U.S. CHARGES OF SOVIET MILITARY BUILDUP IN CUBA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78B05167A001900110011-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 24, 2013
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: January 1, 1966
• Content Type: REPORT

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U.S. Charges of
Soviet Military Buildup
in Cuba
Statements by
Adlai E. Stevenson
U.S. Representative in the
Security Council
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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Today we must address our attention to the
realities of the situation posed by (lie buildup of
nuclear striking power in Cuba.
In this connection I want to say at the outset
that the course adopted by the Soviet -Union yes-
terday to avoid direct confrontations in the zone of
quarantine is welcome to my Government. We
also welcome the assurance by Chairman Khrush-
chev in his letter to Earl Russell that the Soviet
Union will "take no reckless decisions" with re-
gard to this crisis. And we welcome most of all
the report that Mr. Khrushchev has agreed to the
proposals advanced by the Secret tt ry-General.
Perhaps that report will be confirmed hero today.
My Government is most anxious to effect a
peaceful resolution of this affair. We continue to
hope that the Soviet Union will work with us to
diminish not only the new danger which has sud-
denly shadowed the peace but all of the conflicts
that divide the world.
I shall not detain you with any detailed discus-
sion of the Soviet and the Cuban responses to our
complaint. The speeches of the Communist dele-
gates were entirely predictable. I shall make brief
comment on some points suggested by these
speeches and some other points which may have
arisen in the minds of members of the United
Nations.
Both Chairman Khrushchev in his letter to Earl
Russell and Ambassador Zorin in his remarks to
this Council argued that this threat to the peace
had been caused not by the Soviet Union and
Cuba but by the United States.
We are here today and have been this week for
one single reason?because the Soviet Union se-
cretly introduced this menacing offensive military
buildup into the island of Cuba while assuring
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the world that nothing was further from their
thoughts.
The argument, in its essence, of the Soviet Un-
ion is that it was not the Soviet Union which
created this threat to peace by secretly installing
these weapons in Cuba but that it was the United
States,which .created this ,crisis by discovering and
reporting these installations. This is the first
time, I confess, that I have ever heard it said that
the crime is not the burglar but the discovery of
the burglar?and that the threat is not the clan-
destine missiles in Cuba but their discovery and the
limited measures to quarantine further infection.
The peril arises not because the nations of the
Western Hemisphere have joined together to take
necessary action in their self-defense but because
the Soviet Union has extended its nuclear threat
into the Western Hemisphere.
I noted that there are still at least some dele-
gates in the Council?possibly, I suspect, very
few?who say that they do not know whether the
Soviet Union has, in fact, built in Cuba installa-
tions capable of firing nuclear missiles over ranges
from 1,006 to 2,000 miles. As I say, Chairman
IChrushchev did not deny these facts in his letter
to Earl Russell, nor did Ambassador Zorin on
Tuesday evening. And if further doubt remains
on this score, we shall gladly exhibit photographic
evidence to the doubtful.
One other point I would like to make is to invite
attention to the casual remark of the Soviet repre-
sentative claiming that we have 35 bases in foreign
countries. The facts are that there are missiles
comparable to these being placed in Cuba with the
forces of only three of our allies. They were
only established there by a decision of the heads-
of-government meeting in December 1957,1 which
was compelled to authorize such arrangements by
virtue of a prior Soviet decision to introduce its
own missiles capable of destroying the countries
of Western Europe.
a For background, see BULLETIN of Jan. 6, 1958, Ix 3.
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Reasons for Prompt U.S. Action
In the next place there are some troublesome
questions in the minds of members that are en-
titled to serious answers. There are those who
say that conceding the fact that the Soviet Union
has installed these offensive missiles in Cuba, con-
ceding,. the fact that 'this -consti tutes a gra ve threat
to the peace of the world, why was it, necessary for
the nations of the Western Hemisphere to act with
such speed? Why could not the quarantine
against the shipment of offensive weapons have
been delayed until the Security Council and the
General Assembly had a full opportunity to con-
sider the situation and make recommendations?
Let me remind the members that the United
States was not looking for some pretext to raise
the issue of the transformation of Cuba into a, mili-
tary base. On the contrary, the -United States
made no objection whatever to the shipment of
defensive arms by the Soviet Union to Cuba, even
though such shipments offended the traditions of
this hemisphere.
Even after the first hard intelligence reached
Washington concerning the change in the charac-
ter of Soviet military assistance to Cuba, the Presi-
dent of the United States responded by directing
an intensification of surveillance. And only after
the facts and the magnitude of the buildup had
been established beyond all doubt did we begin to
take this limited action of barring only these nu-
clear weapons equipment and aircraft.
To understand the reasons for this prompt ac-
tion, it is necessary to understand the nature and
the purpose of this operation. It has been marked,
above all, by two characteristics?speed and
stealth. As the photographic evidence makes
clear, the installation of these missiles? the erec-
tion of these missile sites?has taken place with
extraordinary speed. One entire complex was put
up in 24 hours. This speed not only demonstrates
the methodical organization and careful planning
involved. But it also demonstrates a premeditated
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attempt to confront this hemisphere with a fait
accompli. By quickly completing the whole proc
ess of nuclearization of Cuba, the Soviet Union
would be in a position to demand that the 8tatu8
quo be maintained and left undisturbed.
If we were to have delayed our counteraction,
the nuclearization of Cuba would have been
quickly completed. This is not a risk which this
hemisphere is prepared to take.
When we first detected the secret offensive instal-
lations, could we reasonably be expected to have
notified the Soviet Union in advance, through the
process of calling the Security Council, that we
had discovered its perfidy and then to have done
nothing but wait while we debated and then have
waited further while the Soviet representative in
the Security Council vetoed a resolution, as he has
already announced that he will do? In different
circumstances, we would have. But today we are
dealing with dread realities and not with wishes.
One of the sites, as I have said, was constructed
in 24 hours. One of these missiles can be armed
with its nuclear warhead in the middle of the
night, pointed at New York, and landed above
this room 5 minutes after it is fired. No debate in
this room could affect in the slightest the urgency
of these terrible facts or the immediacy of the
threat to the peace.
There was only one way to deal with that ur-
gency and with that immediacy, and that was to
act and to act at once?but with the utmost re-
straint consistent with the urgency of the threat
to the peace.
And we came to the Security Council, I remind
you, immediately and concurrently with the Or-
ganization of American States. We did not even
wait for the OAS to meet and to act. We came
here at the same time. We immediately put into
process the political machinery that, we pray, will
achieve a solution of this grave crisis. And we
did not act until the American Republics had
acted to make the quarantine effective.
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We did not shirk our duties to ourselves, to the
hemisphere, to the United Nations, or to the world.
We are now in the Security Council on the initia-
tive of the United States precisely because, having
taken the hemispheric action which has been taken,
we wish political machinery?the machinery of
the United Nations?to take over, to reduce these
tensions, and to interpose itself to eliminate this
aggressive threat to the peace and to assure the
removal from this hemisphere of offensive nu-
clear weapons and the corresponding lifting of
the quarantine.
What Were the Alternatives?
There are those who say that the quarantine is
an inappropriate and extreme remedy?that the
punishment does not fit the crime. But I ask
those who take this position to put themselves
in the position of the Organization of American
States to consider what you would have done in
the face of the nuclearization of Cuba. Were we
to do nothing until the knife was sharpened?
Were we to stand idly by until it was at our
throats? What were the alternatives available?
On the one hand, the Organization of American
States might have sponsored an invasion, or de-
stroyed the bases by an air strike, or imposed a
total blockade on all imports to Cuba, including
medicine and food. On the other hand, the OAS
and the United States might have done nothing.
Such a course would have confirmed the. greatest
threat to the peace of the Americas known to his-
tory and would have encouraged the Soviet Union
in similar adventures in other parts of the world.
And it would have discredited our will, our de-
termination, to live in freedom and to reduce?
not increase?the perils of this nuclear age.
The course we have chosen seems to me per-
fectly graduated to meet the character of the
threat. To have done less would have been to
fail in our obligation to peace.
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To those who say that a limited quarantine was
too much, in spite of the provocation and the dan-
ger, let me tell you a story?attributed like so
many of our American stories to Abraham Lin-
coln?about the passerby out in my part of the
country who was charged by a farmer's ferocious
boar. He picked up a pitchfork and met the boar
head on. It died, and the irate farmer denounced
him and asked him why he didn't use the blunt
end of the pitchfork. And the man replied, "Why
didn't the boar attack me with his blunt end?"
Some here have attempted to question the legal
basis of the defensive measures taken by the
American Republics to protect the Western Hemi-
sphere against Soviet long-range nuclear missiles.
I would gladly expand on our position on this,
but in view of the proposal now before us pre-
sented last night by the Secretary-General, per-
haps that is a matter and a discussion, in view of
its complexity and length, which could be more
fruitfully delayed to a later time.
Finally, let me say that no twisting of logic, no
distortion of words, can disguise the plain, the
obvious, the compelling commonsense conclusion
that the installation of nuclear weapons by stealth
?weapons of mass destruction in Cuba?poses a
dangerous threat to the peace, a threat which con-
travenes article 2, paragraph 4, and a threat
which the American Republics are entitled to
meet, as they have done, with appropriate re-
gional defensive measures.
The Basic Situation
Nothing has been said by the representatives of
the Communist states here which alters the basic
situation. There is one fundamental question to
which I solicit your attention. The question is
this: What action serves to strengthen the world's
hope of peace?
Can anyone claim that the introduction of long-
range nuclear missiles into Cuba strengthens the
peace?
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Can anyone claim that the speed and stealth of
this operation strengthens the peace?
Can anyone suppose that this whole undertak-
ing is anything more than an audacious effort to
increase the nuclear striking power of the Soviet
Union against the United States and thereby mag-
nify its frequently reiterated threats against Ber-
lin? When we are about to debate how to stop
the dissemination of nuclear weapons, does their
introduction in a new hemisphere by an outside
state advance sanity and peace?
Does anyone suppose that, if this Soviet adven-
ture should go unchecked, the Soviet Un ion would
refrain from similar adventures in other parts
of the world?
The one action in the last few days which has
strengthened the peace is the determination to
stop this further spread of weapons in this hemi-
sphere.
In view of the situation that now confronts us
and the proposals made here yesterday by the Act-
ing Secretary-General, I am not going to further
extend my remarks this afternoon. I wish only
to conclude by reading to the members of the
Council a letter from the President of the United
States which was delivered to the Acting Secre-
tary-General just a few minutes ago in reply to
his appeal of last night. He said to Mr. U Thant:
I deeply appreciate the spirit which prompted your
message of yesterday.
As we made clear in the Security Council, the existing
threat was created by the secret introduction of offensive
weapons into Cuba, and the answer lies in the removal
of such weapons.
In your message and your statement to the Security
Council last night, you have made certain suggestions and
have invited preliminary talks to determine whether sat-
isfactory arrangements can be assured.
Ambassador Stevenson is ready to discuss these
arrangements with you.
I can assure you of our desire to reach a satisfactory
and peaceful solution of the matter.
I have nothing further to say at this time, Mr.
President.
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SECOND STATEMENT OF OCTOBER 25
? I want to say to you, Mr. Zorin, that I do not
have your talent for obfuscation, for distortion,
for confusing language, and for doubletalk. And
I must confess to you that I am glad that I do not
But if I understood what you said, you said that
my position had changed, that today I was defen-
sive because we did not have the evidence to prove
our assertions that your Government had installed
long-range missiles in Cuba.
Well, let me say something to you, Mr. Ambas-
sador?we do have the evidence. We have it, and
it is clear and it is incontrovertible. And let me
say something else?those weapons must be taken
out of Cuba.
Next, let me say to you that, if I understood
you, with a trespass on credibility that excels your
best, you said that our position had changed since
I spoke here the other day because of the pressures
of world opinion and the majority of the United
Nations. Well, let me say to you, sir, you are
wrong again. We have had no pressure from any-
one whatsover. We came in here today to indicate
our willingness to discuss Mr. U Thant's proposals,
and that is the only change that has taken place.
But let me also say to you, sir, that there has
been a change. You?the Soviet Union has sent
these weapons to Cuba. You?the Soviet Union
has upset the balance of power in the world.
You?the Soviet Union has created this new dan-
ger, not the United States.
And you ask with a fine show of indignation
why the President did not tell Mr. Gromyko on
last Thursday about our evidence, at the very
time that Mr. Gromyko was blandly denying to
the President that the U.S.S.R. was placing such
weapons on sites in the new world.
Well, I will tell you why?because we were as-
sembling the evidence, and perhaps it would be
instructive to the world to see how a Soviet offi-
cial?how far he would go in perfidy. Perhaps
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we wanted to know if this country faced another
example of nuclear deceit like that one a year ago,
when in stealth the Soviet Union broke the nucle-
ar test moratorium.
And while we are asking questions, let me ask
you why your Government?your Foreign Min-
ister?deliberately, cynically deceived us about the
nuclear buildup in Cuba.
And, finally, the other day, Mr. Zorin, I remind
you that you did not deny the existence of these
weapons. Instead, we beard that they had sud-
denly become defensive weapons. But today,
again if I heard you correctly, you now say they
do not exist, or that we haven't proved they exist,
with another fine flood of rhetorical scorn.
All right, sir, let me ask you one simple ques-
tion: Do you, Ambassador Zorin, deny that the
U.S.S.R. has placed and is placing medium- and
intermediate-range missiles and sites in Cuba?
Yes or no?don't wait for the translation?yes or
no?
[The Soviet representative refused to answer.]
You can answer yes or no. You have denied
they exist. I want to know if I understood you
correctly. I am prepared to wait for my answer
until hell freezes over, if that's your decision.
And I am also prepared to present the evidence in
this room.
[The President called on the representative of Chile to speak,
but Ambassador Stevenson continued as follows
I have not finished my statement. I asked you
a question. I have had no reply to the question,
and I will now proceed, if I may, to finish my
statement.
U.S. Exhibits Evidence of Soviet Military Buildup
I doubt if anyone in this room, except possibly
the representative of the Soviet Union. has any
doubt about the facts. But in view of his state-
ments and the statements of the Soviet Govern-
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ment up until last Thursday, when Mr. Gkomyko
'-denied the existence or any intention of installing
such weapons in Cuba, I am going to make a por-
tion of the evidence available right now. If you
willindulge me for a moment, we will set up an
easel here in the back of the room where I hope it
will be visible to everyone.
The first of these exhibits shows an area north
of the village of Candelaria, near San Cristobal,
southwest of Habana. A map, together with a
small photograph, shows precisely where the area
is in Cuba.
The first photograph shows the area in late
August 1962; it was then, if you can see from
where you are sitting, only a peaceful countryside.
The second photograph shows the same area one
day last week. A few tents and vehicles had come
into the area, new spur roads had appeared, and
the main road had been improved.
The third photograph, taken only 24 hours later,
shows facilities for a medium-range missile battal-
ion installed. There are tents for 400 or 500 men.
At the end of the new spur road there are
seven 1,000-mile missile trailers. There are four
launcher-erector mechanisms for placing these
missiles in erect firing position. This missile is a
mobile weapon, which can be moved rapidly from
one place to another. It is identical with the
1,000-mile missiles which have been displayed in
Moscow parades. All of this, I remind you, took
place in 24 hours.
The second exhibit, which you can all examine
at your leisure, shows three successive photo-
graphic enlargements of another missile base of
the same type in the area of San Cristobal. These
enlarged photographs clearly show six of these
missiles on trailers and three erectors.
And that is only one example of the first type of
ballistic missile installation in Cuba.
A second type of installation is designed for a
missile of intermediate range?a range of about
2,200 miles. Each site of this type has four launch-
ing pads.
3)4
..The exhibit on this type of missile shows a
launching area being constructed near Guanajay,
southwest of the city of Habana. As in the first
exhibit, a map and small photograph show this
area as it appeared in late August 1962, when no
military activities were apparent.
A second large photograph shows the, same area
about 6 weeks later. Here you will see a very
heavy construction effort to push the launching
area to rapid completion. The pictures show two
large concrete bunkers or control centers in proc-
ess of construction, one between each pair of
launching pads. They show heavy concrete re-
taining walls being erected to shelter vehicles and
equipment from rocket blast-off. They show cable
scars leading from the launch pads to the hunkers.
They show a large reinforced concrete building
under construction. A building with a heavy arcli
may well be intended as the storage area for the
nuclear warheads. The installation is not yet com-
plete, and no warheads are yet visible.
The next photograph shows a closer -view of the
same intermediate-range launch site. You can
clearly see one of the pairs of large concrete
launch pads, with a concrete building from which
launching operations for three pads are con-
trolled. Other details are visible, such as fuel
tanks.
And that is only one example, one illustration,
of the work being furnished in Cuba on inter-
mediate-range missile bases.
Other Types of Soviet Weapons
Now, in addition to missiles, the Soviet T.Tnion is
installing other offensive weapons in Cuba. The
next photograph is of an airfield at San Julian in
western Cuba. On this field you will see. 22 crates
designed to transport the fuselages of Soviet
Ilyushin-28 bombers. Four of the aircraft are
uncrated, and one is partially assembled. These
bombers, sometimes known as Beagles, have an
operating radius of about 750 miles and are ea-
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pable of carrying nuclear weapons. At the same
'field you can see one of the surface-to-air antiair-
craft guided missile bases, with six missiles per
?base, which now ring the entire coastline of Cuba.
Another set of two photographs covers still an-
other area of deployment of medium-range mis-
siles in Cuba. These photographs are on a larger
scale than the others and reveal many details of
an improved field-type launch site. One photo-
graph provides an overall view of most of the site;
you can see clearly three of the four launching
pads. The second photograph displays details of
two of these pads. Even an eye untrained in
photographic interpretation can clearly see the
buildings in which the missiles are checked out
and maintained ready to fire, a missile trailer,
trucks to move missiles out to the launching pad,
erectors to raise the missiles to launching position,
tank trucks to provide fuel, vans from which the
missile firing is controlled, in short, all of the re-
quirements to maintain, load, and fire these ter-
rible weapons.
These weapons, gentlemen, these launching
pads, these planes?of which we have illustrated
only a fragment?are a part of a much larger
weapons complex, what is called a weapons
System.
To support this buildup, to operate these ad-
vanced weapons systems, the Soviet Union has sent
a large number of military personnel to Cuba?a
force now amounting to several thousand men.
These photographs, as I say, are available to
members for detailed examination in the Trustee-
ship Council room following this meeting. There
I will have one of my aides who will gladly explain
them to you in such detail as you may require.
I have nothing further to say at this time.
[After another statement by the Soviet representative, Ambas-
sador Stevenson replied as follows:]
Mr. President and gentlemen, I won't detain
you but one minute.
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I have not had a direct answer to my question.
The representative of the Soviet Union says that
the official answer of the U.S.S.R. was the Tass
statement that they don't need to locate missiles in
Cuba. Well, I agree?they don't need to. But
the question is not do they need missiles in Cuba;
the question is have they missiles in Cuba?and
that question remains unanswered. I knew it
would be.
As to the authenticity of the photographs, which
Mr. Zorin has spoken about with such scorn, I
wonder if the Soviet Union would ask its Cuban
colleague to permit a U.N. team to go to these
sites. If so, I can assure you that we can direct
them to the proper places very quickly.
And now I hope that we can get down to busi-
ness, that we can stop this sparring. We know
the facts, and so do you, sir, and we are ready to
talk about them. Our job here is not to score
debating points. Our job, Mr. Zorin, is to save
the peace. And if you are ready to try, we are.4
The Council adjourned at 7 :25 p.m., Oct. 25. to give the
Secretary-General an opportunity to hold discussions with
Interested parties and report back.
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1962 0-666502
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