PRESS CONFERENCE OF THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER SECRETARY OF STATE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78M02660R000800070029-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 18, 2004
• Sequence Number: 29
• Publication Date: February 12, 1976
• Content Type: TRANS

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PRESS CONFERENCE OF
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
y- i
FEBRUARY 12, 1976
SECRETARY KISSINGER: I would like to make a
brief statement on Guatemala.
This is my first opportunity to express publicly
our Government's and my personal sympathy for the people of
Guatemala in the unparalleled tragedy which has befallen
them and their country.
Americans have always traditionally responded
generously in thought and deed to the needs of the
suffering. Reflecting that humanitarian spirit, our
Government, joined by its citizens and charitable
organizations, is mounting a major effort to assist the
Government and people of Guatemala to ease- the suffering
caused by the earthquake.
I will visit Guatemala on February 24 in
connection with my Latin American trip.
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Mr. Secretary, the State Department
Spokesman has this week consistently refused to comment
on the reports of the microwave bugging of the Embassy
in Moscow. Will you now tell us the facts and what
action you have taken to get the Russians to cease this
activity, which has been going on for years?
Also, could you discuss the radiation hazard'
that is involved in this?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: This issue is a matter of
great delicacy which has many ramifications. Our overwhelming
concern is, of course, the health and welfare of State
Department and other personnel in Moscow. We have made
.unilateral efforts to reduce any dangers, and we are also
engaged,, in discussions on the subject. But I do not
believe it would serve these purposes if I went into any
greater detail.
Q May I follow it up, please, because
radiation in the minds of many Americans means radioactivity?
Can you rule out that this is radioactivity?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: I do not. know exactly.
These matters have to be related to accepted health
levels, and they have to be related also to the safety
standards over a period of time. I would not use the word
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Q' Mr. Secretary, in light of the diplomatic
and military successes of the Popular Movement in Angola,
is the United States prepared to follow the OAU line and
.recognize the MPLA as the legitimate government of Angola,
or at least open diplomatic contacts with them?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: The United States has
declared consistently that its objection was not to the MPLA.
as an organization, nor to its political views as such.
Our objection has been to the imposition of a minority
government by what is now 12,000 Cuban troops and nearly
$300 million worth of Soviet equipment . Since January
alone the Soviet Union has introduced over $100 million worth
of military equipment into Angola.
Those facts will not be changed by the military
victory that will inevitably result when one side is
.deprived of restraint and the other is given no opportunity
to resist.
What the United States will do when a de facto
situation exists, we will decide under those circumstances.
But I have said before our objection is to the outside
imposition of a government and not to the African
component of the government itself.
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Q-_ Mr. Secretary,. last year you spoke
eloquently of the principles that give purpose to our
strength--
SECRETARY KISSINGER: I beg your pardon?
Q .'Last'year you gave a number of speeches
dealing with the principles that give purpose to American
strength. In your opinion, what are these basic principles
of American constitutional democracy, and how do you conform
your official conduct and that of the State Department to
the dictates of these principles? .
SECRETARY KIP' TNCER: I haven't seen this
gentleman in over a year and a half, and I think we will
to another question.
question.
'Mr. Secretary, if I could ask another
SECRETARY KISSINGER: Certainly.
Specifically in a government such as ours,
which functions- by the consent of the governed, do you
feel that public officials such as yourself have a duty
to fully, currently, and truthfully inform the public,
their employers, so that the consent will be informed and
not blind?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: What was the last?
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Q -- consent of the governed will be informed
consent and not blind consent.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: In a democracy the
government has an obligation to keep the public informed
and to get support by the existing constitutional processes.
In a democracy also,it is not possible to have effective.
government unless there is a minimum of restraint and a
minimum of decency in the public debate so that the
essential element of confidence that must exist if a
society is to get through its difficulties is preserved.
Mr. Secretary, can you tell us what the
status of the SALT talks is, the prospects for your return
to Moscow?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: As we have pointed out,
in the SALT talks there were a number of propositions
made in Moscow, and a number of proposals were made by
the Soviet Union in reply to the propositions that we
.have advanced. These moved matters forward somewhat. We
are now studying the Soviet reply, and we are developing
a position to transmit to the Soviet Union within the next
week or so. After we have a Soviet reply, we will be
able to judge how close we are to an agreement and what
the next step should be.
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Mr. Secretary, on the question of the
Lockheed reports, could I ask you a three-part question,
please?
What effect do you think these revelations will
have on both the diplomatic and economic interests of the
United States abroad?
Two, could you tell us about a letter that was
published in the New York Times yesterday which says that
you supported pleas by Lockheed that the names of officials
to whom it had made payoffs, along with the names of their
countries, be kept secret?
And three, could you tell us when the Department
first became aware of these matters?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: I do not have the exact
answer to your last question. We became aware of these
matters some months ago when we were asked about the
foreign policy implications of some of these revelations.
And we pointed out that the implications for the domestic
stability and the domestic situation of.other countries
could be extremely serious.
The impact of these revelations has been serious.
On the other hand, we not only do not condone these actions,
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we strongly condemn. them. We think it is an inappropriate
way to conduct business, and we regret very much that these
actions, if they are true, in fact took place.
Could I take you back to part two of that, sir,
as to why you thought not revealing the'names, that the
names be kept secret, was in the interest. of the United
States?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: Because the revelation by
a Congressional committee of the names of senior officials
of other countries is boi_=e to have serious consequences in
those countries. And that is a matter that we thought the
Committee should keep in mind.
But I repeat,this has nothing to do with our
approving or condoning the actions that are revealed in
those reports, if they are true -- which I do not know.
Q Mr. Secretary, on the same point, sir, does
it disturb you at all that an American company was engaging
in activities involving foreign officials, including in
many cases right-wing officials, that from your statement
was apparently unknown to U.S.. intelligence officials or
the State Department?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: It disturbs me. I
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think it is a matter that should not take place and
we must make every effort to prevent in the future.
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Q Mr. Secretary, what are your future plans
for any sort of.negotiationsregarding the Middle East
situation, and also can you confirm reports of meetings
between Israeli and Jordanian officials concerning:-the
West Bank?
SECRETARY KISSIF-G^ER: I think other governments
have to confirm or deny meetings that they may be having.
We are not involved in any such activities. We have had
full and, on, the whole, satisfactory talks with Prime
Minister Rabin. We will have some more exchanges with
the Israeli Government, and then we will bring back our
Ambassadors from the Middle East, from the Arab countries,
for consultation to discuss what the next move should be.
And we will then convey our best judgment of the various oppor-
tunities that are available to all of the parties within
the course of the next month.
Mr. hisagor?
Q M
Secretary, a representative of
Zaire has been here talking to the President and yourself.
Does this Administration plan some overt course of
policy in relation,-to those countries that
surround Angola?
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SECRETARY KISSINGER: With respect to overt
actions as they apply to Angola, I do not think it has been
generally understood the difficulty that any overt request
would have from a legal point of view, because it would
in-effect say that the United States is asking for funds
for some country to intervene-in a civil war in some other
country. So that part of it is a matter of extreme legal
and political difficulty.
The second problem we now face is that, as
a result of this war and of the Cuban and Soviet inter-
vention, there is grave concern in countries like Zaire
and Zambia and other countries of Africa that this
pattern might be repeated, or. that the weapons that
have been accumulated there might be used for purposes
beyond the borders of Angola.
We are talking to the Governments of Zaire
and Zambia., and we will be talking to other governments,
to make sure that we understand what they consider their
necessities, and to do the best that we can to prevent
the pattern of Angola from setting a precedent for the
rest of Africa. And when I go to Africa later this year,
this is one of the subjects that I plan to discuss.
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Q
Can I follow that up by asking if they
are requesting specific American actions now?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: If they request specific
American action now, we would take it very seriously and
we would, of course, discuss it fully with th-_ Congress.
Mr. Secretary, you have gone to quite a bit
of trouble in the last few weeks to set forth your views
about the kind of debate on foreign policy that ought to
take place in 1976, particularly with reference to the
Soviet. Union. How do you feel, having done that, about
the statements which have recently been made -that the
only result of detente is advantages to the Soviet
Union and the ability of the United States to sell some
Pepsi-Colas in ,Siberia? .
SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think that there are a
lot of candidates,and they all have a problem about getting
into the headlines, I can not spend my time answering
every candidate making some political charge.
I believe that the Administration has attempted
to set forth our over-all philosophy, tied to our interpre-
tation of realities. I believe that a debate ought to
deal with some other version of reality, with some other
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relationship between the United States, the Soviet Union,and
the Peoples Republic of China is too delicate, too
important for the peace of the world to be used for
simply partisan sloganeering.
Mr. Secretary, the president of an outfit
called Hudson Engineering it New Jersey claims that he
,has seen Soviet trawlers using sonic equipment testing
for oil off the Jersey coast. Mr. Hudson claims to have
been in touch with the State Department, and to have
heard from the State Department that the Soviets have tried
to begin talks on this subject, and that such talks are
in fact underway. Would you respond, please?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: I never heard this, and I
will have to check into it. I have never heard this
argument.
Q Mr. Secretary, would you comment, please,
on two things -- Angola and the Moscow Embassy affair?
Do these have a cunnilative effect which at least affects
the climate in which the other aspects of detente, such
as SALT,proceed?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: The Moscow Embassy affair,
I have tried to point out, is a matter of great complexity
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and sensitivity.
Angolaq we have stressed since November, is a
pattern of behavior that the United States will not accept,
that if continued it will have serious consequences for
any possibility of easing of relations with the Soviet
Union, and if continued, and if it becomes a pattern, must
affect other relationships.
Q
Mr. Secretary, would you comment on recent
changes in-Peking, and on what effect this might have
on U.S.-China relations?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: We were not previously con-
sulted before these changes were made. Indeed, at the
risk of undermining our reputation for foreseeing things,
we were surprised by the changes.
We believe that the basic foreign policy of the
Peoples Republic of China, as well as ours, depends on
the basic conception of the national interests of both
countries. Those interests will determine the policies,
and their personalities, in this sense, play a secondary
role. So we expect that the basic lines of our foreign
policy, as the basic lines of Chinese policy,will continue.
Mr. Secretary, you saw former President Nixon
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in San Clemente before it was announced that he was going
to go to China. What do you think of his trip, and what
does it mean for American-Chinese relations?. What are
the Chinese trying to tell us by that invitation?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: When I saw President Nixon
he did not tell me that a trip by him to the Peoples
Republic of China was imminent. He talked in very general
terms of his intentions eventually to take a trip, but not
that it was as imminent as it turned out to be.
President Nixon was responsible for the opening to
China, and I believe this to have been one of the major
American diplomatic initiatives of the recent period.
The Chinese are undoubtedly attempting to underline
the importance they attach to this relationship by their
invitation.
This Administration has repeatedly made clear
that we attach very great significance to the relationship
with the Peoples Republic of China, and therefore we
consider anything that symbolizes this to be, on the
who le , he lp fu l .
On the other hand, President Nixon is going there
as a private citizen, and what the intentions of the
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15.
Chinese were, beyond what I have stated, is really a
matter that they have not discussed with us.
Mr. Secretary, going back to Angola, now
that the MPLA seems to have won a military victory, how
serious a setback do ;you think this is :for the United
States, and what lessons dcrez tzis tell the rest of the
world about the attitudes and divisions in Washington?
-SECRETARY KISSINGER: The MPLA did not score a
military 'victory. Cuba scored a military victory, backed
by the Soviet Union. Almost all of the fighting was done
by Cuban forces.
What it should make clear is that we can conduct
foreign policy only as a united people, that these victories
and setbacks that I am being asked about are not victories
and setbacks for the Administration, they are setbacks
for the United States ; and not so much for the United
States as for those who have to make the decision what
to do in similar circumstances when similar pressures
appear again.
It cannot be in the interest of the United States
to establish the principle that Soviet arms and Cuban
expeditionary forces can appear in situations of turmoil.
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As we look around the world at areas o.f',potential
conflict, it cannot'be in the interest of the United
States to create the impression that,in times of crisis,
either threats or promises of the United States may
not mean anything because our divisions may paralyze
So, leaving aside the merit of the particular
argument as between one branch or the other, the absolute
requirement of the United States is to come together on
a unified position, and this cannot wait for our electoral
process to work itself out.
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Following up on that, Mr. Secretary,
there is a catch phrase that has been kicking around the
hemisphere for about twelve years -- the export of
revolution -- with reference to Cuba. Premier Castro
denies that he is exporting revolution. The Soviets
deny they are exporting revolution. Premier Castro
this week in Havana was saying this. Do you feel
that the Soviet Union and Cuba are attempting to export,
if not revolution, at least.their system in the
Angola matter?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: I do not care what label
you give it. There are 12,000 Cuban troops, and
hundreds of millions of dollars of Soviet equipment in
a situation that, had it been left alone, would have led
to some African solution of a coalition of all of the
factions in which over a period of time one or the other
might have prevailed, but in a local context.
This is a pattern which, as one looks at other
parts of the world, would have the gravest consequences
for peace and stability, and it is one which the United
States treats with indifference only at the risk of buying
raver crises at higher cost later on.
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Well, if you had your "druthers", what would
you do vis-a-vis Cuba?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: We stated our preferences
in December, when the situation in our judgment was
manageable and negotiable. It did not get out of hand
until our domestic divisions deprived us of diplomatic
leverage.
What we will do in the future is not for me to
say right now, except that we cannot leave the impression
that we will be indifferent to a continuation of these
efforts. And if we continue to speak about Angola it is
not because we have any illusions about what is going on
in Angola, but because we want the American public to
understand, we want other countries to understand, that
at least the Executive Branch understands what the problem
is and that it will exercise its responsibilities in a
.democracy to try to bring home to the public and to the
Congress what our future obligations may be.
Q Mr. Secretary, there has been a published
account of the Pike Committee report, including dozens
of charges against you, ranging from the allegation that
your policy resulted in a willful massacre of Kurds, and
also that your practices of withholding information
on the SALT talks produced comments by you which are at
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.variance with the facts, which of course is a
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euphemism for lying. Can you direct yourself specifically
to any of these charges so that we can run through them?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well,'of course, it is
extremely difficult to reply to charges in a leaked
document. And I do not know what version of the Pike
Committee report is now being circulated.
The Pike Committee report presents two problems.
One , the use of highly classified information in violation
of an agreement between the Executive Branch and the
,Legislative Branch.
Secondly, the use of classified information
in a manner that is so distorted, so geared to preconceived
ideas, that the total impact is to produce a malicious
lie.
And therefore, even where documents in themselves
are correct, they are taken so out of context and they
are so fitted into a preconceived pattern that we are
facing here a new version of McCarthyism.
Q Mr. Secretary, may I ask a question ?
It is indicative of the general interest that until
now no question has been asked about Latin America.
Why are you going to Latii America? And in connection
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with the previous discussion on Angola and the role of
? Cuban troops, are you going to take this up and possibly
propose putting Cuba back into the Hemispheric diplomatic
doghouse?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: The trip to Latin America
has been planned for a long time, and it had to be
postponed on a number of occasions because overwhelming
other events occurred. It is designed to discuss
primarily Hemispheric problems: the relationship of
Latin America to the United States; the relationship
of the Western Hemisphere in which we are facing the
problems of the traditional Hemispheric pattern in a
world of interdependence; in which the regional concerns
of some of the countries are now competing with the
interests in the developing world in general; and in
which in Latin America we deal with countries of similar
backgrounds, similar histories, but a different economic
development.
So that how we manage this relationship is
of very great importance.
What is happening in Angola may or may not come
up. It is not the primary. purpose of my trip. I am
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Latin Ame icans on the Cuban problem.
It is clear that the evolution towards
normalization of relations with Cuba,-which had started
last year and with which we had been prepared to cooperate,
has been interrupted. -
But we are not going to Latin America on a
crusade against Cuba.
Q Mr. Secretary, did the United States
encourage the Kurds to expect our support and then
suddenly double-cross them?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: That is a total falsehood.
But it is impossible in these covert operations to
explain the truth without creating even more difficulties.
But the charges that have been made are
utterly irresponsible.
Q Mr. Secretary, on the UN resolutions
concerning Namibia, what would be the U.S. position
if the military operations now in Angola extend
through the frontier to Namibia and involve now South
African troops against Cubans'or against Angolans?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: This is a problem that
we have not yet had to face. But I can only say we
cannot look with equanimity to the sending of Cuban
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expeditionary forces around the world.
Q Mr. Secretary, the West. German Republic
and the United States have just concluded an
international treaty on social security matters. Before
this treaty was signed, about $1 billion worth of insurance
policies held by American citizens were cancelled by the
West German Government. These people are now in suspense.
Cannot some pressure be borne on the West German Government
to re-institute them into their contractual rights?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: At the risk of under-
mining public confidence, I do not know what you are
talking about. (Laughter) We will look into this.
Q Mr. Secretary, referring to your
characterization of the Pike Committee leaks, could you
tell us to what extent they will. affect your conduct
of the foreign policy of. this country?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: I believe that the mis-
use of highly classified information in a tendentious,
misleading, and totally irresponsible fashion must
do damage to the foreign policy of the United States
and has already done damage to the foreign policy of the
United States. As far as my conduct of foreign policy
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is concerned, the best I can do.is to recommend what I
believe to be in the national interest, to defend it
within the government and to the public as best as I
can, and then let the demQcraticeprocess and-history
sort it out.
Mr. Secretary, given the irreconcilable
clash between your enemies, those who attack you, and
your own determination to continue foreign policy as you
best see fit, at which point -- and I hope you won't
dismiss it again with a joke -- at which point does
it become necessary fo - ou to consider whether you in
effect should not step down in the interest of American
foreign policy?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: If I should conclude
that it is in the interest of American foreign policy,
I would step down. But what one also has to consider
is whether the style of public debate should be that
any public figure can be destroyed by the most
irresponsible and flagrant charges, and that then the
argument should be made that'the effectiveness is
affected because totally irresponsible and essentially
untrue charges are made. That, too, has to be weighed.
Q Mr. Secretary, did you receive a
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gift from-General Barzani, and if so where is it?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: This is a question --
Q Following up Mr. Marder's question.
He asked you in generalities; I'm asking you for details.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: General Barzani sent
a gift to the White House which was never in my possession,
?which_I have-never--received, which I never in any way
dealt with, which was kept in the White House in some
regular procedure. And I have never received a gift
either from General Barzani or a gift I kept from any
other foreign leader. And I think it is a disgrace to
believe, and to imply, that the. United States would
conduct foreign policy because of gifts that senior
officials may receive.
Q Mr. Secretary, what is the status of the
negotiations with the Soviet Union on our buying oil
from them?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: We are negotiating the
purchase of 10 million tons of oil a year, which is
about three percent of our total imports. This
involves a number of issues -- price, shipping rates
and related matters. There is a particular interest
in it, because our shipping is going to the Soviet Union
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anyway,deiivering grain, and could therefore be
advantageously used on the return trip carrying oil.
The negotiations are still in process. There
is an agreement that 10 million tons a year will be
available if we can agree on a price that is advantageous
to the United States or surrounding benefits that will
make this competitive with other purchases.
Don't you think the price is below
what the OPEC countries are charging?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: One has to look at the
over-all package, including all the related matters, before
one can make a judgment whether it is a competitive deal.
Mr. Secretary, at the initiative of the
Soviet Union, the press credentials of the Radio Free
Europe correspondents in Innsbruck were lifted by the
International Olympic Committee. I wonder whether or not
you think that is a violation of the Helsinki agreement?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: I have not considered
this. But of course as you know we support Radio Free
Europe, and we have always encouraged it.
Mr. Secretary, could you tell us how
your wife is doing after her operation?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: She is improving daily,
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thank you.
Q Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
(Whereupon at 12:45 p.m. the press
conference was concluded.)
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