AN APPRAISAL OF THE BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM THROUGH 14 MAY 1966

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78S02149R000100070006-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 13, 2002
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: May 19, 1966
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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AN APPRAISAL OF THE BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM
THROUGH 14 MAY 1966
SUMMARY
1. (S) US air strikes in NVN during the period 15 April -
14 May 1966 were primarily armed reconnaissance against lines of
communication, infiltration routes, dispersed logistic targets
and land and waterway traffic. The interdiction effort in the
northeast section of the country was intensified while continuing
pressure was maintained on LOCs to the south. All railroad lines
radiating from Hanoi with the possible exception of the line
between Hanoi and Haiphong are estimated to be presently closed to
through traffic, although extensive provisions have been made to
circumvent damage through bypasses, shuttle service, and/or water
traffic. The constant interdiction of rail and road facilities
and traffic apparently has caused the North Vietnamese to emphasize
the use of waterways for moving supplies southward as evidenced by
the record high destruction or damage of watercraft reported during
the period. Strikes against fixed targets (other than LOC targets)
were few; consequently, there was little effect on national capacities.
2. (S) Although the flow of men and material from NVN into
Laos and SVN continues, perhaps at an increased rate, the US air
effort below the 20th parallel is having adverse effects and
operations from a dispersed logistical base continue to cause
EXCLUDED FROM .AUTO AT1C
REGRADING; DOD DIR 5200.10
DIA review(s) completed. SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM DOES NOT APPLY
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management and control problems for Hanoi. The North Vietnamese,
in attempting to circumvent the effects of the air strikes, continue
to place major emphasis on construction and maintenance of LOCs.
While the capacities of the LOCs still greatly exceed observed
traffic densities, the reduction in LOC capacities which has been
achieved by US air strikes has lessened North Vietnam's capability
to mount and sustain an overt attack into South Vietnam and Laos.
On the other hand, the capability of the NVN armed forces to perform
the missions of national defense, internal security, and to train
and support with men and materiel VC/NVA and PL/NVA forces in South
Vietnam and Laos has not been appreciably impaired.
3? (C) The North Vietnamese leadership in the past several
weeks has stepped up its propaganda campaign to bolster the morale
of the NVN populace. This intensification of optimistic themes
suggests growing concern on the part of North Vietnam's leaders
over the effects of the air raids on popular morale, although
there is no evidence of any impending change in regime policies.
4+. (S/NFD) Although the economic impact of air strikes against
NVN has been limited by the restriction of bombing to targets of
relatively minor economic significance and by the receipt of assistance
from communist countries, the previously estimated adverse effects
of the bombing have now been confirmed by recent statements of the
Hanoi regime. Increasing amounts of resources are being drawn
rf%D
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from agriculture and industry to counter the effects of bomb damage,
thereby contributing heavily to constraints on the growth of these
sectors. Problems resulting from the reallocation of manpower and
inept management continue, with industry experiencing a decline in
the quality and efficiency of production. US air strikes of 19 and
23 April halted seaborne exports of coal from Cam Pha Port, North
Vietnam's principal coal export harbor, causing a substantial
reduction in coal exports for April. There are also indications
that loadings scheduled for early May have been postponed as much
as two weeks and that shipping may not return to normal before July.
A prolonged reduction in exports of coal from Cam Pha will have a
serious effect upon North Vietnam's foreign exchange earnings,
25 per cent of which are derived from sales of coal.
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Effects on Military Targets
1. (S) US air strikes in NVN during the period 15 April -
14 May 1966 were primarily armed reconnaissance against lines of
communication, infiltration routes, dispersed logistic targets and
land and waterway traffic. Strikes against fixed targets (other
than LOC targets) were few; consequently, there was little effect
on national capacities.
2. (S/NFD) The inderdiction effort in the northeast section of
the country was intensified while continuing pressure was maintained
on LOCs to the south. All railroad lines radiating from Hanoi with
the possible exception of the line between Hanoi and Haiphong, are
estimated to be presently closed to through traffic, although
extensive provisions have been made to circumvent damage through
bypasses, shuttle service, and/or water traffic. An intensive effort
will probably be made to repair the most important bridges. Destruction
of the Hai Duong combination rail/highway bridge on 17 April interrupted
through traffic between Hanoi and Haiphong, and required an estimated
two to four weeks to accomplish temporary repairs. Recent strikes
against the Hanoi-Dong Dang line, the main land supply route from
China, resulted in the destruction of the Bac Giang combination
rail/highway bridge, effectively interdicting through traffic. The
Hanoi-Lao Cai line remains closed to through traffic. New inter-
dictions have been accomplished south and north of Yen Bai. Continued
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strikes against the Hanoi-Vinh railroad line also have resulted
in new interdictions with the Phu Ly bridge between Hanoi and Nam
Dinh being the most important target.
3. (S) Air strikes on highways were concentrated along Routes lA
and 15 south of the Thanh Hoa area. Significant repetitive inter-
diction of lateral routes in southern North Vietnam also was effected.
On 26 April, B-52's conducted the second heavy bomber attack against
North Vietnam on the northern side of Mu Gia Pass about 60 nautical
miles south of Vinh. Convoys were noted using the pass within
21+-hours of this strike. The repairs -- actually accomplished during
about 10 hours of darkness -- indicated how important this route is
and illustrated that the communists will spare no effort to keep
it open.
4. (S) Recent Allied air strikes have inflicted extensive
damage to transport equipment in Military Region IV, as the North
Vietnamese logistic effort in this region has increased. Both
coastal and inland water transport routes and equipment, have
absorbed heavy losses. Although no JCS targeted inland waterway
facilities were struck during the period, transshipment facilities
were attacked at four locations and a record high of over 1,)+00
waterway craft were reported damaged or destroyed. Junks and barges
are using a new coastal route from Thanh Hoa south to Vinh. The
route utilizes existing waterways as well as some coastal routes
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to cover the distance of approximately 80 nautical miles. Over 600
rivercraft were destroyed or damaged on this new coastal route alone.
The constant interdiction of rail and road facilities and traffic
apparently has caused the North Vietnamese to emphasize the use of
waterways for moving supplies southward into and within Military
Region IV. Although there are indications that some NVN ships are
restricting their movements to the hours of darkness, the numbers
of junks which could be called into service to support these movements
probably precludes a significant reduction in this supply system in
the near future. Cumulative totals of damaged and destroyed targets
are shown in Tab A.
5. (S) While the flow of men and materiel from NVN into Laos
and SVN continues, perhaps at an increased rate, the US air effort
below the 20th parallel is having adverse effects. In the armed
reconnaissance areas, movement has been restricted almost entirely
to the hours of darkness and dispersed supply facilities have been
harassed, causing operations to be conducted from small, isolated,
or camouflaged areas. Operations from a dispersed logistical base
continue to cause management and control problems for Hanoi.
6. (S) The North Vietnamese, in attempting to circumvent the
effects of the air strikes, continue to place major emphasis on
construction and maintenance of LOCs. No apparent effort is being
made to repair fixed military installations such as barracks, supply
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depots and ammunition depots. While the capacities of the LOCs
still greatly exceed observed traffic densities, the air strikes
are causing the North Vietnamese to devote an increasing amount of
time and effort to maintain them. Moreover, the NVN armed forces'
capability to perform the missions of national defense, internal
security, and to train and support with men and materiel VC/NVA
and PL/NVA forces in South Vietnam and Laos has not yet been
appreciably impaired. On the other hand, the reduction in LOC
capacities which has been achieved by US air strikes has lessened
North Vietnam's capability to mount and sustain an overt attack
into South Vietnam and Laos.
Leadership and Public Reactions
7. (C) The North Vietnamese leadership in the past several weeks
has stepped up its propaganda campaign to bolster the morale of the
NVN populace by claiming that the continuing US bombing raids
merely represent a "frenzied" effort by the Americans to offset
repeated defeats in South Vietnam.
8. (C) The most recent major effort by the regime to shore up
morale came in a week long National Assembly meeting convened on
16 April. Speakers at the assembly, including Ho Chi Minh, Vo Nguyen
Giap and Pham Van Dong, gave the people an optimistic report on
the developments of the war, and reaffirmed North Vietnamese
determination to win the war even if it takes a long time. The
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assembly speakers pointed to what they alleged were the factors
that the Vietnamese people have in their favor in the prosecution
of the war. They stressed the unity of all Vietnamese on both
sides of the 17th parallel, the growing opposition in the US to the
war, the support of the socialist countries for the Vietnamese
position, and the successful challenge of US military power in the
air over North Vietnam.
9. (U) Emphasis on the air victory culminated in a flood of
boastful propaganda to celebrate the alleged shoot-down of the
"1,000th" US aircraft over NVN on 29 April. In the context of this
celebration, the propaganda asserted that in spite of the US bombings,
the people have been able to step up production, improve the economy
and other facets of life while at the same time achieving a better
allocation of manpower resources and a greater defense effort.
10. (C) This intensification of optimistic themes in regime
propaganda suggests growing concern on the part of North Vietnam's
leadership over the effects of the air raids on popular morale.
Nevertheless, despite the destruction of military and economic assets,
and difficulties in transportation, communications, and the allocation
of food and consumer goods there is no evidence of any impending
change in regime policies.
Effects on the Economy
11. (S/NFD) Air strikes against North Vietnam are having a small
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but increasingly debilitating effect upon the economy. Even though
the economic impact has been limited by the restriction of bombing
to targets of relatively minor economic significance, the previously
estimated adverse effects of the bombing have now been confirmed by
recent statements of the Hanoi regime. Increasing amounts of
resources are being allocated to counter the effects of bomb damage.
These resources are being drawn from agriculture and industry, thereby
contributing heavily to constraints on the growth of these sectors.
According to Hanoi, gross value of agricultural output increased
only 1.1 per cent in 1965 compared with an announced 6.7 per cent
in 1964. The gross value of industrial output increased 8 per cent
in 1965, somewhat less than the 10.7 per cent increase claimed for
1964. The customary announcements of annual production figures for
individual commodities and other sectors of the economy have not
been made and the claims for over-all economic performance in 1965
are markedly low-keyed, thus suggesting that even the alleged
increases may be illusory.
12. (S/NFD) A recent statement of the premier of North Vietnam
confirms our estimate that at least 200,000 workers have been
allocated to repair and to maintain essential lines of communications
(LOC's). Pham Van Dong boasted that as a result of this effort "...
for many months now ..." the average daily tonnage of goods
transported has exceeded the average volume reached by the end of
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1964. He also gave at least a partial indication of the increasing
share of resources required to prosecute the war and to compensate
for bomb damage. Planned investment in capital construction for
1966 amounts to an estimated 330 million dollars, one-third more
than the level of 1965. This investment will be used to develop
communications and transportation associated with defense require-
ments, and to strengthen other sectors of the economy. A program
of this magnitude is facilitated by the stepped-up program of
economic assistance from other communist countries which is becoming
increasingly important to North Vietnam. Such assistance has
averaged some 100 million dollars annually since 1955. During the
13 month period through January 1966, communist countries offered
an estimated 100-150 million dollars in economic aid.
13. (S/NFD) Indications of problems resulting from the re-
allocation of manpower and inept management continue to persist.
Some of the manpower normally available for industry and agriculture
has gone into military service, but large increments have been
shifted into repair and maintenance of the transportation and
communications sectors. Although the volume of output in industry
seems to have held up reasonably well, there are signs that wasteful
use of manpower and materials has contributed to a decrease in the
quality of the output and an increase in the cost of production.
Agriculture has been affected adversely by the loss of supervisory
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personnel, particularly in irrigation projects, as well as by the
failure to make small machinery available to the farms to compensate
for the loss of labor.
14. (S) Recent air strikes against targets of economic
significance have included attacks against the port and coal
preparation plant at Cam Pha, the country's largest electric power
plant at Uong Bi and bridges on the four railroad lines radiating
from Hanoi.
15. (S/NFD) Seaborne exports of coal from Cam Pha Port were
halted by US air strikes of 19 and 23 April. Most of North Vietnam's
coal is shipped by sea, and 90 per cent of these shipments over the
past 15 months originated at Cam Pha. The only alternative port for
the shipment of coal is Hon Gai which has a shallower draft limitation
and more limited loading facilities. Exports of coal amounted to only
83,000 tons in April compared with an average of nearly 130,000 tons
a month in the five months ending 31 March. There are also
indications that loadings scheduled for early May have been postponed
as much as two weeks and that shipping may not return to normal
before July. The sharp decline in coal shipments reduced North
Vietnam's total seaborne exports well below average levels, despite
a strong recovery of exports of cement. A prolonged reduction in
exports of coal from Cam Pha will have a serious effect upon North
Vietnam's foreign exchange earnings, 25 per cent of which are
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derived from sales of coal. A less significant effect of the strikes
on Cam Pha is the possible prohibition by Poland of further calls
at North Vietnam by Polish flag ships, one of which Poland claimed
was damaged during the strike on 19 April. While Polish ships
in the past have carried only relatively small volumes of cargo
to North Vietnam, they would nevertheless have to be replaced in
the trade, probably by ships of other communist countries.
16. (S/NFD) On 18 and 28 April 1966 restrikes were carried out
against the Uong Bi thermal power plant, which had been put out of
operation initially by air strikes in December 1965. Photographic
analysis indicates that the damage inflicted by the restrikes again
was sufficient to halt operation, but the power plant probably can
be restored to partial operation within one or two months.
17. (S/NFD) The estimated costs of replacing damaged and
destroyed economic and military facilities and equipment continue
to accumulate slowly. During this reporting period some 95 per
cent of the strike sorties flown against North Vietnam were by
armed reconnaissance missions. Pilots report numerous military
and economic targets destroyed or damaged, but lack of adequate
and timely post strike photography and descriptions of the targets
make it impossible, except in specific instances, to quantify the
value of the loss or the cost of accomplishing repairs to the
facilities and equipment. Intelligence on the results of attacks
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on military facilities and equipment has not permitted an upward
revision of the estimate carried for this category in the previous
report. Direct cumulative losses caused by confirmed bomb damage
to economic and military facilities and equipment are therefore
estimated at approximately $59 million as indicated in the follow-
t
b
l
ti
i
ng
a
u
a
on:
Economic Facilities and Equipment
Military Facilities and Equipment
Million
Million
Targets
Dollars
Targets
Dollars
Railroad/Highway Bridges*
Barracks
16.0
Reconstruction
11.0
Ammunition Storage
4-i),
Temporary Repairs
2.7**
Supply Depots
3.0
Transportation Equipment
8.8
Radar and Communications
1.L
Railroad Yards and Ports
1.0
Naval Bases
0.(3
Electric Power Plants
Petroleum Storage
Facilities
6.3***
0.7
SAM Sites
Airfields
Miscellaneous Targets of
0. )
0.
Manufacturing Facilities
1.5
Armed Reconnaissance
The estimate in this category is incomplete because of inadequate
post strike photography.
Includes 1.8 million dollars expended to date on temporary repairs
and 0.9 million dollars required to provide temporary repairs
for structures damaged but not yet repaired.
* Assessment of recent, good quality photography of the Uong_Bi
power plant has required a downward revision of the estimated
restoration costs of this category.
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Measurable indirect losses amount to about 10.1 million dollars
made up principally of losses of foreign exchange earnings of
6.6 million dollars* and losses in the 1965 fall rice crop of
3.5 million dollars.
This figure includes those decreases in exports of apatite, cement
and coal that appear to be related to the bombing. This month's
figure has been revised downward to take into account a more
accurate average value of cement exports.
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SE_RET-NO FOREIGN DI_.EM
RZSULTS 01? STRIKES ON NVN TAIMETS PL/ THRU 16 May 1966
Total Tarsax&_
Tar& to
Strunk
% Of Nxticse`1
Fixed Targets
#/
No
a
d
No.
b/
Strike
Barracks
443 man
9
44
23.0
igi
2436
Ammo Depots
119-6
ion
79-7
51
1143
19-AL
71
20
POL Storage
91A
1 1
a &-a
10 n
12
142
17.2Q
-
S
_
raw-UJI ant a
175
KW
19
97.5
6
27.5
25
23A
2
2Z.50
Maritime P
S d
8
95
5
12.0
17
219
_
5
Yards
2
11
9-9
Z
50
Explosive
.
71.00
Airfields
23
4
12
359
Naval Bases
15
15
196
17.1% of Vational
Capacity destro ed
Bridges
822
43
151
2211
Cornmo Install
45
2
2
15
Radar Sites
29
13
59
383
SAM Sites
97
24
37
59
lucks & Dams
91
9
Ferries
34
11
e
7
44
Astericks indicate a complete
re-accounting from 1 Apr 66.
RR Stock * 410
es:*8,370 Results f
Armed Recce Sorties Destroyed Da~~maggedd
*29,397 Vessels %'1362 Vehicles * 758 ;: 7afl
/ Assessments are based on best information received, will be refined as more accurate
information becomes available.
h/ Strike plus flak suppression sorties. Some applied to multiple targets; in this
summary assigned to principal target.
~./ National capacity in 1,000's where measurement shown.
d/ Percentages of national capacity where appropriate.
c,/ Also numerous attacks during armed recce and other missions.
f/ Also numerous installations, AA sites, bridges, etc, attacked and road and rail cuts made
g/ Per cent inactive due to dismantling or abandonment of facilities as a result of air
strikes.
( ) These columns are not additive, since the number of installations, both targeted and
struck in some cases, apply to more than one category of targets. (i.e., barracks,
supply and ammo depots).
NOTE,: For comparative purposes.
US worldwide ammo storage capacity is 6,936,000 metric tons (CONUS 5,719,000 MT).
US worldwide military POL storage capacity is 15,452,000 MT; national US commercial
capacity is 151,325,000 MT; approximate average $ value of 1 MT of POL products is$28.
US worldwide military supply depot covered storage space is 137,100,000 sq. ft.
(CONUS 121,300,000 sq. ft.).
I'otal kilowatt capacity of power plants sere ng metrop lit an areas: New York - 7.6
million; hitspo 6b million, , Washin ton DCC and M8/suburbs only) - 2.4 million.
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