STATUS OF PIB REPORTING ON BOMB DAMAGE IN NORTH VIETNAM FROM IAD/NPIC
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP78S02149R000100070007-6
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
2
Document Creation Date:
December 12, 2016
Document Release Date:
April 29, 2002
Sequence Number:
7
Case Number:
Publication Date:
March 1, 1966
Content Type:
MEMO
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
![]() | 127.35 KB |
Body:
OPT ONA Approved For Release 2002%07/01: CIA-RDP78SO2149R000100070007-6
5010-~04
Memorandum
TO : Acting Chief, D/T
FROM : Chief, T/CST
DATE: 1 March 1966
25X1
SUBJECT: Status of PIB reporting on bomb damage in North Vietnam from IAD/NPIC
1. In three days our report on bomb damage assessment will
be due (4 March 1966). The situation at this moment forces us to
conclude that our report will be anything but current. This is
the situation:
a. Since our last report (4 Feb 66) we have received from
IAD three reports which deal with bomb damage in North Vietnam since
the resumption of bombing on the 30th of Jan 1966. These reports
are of bomb damage from missions flown on 2 and 3 Feb 1966 which
were received in this Office from IAD on 25 Feb 1966 (this is a lag
of 22 days).
b. Since our last report (4 Feb 66) we have also received
PIB's from IAD based on 14 "Recce" missions of bomb damage caused by
bombing missions flown prior to cessation (24 Dec 1965).
Number of Date of
Reports Recce Mission
2 Nov 26 & 30
1 Dec 6
11 Jan 1-18
T (Total)
We assume that Recce missions were continued beyond 18 January, thru
the end of January, however, we have not received any PIB's from
IAD covering this period.
c. In addition to the blank space above (19-31 January)
we have no PIB's from 3 February to date. In a telephone conversa-
tion with IAD this morning he stated that he would
forward four reports w ich we should receive tomorrow (2 March 66).
Two of the reports cover a mission flown on 2 February and two re-
ports cover a mission flown on 10 February. They received the film
for these two missions on Saturday, 26 February 1966. We assume
that there must be film somewhere for several missions between the
resumption of bombing (30 Jan 66) and the most recent PIB which we
hope to receive tomorrow, in addition to the two missions 2 and 10
February, which has not been made available to IAD. Moreover, there
X1
Approved For Release 2002/07/01 : CIA-RDP78SO2149R000100070007-6
Approved For Release 2002/07/01 : CIA-:DP78S02149R000100070007-6
is a gap of nearly three weeks, 11 February to date, for which we have no
reporting. There is no doubt that many strikes against bridges have been made
in the periods mentioned above and that pictures of the damage have been made
and reports are being prepared which at least in part are being based on this
photography. For example, we have attached a recapitulation of bridge damage
prepared by DIA for the National Military Command Center, DOD. It is noted 25X1
that the latest report is less than one week old (21. Feb 66). Also, for a
telephone conversation with this morning we have learned
that he has photography as late as 17 February bb. The question is, where are
the pictures and why hasn't IAD received the earlier ones?
The problem, which is a recurring one, as we see it lies with DIA and
perhaps to a lesser extent with PAG/NPIC. We get the feeling based on some
of our experiences that there has been, and continues to be, a studied attempt
on the part of some elements in the military establishment to prevent us from
satisfactorily carrying out this assignment. We cannot achieve accuracy and
currentness if we do not have these pictures with a much higher degree of time-
lines. In our opinion it will serve no useful purpose at this time to recite
the details which force us to conclude that DIA is not giving us full coopera-
tion. Suffice it to say that from the very beginning of this assignment
(September 1965) they have been "pulling back in the breeching."
2. What can be done in the short run to alleviate the situation? Not
much that will help this report. Even if we supply final estimate figures as
late as Friday, 11 March, there is every indication that we still will have a
lag of 3 weeks which means that report will not accurately reflect the actual
bomb damage after mid-February.
3. What can we do in the long run so that we may have an accurate, complete
and current report on 1 April? We suggest the same procedure adopted last fall.
That is to persuade DIA, with an assist from the DD/I Office, to return to the
film distribution and schduling plan which worked so well in November and
December 1965. Failing in this, the sole remaining alternative is to arrange
for making another duplicate positive regardless of cost.
4. As we see it, the situation boils down to just this; for various reasons
DIA is not able to provide satisfactory damage assessments and at the same time
they are bound and determined that we don't either. At the moment the odds in
this contest seem to be in their favor.
25X1A9A
Approved For Release 2002/07/01 : CIA-RDP78SO2149R000100070007-6