking the occasion,
Premier Pham Van Doug called upon the Vietnamese people to practice
"to the highest degree" economy in production, fighting, consumption,
manpower, and material "so as to have abundant reserves for protracted
fighting."
he bombing raids have, none the less, caused mount-
ing disruption
continuing shortages in certain food
commodities and that the evacuation of the city is moving slowly.
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it strikes continue to depress economic growth and
have been responsible for the abandonment of some plans for economic
development, but essential economic activities continue. The increas-
ing amounts of physical damage sustained by North Vietnam are in large
measure compensated by aid received from the Communist countries..
This aid, which totaled roughly $1.5 billion in 1955-1965 and at
least $350 million in 1965 alone, probably has been significantly
augmented in 1966. In addition, a North Vietnamese mission recently
signed new agreements for additional unspecified grants of economic
and technical assistance from Communist China and North Korea, and
probably will receive or has already received further commitments
from the USSR and East European countries. The composition of the
forthcoming economic aid may reflect Hanoi's need for material for
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the restoration of economic facilities destroyed or damaged in air
attacks as opposed to earlier economic assistance which was directed
mainly to new development. The delegation sent by Hanoi to seek
foreign aid was the second such mission in 1966 and the third in
slightly more than a year. The first two missions obtained loans
and grants from the USSR, all the Communist countries of Eastern
Europe, except Albania and Yugoslavia, and from China and North Korea.
The measurable damage to the economy caused by the
air strikes now stands at some 125 million dollars, an increase of
almost 20 million dollars over these losses recorded a month ago and almost
double those at the end of 1965. Damage to transportation equipment,
the Uong Bi Thermal Power Plant, and naval craft accounted for some
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75 per cent of the measurable damage inflicted in the current report-
ing period which saw the heaviest damage of any month since the air
strikes began. Total reported damage to transportation equipment
in 1966 is now estimated at 19.2 million dollars or more than the
cumulative losses for 1965 and 1966 in any other category.
Direct losses caused by air strikes against economic
and military facilities and equipment measured in terms of estimated
reconstruction or replacement cost are now estimated at some 109
million dollars as shown in the tabulation below:
Economic Facilities and Equipment
Million
Taets Dollars
Railroad/Highway Bridges if
Reconstruction 15.4
Temporary Repairs 3.1 2/
Transportation Equipment 25.1 3/
Railroad Yards and Ports 1.0
Electric Power Plants 11.5
Petroleum Storage
Facilities 2.3 4/
Manufacturing Facilities 2.1
Telecommunications
Facilities
Military Facilities and Equipment
Million
Targets Dollars
Barracks 16.4
Ammunition Storage 4.5
Supply Depots 3.2
Radar and Communications 1.1
Naval Bases 0.8
SAM Sites 2.0
Aircraft - 10.7
Airfields 0.4
Naval Craft 8.2
Miscellaneous Targets of 25X1
Armed Reconnaissance jr .
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Measurable indirect losses amount to about .16.2 million dollars made
up of losses of foreign exchange earnings of 12.7 million dollars, and
losses in the 1965,fal.l rice crop of 3.5 million dollars. In addition
to these measurable losses, there are many other losses and costs to
the economy and the military establishment which cannot be assigned
values. These would include the loss of production and lower pro-
ductivity of labor resulting from the dispersal of industry, time lost
from work as a consequence of civil defense measures, and loss of pro-
duction caused by shortages of electric power.
11 sectors of the economy have shared in the diffi-
culties produced by the bombing. In August the regime admitted that
"the US imperialists have created difficulties for the economy in
general and light industry in particular." Air strikes have undoubtedly
contributed to shortfalls in the spring rice crop and to problems en-
countered in the planting of the fall, rice crop. Although the regime
claims that industrial. production in the first seven months of 1966 met
state plans, and that production in heavy industry increased since the
beginning of the bombing, the failure to announce data on either plans
or output suggests that growth was, in fact, limited. Lagging produc-
tion in light and local industry is evident in a recent government
statement regarding the importance of this segment of industry which
placed emphasis on accomplishments in 1964 rather than 1965 or 1966.
He recent attention devoted to the increased employ-
ment of women, particularly in the agricultural cooperatives and the
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militia, indicates that the manpower problem in North Vietnam is becom-
ing more troublesome. Tens of thousands of women allegedly have learned
agricultural skills since 1965, thus helping to alleviate a problem which
is in large part the result of the diversion. of labor to repair and
reconstruction activities and dispersal programs associated with the
bombing. Hanoi continues to devote an. extremely large portion of its
manpower and materiel resources to the construction and maintenance of
lines of communication and there continue to be reports of shortages of
both men and materiel. These shortages are considered to be primarily
caused by poor management practices and by problems of distribution.
To further supplement the labor supply the regime is trying -- apparently
with limited success to make greater use of unskilled workers from
the peasant and urban population. Other measures embarked upon to
relieve the tight labor situation include increased training and the
increased use of agricultural implements. The latter step, in turn, is
hindered by the shortage of skilled workers needed for the production
of .labor--saving implements.
he damage -- valued at about 4.4 million dollars --
inflicted in August by two restrikes against the Uong Bi Thermal Power
Plant will prohibit operation of the plant for at least one year.
Complete restoration of the generating facility will require a minimum
of two years. Uong Bi supplied some 20-25 per cent of the electricity
consumed in both Hanoi and Haiphong. Both cities will now be forced
to rely primarily on power supplied by older plants which are subject
to intermittent breakdowns.
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eaborne trade continues to be hindered as a result
of the air strikes. Petroleum products arriving by sea totaled about 25X1
12,000 M.'C.s in August compared with an average of over 2n nnn m T
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