REVIEW OF NPIC DRAFT HISTORY, 'THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS, PART I, ' (Sanitized)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: NGA Records (Formerly NIMA)
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78B05703A000400070006-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 9, 2003
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: November 6, 1970
• Content Type: MF

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MEMORANDUM FOR: H0/NPIC
ar. pleased to learn from
that the DOI Historical Board is a,jproving
very fine history for inclusion
in the Historical Program. This is of course
independent of whether it is published in the
Studies.
Attached for your information is my re-
view of this paper. I am passing the MS to
the DDI/HO who will collect
e comments of the Board Members and coordinate
them with you and Dino.
(DA E)
FORM
NO -
54 10 1 WHICH RELACES FORM
USE0-101
D.
Declass Review by NIMA/DOD
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6 November 1970
MEMORANDUM FOP: Chief, CIA Historical Staff
SUBJECT Review of NPIC Draft History, "The Cuban
Missile Crisis, Part I,"
1. Subject history is a finely crafted account of
the origin and build-up of the Cuban missile crisis,
from the spotting of unidentified objects in the U-2
photography, and the subsequent disclosure of the Soviet
strategic missiles, through the briefing of the President,
on 18 October 1962.
2. The story dramatically documents the step-by-step
process by which NPIC established that the objects were
not air or coastal defense missiles, and then proceeded
to solve the riddle by comparing the photography with
collateral photographs of Soviet MRBM's. The handling of
the measures taken to check and recheck this judgment is
particularly illuminating, as is the subsequent discussion
of the procedure by which the intelligence was spiralled
upwards through progressively senior echelons to the
President. The study thus consolidates the record of how
NPIC handled the crisis. While the substantive support
provided by OSI and ORR is acknowledged, the history
does not claim to tell the full role of these components,
of ONE, the DDI, the Agency as a whole, or of USIB's
reaction to the crisis. Just enough reference to US
relations with the USSR at the time is made to place
NPIC's activities in context. To assist in fully
completing the record, other components will still want,
therefore, to relate the story of their participation in
the handling of the crisis. The present account sets a
high standard which it is hoped they will emulate.
3. The study reflects close research, to well-
organized, and ably written, and needs only minimal
editorial treatment, such as on the items Indicated in
the attached notes. The present draft in documented only
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by collateral material from the published accounts of
the senior members of the Kennedy administration. It
should also be documented to the appropriate intelligence
sources. tells me that he is prepared to
provide the documentation.
4. It is my understanding that the manuscript has
been submitted to Studies in Intelligence for publication.
I agree that the study merits the wide circulation which
such publication would provide, but I would also recommend
separate publication in the CIA Historical Program, if
only because the Studies has in the past, limited documenta-
tion to open sources and cross references to other articles
in the Studies. Unless the Studies runs the manuscript
serially, o'r 'evotes the major lion of an issue to
it, there may be pressure to condense the present account
for publication. Publication in the Historical Program
will permit recounting the full story, complete with
documentation.
Deputy Chief, CIA Historical to
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Notes on the Cuban Missile Crisis, Part I
P4, last pare, first sentence
For transition from the previous paragraph, begin
with: "In addition. . . "
Pp 5-6
Standardize spelling of Bosphorus, which in spelled
two different ways here.
P7, lines 2-3
Place reference to collection guides in context,
to establish continuity with the previous sentence.
P10, third pars
Can the date of Mr. McCone's prediction be provided?
P14, third sentence
Since this is the first reference to the Banes
cruise-missile site, it needs additional introduction,
in preparation for the discussion that follows.
P25, line 8
Carter's.
P34 line 2
conglomeration
P55, 2d complete pare
Clarify how and when
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