ESTIMATING ENEMY LOGISTICAL REQUIREMENTS DURING THE KOREAN WAR

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP78S02149R000100040003-3
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
1
Document Creation Date: 
November 16, 2016
Document Release Date: 
October 23, 1998
Sequence Number: 
3
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
April 26, 1966
Content Type: 
MEMO
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PDF icon CIA-RDP78S02149R000100040003-3.pdf50.76 KB
Body: 
OPTIONOL?pprov ~ r Boto-t ed For Release 2000/ (lT,-RDP78S02149R000100040003-3 UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT Memorandum Chief, Trade and Services Division, ORR FROM : Chief, Manufacturing Branch, D/R DATE: 26 April 1966 SUBJECT: Estimating Enemy Logistical Requirements During the Korean War 1. As you requested, our recent review of the Korean Air 25X1X7 War was followed, by a look at another aspect of that conflict, the examination of various estimates of ene logistical re- quirements. These estimates were made by intelli- gence components during and. after the Korean War. After re- viewing these efforts we are struck with the tenuous nature of many of the numbers which flow out of such an estimating exercise, and the need to continue to improve them. 2. Simply, the review which we made consisted of examining various total and individual logistical requirements, supply classes, the origin of early estimates, and. the progress of the methodology. We have noted the fact that for lack of better data the estimating process began with the use of scaled.-down US requirements and proceeded to refine these as better analysis of intelligence became available. 3. Total logistical requirements, for all classes, probably are not too relevant to current conditions in Vietnam because of the different kind of a war being fought. Some of the individual estimates for various classes of supply, such as ammunition re- quirements, may be relevant to today's situation in Vietnam. 4. We have not examined. current estimates of the logistical requirements of enemy forces in Vietnam nor compared Korean ex- perience with these estimates. Perhaps we could discuss this problem informally sometime soon. 25X1A9a a& Fs f '1122 Approved For Release 2000/05/30 : CIA-RDP78SO GnOUP 4 Excluded from an?omaflc dnwngradiag and 040003-3