ESTIMATING ENEMY LOGISTICAL REQUIREMENTS DURING THE KOREAN WAR
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP78S02149R000100040003-3
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
1
Document Creation Date:
November 16, 2016
Document Release Date:
October 23, 1998
Sequence Number:
3
Case Number:
Publication Date:
April 26, 1966
Content Type:
MEMO
File:
Attachment | Size |
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CIA-RDP78S02149R000100040003-3.pdf | 50.76 KB |
Body:
OPTIONOL?pprov
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Boto-t ed For Release 2000/ (lT,-RDP78S02149R000100040003-3
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
Chief, Trade and Services Division, ORR
FROM : Chief, Manufacturing Branch, D/R
DATE: 26 April 1966
SUBJECT: Estimating Enemy Logistical Requirements During the Korean War
1. As you requested, our recent review of the Korean Air 25X1X7
War was followed, by a look at another aspect of that conflict,
the examination of various estimates of ene logistical re-
quirements. These estimates were made by intelli-
gence components during and. after the Korean War. After re-
viewing these efforts we are struck with the tenuous nature of
many of the numbers which flow out of such an estimating exercise,
and the need to continue to improve them.
2. Simply, the review which we made consisted of examining
various total and individual logistical requirements, supply
classes, the origin of early estimates, and. the progress of the
methodology. We have noted the fact that for lack of better
data the estimating process began with the use of scaled.-down
US requirements and proceeded to refine these as better analysis
of intelligence became available.
3. Total logistical requirements, for all classes, probably
are not too relevant to current conditions in Vietnam because of
the different kind of a war being fought. Some of the individual
estimates for various classes of supply, such as ammunition re-
quirements, may be relevant to today's situation in Vietnam.
4. We have not examined. current estimates of the logistical
requirements of enemy forces in Vietnam nor compared Korean ex-
perience with these estimates. Perhaps we could discuss this
problem informally sometime soon.
25X1A9a
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Approved For Release 2000/05/30 : CIA-RDP78SO
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040003-3