LONDON CONFERENCE ON INTELLIGENCE METHODS
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP78B05167A001900110010-2
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
4
Document Creation Date:
December 23, 2016
Document Release Date:
September 24, 2013
Sequence Number:
10
Case Number:
Publication Date:
July 19, 1966
Content Type:
MEMO
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
CIA-RDP78B05167A001900110010-2.pdf | 105.71 KB |
Body:
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/24: CIA-RDP78B05167A001900110010-2
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
UNITED STATES GM, -ANMENT
Memorandum
A
TO : Mr. Lundahl: NPIC
FROM : Bruce C. Clarke'
SUBJECT: London Conference on Intelligence Methods
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DATE: 19 July 11966
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1. The attachment is a kind of outline or checklist for the prepara-
tion of a presentation on "The Role of Intelligence in the Cuban Missile
Crisis" at London on 19 September. As I see it2 the focus of the
presentation will be primarily on how intelligence went about serving
the decision maker during the crisis period/ and not on the substantive
issues exRepted as they serve to illustrate the actions taken by the
intelligence community. For this reason it appears to me that there
is not a great deal of relevant written material and that it will be
necessary to gather the information needed by talking with yourself
and others in your office who had a part in the events.
2. I would appreciate the opportunity to discuss this further
with you when you have the time.
Attachment
'Ns
SECRET
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/24: CIA-RDP78B05167A001900110010-2
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/24: CIA-RDP78B05167A001900110010-2
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fi4.
DRAFT 15 July 1966
Rcle of Intelligence in the Cuban Missile Cri5iis
I. Brief Recap of History of Crisis
A. Prelude
B. Discovery
C. Eyeball to eyeball
D. Khrushchev's blink
E. Denouement
II. Role of Intelligence in Pre-Crisis Period
A. Sources
1) Recce
2) Clandestine reporting
3) Comint
4) ?
B. Analysis and Reporting
1) Community response to reporting at this stage
2) Briefings - to whom? by wit? feedback?
3) Publications - SNIE, CIB, ???
III. Role of Intelligence at Height of Crisis
A. Community adjustments to crisis needs -- the producers
1) Watch Committee
2) GMAIC
ST*Cr''7
aL ?
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/24: CIA-RDP78B05167A001900110010-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/24: CIA-RDP78B05167A001900110010-2
3) DDI - OCl/ORR/OSI
a) Cuban Daily Summary
b) President's Checklist
c) CIB
d) ?
4) NPIC
5) COMOR
6) ?
7) ?
B. The Users
1) President
2) Executive Committee
3) Special Group
4) DCI - USIB
5) Congress
6) ?
7) ?
IV. Aftermath
Machinery to monitor and report on Soviet fulfillment of
agreement, to report on developments in Cuba, and to
prevent repetition of Soviet venture:
COMOR - Recce, NPIC
NSA
Clandestine reporting
(-!??, ?
?
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/24: CIA-RDP78B05167A001900110010-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/24: CIA-RDP78B05167A001900110010-2
r
V. Intelligence Techniques Important to Community Response
to Crisis
A. Crate-ology
B. Photo interpretation
C. Highly current assessment by interagency committees
D. Refugee and exile interrogation
E. Daily reporting and briefing
F. Other ?
?3-
11?f-
,
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/24: CIA-RDP78B05167A001900110010-2