THE ADMINISTRATION OF NPIC IN WAR TIME

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78B05167A001800140002-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 45
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 12, 2014
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: January 1, 1969
• Content Type: MISC

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THE ADMINISTRATION OF NPIC IN WAR TIME
1. This information is based on some materials that Mr. Knoche
made available to me before he left NPIC, on 31 October 1969.
2. On the 2 October 1963, the Deputy Secretary of Defense,
Roswell L. Gilpatric wrote a letter to the DCI, John A. MtCone.
The subject of this letter was; The War Time Role of NPIC and Problem
of a Smooth Tranfer of Administrative Control over NPIC to the Depart-
ment of Defense in Case of War. This letter is identified by the Top
Secret Control Number 188384. In this memo, in which Gilpatric
addresses NtCone as "Dear John?, he reminds NtCone that the three
military detachments at NPIC have been consolidated and that certain
military personnel have been assigned to key positions as agreed by
MtCone and the director, DIA. Gilpatric points out that these actions
:::1E1e5;')
have given the director, NPIC, assets and authority comme with the
mission assigned him under NSCID No. 8, and hence have enhanced the
capability of NPIC to respond to peace time requirements. Gilpatric
stresses the important role NPIC would play in case of war and suggests
that plans Should be made to transfer the administration of NPIC to the
Department of Defense, as provided in NSCID 8, not later than a national
declaration of defense condition No. 2. Gilpatric further states that
until such an agreement is reached, optimum military planning in this
respect cannot be accomplished. He suggests that the DIA representative
whom he designates as the Director/DIA should convene at an early date
TOP STERET
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THE ADMINISTRATION OF NPIC IN WAR TIME
to develope a plan for transfer of authority.
3. On 25 October 1963, the DCI responded to the Deputy
Secretary of Defense in a Dear "Ros" letter identified as TS188384-A.
In his letter MCCone says that he is currently engaged in a compre:
hensive review of emergency and war plans as they apply to the intell-
igence community, hid, more specifically, to CIA. He says that this
study should be completed by the end of the year. NitCone reminds
Gilpatric that agreements exists with the JointsChiefs of Staff for
phasing certain CIA overseas assets in the military upon the commence-
ment of hostilities in command areas. He says that in the broader
field of collection analysis and production of finished intelligence
for policy makers, particularly at the Washington level, his views may
be influenced by the study that is underway. WCone adds that he will
be in touch with Gilpatric at a later date when "I have determined to
my own satisfaction just what the arrangements should be for the in-
telligence community at the national level." It seems from the tenor
of McCone's response that he is firmly asserting his responsibilities
as the DCI.
4. Nearly two years later, on 13 July 1965, the DDCI, Mr. Helms,
in a memo for the Deputy to the DCI for national intelligence programs
evaluation,picks this point up. He was reminded by the IG's 1965 report
411 on the survey of NPIC that the question raised by Gilpatric in his October
1963 letter to McCone was never really answered. The DDCI points out
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THE ADMINISTRATION OF NPIC IN WAR TIME
that although the issue has been dormant, it is unlikely that it has
been forgotten by the DOD. I find no further reference to this matter
in any of the documents available to me as of this date, so I am un-
certain as to what, if any, official action has been taken with respect to
this matter since that time.
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CHARTER FOR NPIC TO DO IMAGERY INTEPRETATION
1. In the same 13 July 1965 memo which the DDCI, Mt. Helms,
wrote to the Deputy to the DCI for national intelligence programs
evaluation, Mt. Helms points out that NSCID 8 may not be an adequate
charter for the DCI's exercise for responsibility to provide a National
Imagery Interpretation Center as opposed to a National Photographic
Interpretation Center. Helms points out that NPIC is now receiving
radar imagery. He seeks adviAp and recommendations from
the Director NT concerning what if any changes should be recommended
in NSCID 8 to provide for across the board imagery interpretation at
NPIC. This is the first and last document that I have come across re-
lating to this subject. The subject, incidentally, was raised in the
IG's 1965 report on NPIC. I am not aware whether or not there has been
any further discussion on this matter.
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WORKING VArti41,
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THE NPIC PROBLEM
1. The first document that I have which refers officially to
the so called NPIC problem is dated 2 July 1965. It consists of the
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results of a study of axaG report on NPIC and the DDIAWhite Paper by
Hank Knoche as requested by the Deputy DCI, W. Helms. This is an
extremely significant and revealing document in that the analysis of
the problem and the recommendations for its solution already at this
early date portend the Agency's position with respect to these matters
and to the Japied (S) report more than a year later.
2. In the covering memo Hank Knoche lauds the IG report and
urges that Mr. Helms read it in its entirety. He does not believe
that the DDI White Paper is worth spending much time with, though
he points out that the DDI memo accompanying the White Paper is
largely a confession of an inability to suggest ways of solving the
problem at NPIC other than to honor demands.
3. With respect to the NPIC problem Knoche says there are four
primary aspects:
a. That the NPIC product is crucial, and that it provides
the only hard information on the nature and dimensions
of the Soviet strategic threat.
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(Page Two)
THE NPIC PROBLEM
b. That the volume of materials collected has been on
the rise, and that in the next few years the quantity
and quality of these materials will increase substantially.
c. That compared with the expense of collecting the informa-
tion, the number of dollars devoted to its exploitation
are very, very small.
After having seemed to take a position rather sympathetic to the NPIC
problem, Knoche's final point is one very critical of the Center. He
says that read in its entirety, the IG report to him constitutes a strong
inditement of NPIC management, and in turn the management responsibility
of the DDI. He says there is need for change, one might presume, close
to the top in NPIC, but he hastens to add that Art Lundahl must remain
at the helm of NPIC.
4. Knoche continues by summing up the projected increases in inputs
and the cooresponding projected needs for personnel and funds to run NPIC
during the next five years. He adds that the IG report points out that
these projections may well be conservative. Knoche questions this. He
believes that the NPIC projections cah be cut back substantially. First
of all he says that much greater selectivity can be exercised in accepting
requirements at NPIC. He agrees with the IG that NPIC has, to some degree,
been the victim of its own "can do" philosophy. Knoche also refers to the
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THE NPIC PROBLEM
discussion in the IG report about the need for more attention to the
problems of photographic exploitation. Knoche personally challenges
the proposal to establish a committee on exploitation. He doubts the
wisdom of setting up a second committee which might only feud with
COMOR, thus presenting the USIB with a series of Hobson's choices.
Knoche states his personal preference for adding to the tasks of COMOR
another dimension, namely, responsibility for making recommendations on
the exploition program. It is, thus, interesting to note that as early
as July 1965, proposal to create what later became COMERIX was advanced
by W. Knoche.
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5. At this early date, it is also interesting to note that Knoche
is challenging the excessive number of support personnel in the Center.
He feels that if NPIC processes can be streamlined, then it follows that
the ratio of support personnel can be cut significantly. One way of
doing this he suggests is to legitimize satellite activities. This is
not the first time that such a course of action has been proposed, the
former DDI, Robert Amory, Jr. proposed this as early as 1960. Knoche
does point out, however, that were satellite collection to be legitimized,
that many support personnel could be saved not only in the control of the
materials but also in the special processing facilities needed to publish
the results of exploitation.
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THE NPIC PROBLEM
6. It is also interesting to note, that in July 1965, Knoche
is suggesting the possibility of tasking PI units in the community other
than in NPIC to do some of the photographic interpretation. He also
mentions that
tation assignments.
ivould be ready and willing to undertake exploi- 50X1
7. In coming up with some proposal as to where the additional
people to man NPIC might come from, Knoche proposes that the vast ma-
jority of them come from within the DDI. He thus envisions cross
training with some of the analysts so that they might become competent
PIs. Knoche points out that one of Art Lundahl's prime contributions
to the procedures for photographic interpretation, has been the provision
of quantities of collateral for the photointerpreters. He points out
^eviahn9.
that this has resulted in wealth of all sorts of information
for NPIC PIs. This, says Knoche, has clearly led to a duplication of
much material assembled and used elsewhere in the Agency. Why not, says
Knoche, move many of the analysts to NPIC and let them work there where
the photography is and where there are adequate amounts of collateral.
More?Over, these same analysts are the ones who are leAling many of the
requirements on NPIC and contributing to the increased work load. If
they were moved to NPIC, Knoche believes this would not only provide for
more economical proceduresAn exppoitation, but it also might eliminate
some unnecessary requirments.
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THE NPIC PROBLEM
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8. Knoche points out that there are a number of conditions
which make it difficult to project figures for manning NPIC in the
next several years. He points out/for example)that there are still no
firm decisions about projected intelligence requirements in the state
of the satellite art. A number of new systems as well as imporvements
to old collection systems are under consideration but no firm decisions
have been made. Until more precise answers are available, however,
Knoche admits that it is only wise to figure on greater volume, and (k(
consequent need to increase at least in some measure NPIC personnel
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and costs. Another that he mentions is R&D, he says that
he believes NPIC R&D estimates should be regarded as exaggerated. He
says the NPIC projection lacks precision and rational. He adds, however,
that breakthroughs in the R&D field should result in both reduced future
!hi loY oared
spendings for R&D and impftwea-processing of information with the re-
sulting decrease in work load.
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9. After gazing at his crystal ball, Knoche comes up with
projected figures for NPIC for 1970 for personnel and dollars
that are about midway between the then current figures and the
NPIC 1970 projection. In a private conversation with Hank,
he ad itted that these figures were pretty much pulled out of
thin air.
10. Knoche concludes his study with a serious of recommenda-
tions as follows: (a) that the deputy DCI insist,1 on early actions
in response to the recommendations made by the IG in his report of
the survey of NPIC. (b) that the executive director, DDI, and the
Director, NPIC, be charged with proposing bold and imaginative pro-
grams to meet the recommendations of the IG. (c) that the execu-
tive director, be asked to expAdite a look at the question of legi-
timizing satellite reconnaissance and the handling of satellite pro-
ducts. (d) that the deputy, DCI, direct that early action be taken
to fill the 100 authorized, but unfilled slots currently available
to NPIC, and that he further authorize a buil&up to _a figure of
1200 capacity of the current space in Building 213. He stresses
however, that a proposal acceptable to the DCI should be presented
to him in justification for proceeding with this buildup. (e) that
the Deputy, DCI direct the executive director to begin to work with
the DDI and the director, NPIC to make more specific proposals for
funding and manning rINPIC. (f) that the deputy, DCI direct that ac-
tion be taken to further plans for future space reconnaissance collec-
tions systems and that steps be taken to ensure the closest possible
0 rt
between NPIC and the collectiab. (g) that the deputy DCI
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arrange with the Del and USIB to revise the charter for COMOR so that
it includes responsibility for assessing the impact for collection on
exploitation process at NPIC. (h) that the Executive Birectvr, the
DDI, and the Director, NPIC, be required to take early action to bring
overtime at NPIC under better control. It is interesting to note that
Knoche comments that just because a new package of materials has been
received, there is no need to begin immediate around-the-clock ex-
ploitation. Knoche adds that DOD is a principle consumer of this
immediate readout and may not be content with delaying it unless told
ordeviiness.
by the very top that there is need for the institution of IlikagloodomAs-v-elil
(i) that the deputy DCI direct that the NPIC problem and its implications
become a prime factor in the development of Agency long-range plans now
underway.
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MORE ON THE NPIC PROBLEM
1. In a memorandum dated 13 July 1965, and signed by Richard Helms,
the Deputy Director, he addresses the Executive Director, Pointing out
that the purpose of his memornadum is to=generate new approaches to deal-
ing with the NPIC work load. He stresses that the Agency is in no po-
sition to request relief from the Bureau of the Budget or the White House
until these new approaches to the NPIC problem have been explored thoroughly
and future plans have been made and fully justified.
2. The memo touches on the following points, all of which were men-
tioned in Hank Knoche's analysis of the NPIC problem: (a) He asks the
Executive Director to arrange for close and frequent contacts between the
IG, the DDI, and the Director, NPIC to ensure early response to the IG's
111 report. (b) He calls for imaginative and bold proposals to solve the pro-
blem of the growing work load at NPIC. Among other things he cites the
need for looking into the assigning of analysts from elsewhere in the DDI
to work at NPIC, and to seek to decentralize some Of the photographic in-
terpretation to other elements in the intelligence community. (c) He brings
rwu4r-0,44e00- up the the question of the secu ity system and asks the Executive
Director to look into the question of revising it. (d) He: callsfor ways
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and means to reduce the support personnel and the oVerhead at NPIC. (e)
the charter of
He calls for the enlargement of/COMOR and the addition of responsibilities
in the exploitation field. (f) He speaks of the need to improve liaison
between NPIC and the planners of overhead reconnaissance systems. (g) He
speaks for the need to have detailed justification and explanation of NPIC's
R&D plans. (h) He suggests the possibility of redoubleing efforts to fill
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the vacant positions at NPIC, but cautions that first he would like to
know what the possibilities are for filling most of those positions from
within the Agency.
3. If this memo is reminiscent of Hank Knoche's assessment of the
NPIC problem, it is no chance occurrance. Hank Knoche told me in a private
conversation that he had drafted this memo for the Deputy DCI to send to
the Executive Director. It seems to me exceedin significant that at this
early date, long before the JIIRG study was completed, Knoche had been
given the responsibility for staffing out the proposals for the solution of
the NPIC problem, and that many of the recommendations that he made were
ultimately adopted.
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Space Requirements of NPIC
In the fall of 1965 NPIC forwarded to the DDS a staff study on space
requirements. Although I do not yet have a copy of this staff study, it is
apparent from the context of comments in other memos that NPIC was pointing
out to the DDS that recent approval had been given for an increase in
personnel strength at NPIC
by June 1967. NPIC apparently
pointed out that Building 213 could accommodat
and,
therefore, space would be lacking to accommodate 325 of the additional
personnel. The NPIC staff study also apparently pointed out the need for
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co).ocating any new facility with the existing NPIC facility in Building 213.
In a memo dated 1 December 1965 for the DDS from the Director of
Logistics, George Meloon, Meloon says that he concurred in the NPIC staff
study and the selection of
because of its proximity to Building
213A1 the latter building, Meloon points out, could, with modifications, serve
the new building as well as Building 213. What Meloon proposes in his memo
is the construction of a one-story building having 65,000 sq. ft. of space
at that time, a Navy garage. The
and located on the site of
estimated cost of this construction, including the relocation of activities
presently in
, is
Meloon estimates that
the relocation of Building 213, the demolition of the present structure and
the construction of the NPIC addition could all be accomplished in 24 months.
On 29 November 1965 a draft memorandum was prepared from the DDS for the
DCI. The subject was "Additional Space for NPIC" and the request for approval
? of construction. This memorandum summed up the major points in the NPIC staff
study pointing out NPIC needs and the proposal for satisfying them. The memo
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further pointed out that the necessary funds were not included in current
budgets and it requested the DCI to approve this construction project in
the amount specified. In this draft memorandum for the DCI it said that
there were attached copies of the NPIC staff study and a memo from the
Director of Logistics on the logistical implications of the proposed new
building. It would seem to me that the memo from the Director of Logistics
is the one dated 1 December 1965 and mentioned in the previous paragraph.
There is as yet no indication that this memorandum for the DCI was ever
finalized and forwarded by
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On 16 December 1965 the Director of Planning, Programming and Budgeting
sent a memorandum to the DDS. The subject of this memorandum was "Construction
of Additional NPIC Space." It referenced the memo for the DDS from the
Director of Logistics dated 1 December 1965, same subject. This would seem
to indicate that upon receipt of the memo from the Director of Logistics,
the DDS sought the advice and opinion of John Clarke. In his memo of 16
December for the DDS Clarke mentions the fact that undoubtedly the PI program
will grow in the future. He points out that it is the subject of budget
negotiations in CIA and the entire community. In this connection he speaks
of the JIIRG study then underway. He admits that Agency figures seem to
support the position that the activity at NPIC will grow substantially in
the next five years. He says, however, that until the manpower ceiling
figures can be set there is little hope of getting funds for construction.
He closes with the admission that a serious problem could develop in the
meantime and that dual shifts might be the only solution. From this memo
it is apparent that the subject of additional space for NPIC is already
being questioned in higher echelons within the Agency. It is further
2
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411 evident that at least at this time the Agency was reluctant to undertake
the difficultjof justifying any proposal for increased space for NPIC with-
out a careful study of the manpower ceiling.
On 21 December 1965 the DDS wrote a memorandum for the D/DCl/NIPE.
The subject was "Construction of Additional NPIC Space" and attached were
two memos. One was the 16 December 1965 memo for the DDS from the Director
of Planning, Programming and Budgeting. The other was the 1 December 1965
memo for the DDS from the Director of Logistics. In his memorandum of
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21 December
summed up the situation pointing out that the 50X1
anticipated growth of NPIC could be accommodated only by new construction;
Xhat some internal adjustments such as dual shifts could be made,, and that
the construction under consideration would require a minimum of two years.
points out the fact that the JIIRG study then underway would have 50X1
a bearing on the decision. He requests the Director of NIPE to review the
attached memoranda in the context of the JIIRG study to determirewhether or
not it would be possible to make some interim decisions concerning the pro-
posed NPIC construction. Before completion of the JIIRG study he asks for
any guidance that the Director, NIPE, can give him. There is no record in-
the materials that I have on hand that the DDS ever received a response from?
the Director, NIPE.
On 2 February 1966 the DDS wrote a memorandum for the record on the
subject of NPIC space problems. He points out that this is a record of a
meeting on 26 January 1966 with the Executive Director - Comptroller con-
cerning the NPIC space problem. According to the DDS it was agreed not to
wait until the projected completion of the JIIRG report in June because to
do so would lose six months lead time. It was agreed to project an NPIC
population of 2900 and base a construction program on it. It was agreed
3
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that the new space must be colocated with NPIC and that relocating of NPIC
at Headquarters was not feasible. It was reed that the Office of Logistics
should immediately initiate informal discussions with the Public Building
Service, GSA, and the Department of Navy to take over
and have 50X1
it relocated. It was agreed that informal negotiations should be entered
by the Public Building Service with the Geological Survey in an attempt to
determine their plans for moving from Building 213. It was agreed that the
Office of Logistics should work with of NPIC in planning for 50X1
occupancy of the new building. It was agreed to project a full scale building
rather than a one-story structure with a view to putting other Agency tenants
in the the same building. It was finally agreed that no formal A contracts
would be undertaken at this time but that after plans were made and the
Navy reaction was determined that approval of the Bureau of the Budget ami
congressional committees would be sought. From the contents of this memo-
randum it is apparent that the Executive Director was prompted for some
reason not entirely clear to proceed immediately at least with serious plans
for some rather large-scale construction. It is all the more puzzling when
cas
one recalls serious doubts upon the initial proposal for the construction
of a one-story building by John Clarke more than a month previously. On the
9th of March the Director of Logistics wrote a memorandum for the Acting
Deputy Director of Support proposing an additional building for NPIC. In
this memo he purports to be responding to "your request" for tentative
information for planning so as to arrive at an estimate of the siz,and the
costand the time to complete another building for NPIC. As far as size is
concerned, he is proposing a building of 450,000 sq. ft. to be constructed at
411 a cost of $25.8 million dollars with the complete planning, relocation and
construction effort to take 46 months and with the new building to be located
17--Ar;7-7.
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on the site of
Here then, presumably in
response to the agreement reached between the DDS and the Executive Director -
Comptroller on 26 January, is a proposal for a new full-scale building for
NPIC, large enough to accommodate a projected NPIC population of
persons and at a cost approximately ten times the proposal of only three
months earlier. It is further interesting to note that this much larger
and more urgent project was projected in spite of the comments by the Director,
Planning, Programming and Budgeting to the effect that the Agency would be
unable to justify any such construction until the JIIRG report was finished
and a firm figure set on the personnel ceilings for NPIC. In a private
conversation with Hank Knoche on 31 October 1969, Hank pointed out to me
that this expensive and grandoise scheme terminated all plans for further
111 construction for NPIC.
The next time construction for NPIC is mentioned is in a memo for the
record dated 8 July 1966 and signed by John M. Clarke, Director of Planning
Programming and Budgeting. The subject was the "Bureau of the Budget Review
of the Fiscal 1968 Program Issues." Present at this meeting were a number of
Bureau of the Budget staff members,, including Charles L. Schult34 Director
Agency representatives included Richard Helms, Col. White, John Bross and
John Clarke. In this meeting Schultze requested among other things that
proposals on new building for NPIC be separated from consideration of other
budget items. Schultze further reminded Helms of a disagreement the previous
year over the validity of factors supporting the build-up in NPIC and remarked
that Helms should study the factors supporting any proposed build-up at NPIC
in terms of the following alternatives: (a) a sharper priority on PI
0 requirements and (b) a consideration of the amount of photography collected.
He pointed out that the JIIRG report promised to be constructive. Helms
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agreed to this review and expressed his own concern of the growth of NPIC.
He promised the manpower figures would be further considered with relation
to practical considerations of recruitment and training. Schultze stated
that there would be no new construction for NPIC, that economic pressures
had to take precedence even over the legitimate need for an NPIC building.
He asked Helms to consider alternatives such as double-shifting.
Although I do not have a copy of the memo, it is apparent that the
Executive Dinetor - Comptroller wrote a memo to the DDI on 24 July 1966
requesting a report on a study of alternatives to constructing a new building
for NPIC. This memo was said to have an attachment . I do have a paper labelled
attachment. It is entitled: "Alternatives to the Construction of a New NPIC
Building." It appears to be the attachment to the Executive Director's memo
II/ to the DDI on 24 July. This attachment states the problem, namely, that the
Director, Bureau of the Budget, has requetted the DCI to consider alternatives
other than the construction of a second building to satisfy NPIC needs. He
asked the DDI to base his analysis on more than one assumption concerning NPIC
manpower over the next five years, i.e., 1968 to 1973. He says the assumption
should be clearly stated and show both CIA and non-CIA personnel. He asks
that the study be carried out under the general direction of the DDI with
support and assistance from the DDS and with further guidance from the Office
of Planning, Programming and Budgeting. He4,4547the report deadline of 20
September 1966. He says the study should include analysis of the following
alternatives: (a) intensified use of the present space including possible
double shifts, (b) the possibility of expanding NPIC operations into other
4uw-
leased or government-owned buildings such as attaining more spaceAthe
411 Geological Survey or the use of space in
50X1
This memo and attachment clearly follow from the 8 July 1966 meeting of
-,71-17-11rT
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Bureau of the Budget representatives with the DCI and his representatives.
The final memorandum dealing with the subject of. NPIC space is dated
16 September 1966 and it was prepared by Hank Knoche for the Executive
Director - Comptroller. The subject has now become "Alternatives to
Construction of a New NPIC Building." In this memo Mr. Knoche points out
the DDI asked him, Knoche, to take action to meet the requests by the
Executive Director - Comptroller to submit by 20 September 1966 a study of
alternatives to constructing a new building for NPIC. Knoche says that
since "it has already been decided not to seek construction funds in FY
1968 and because space for NPIC is a problem directly related to questions
under study by JIIRG a study of alternatives as requested would best be
deferred until after completion and approval of the JIIRG report and a
determination of its effect on future needs for NPIC space." Knoche speaks
of the intention to form a small Agency task group following approval and
implementation of JIIRG to make the fullest possible study of space needs
for imagery exploitation under Agency direction.
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-""JtI WORIMIG-TAM ,
?
More on the NPIC Problem
On 10 January 1966 the Executive Director - Comptroller sent a memorandum
to the DDI. The subject was ''NPIC." In this memo, of which I do not have a
copy, the Executive Director - Comptroller gives a list of points and problems
on which he wants the DDI's views. He says he desires a meeting in the next
few days. It should be noted that this must be the meeting that was held on
14 January.
On 17 January 1966 Hank Knoche wrote a memo for the record. The subject
of this memo was "Status of Actions Concerning NPIC." This memorandum records
chatrd
the results of a meeting held on 14 January and y Col. White. The
subject of the meeting was "The Current Status and Outlook of Various Actions
Intended to Alleviate Workload & Management Problems at NPIC." It is
interesting to note that among those present were Cline, who was then the DDI,
R. J. Smith, who was to become the DDI three days later, Art Lundahl, 50X1
and General Reynolds. 50X1
At this meeting Col. White invited Cline to comment on the status of
actions on the June 1965 IG Report on NPIC. The DDI mentions a memo he sent
to the DCI on 24 August 1965 indicating various actions that he intended to
take and that the DCI had approved his memo in principle. Cline claimed that
since that time two issues had developed to stall the accomplishment of his
intended action. One was the question of budget and manpower for NPIC. The
other was the JIIRG study which was then underway and scheduled for completion
on the 31st of May 1966. Lundahl made comments on several points raised in the
IG Report and of actions that had been taken or were about to be taken. Like
411 Mr. Cline, Lundahl also pointed out that some of these actions were being
deferred pending completion of the JIIRG study. By this time Colonel White
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111 was apparently becoming very testy about the manner in which everything seemed
to be in a state of abeyance pending completion of the JIIRG study and he
spoke up to say that the survey's findings were not likely to eliminate
the NPIC problems. He asked Smithlwho was to take over on 17 January as
the DDI/to make a concerted effort to classify the issues and potential
actions. He said there should be one list of actions which could be taken
which are not dependent on the JIIRG study. There should be a second list
of those which must await the JIIRG study betere which some planning and
suggested actions could be undertaken on the basis of assumption as to what
the survey's findings are likely to be and then there should be a third list
of those actions which cannot possibly be taken until the survey is completed.
On 31 January 1966 the new DDI, R. J. Smith, sent a memorandum to the
Executive Director - Comptroller. The subject was: "Status of Actions -
IllNPIC." As the Executive Director - Comptroller had requested on the 14th
of January, Smith categolid these actions in three groups. In the first
list, which consisted of actions which had been or can be undertaken without
reference to JIIRG, were the following: (a) Review the effects of NPIC R&D
and automation, current and projected. (b) Investigate the possiblities
for realignment of analytic forces within the Agency to augment NPIC's
capabilities. (c) Assess the outlook for reducing the support and overhead
in NPIC, including the prapect for less overtime work by NPIC personnel.
(d) Make arrangements to improve liaison and rapport between NPIC and the
planners of overhead reconnaissance collection systems at.NRO, CIA, and USAF.
His second list of aetions were those on which some work can be accomplished
pending the outcome of JIIRG deliberations. These actions included the
following: (a) consider the need for a USIB committee to deal with imagery
exploitation as well as requirements, (b) formalization and maintenance
2
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in strength of a CIA detachment at NPIC with a separate Table of Organization,
(c) take steps to insure authortative screening and validation, of requirements
levied against NPIC. His third list consisted of only one action which he
felt must await final decisions of the JIIRG. This was to develop plans
for the delegation of photo interpretation work to American military
components,
From this memo it appears 50X1
that the actions which the DDCI and the Executive Director had attempted to
get underway the previous July following Hank Knoche's analysis and
recommendations relative to the NPIC problem, were at last underway.
?
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Agency Reaction to the JIIRG Report
On 19 August Hank Knoche wrote a memorandum for the record concerning a
meeting that he had with the DCI and the Executive Director that morning to
brief them on the JIIRG findings and recommendations. This led to a discussion
of the Agency's comments which it was proposed that the Executive Director
would send to General Reynolds. It was pointed out by Knoche that in the
final analysis the Agency would sooner or later have to abide by something
like the tasking plan proposed by JIIRG. There is no indication in this memo
of any objection to this point of view, and it is to be assumed that this
meant that the DCI approved. On the other hand, the DCI concurred "with
emphasis" on Knoche's view that the COMEX proposal was unacceptable to the
? Agency because it invested the committee with executive authority which would
conflict the DCI and the Director of NPIC in the management of NPIC affairs.
At this point it is interesting to note that the DCI observed that it as
his responsibility to see to it that a tasking plan is made good and that
all the participants perform. To accomplish this he thought that some kind
of special assistant would have to be designated who would be responsive to
the DCI and to USIB and he suggested that such a mission might be assigned
to the Director of NPIC. At this point a brief discussion ensued in which
the point was made that the Director, NPIC, would not logically appear to be
the one charged with responsibility for establishing the priority of intelligence
exploitation requirements, but rather that the Director of NPIC would be
charged with responsibility to insure the technical competence and performance
of various PI agencies. According to Knoche's memo, it is not clear whether
it was he or the Executive Director - Comptroller or both who threw cold water
on the idea of assigning this honcho responsibility to the Director, NPIC.
?7,7777T-T
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Knoche continues that no conclusion was reached but it was agreed that the
paper should go forward from the Executive Director to General Reynolds with
the addition of a statement emphasizing that a committee should not be
invested with the proposed executive authority.
On 23 August 1966 Hank Knoche met with General Reynolds to discuss the
Agency's views and comments on the JIIRG report. General Reynolds told Knoche
that JIIRG was perfectly aware that not all the things that were recommended
could be accomplished at once or even in a short period of time. Next, they
discussed COMEX. Knoche told Reynolds that there was no sentiment anywhere
in the Agency to provide a committee solution to a mangement prob lem and
the Agency could not concur with the sweeping authorities assigned to COMEX
by the proposed CDCID. Reynolds responded that he was inclined to recommend
to the DCI that he either approve the COMEX proposal made by JIIRG or toss
the whole JIIRG report out. Knoche replied that he felt there was too much
that was good in JIIRG to have it over this one issue. Reynolds asked
for Knoche's views on the nature of possible options and Knoche advanced his
proposal that one reconnaissance committee with a COMOR and COMEX Working
Group under a single authority could deal with the requirements phases of
to
exploitation as well as the collection)and that in other areas/deal with
the tasking plan, particularly the more technical fields, the Director of
NPIC could be assigned increased responsibilities to insure performance.
With regard to the JIIRG recommendation that construction of a new NPIC
building be revalidatediReynolds said that the intent of JIIRG was that this
question should be restudied, or reassessed and that the word revalidated was
a poor choice.
?
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Reactions to JIIRG
The following was taken from hand-written notes made by Hank Knoche
after he had interviewed the several components and persons indicated.
NNPIC
1. Items not costed.
2. Political warning: downgrading of DCI and CIA.
3. COMEX improve on management.
4. See RD growing; no shared funding arrangement.
5. Support load under Option 2 might not permit timely production.
6. Target methodology untested.
7. Plots to AMS, but NPIC will have to do other plots for first-phase
exploitation.
8. Recommendations by NPIC.
a. Staff out options I, II, and III.
b. Study and recommend more equitable allocations for NPIC and
get Bureau of Budget advise.
c. Clarify assignment of first and second-phase reporting.
1. Use OPIC's only when authorized by USIB.
2. Keep OPIC's as standbys.
3. Concern over COMEX -- intrudes on COMOR.
1. COMEX intrudes on standing substantive committees as well as
on COMOR and NPIC.
2. Mast insure validity and realisim of requirements.
3. Let committees handle requirements.
Ttlp PITUT
50X1
50X1
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1. Conclusions ok; recommendations not.
2. COMEX ok. Have COMEX develop tasks. Get control of the three
variables.
3. No U.S. facility can take on more load; merely shift NPIC load
to offices that can handle.
4. Increased target base will cause growth rather than reductions.
5. Flys in the face of experience against breakdown of functions
for responsibilities. Giving a department a national responsibility gets
bias into national reporting.
6. Means national vs departmental competition for resources.
7. Second phase will build data base in time otherwise there is
duplication.
8. NPIC's support at mercy of DOD.
PPB
now.
9. ADP not .available in 66-71 time frame.
1. Enhance D/NPIC as national manager.
2. Accept JIIRG figures, but for different reasons. No new building
3. Don't commit to a figure beyond 68.
4. Restudy COMEX.
fa sik.
5. Cost ofes4 two is unknown. Comment: Does he mean Option II
rather than task 2.
ORR
?
1. Too many on COMEX.
2. DIA and CIA should be the cogs. Services should be advisory.
3. Decries NPIC inability to do direct support.
2
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4. Why is DOD to be made responsible for second- as well as
first-phase readout over Vietnam? Second-phase readout is of national
interest. Will be much duplication. Example: Aircraft plants.
DDI
1. Leans to PI systems; not to needs of intelligence officers and
producers. Let them be represented on whatever committee is established.
2. Committee in long run won't do. Need a non-substantive authority
to make decisions in area of targeting and exploitation. Responsible to
DCI and reporting to USIB.
3. Cost options I and 2. Must go number I sooner or later.
4. Thirty percent of DIA budget goes to mapping, charting, and area
intelligence. Why no mention of these in tasking?
5. Security drives up costs.
6. The following comments are attributed to John Hicks.
a. Link COMOR and COMEX. Get 0 and NPIC representatives,
but have them under one permanent manager and staff. No committee.
b. Two staffs -- targeting and exploitation, with representatives
from all USIB agencies.
c. CIA could assign representatives from producing offices.
d. Give OPIC's to NPIC.
e. Intelligence problems decreasing. This and better resolution
will bring reduction of resource forecasts.
DDSU
1. JIIRG unacceptable. Erodes DCI and CIA authorities. COMEX not
justified; nor is existing mechanisms. Duplication not proved.
2. Remand in order to cost the duplication. Take note of existing
committees. And take note of NPIC responsibility under NSCID #8.
3
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3. Have USIB committees and NPIC take steps to reduce duplication.
4. Not necessary to form USIB committee on R&D. COPE and ISCIG
provide adequate coordination.
5. NPIC R&D ok. Extension of R&D as common concern is ill-defined.
6. Tasking plan unclear and not costed. Might fragment well-regarded
PI efforts.
7. 'Gives responsibility to offices lacking expertise, equipment,
etc.
8. Committee cannot override Agency lines of command.
9. Will not cure but will foster duplication.
10. What about uncategorized targets.
11. OSI Annex: Affects CIA ability to do its work.
12. FMSAC: Elevates DIA; wrecks CIA. Bring IAD to Headquarters.
Go for Option I. "Political dynamite."
13. OLDHAM: Alternative not costed. Add COMEX to COMOR.
14. CROWLEY: "Deceptive."
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NPIC and the JIIRG Recommendations
On 15 September 1966 E. H. Knoche wrote a memorandum for Mr.
and commenced it with the salutation:
50X1
In this memorandum 50X1
Knoche speaks of "our discussion yesterday" and a chat that Knoche had
with "yesterday afternoon." Knoche says that
50X1
he made the point with Hal and John that it was important to discuss some
aspects of the JIIRG Report that seem uncertain or trouble to people at NPIC.
He requests that P?Orepare a list of such questions and arrange to meet 50X1
with him and Hal and John on Monday, Knoche then says he wishes to re-
iterate
them to
aspects
some of the advantages of the JIIRG proposals as he had presented
on the previous day: (1) According to the JIIRG proposal all 50X1
come within USIB cognizance, thus enhancing the DCI's ability to
deal with the entire PI problem in the intelligence community. Knoche adds
parenthetically that this is a point that caused great difficulties for
General Carroll within DOD, that Carroll insisted on including this provision
in the face of opposition and that Knoche feels he is worthy of DCI's support
in this regard. (2) It provides clear authority for NPIC to do third-phase ?
reporting, and that in the area of greatest significance -- the stragetic
threat. (3) It recognizes CIA's right to do departmental PI exploitation
across the board. (4) It provides savings, primarily by using NPIC support
facilities in the preparation of all national basic reporting. (5) If the
JIIRG recommendations are adopted, money and manpower needed to do the job
will be approved by the Agency and Bureau of the Budget) /if the funds and
manpower requested are consistent with JIIRG findings and principles. Knoche
then digresses to point out that these advantages which he has enumerated
411 are of particular importance to the top leadership in the Agency, and he
urges
and all other NPIC officials to adopt a positire and constructive 50X1
7.7 71',P1714
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LA cg.'.ualwil
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attitude toward JIIRG findings and recommendations. He cautions against
giving any appearance of being a "dog in the manager." He reminds that 50X1
his and Art Lundahl's leadership over the years has been too brilliant to
risk the possibility of tarnishing their reputations now. Knoche then returns
to his consideration of the JIIRG recommendations to point out that he realizes
there are a number of points that require clarification and revision. He says
that in his judgment the proposal for COMEX constitutes an intrusion by a committee
into the field of management. He adds, however, that some alternative is
necessary in order to provide a champion for the cause of exploitation. Knoche
points out that he is aware that
and his colleagues are troubled with 50X1
points other than the one just mentioned. He says he is glad that
aised 50X1
these points in his discussion of the previous days and it is that in order to
111 deal with them that he proposes the meeting on Monday. He points out, however,
that he does not believe that these questions invalidate the good points of
JIIRG or the advantages that he has enumerated. He says that
must realize 50X1
that it is in his own interest in most of these cases that provisions in the
JIIRG report should be kept general and flexible so that NPIC can develop its
own ways of meeting the general principles and objectives. He says that with
this approach NPIC can find itself with broader powers, with the possibility
of making wider contributions, and receiving wider recognition by pressing
ahead in developing new solutions and new procedures. He closes with the
remark that change is inevitable and says that it's
to be the masters of the changes.
On 30 September 1966.
and Art's job 50X1
wrote a memo addressed to "Mr. Henry
Knoche." The subject of this memo was "Work Force Needed at NPIC and RAD
111 to Meet Current Requirements." The contents of this memo, according to
Steele, were derived mainly from the August NPIC Workload figures.
50X1
50X1
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0 concludes that it would take about 80 PI man-months per month to do third-
phase requirements under JIIRG Option II, and that it would take about
?
?
another 80 PI man-hours for mission exploitation.
thus, comes up 50X1
with the figure of about 160 PI's for PAG. There is a marginal note at this
point made by Knoche, "SEA Double Checking Field Readout plus extensive
third-phase work on logistics per DIA request." says that it would 50X1
be foolish for him to estimate the numbers of support people needed at NPIC
to handle the Option II workload, but points out that ratios have been worked
out for the number of support people needed to service a given number of PI's.
comments also on the IAD workload under JIIRG Option II. He comes up
with a figure of about 100 PT's. He says he sees no evidence of increased
requirements on IND from increases in volume for resolution of film.
On 31 October 1966
50X1
wrote a memorandum for the Assistant to 50X1
the Director, Mt. Knoche. The subject of this memo was "Estimated Personnel
Costs for Option II of JIIRG." In his memo
stresses that this is a rapid 50X1
assessment, made under a 48-hour deadline. He also points out the assumptions
under which the estimates were made. The results call for 1,690 employees in
NPIC and IND by the end of Fiscal 1968.
these.
says CIA would provide 1,568 of 50X1
stresses that no comparison is possible between these figures and 50X1
previous projections made by NPIC for a five year period because of the differing
concepts and assumptions. speaks of the reservations and apprehensions in5oxi
NPIC concerning the operational concepts of the JIIRG study and says that these
have made quantification difficult. He adds, however, that he believes that the
results are accurate and objective.
uses the IAD projection as a basis fc50X1
making comments about the strong reservations that CIA employees, presumably in
IND, have that the e previous fine record of performance will be impossible under
the JIIRG proposal, and that theWPast support of the Agency analytical effort
3
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may be expected to diminish by 50 percent. In closingrrefers to a memo 50X1
by Mr. Lundahl dated 14 October 1966 and sent to the DDI: adds that 50X1
"it is clear that a strong show of constructive concern and interest in the
future of photo interpretation under CIA auspices is necessary."
W) T
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I WORKING PAPER
?
The Lundahl Memo of 14 October 1966
On the above date Art Lundahl wrote a memo for the DDI on the subject
of the effect of proposed FY 67 personnel ceiling cuts on NPIC.
Lundahl says that he has studied the three alternative cuts and finds
they will have a serious effect in meeting current commitments and even
more serious effect in meeting commitments three or four years in the future.
He reminds the DDI that the JIIRG report, which has not yet been approved,
recommends additional NPIC personnel through 1970. Lundahl lays it on the
line when he says that repeated cuts below levels needed for present and
projected JIIRG workloads "seriously challenge the intent of CIA to support
a National Photographic Exploitation Program and particularly the National
Photographic Interpretation Center."
Lundahl recounts the history over the past six months during which the
Center has been requested to renew the implications of successively lower
ceilings below this
CIA employees requested for Fiscal 67. He points
out that whereas CIA is experiencing budgetary constrictions in providing
resources for exploitation that NRO and DOD are funding the development of
new and revised collection systems. He points out that unless the Agency is
willing to make plans and provide funds for the exploitation of the inputs
of the
from these systems, NPIC may be counted out of the exploitation/take from
these systems. He recommends that if the Center is not given funds to provide
for the exploitation of such materials that the collection authorities should
be so advised.
Lundahl says that the DCI "must seriously examine the extent to which CIA
110 can support a bonafide national exploitation center." He recommends that
???-??????-?t, ..".? ? ^-,77,,,,121
50X1
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whatever JIIRG option the DCI chooses, the Department of Defense should be
advised of the limitations of NPIC to provide technical assistance and
exploitation resources needed to exploit the material so that DOD can budget
and plan for the technical assistance and the exploitation currently assigned
to NPIC.
Lundahl concludes with the statement that if CIA is to support a national
center, no reduction in the planned mources for NPIC is feasible.
?
?
, ? . ,z ?1, ,
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177 - CUM
WOE,Enn ?Ant'
?
Agency Plans for the Management of NPIC Under JIIRG
On 31 October 1966 the DDI wrote a memo to the Executive Director -
Comptroller on the subject of management and supervision of NPIC. The most
important point in this memorandum was a proposal for the establishment of
a Board of Directors to provide policy guidance to the managers of NPIC and
to provide for a greater sharing of responsibilities and costs by the Depart-
ment of Defense. He proposes that this Board of Directors consist of the
Director, DIA, or his designee, the D/DCl/NIPE and the DDI. He claims that
the proposed Board of Directors would have the following advantages. DIA
would be impressed with the cost implications of requirements, thereby leaikng
h'vthni
to better cooperation (b) Increased DOD participation would provide relief
411 in meeting funding and personnel needs for NPIC. (c) NPIC would get agreed-
?
upon guidance from its two owners, DOD and CIA. (d) The three inter-related
levels of controls would provide less costly and more efficient operation of
NPIC. With respect to this latter point, the DDI points out that presumably
the instrumentality would have a CIA Chairman, that in any case it would be
responsive to the USIB and its chairman, that the DCI would have two
representatives on the Board of Directorsj and that the DDI would be the
DCI 's agent for the supervision and management of NPIC. The DDI pointed
out that in speaking of NPIC he was considering PAG and all the support
elements. He added that IAD would be resubordinated directly to the DDI
and would be authorized to do deparmental imagery interpretation. He added
that this capacity should be carefully nurtured, and that IAD should be
responsive to allr_te and validated Agency requirements.
On 4 November 1966 E. H. Knoche wrote a memorandum for the Executive Director -
Comptroller on the subject of some affects of the JIIRG report on NPIC. Basically,
? -r
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Eld
this memorandum answered two questions. First, can NPIC do the ADP job by
JIIRG? The answer is yes, but not in the 18 months suggested by JIIRG.
Three years is more like it. Knoche adds that success can be assured
only if NPIC ceases to insist on a totally separate automation effort.
He says that liaison with and assistance from Agency and DOD automation
offices is needed. He adds that outside expertise, such as the United
? Aircraft study will also be needed. The second question was how much
will JIIRG proposals add to NPIC costs? The answer is that current
authorizations are generally sufficient to handle NPIC tasks assigned under
JIIRG. Knoche adds that some increases may be needed, but that it would be
best to wait until experience in working under JIIRG demonstrates what the
needs are. He also advises against budgeting any funds for the acquisition
111 of the sixth floor Geological Survey space in Building 213. He says the
space is not worth the estimated expense and may not really be required.
He points out that if this judgment should prove to be wrong, shift work
is available, if needed; Knoche speaks of the NPIC costing that was done
on JIIRG Option II on what he calls short notice. This obviously is in
reference to the 31 October 1966 memo to him from
Knoche points out 50X1
that this estimate includes 500 positions over current authorizations and
334 positions over the Fiscal 68 budget request for NPIC, and he states
that he biieves these estimates did not take into consideration provision
of requirements control which will be provided by the instrumentality, plans
to reduce cost publication, and advances in R&D and automation. My comment
at this point is that note the introduction here for the first time of the
suggestion that costs of publication should be reduced.
On 7 November 1966 E. H. Knoche wrote a memorandum for the Deputy Director
for Intelligence on the subject of the USIB instrumentality vs DNPIC. In this
2
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0??Uttraii
k_
0 memorandum Knoche speaks of the DDI's having asked about the extent to which
the USIB instrumentality as proposed by JIIRG would encroach on the managerial
rights and responsibilities of the Director, NPIC. Knoche refers to the
13 functions that are proposed in the JIIRG report for the COMEX. He says
that 12 of these 13 need doing. He recommends that number 6 be eliminated
from COMEX responsibilities. This is the one that calls for a periodic
survey of resources to insure their adequacy to meet national needs. He
points out that this would intrude on managerial responsibilities within
both CIA and DIA as well as the services. He also addsithat this would
conflict with the responsibilities for the proposed CIA-DIA Board of
Directors. In two other case he suggests slight rewording. In the case
of function 1 in which it was proposed that the instrumentality be responsible
for formulating policies on the conduct of imagery exploitation activities,
Knoche proposes that this be changed to formulate policies as guidelines
for imagery exploitation activities. Knoche adds that this change would be
in keeping with the author's intent anyway. In the case of function 5 he
suggests a similar change. In number 5 the instrumentality was to be given
the responsibility to do an annual five year program for planning. Knoche
feels the program for planning conjures up too many management prerogatives
to make this acceptable. He suggests that it should be changed to guidance
and that it further should be made clear that the guidance is to be
translated by the participating agencies not by the instrumentality.
?
"'"IeM1757
`4;r4 L:ima
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1r61 0.1t. \
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BOARD OF DIRECTORS
uee: okjata)
1. In a memorandum for the record by Hank Knoche dated 30 January 1967,
he recalls the results of a meeting that included John Bross, R. J. Smith,
and Hank Knoch at CIA initiative with General Joseph Carroll, and 50X1
in Gen. Carroll's office. Presumabley, this meeting took place on the same
day as the date of the memo for the record. The announced purpose of this
meeting was to discuss Agency thinking and planning regarding imagery inter-
pretation in the wake of the approval of the 3IIRG report.
2. Smith told Carroll of the resubordination of IAD and the appointment
of as the Chief, IAD. Smith then introduced the concept ofaa Board 50X1
of Directors. According to Knoche's memo, Carroll seemed very uncertain about
the distinction between the proposed Board of Directors and the USIB instru-
mentality. Parenthetically Knoche notes that no mention was made at this
time of Agency desires of funding and management assistance from DCD as per
Knoche's justification for the Board of Directors concept in his briefing of
the DCI. CArroll said that he had no quattel.with the-Board of Directors
concept or the plan to use it for providing guidance for managerable decisions
on a joint basis with DIA, but he wanted to see the terms of reference for
the proposed Board of Directors before committing himself. It was agreed
that the terms of reference would have to be compatible with responsibilities
assigned to USIB instrumentality. At this point, Bross advanced the idea
of one USIB committee rather than two as proposed in JIIRG. Carroll said that
he had considered such an altervative, but rejected it in favor of a new group
to handle exploitation problems. He said, however, that he was basically
neutral, and that he expected in the long run there would be but one committee.
It was agreed that d Knoche would meet and prepare proposed terms 0f5?X1
reference for the Board of Directors.
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?
?
3. Oft or about 8 March 1967, John Clarke passed to Hank Knoche,
a draft of the terms of reference for the Board of Directors of NPIC.in
a note on his buck slip, John Clarke advised that this is "a clean draft
incorporating the changes I talked about with you." This draft included
a statement of the authority for the proposed Board of Directors, the
purpose, its composition, the scope of its responsibilities, the scheduling
of its meetings, and provisions for periodically reporting. I am not in-
cluding any of these details in this recording because Hank Knoche indicated
in his interview of 30 October 1969, that the Board of Directors proposal
was not adopted by the DCI. At that time, Knoche pointed out, that4NNW
firth? py; grtrcae,
I felt that it would open the door to intrusions by DIA
in the management of NPIC.
0
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L II
, 4
Vatia-Nu
AGENCY APPROVAL 'OF -HUG FINDINGS AND RECOMMDNDATIONS
?
1. The following comments are based on some notes by E. H. Knoche
to use in briefing the Deputy DCI and the DCI on recommendations for Agency
approval of the JIIRG report. According to these notes, the chief results
and actions from CIA should be as follows: (a) The DCI to approve JIIRG
recommendations and sign a letter to the Director of the Bureau of the Budgetjj)
to DCI to direct the D/DCl/NIPE to prepare a plan for USIB approval covering
the missions and functions of the proposed USIB "instrumentality" for dealing
with imagery matters (note that he does not say for dealing with imagery ex-
ploitation matters;) (c) The DDI, the D/DCl/NIPE, and the Director, DIA,
arranged for themselves to act as a board of directors to provide policy
guidance for the management of NPIC. According to Knoche's notes the ob-
jective of this is to increase the role of the DOD/DIA in sharing funding,
111 staffing, and management responsibilities at NPIC. (d) CIA/IAD should be
N,antd14i
detached from NPIC and established as a departmental 'iRtiq under the DDI.
components
The DDI, in-sousot-at-ierrwith other Agency/ should establish a mechanism
for screening Agency requirements levied on IAD. (e) The DDI should take
the lead in developing less costly procedures for producing imagery intell-
igence in NPIC and IAD.
2. On his working sheets, Knoche notes that there must be belt tighting
in the analyst's procedures to match efforts to control requirements. These
measures apply to (a) floss and gloss, (b) elevation of production controls,
(c) adjustment of working procedures to no new space.
3. In a personal conversation with E.H. Knoche on 30 October 1969,
Knoche stated that when the briefing of the DCI was completed on 12 January 1967,
he signed the JIIRG report.
?
LIN?, .12-tri
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4_ ? 44.a
0a NG PAPER,
SUBORDINATION AND SUPERVISION OF CIA/IAD
1. On 7 November 1966, Hank Knoche wrote a memorandum for the
DEputy Director of Intelligence on the subject," Subordination and Super-
vision of CIA/IAD.'
2. In this memo, Knoche points out that IAD is authorized under
JIIRG TO do departmental photointerpretation. Knoch adds that the DDI,
working with the DDP and DDSUIshould develop a mechanism for screening
requirements levied on LAD. Knoche points out that NPIC should not be
doing this work as it had been in the recent past and that supervision
of IAD should be removed from the hands of the Director, NPIC. Knoche
points out that under the DDI, LAD could be developed into a model PI
shop, one to be emulated by NPIC and others. Knoche further states that
? LAD could quietly be used to serve as sort of a watchdog over the military
units which have recently been given national responsibilities under JIIRG.
Knoche says the DIA would heartly approve such a shift in management.
3. Adipting the recommended change, however, would create certain
problems. Among them Knoche lists the following: (a) The DDI must regulate
and prioritize Agency wide requirements levied on IAD. IAD must not be per-
mitted to do this alone as it had in the recent past. (b) Rotation of PIs
should be stopped. DIA objects to the then current practice. (c) IAD shotld
remain in Building 213 so as to utilize NPIC support. Knoche reminds the DD1,
however, that providing support for IAD may lead to a request for similar
support in departmental production by DIA ELEMENTS in Building 213. (d) Knoche
suggests that IAD might be subordinated into the office of Central Reference
which has experience in matters of common concern and which has a Deputy Chief
who is familar with imagery interpretation, as well as IAD itself. A marginal
LIP c!,q.,:r
\
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p.
0 comment by Ed Proctor, the Deputy DDI, says "No"%
?
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Cs,E717,*
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?
w ornn I) Ant ,
DRAFT
3 November 1969
Co rkAM 67015 OW 30PUF D?t'rAti-S OF Mir E142-1-1 141.57-0
On today 29 October 1969, came up to discuss several
ltetitr-s--0 1-'
matters of mutualVga . While he was here, I took the opportunity
to question him on several points relating to the years prior to the
establishment of the PI component in the Agency. Jim had been in the
Agency for some time before the PI unit was established and was familiar
with some of the people and some of the things that antedated the es-
tablishment of the PI component. Iasked him about Kirkpatrick,
whose name appeared on a 3 x 5 piece of notepaper attached to one of the
early pieces of correspondence sent to
who later became the PI consultant.
had sent an unclassified
personal letter to under the date of 7 August 1950, in
_which he explained that he had personally drafted on eight sheets of
Esquire onionskin, his proposal for a high-level PI component in the
CIA.
said thht this proposal was being transmitted to
50X1
50X1
)(
50X1
50X1
50X1
in 50X1
a double-envelope package through the courtesy of some Agency person in
New York City. The 3 x 5 paper to which I refer, had Kirkpatrick's name
on it and said, "Envelope marked to Kirkpatrick for
" This envelope 50X1
presumably was turned over in New York City to an Agency employee by the
name of
50X1
5X
observes that according to his recollection, Kirkpatrick01
- ---.
was then deputy to the DDP, and that in all probability, the man in New York
City to whom
papers were turned over was a pre type, who 50X1
MP 1
Ddido Irpm ut.imtV
(cont.)
ownr fli?)v iod
tormati PAP.'n ofte:t1,,
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Rituakeviu I
?
?
?
(Page Two)
delivered them to Kirkpatrick for transmittal to
50X1
typed on the
eight
pages of
50X1
Attached to the proposal,
Esquire onion skin, is an official
routing slip
with the name
50X1
on it, d with the remarks from
as follows: "AD
-RR asked
50X1
me to give this to you for safe keeping.
I suggest
that
you hold it for
him on an'Eyes Only' basis." Signed,
According
to , at
50X1
this time the date on the buck slip
is 12 July
1951.
50X1
was ,
Chief of the General Division of ORR.
chief of
50X1
was deputy
Co MOT
the special center ( Center) fORIL
In a memo written by Robert Amory Jr. on the 19 of March 1952, at
which time Amory was the Assistant Director, Research & Reports, he
requested approval by the Director of Central Intelligence for the appoint-
ment of
as PI consultant. In the memo, among other things,
Amory pointed out that the position of Brown would be substantially the same
as that held by W.
According to
50X1
with respect to the latter's field. 50X1
was a consultant or contract emp1oye450X1
50X1
engaged by .ORR to work on maritime activities. As Jim recalls it,
`g=2/
was doing a study on the success of as it related to all
activities. Jim further has the recollection that
maritime
50X1
was working
with this group, but on anOther subject. Alice of course, later became a
full time staff employee and soon after the establishmetit of the PI element,
joined it as a PI.
One final note from , was the observation that Robert Amory Jr. 50X1
hex isrlOhka(4
replac as the Assistant Director, Research & Reports.
NS? I
Erludee from Idomfii-
SF1271"
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