CAPABILITIES OF PERIPHERAL PHOTOGRAPHY OF CUBA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78B05708A000200160005-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 5, 2014
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: June 16, 1964
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/03/05:
CIA-RDP78B05708A000200160005-0
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/03/05:
CIA-RDP781305708A000200160005-0
.? Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved forRelease2014/03/05 : CIA-RDP78B05708A000200160005-0
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MEMORANDUM FOB THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIOXNCE
SUBJECT: Capabilities of Peripheral Photography of Cuba
1. Previous COMB examination of this subject (UBIBeD-41.14/1 7,
) co4on4)-24/137, 1 May 1964) has resulted in the conclusion
that peripheral reconnaissance could satisfy present
requirements for coverage of coastal areas of Cuba, but
limitations of range and. resolution mould prevent satisfactory
coverage of inland activities.
2. These conclusions were based on the capabilities
of the 100" cemerae which iS regarded as the best
currently available for the purpose. This camera under optimum
cdnditione can provide useable photography to a distance
of 20 miles from the aircraft. The interpretability of the
photography at the longer ranges, however, is minimal. Resolutions
under the best operating conditions are 3 to 5 feet at 3 miles,
5 feet at 3 to 6 miles, and about 10 feet at greater distances.
Assuming that the aircraft is flying 5 miles from the coast,
maximuM penetration would be only 15 miles inland.
? 3. Additional degrading features must also be considered.
Obliquity itself has n degrading effect on scale and readability.
At the greater distances from the camera, mere identification
of the target itself is difficult, and meaningful interpretation
io nearly. impooeible. Of equal importance is defilade, or
terrain obstructions. As will be recalled, the WM installations
in Cuba were generally emplaced in a defile and were visible
only from overhead. Trees and vegetation add to this problem.
Finally there is the factor of atmospheric conditions. Clouds
and haze have a much ;reater effect on slant range photography
than on vertical.
I
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i".r.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP78B05708A000200160005-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/03/05 : CIA-RDP78B05708A000200160005-0
4,
4. The attached map is designed to illustrate the
maximum scope of peripheral photography, assuming optimum
conditions as follows:
a. The flight track will maintain an offShore distance
no greater than 5 miles.
b. The 100 inch camera will be used.
c. The maximum effective camera range is taken to be ?
20 miles. (The actual effective range, considering aospheric
effects and deterioration of resolution, probably will
be leas than half of this distance.)
d. Terrain Obstacles, which also would reduce coverage,
have not been taken into account.
5. The map indicates that coverage would be inadequate
for present intelligence needs because:
a. Only about half of the current COMM targets could
be covered.
b. Only 15 of the 27 Highest Priority targets could be
covered.
c. Area coverage probably would not amount to more than
20 percent, Which is unacceptable for search or surveillance
purposes.
d. Coverage of targets of military interest in the
Havana area would be fair to good, but coverage of central
Cuban targets would be negligible.
6. Conclusion: Peripheral photography would be inadequate
in both scope and quality to provide an acceptable alternative
to U-2 reconnaissance in Cuba.
R. JACK SMITH
Acting Deputy Director (Intelligence)
Attachment: Map of Cuba
DDI/CW/RECCE, 15 June 1964)
Dist: Orig & I - Addressee
2 - 0/140
1 - CGS Chrono
DD/S&T
NPIC (Mr. Lundahl)
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP78B05708A000200160005-0