COMMENTS ON THE CASE FOR BOMBING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78S02149R000100130003-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 4, 2002
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: October 13, 1966
• Content Type: PAPER

Approved For Release 2002/08/20
Comments on The Case for Bombing
In the attached article which appeared in the New York Times of 12
October, Hanson Baldwin writes that, according to Pentagon appraisals, the
bombing campaign in North Vietnam and Laos has led to a definite reduction
in the supply tonnages moved into South Vietnam from the North. The infre-
quency of major Communist military operations earlier this year, in turn,
was related to supply inadequacies. Without attempting to comment on Com-
munist military tactics, we estimate that any inadequacies of supplies in
the South -- no general shortage of supplies has been apparent -- are pri-
marily a result of Allied air and ground operations in the South as opposed
to air operations over North Vietnam or Laos. The traffic through the
Laotian corridor in the dry season, supplemented by supplies infiltrated
through the DMZ, by sea, and from Cambodia, has been more than adequate to
meet the estimated overall Communist requirements in'South Vietnam from
external sources under current combat conditions. The lack of any Commu-
nist attempt to move trucks through the southern part of the Laotian corri-
dor during at least half of the rainy season supports this estimate. More-
over, the build-up in the DMZ continues apace although concentrated air
strikes against the North Vietnamese Panhandle apparently have inflicted
heavy damage to stocks, vehicles, watercraft, and roads.
Baldwin quotes US intelligence experts as estimating that the enemy
main force in the South requires about 150 tons of supplies a day -- chiefly
ammunition and weapons -- but that various sources believe supply tonnages,
presumably arriving in the South, have been reduced to 75-90 tons a day,
with indications that as little as 57 tons a, day were received in August.
The article implies that these requirements must all be met from external
sources. The current daily external supply requirement of Communist forces
in South Vietnam cannot be estimated with confidence at this time. Exclu-
sive of food, however, the external requirement probably is onlyd:on the
order of 20 to 30 tons, most of which has moved from North Vietnam through
the Laotian corridor. The external food requirement of the Communist forces
in the rice-deficit Central Highland provinces of South Vietnam probably
is met for the most part by deliveries from Cambodia which would seldom
transit Laos and would, therefore, be subject to attack only within South
Vietnam. Cambodia apparently is making available to Communist forces in
South Vietnam during calendar year 1966 some 10,000-20,000 tons of rice
(roughly 25-50 tons per day).
The 150 ton daily requirement quoted above is the same as our estimate
of the total resupply requirement of the main and local Communist forces
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in South Vietnam as of mid-1966. This requirement, however, consisted pre-
dominantly of food supplied primarily for internal sources. The daily
supply tonnages of 75-90 tons are fairly consistent with our estimates of
supplies moved from North Vietnam into Southern Laos in the past dry season
for Communist troops in both Southern Laos and South Vietnam. However, we
estimate that only 10 tons moved into Laos daily in the rainy season, com-
pared with the 57 tons for August quoted by Baldwin.
Baldwin's statement that all but 20 percent of North Vietnam's petroleum
storage facilUtties have been destroyed is in error. All but 20 percent of
the JCS targeted POL storage capacity has been destroyed. In addition,
North Vietnam has an unknown but significant POL storage capacity in dispersed
tank sites.
Prepared by
13 October 1966
Attachment:
Article from the New York Times of
12 October 196
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