THE PROS AND CONS OF THE BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78S02149R000100130005-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 4, 2002
• Sequence Number: 5
• Content Type: REPORT

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THE PROS AND CONS OF THE BOMBING
OF NORTH VIETNAM
1. Positive Effects of Bombing
A. Manpower Drain*
1. The airstrikes have tied up from 600, 000 to 700, 000
North Vietnamese people. The major categories are:
a. About 220, 000 full-time and 100, 000 to
200, 000 part-time workers have been diverted to
repair, reconstruction, dispersal, and transport
programs.
b. About 150, 000 persons are involved in
part-time civil defense activities.
c. About 83, 000 military personnel, or 20
percent of North Vietnam's military strength, are
directly engaged in air defense activities; an addi-
tional 27, 500 personnel are indirectly involved,
d. An estimated 20, 000 to 25, 000 personnel
are directly involved in full-time coastal defense duties.
2. These diversions of manpower have limited North
Vietnam's capability for sustained large-scale conventional military
operations against South Vietnam.
3. The manpower shortage has also contributed substan-
tially to a shortfall of from 5 to 10 percent in agricultural production
and caused sharp increases in North Vietnam's food import require-
ments.
4. The North Vietnamese population has sustained from
36, 000 to 38, 000 casualties, of whom about 12, 000 were military
* Latest estimates and, therefore, higher than Secretary McNamara's
1 March press release.
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personnel. Most of the civilian casualties (at least two-thirds) are
of a war-related nature -- for example, workers engaged in the
repair of bomb damage, and truck drivers on logistic supply lines.
B. Military Effects
1. Air attacks have destroyed or inactivated significant
percentages of total national capacity in direct military or war-
supporting target categories. These include:
Percent of National
Target Category Capacity Destroyed
Barracks 2;3
Ammunition depots 69
Petroleum storage 55
Electric power 30 to 4+5
Explosives manufacturing 71
Radar sites 43
2. Additional significant destruction of airfields, naval
bases, SAM sites, bridges, and communication facilities has ta?E(2n
place.
3. North Vietnamese prisoners tell us the bombing of
North Vietnam and the Laotian Panhandle makes the infiltration of
South Vietnam very difficult. A graphic picture of what infiltrators
go through because of airstrikes is portrayed in the captured diary
of a North Vietnamese soldier, who marched south
last year. During a six-week trip down t e Ho Chi Minh trail,
Corporal Tap's unit was struck twice by American aircraft, and
raids hit nearby on four other occasions. His unit usually had to
travel at night without lights. As a result, men stumbled and fell,
and often had to eat. uncooked food. Once he broke regulations and
lit a fire; just as he did so a reconnaissance plane zoomed overh-?-),
at treetop level, and it "made his hair stand on end. " When his ,tit
arrived in South Vietnam, it had suffered several casualties; mar
others had deserted. Many of the survivors had malaria; all were:
exhausted. We do not know how many infiltrators are lost on the
march south, but we do know that stories and attitudes such as tho.c
expressed above are not unusual. While bombing is not the compl.L,
25X1 C
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answer to infiltration, it complicates the journey southward and
reduces the morale and immediate combat effectiveness of those
who make the arduous trip.
The bombing initially hardened popular attitudes in North
Vietnam, enabling Hanoi to arouse and manipulate the nationalist
sentiments of its people. But Hanoi' s effort to persuade the United
States to halt the bombing may now reflect the reduction of popular
enthusiasm for its policies resulting from cumulative war-weariness
of the populace. In addition, the shock created by our disregard of
the "privileged sanctuary" for indirect aggression which North
Vietnam represented evidently has increased factional debates in
the Hanoi regime between advocates of aggression and those responsible
for developing the north' s economy and implementing its policy of
"socialist revolution. " This factional split parallels and reinforces
the lines drawn between those favoring Peking's hard line, liberation
war strategy, and those sympathizing with the USSR' s concern over
continued escalation. The growing cost of the war to the Soviet
Union and the Eastern European Communist countries has reinforced
their preference for negotiations in opposition to Hanoi's policy of
continuing the war, which is enthusiastically supported only by
Communist China.
D. Effect of Abandonment of Bombing on Hanoi
Hanoi would regard the abandonment of bombing its territory
as a clear-cut major victory. It would believe that, by propaganda
and political pressure, it had forced the United States to take this
action. Hanoi' s belief in ultimate victory would be strengthened; it
would be greatly encouraged that the United States would ultimately
tire of the war. Almost certainly, the North Vietnamese would not
interpret a halt to the bombing as an act of US de-escalation, but as
a sign that its policy was forcing the United States to retreat.
1. The cost of repairing the damage caused by air attacks
exceeds $215 million, of which over $80 million represents destruc-
tion of military equipment and supplies. Economic losses include
not only repair costs of direct physical damage to transportation
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equipment, bridges, and electric power plants but also heavy in-
direct losses stemming from the reduction of agricultural output,
the impairment of foreign exchange earnings resulting from the
inability to continue normal exports, and the expense of passive
defense measures.
2. Estimated losses in agricultural production and the
fishing industry total over $30 million. Although the food situa-
tion is not yet critical, rice production was 300, 000 tons below
average in 1966; this deficit will create additional problems for
the regime and will require more food imports from other Com-
munist countries. North Vietnam has been forced to cut back on
some of its exports of processed food.
3. Export losses attributable to the bombing total over
$15 million, an amount equivalent to about one-third of North
Vietnam's usual annual export earnings of hard currencies.
4. The cost of the more than 20, 000 units of transport
equipment destroyed or damaged by air attacks is between $35
million and $40 million. The major losses of transport equipment
are as follows:
Equipment
Destroyed
Damaged
Vessels
4,451
8,233
Vehicles
2,548
2,377
Railroad stock
1,508
1,859
5. The air attacks have inflicted high costs in the main-
taining of supplies for the Communist forces in Laos and South.
Vietnam. North Vietnam has had to increase the number of trans-
port workers by 50, 000 and to commit one-fourth of its truck
inventory in the effort to maintain distribution and logistic activities
at required levels. It is estimated that at least 3, 000 truck drivers
alone have been lost as a result of air attacks. The inability to
move goods in daytime has reduced the operating efficiency of its
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truck park by at 1, ast 50 percent and has at least doubled, if not
tripled, the time required to transport goods. We estimate that
losses in transit resulting from spoilage, pilferage, and air attack
have reduced total traffic volume by 20 to 40 percent.
6. The air attacks have forced North Vietnam to undertake
a program to disperse industry, which has disrupted normal eco-
nomic production and aggravated the management and administration
of economic activity.
7. he disruption caused by air interdiction of the trans-
port system zx cI electric power facilities, plus the dislocation of
manpower, ha., required the indefinite postponement of Ho Chi Minh's
plan to build North Vietnam into a modern industrial state. As the
war continues, the industrial damage mounts, and the time when
North Vietnam can hope to have a modern industrial sector is pushed
progressively farther into the future. If Hanoi fails to react, a
continuation of the air attacks will deal a most serious blow to North
Vietnamese hopes for economic progress and status, nullifying a
decade of intense effort and sacrifice on the part of the people.
F. Effe;:ts on South Vietnamese Morale
The bombing has given a real boost to the morale and
determination of our South Vietnamese allies. The situation exist-
ing prior to the initiation of the aerial pressure campaign against
North Vietnam was one the South Vietnamese found increasingly
frustrating, discouraging, and intolerable. South Vietnam was
racked by a war instigated, supported and controlled by Hanoi.
The destruction and unrest caused by this war, however, was
confined to South Vietnam. North Vietnam got off scot free. Its
territory was immune to attack and it suffered no physical punisl--
ment despite the fact that it was waging war south of the 17th
Parallel. This situation continued even after North Vietnam began
taking a direct hand in the southern conflict. Ethnic North Vietnamese
soldiers began appearing in South Vietnam in mid-1964; by the end
of 1964 a whole division of the North Vietnamese Army (the 325tt.,
was moving into South Vietnam. The policy decision to use the North
Vietnamese Army in an attempt to crush the Saigon Government had
obviously been made in Hanoi by 1964 and was in the process of
implementation well before the start of our bombing.
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Cessation of the bombing would be something the South
Vietnamese would understandably find depressing and perplexing.
They, who are bearing and will continue to bear the major burden
of this war so long as Hanoi's aggression continues, would find it
hard to comprehend why the aggressor should be relieved of his
burden and no longer compelled to pay some price on his own
territory for the hardship and destruction he is inflicting on his
southern neighbors.
II. The Negative Effects of the Bombing
A. Costs of Operation
The air campaign against North Vietnam is expensive.
Direct operating costs, which do not include the maintenance of
air bases and the aircraft carriers or logistic support, have been:
1965
1966
Aircraft lost
305.8
605.6
Sortie overhead
98.0
330.4
Ordnance
56.2
311.5
Total
460.o
1,247.5
B. Offsetting Effects of Communist Aid
North Vietnam's apparent willingness to withstand the effects
of continued air attack may be explained by the assistance furnished by
other Communist countries. Total economic and military aid delivered
in 1966 amounted to more than $500 million, or almost four times the
damage resulting from air attack in 1966. There is at least a tacit
implication that the USSR and Communist China have committed them-
selves to underwrite the eventual reconstruction of North Vietnam's
industrial base.
C. Innocent Civilian Casualties
While the air attacks have been directed solely at military
and war supporting targets, it is true that there have been, unfortunately,
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some innocent civilian casualties. Careful planning by US force
commanders has held this total down tc, 11iat must he recognized
by any historical comparison as a very small number. Nevertheless,
Hanoi, its Communist sympathizers around the world, and many
well-meaning people in other countries have had a propaganda field
day with the handful of authentic cases of innocent civilian casualties.
This has hurt the image of the United States despite the good military
record.
D. Adverse Third-Country Attitudes
While there is considerable third-country support for the
bombing of North Vietnam, there is strong opposition to these air
attacks in certain neutral countries. This opposition seems to
stem from fear that the war may become a worldwide conflict, or
that the United States is guilty of "aggression" against a weaker
Asiatic state. Specific major nations in opposition include India
and France; important segments of public opinion in the United
Kingdom, Canada, and Japan share the opposition view.
E. Air Campaign a "Failure"
Finally, the air campaign is frequently criticized because
it hasn't stopped the infiltration of men and supplies into South
Vietnam. But as Secretary McNamara has made clear, the United
States never believed that it would. Air attack against military
targets in the north was designed to make Hanoi pay a high price
for continuing its infiltration, and it has done this.
F. The Bombing Is Prolonging the War, It Is Charged
The argument that the bombing of the north is prolonging
the war or keeping Hanoi from the negotiating table overlooks the
nature of Hanoi's aggression and the North Vietnamese rationale
concerning the war in Vietnam. Although Hanoi has openly
acknowledged since 1960 the role of North Vietnam as the rear
base for the "revolution" in the south, it has supported that
"revolution" through clandestine means to maintain the myth that
the conflict in the south is an internal one.
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North Vietnam, therefore, officially views the cessation
of the bombing as a means of restoring the war to its pre-bombing
status and removing the north as an overt participant. The problem
is thus not one of convincing Hanoi of our peaceful intent nor of
our making a gesture of good will in order to negotiate with Hanoi.
The bombing is not preventing Hanoi from halting its material
support for the so-called "war of liberation" in the south, and
cessation of the bombing would not in itself cause Hanoi to halt
its unacknowledged aggression.
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