AN IMPERATIVE FOR THR CIA: PROFESSIONALISM FREE OF POLITICS AND PARTISANSHIP

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78B02992A000100040013-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 15, 2006
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: November 11, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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AN IMPERATIVE FOR THE CIA:
PROFESSIONALISM FREE OF POLITICS
AND PARTISANSHIP
SENATOR FRANK CHURCH
(11 NOVEMBER 1975)
FOR RELEASE UPON DELIVERY
AT NOON (EASTERN TIME)
NOVEMBER 11, 1975
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AN IMPERATIVE FOR THE CIA:
PROFESSIONALISM FREE OF POLITICS
AND PARTISANSHIP
SENATOR FRANK CHURCH
(11 NOVEMBER 1975)
"FOR YE SHALL KNOW THE TRUTH AND THE TRUTH SHALL MAKE
YOU FREE." SO. READ THE WORDS CARVED IN WHITE MARBLE AT THE.
ENTRANCE. TO THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE'AGENCY. IT IS A NOBLE
BIBLICAL THOUGHT, CHOSEN BY ALLEN DULLES WHEN HE WAS DIRECTOR
OF THE CIA PERHAPS TO REMIND HIS COLLEAGUES OF THEIR ULTIMATE
PURPOSE: THE CREATION OF OBJECTIVE INTELLIGENCE.
OBJECTIVITY OUGHT TO BE THE HALLMARK OF EVERY PUBLIC
TRUST. AS CHAIRMAN OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTEL-
LIGENCE ACRIV'ITIES, I HAVE DONE MY UTMOST TO ASSURE A FAIR
AND BALANCED 'INQUIRY INTO THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES. WHEN
THE COMMITTEE WAS FIRST ESTABLISHED, SENATE MAJORITY LEADER
MIKE MANSFIELD STRESSED THAT THE ALLEGATIONS AGAINST THE IN-
TELLIGENCE AGENCIES'WERE SERIOUS. THEY DESERVED, HE.SAID, A
SOBER INQUIRY. WHICH WOULD BE "NEITHER A WHITEWASH NOR A VEN-
DETTA"" THAT IS HOW I HAVE TRIED TO CONDUCT THIS INVESTIGA-
TION. tCERTAINLY IT HAS NOT BEEN A WHITEWASH. THE COMMITTEE HAS
ALREADY EXPOSED MANY SERIOUS ABUSES OF POWER WITHIN THE IN-
TELLIGENCE SERVICES. WORKING STEADFASTLY FOR NINE MONTHS,
THE SELECT COMMITTEE HAS AMASSED A COMPREHENSIVE SET OF REC-
ORDS,. DOCUMENTS, AND SWORN TESTIMONY.
THIS MONTH, THE COMMITTEE WILL PUBLISH A DETAILED INTERIM
REPORT ON ASSASSINATION. THE COMMITTEE HAS VOTED TO MAKE THE
EPORT PUBLIC, DESPITE AN APPEAL BY THE PRESIDENT TO SUPPRESS
IT. BASED ON THE SWORN TESTIMONY OF OVER 100 WITNESSES, SOME
8,0 00 PAGES OF TRANSCRIPTS, AND COUNTLESS HOURS OF RESEARCH,
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THIS REPORT EXAMINES THE INVOLVEMENT OF OUR GOVERNMENT IN
FOREIGN ASSASSINATION INTRIGUE DURING THE ADMINISTRATIONS OF
FOUR PRESIDENTS, EISENHOWER; KENNEDY, JOHNSON, AND NIXON.
PIECING TOGETHER THE AVAILABLE EVIDENCE HAS BEEN AN EXTRA-
ORDINARILY DIFFICULT JOB. BUT THE RESULT HAS BEEN AS PENETRAT-
ING AN INQUIIY INTO THIS REGRETABLE CHAPTER OF OUR HISTORY AS
THE OBTAINABLE FACTS WILL ALLOW
BEYOND INDENTIFYING THREATS TO THE LIBERTY OF AMERICAN
CITIZENS, THE COMMITTEE IS WORKING DILIGENTLY TO ESTABLISH
LEGISLATIVE SAFEGUARDS TO BETTER PROTECT THEIR RIGHTS. IN THE
FUTURE. THESE PROPOSALS FOR REFORM WILL BE THE FOCUS OF PUB-
LIC HEARINGS LATER THIS YEAR.
SO1 A WHITEWASH THIS INVESTIGATION IS NOT.
JUST AS CLEARLY, IT I3 NOT A VENDETTA,
IN THE INTERESTS OF FAIRNESS, WHEREVER THE CIA HAS BEEN
WRONGLY C#%ARGED, 1 HAVE BEEN QUICK TO SAY SO. SOME ALLEGED
EARLIER.THIS YEAR THAT THE CIA HAD BEEN INVOLVED IN PLOTS TO
MURDER CHARLES DEGAULLE, THE LATE PRESIDENT OF FRANCE. AN
IMMEDIATE REVIEW OF THE FACTS SHOWED NO SUCH PLOT WAS EVER
CONTEMPLATED BY THE: CIA ON ANY OTHER AGENCY OF THE UNITED
STATES GOVERNMENT. WHAT ACTUALLY HAPPENED WAS THIS: A CIA
AGENT WAS APPROACHED BY A FOREIGN CITIZEN WHO MADE A TOTALLY
UNSOLICITED SUGGESTION OF A k AN TO KILLDEGAULLE. THE PLAN
WAS REJECTED AT ONCE BY THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
ON ANOTHER OCCASION, THE ACCUSATION WAS MADE THAT THE
CIA HAD PERIODICALLY "INFILTRATED" THE WHITE HOUSE AND OTHER
EXECUTIVE AGENCIES. SPECIFICALLY, IT WAS SAID THAT ALEXANDER
BUTTERFIELD, AN AIDE TO PRESIDENT NIXON, HAD SERVED IN THE
WHITE HOUSE AS A SPY FOR THE CIA. THERE WAS NO SCINTILLA OF
EVIDENCE THAT MR. BUTTERFIELD HAD SPIED ON THE PRESIDENT FOR
THE CIA. I ANNOUNCED THIS FINDING AS QUICKLY AS IT COULD BE
CONFIRMED, IN THE INTEREST OF FAIRNESS BOTH TO THE CIA AND
MR, BUTTERFIELD,
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WHERE THE CIA HAS ERRED, THE COMMITTEE WILL SAY SO;
WHERE IT HAS PERFORMED WITH'MERIT, THE COMMITTEE WILL ACK-
NOWLEDGE THAT AS WELL. IN SHORT, OUR OBJECTIVE HAS NEVER
BEEN TO WRECK THE INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM, BUT TO EXPOSE WRONG-
FUL AND UNLAWFUL CONDUCT, SO THAT NEEDED REFORMS CAN BE WRIT-
TEN INTO LAW.`
IN APPRAISING THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES, A SUBJECT OF
PARTICULAR CONCERN IS THE QUALITY OF OUR NATIONAL INTELLI-
GENCE ESTIMATES, OR NIES AS THEY ARE MORE COMMONLY CALLED.
THE PREPARATION OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES IS A MOST
IMPORTANT TASiK, FOR THE NIES FORM THE BUILDING BLOCKS OF NA-
TIONAL SECURITY POLICY, PUT BRIEFLY, AN INTELLIGENCE ESTI-
MATE IS A PAPER PREPARED BY THE CIA IN COOPERATION WITH THE
OTHER INTELLIGENCE SERVICES WHICH ASSESSES THE CURRENT SITUA-
TION IN SOME PART OF THE WORLD, OR ANALYZES THE MAJOR FORCES
AT WORK--POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, MILITARY, SOCIOLOGICAL, PSYCHO-
LOGICAL--ON SOME ASPECT OF THE WORLD SITUATION. OFTEN AN ES-
TIMATE WILL GO FURTHER AND MAKE A PREDICTION ABOUT FUTURE
DEVELOPMENTS. IN THIS SENSE, AN ESTIMATE IS A FORECAST, A
JUDGMENT, A `SHREWD' GUESS{` AS TO WHAT I S LIKELY TO HAPPEN,
, THOUGH IT ISAMPOSSIBLE TO PREDICT THE PRECISE COURSE
OF EVENTS, THE GOOD NIE DESCRIBES IN DETAIL HOW VARIOUS PARTIES
INVOLVED VIEW A SITUATION, AND HOW THEY MIGHT ACT TOWARD HYPO-
THETICAL CHANGES. THE ESTIMATE WILL LAY OUT, AND OFTEN RANK,
A RANGE OF POSSIBLE OUTCOMES, ESPECIALLY THOSE THAT THREATEN
AMERICAN INTERESTS OR PRESENT AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THE UNITED
STATES.,
THE VALUE OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES TO THE DE-
CISION MAKERS IN OUR GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE IMMENSE, OUR NA-
TIONAL SECURITY COULD DEPEND UPON RELIABLE JUDGMENTS AS TO
FUTURE ACTIONS AND CAPABILITIES OF HOSTILE NATIONS, THE NA-
TIONAL ESTIMATE IS THE FINAL PRODUCT OF AN INTRICATE GATHER-
ING AND EVALUATION OF INTELLIGENCE, DRAWN FROM ALL SOURCES,
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IF NIEs ARE ACCURATE AND TIMELY, AND DECISION MAKERS HAVE
CONFIDENCE IN THEM, WE'VE SRENT OUR MONEY WELL. BUT WE HAVE
BOTH WASTED MONEY AND POSED AN ADDED DANGER TO OUR SAFETY IF
OUR ESTIMATES ARE INACCURATE, OR IF THEY HAVE BEEN DISTORTED
BY-ANALYTIC OR POLICY BIAS. MISTAKEN ESTIMATES OF ENEMY IN-
TENTIONS HOLI.IA POTENTIAL FOR NATIONAL DISASTER. THIS WE
LEARNED ALMOST TOO LATE, PRIOR TO 19621 FROM THE ESTIMATE
WHICH ASSURED US THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD NOT PLACE NUCLEAR-
TIPPED MISSILES IN CUBA,
WE HAVE HAD OTHER MISTAKEN ESTIMATES. THE PROFESSIONALS
HAVE ERRED IN OVERESTIMATING THE GROWTH OF SOVIET ICBM FORCES.
THE MISCONCEIVED "MISSILE GAP" IN THE EARLY 1960'S IS ONE IL-
LUSTRATION. THE INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES ON THE SOVIET INVASIONS
INTO HUNGARY IN 1956 AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA IN 1968 WERE ALSO WIDE
OF THE MARK. BY FAR THE WORST FAILURE OF THE ESTIMATIVE PRO-
CESS IN MANY YEARS WAS THE MISREADING OF THE IMMINENCE OF THE
1973 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR.
INA WORD, OUR NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES HAVE CER-
TAINLY BEEN FALLIBLE. THE COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE IN THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES IS TO BE STRONGLY COMMENDED FOR EX-
AMINING RECENT ESTIMATES BY THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES WHICH
HAVE PROVEN TO BE, INACCURATE. SUCH FAILURES NEED TO BE EX-
EA BLIND FAITH IN OUR INTELLI-
POSED SO WE WILL NOT DEVELOPr~.
GENCE AGENCIES.
HOWEVER,, WE SHOULD NOT FORGET THAT ON OTHER OCCASIONS,
OUR INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES HAVE PROVEN TO BE ACCURATE AND
VALUABLE. ADMITTEDLY, THE CIA DIRECTORATE OF SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY HAS NOT YET DEVELOPED A CRYSTAL BALL. PREDICTING
.THE FUTURE MUST REMAIN PROBABILISTIC. THOUGH THE CIA DID
GIVE AN EXACT WARNING OF THE DATE LAST YEAR WHEN TURKEY WOULD
INVADE CYPRUS, SUCH PRECISION WILL BE RARE. SIMPLY TOO MANY
UNPREDICTABLE FACTORS ENTER INTO MOST SITUATIONS. THE IN-
TRINSIC ELEMENT OF CAPRICE IN THE AFFAIRS OF MEN AND NATIONS
IS THE HAIR SHIRT OF THE INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATOR,
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WHEN THE SOVIET UNION MOBILIZED TROOPS IN THE..SUMMER OF
1968 TO THREATEN CZECHOSLOVAKIA, NO SOLID INDICATION WAS
AVAILABLE ONE WAY OR THE OTHER AS TO WHEN, OR EVEN IF, THE
ASSEMBLED FORCES WOULD ACTUALLY BE USED. THE POLITBURO WAS
SHARPLY DIVIDED ON THE ISSUE OF INTERVENTION. THE DECISION
NOW APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN TAKEN ONLY.A FEW HOURS BEFORE THE
INVASION WAS LAUNCHED ON AUGUST 20TH. THOUGH THE MOBILIZA-
TION OF SOVIET TROOPS WAS DULY REPORTED BY THE CIA, NO ONE
COULD SAY FOR SURE WHAT THE POLITBURO DECISION WOULD BE--THEY
THEMSELVES DID NOT KNOW UNTIL THE LAST MINUTE.
WHILE IT IS UNREASONABLE TO EXPECT PRECISE PREDICTIONS,
A DEVELOPING SITU TION OUGHT TO BE WELL-UNDERSTOOD AND REPORTED
TO POLICY MAKERS. ALSO, COMPETENT INTELLIGENCE. SHOULD SHIELD
THE UNITED STATES AGAINST MAJOR SURPRISES. IN THIS FIELD, THE
INTELLIGENCE SERVICES EARN HIGHER MARKS. EXAMPLES ARE PLENTI-
FUL IN THE CRITICAL AREAS OF MILITARY, ECONOMIC, AND POLITICAL
INTELLIGENCE.
MILITARILY, THE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES MUST DETECT NEW
WEAPONS SYSTEMS. BEFORE ANYTHING ELSE, WE NEED TO KNOW THE
NUMBERS AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE WEAPONS THAT CAN STRIKE US
DIRECTLY, THE DOCTRINE FOR THEIR USE,. INTENTIONS FOR`FURTHER
DEPLOYMENT, AND, MOST IMPORTANTLY, THE NEW WEAPONS STILL ON
THE DRAWING BOARDS. IN THE LAST 25 YEARS, NO IMPORTANT NEW
SOVIET WEAPONS SYSTEM, FROM THEIR H-BOMB TO THEIR MOST RECENT
MISSILES, HAS APPEARED WHICH HAD NOT BEEN HERALDED IN ADVANCE
BY.NIEs. THE. NEW SOVIET POLARIS-TYPE "Y" MISSILES AND THE
SUBMARINES ON WHICH THEY ARE CARRIED WERE ANTICIPATED WELL
BEFORE THE FIRST'BOATS SLID DOWN THE WAYS.
THE CIA, WITH THE HELP OF THE OTHER INTELLIGENCE.SERV-
ICES, IDENTIFIED AND MONITORED THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOVIET
ABM SYSTEM AROUND MOSCOW SOME 7 YEARS BEFORE IT BECAME OPERA-
TIONAL, INDIVIDUAL ABM RADARS WERE IDENTIFIED IN THE EARLY
PHASES OF TYEIR CONSTRUCTION--UP TO 5 YEARS BEFORE THEY BECAME
ACTIVE,
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OUR GOVERNMENT WOULD NEVER HAVE BEEN ABLE TO ENTER INTO
THE SALT NEGOTIATIONS WERE IT NOT FOR THE ABILITY OF THE IN-
TELLIGENCE SERVICES TO VERIFY--THAT IS, DETECT THROUGH OUR
OWN INDEPENDENT MEANS--ANY SIGNIFICANT VIOLATION OF THE AGREE-
MENTS. THIS CAPABILITY GAVE US THE CONFIDENCE TO TAKE THIS
IMPORTANT STEP TOWARD ARMS CONTROL. MOREOVER, U.S. INTELLI-
GENCE STUDIES ON SOVIET STRATEGIC MISSILE PROGRAMS,, AS THEY
MIGHT DEVELOP WITHOUT A FURTHER SALT AGREEMENT, PLAYED AN IM-
PORTANT ROLE IN DETERMINING THE CEILINGS REACHED AT VLADIVOSTOK
EVEN IN THE ESTIMATE FAILURE I CITED EARLIER CONCERNING
THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS, WE SHOULD NOT FORGET THAT ULTIMATELY
IT WAS THE CIA-DEVELOPED U-2 PLANE WHICH DETECTED THE MISSILES
IN TIME FOR US TO ACT. MOREOVER, TWO MONTHS BEFORE, JOHN
MCCONE, THEN DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL. INTELLIGENCE, HAD WARNED HIS
COLLEAGUES ON THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL OF HIS BELIEF THAT
THE SOVIETS MIGHT PLACE BALLISTIC MISSILES IN CUBA. HE IN
FACT TOOK ISSUE WITH THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE THAT
DISCOUNTED THIS POSSIBILITY.
THE ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES WE HAVE RECEIVED
HAVE. ALSO BEEN VALUABLE. THE GREAT WEALTH OF OPEC GOVERNMENTS
r -
NOW GIVES THEM AN ENORMOUS POTENTIAL TO EXERT INFLUENCE AND TO
CREATE DISRUPTION THROUGHOUT THE WESTERN WORLD. THE QUADRU-
PLING OF OIL PRICES IN 1973-74 HAS GIVEN THEM A HUGE SURPLUS
TO INVEST--OVER $40 BILLION IN THIS YEAR ALONE.
OUR INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFUL INTRACK-
ING THE FLOW OF PETRODOLLARS WORLDWIDE AND HAVE ALERTED U.S.
POLICY MAKERS TO SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN OPEC INVESTMENT STRATE-
GIES. IN ADDITION TO COMPREHENSIVE ESTIMATES ON PRODUCTION,
CONSUMPTION, AND PRICING, THEY HAVE GIVEN US TIMELY ASSESS-
MENTS ON THE STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF OPEC AS A CARTEL AND
THE AVAILABILITY OF ALTERNATIVE SOURCES OF ENERGY.
TO FURTHER ASSIST THE STATE DEPARTMENT IN ITS OVERSEAS
RELATIONS, THE CIA REGULARLY PREPARES VALUABLE BIOGRAPHIC
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PROFILES ON POLITICAL OFFICIALS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD, MANY
OF WHOM WOULD OTHERWISE REMAIN STRANGERS TO US1 CONCEALED
WITHIN THEIR CLOSED SOCIETIES.
THESE EXAMPLES ILLUSTRATE THE POINT: NATIONAL INTELLI-
GENCE . IS BY NO MEANS LIMITED TO THE PREDICTION OF SPECIFIC
EVENTS. ITS4PR_IMARY PURPOSE IS TO HELP OUR LEADERS PROTECT
THE NATIONAL INTEREST BY MAKING AVAILABLE THE BEST POSSIBLE
UNDERSTANDING OF FOREIGN CAPABILITIES, LEADERS, AND DEVELOP-
ING EVENTS.
TO ACCOMPLISH THIS PURPOSE, WE MUST CONTINUE TO DEMAND
OF OUR INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS THE STANDARDS SUGGESTED BY SHERMAN
KENT, WHO FOR MANY YEARS WAS CHAIRMAN OF THE CIA BOARD OF NA-
TIONAL ESTIMATES. HE OBSERVED THAT THESE MEN AND WOMEN MUST
HAVE "THE BEST IN PROFESSIONAL TRAINING, THE HIGHEST INTEL-
LECTUAL INTEGRITY, AND A VERY LARGE AMOUNT OF WORLDLY WISDOM."
BUT TH1S IN. ITSELF WILL NOT BE SUFFICIENT. IT IS IMPERA-
TIVE THAT WE PRESERVE THE PROFESSIONAL STATURE OF THE CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, KEEPING IT FREE FROM THE ERODING FORCES
OF POLITICS AND PARTISANSHIP, ONLY IN THIS WAY WILL THE CIA
CONTINUE TO SERVE AS AN ADEQUATE COUNTERBALANCE TO THE INTELLI-
GENCE ESTIMATES FROM THE MILITARY SERVICES. IF THE CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY BECOMES SO DISCREDITED THROUGH AN OVER-
EMPHASIS ON ITS FAILURES IN THE DRAWING OF ESTIMATES, WE MAY
FIND THIS CRUCIAL TASK LODGED EXCLUSIVELY WITHIN THE PENTAGON
IN THE FUTURE.
OFTEN THE MILITARY HAS EXHIBITED A BUILT-IN BIAS TO TAKE
THE MOST DOUR VIEW ON ENEMY THREAT ASSESSMENTS. THE "WORST-
CASE" APPROACH SO OFTEN ADOPTED BY THE MILITARY LEADS TO THE.
MOST FRIGHTENING FORECASTS. THE RULE-OF-THUMB AT THE PENTAGON
STILL APPEARS TO BE "THE BIGGER, THE BETTER." DISTORTIONS IN
THESE JUDGMENTS SOMETIMES ARISE THROUGH PRESSURES TO JUSTIFY
LARGER MILITARY BUDGETS OR NEW WEAPONS SYSTEMS.
IN CONTRAST, THE CIA NATIONAL ESTIMATES. PROCESS IS MORE
T
APT TO BE FREE OF SUCH SELF-SERVING INTERESTS. THIS IS. WHY
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THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WAS CREATED IN THE.FIRST PLACE.
IT WAS TO BE AN AGENCY WITHOUT POLICY BLINDERS; ONE DEDICATED,
AS ALLEN DULLES PUT IT, "TO GET AT THE HARD FACTS ON WHICH
OTHERS MUST DETERMINE POLICY."
LIEUT. GENERAL DANIEL 0. GRAHAM, DIRECTOR OF THE DEFENSE
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY UNTIL THE ADMINISTRATION SHAKE-UP LAST
WEEK, WROTE RECENTLY THAT HE THOUGHT THE TIME WAS "RIPE FOR
THE MILITARY PROFESSION TO REASSERT ITS TRADITIONAL ROLE IN
THE FUNCTION OF DESCRIBING MILITARY THREATS TO NATIONAL SE-
CURITY." ONE MUST VIEW WITH SOME ALARM THE PROSPECT OF A
SILENCED CIA SUCCUMBING TO AN INCREASINGLY DOMINANT MILITARY
VOICE IN CALCULATING THE.FOREIGN THREAT TO OUR NATION.
THE ABM DEBATE INI CONGRESS A FEW YEARS AGO ILLUSTRATES
THE PROBLEM. IN THE DEBATE, LARGE OUTLAYS AS WELL AS QUES-
TIONS OF O.S. SECURITY IN THE 1970'S RODE ON THE DECISION OF
WHETHER TO DEPLOY A NATIONWIDE ABM SYSTEM. THE DEBATE WAS
J.
MARKED BY CONFLICTING ANALYSES AND DIFFERING FORECASTS BETWEEN
.THE CIA AND 'THE MILITARY OF WHAT THE USSR COULD ACHIEVE WITH
NUCLEAR WEAPONS, GIVEN TIME. TECHNICAL DETAILS BECAME CRUCIAL
FOR ASSESSING THE OPPOSING POINTS OF VIEW.
THE PENTAGON WAS DRIVEN BY ITS OWN POLICY CONSIDERATIONS,
BASED ON A "WORST-CASE" ANALYSIS. THE QUESTIONS THEY ASKED
THEMSELVES LED TO ONE ANSWER: THE NEED FOR A NATIONWIDE ABM
SYSTEM. THE PRICE TAG WOULD"HAVE BEEN SOMETHING LIKE $100
BILLION, A BONANZA GUARANTEEING A BLOATED MILITARY BUDGET FOR
YEARS TO COME.
THE CONGRESSIONAL COALITION AGAINST THE ABM HAD TO HAVE
RELIABLE INFORMATION TO COUNTERACT THE REAMS OF DATA TURNED
OUT BY THE MILITARY. THIS INFORMATION WAS AVAILABLE ONLY AT
ONE SOURCE: THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. THE CIA HAD NO
POLICY AXE TO GRIND, AND NO PRESSURES UPON IT TO PROTECT LUCRA-
TIVE CONTRACTS, THROUGH A SERIES OF CIA BRIEFINGS, (MEMBERS OF
CONGRESS WERE GIVEN THE WHOLE RANGE OF INFORMATION ON THE
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STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF THE ABM SYSTEM. THESE BRIEFINGS
WENT FAR BEYOND THE SELECTIVE DATA PROVIDED BY THE PENTAGON,
THE DATA PRESENTED BY THE CIA INDICATED THE FUTILITY OF
AN ABM SYSTEM. SINCE NO WAY EXISTED TO PREVENT A SATURATION
OF THE SYSTEM BY ENEMY MISSILES, THE ABMs WOULD NOT PROVIDE
AN ADEQUATE SHIELD. THIS EVIDENCE ENABLED OPPONENTS TO MOUNT
AN EFFECTIVE4DEBATE AGAINST THE CONCEPT, By 1967, CONGRESS
HAD DECIDED THAT A NATIONWIDE ABM DEPLOYMENT AGAINST A SOVIET
ATTACK WAS NOT DESIRABLE AND EVEN A LIMITED ABM DEPLOYMENT
WAS APPROVED IN THE SENATE BY ONLY A SINGLE VOTE. THE IN-
SIGHTS PROVIDED BY THE CIA BRIEFINGS'HELPED IMMEASURABLY TO
STOP THE STAMPEDE TOWARD-THE COSTLY DECISION TO CONSTRUCT A
NATIONAL SYSTEM, AND LAID THE FOUNDATION FOR A READY ACCEPT-
ANCE OF THE ABM TREATY WHICH SOON FOLLOWED
AS RECENTLY AS LAST WEEK, CIA TESTIMONY BEFORE CONGRESS
CONTRADICTED CLAIMS BY THE PENTAGON THAT MASSIVE SOVIET MILI-
TARY BUILUPS ARE REDUCING THE UNITED STATES TO THE STATUS
OF A SECOND-FATE POWER. IN CONTRAST TO GLOOMY DEFENSE DEPART-
MENT ESTIMATES, THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY FIGURES INDI-
CATED THAT SOVIET MILITARY SPENDING HAS NOT LEPT FORWARD AT
ALL, INSTEAD IT HAS BEEN INCREASING AT THE STEADY 3 PERCENT
ANNUAL RATE WHICH IT HAS MAINTAINED FOR THE PAST 10 YEARS.
MOREOVER, NOTED THE CIA, A SUBSTANTIAL PORTION OF SOVIET
MILITARY SPENDING HAS NOTHING DIRECTLY TO DO WITH THE UNITED
STATES, SUCH AS THE EXPENSES INCURRED BY THEIR POSITIONING
OF GREAT NUMBERS OF FORCES ALONG THE CHINESE-SOVIET FRONTIER.
ALSO, THE CIA HAS TAKEN A MUCH CALMER VIEW OF SOVIET NAVAL
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN THAN HAVE ASSESSMENTS PRE-
PARED BY THE U.S. NAVY OR THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE--WHO JUST
HAPPEN TO HAVE A DIEGO GARCIA CURE-ALL. WITHOUT THESE INDE-.
PENDENT CIVILIAN CONTRIBUTIONS FROM THE CIA, WE WOULD BE
FORCED TO RELY SOLELY ON THE MILITARY POINT OF VIEW, THE
CONGRESS CAN ILL AFFORD TO DO WITHOUT THE MORE IMPARTIAL
JUDGMENTS OFFERED BY THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY,
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HOWEVER, IT IS NOT ONLY A MATTER OF STANDING UP TO THE
PENTAGON. WE NEED A CIA THAT CAN RESIST ALL THE PARTISAN
PRESSURES WHICH MAY BE BROUGHT TO BEAR BY VARIOUS GROUPS IN-
SIDE AND OUTSIDE THE GOVERNMENT--INCLUDING PARTISAN PRESSURES
FROM THE WHITE HOUSE ITSELF. WE MUST SEEK TO INSULATE THE
CENTRAL INTE~:LIGENCE AGENCY FROM THE EBB AND FLOW OF POLITICAL
CONSIDERATIONS.
THIS DOES NOT MEAN THAT WE MUST ALWAYS SELECT A DIRECTOR
FROM WITHIN.T'HE AGENCY OR FROM OUTSIDE THE GOVERNMENT. THE
CRITICAL FACTOR IS THE SELECTION OF A PERSON OF DEMONSTRATED
INDEPENDENCE, SOMEONE WHO WOULD HAVE THE ABILITY TO SAY:
"NO, MR. PRESIDENT, I BELIEVE YOU ARE WRONG, ACCORDING TO
OUR BEST INFORMATION, THE POLICY YOU PROPOSE WILL FAIL. IT
IS BASED UPON INCORRECT ASSUMPTIONS, WHICH ARE CONTRADICTED
BY THE UNDERLYING FACTS." WITHOUT THIS STRENGTH OF RESOLUTION
IN ITS DIRECTOR, THE IMPORTANT ROLE THAT THE CIA CAN PLAY IN
OUR GOVERNMENT WILL BE LOST.
THIS IS WHY THE APPOINTMENT OF AMBASSADOR GEORGE BUSH
IS SO ILL-ADVISED. IT IS. ONE THING TO CHOOSE AN INDIVIDUAL
WHO MAY HAVE HAD POLITICAL EXPERIENCE, AND QUITE ANOTHER TO
CHOOSE SOMEONE WHOSE PRINCIPAL POLITICAL ROLE HAS BEEN THAT
OF,-'CHAIRMAN OF THE REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE. THERE IS
NO NEED TO ELIMINATE FROM CONSIDERATION AN INDIVIDUAL SIMPLY
BECAUSE HE OR SHE MAY HAVE HELD PUBLIC OFFICE. BUT THE LINE
MUST BE DRAWN SOMEWHERE, AND A MAN OF MR. BUSH'S PROLONGED
INVOLVEMENT IN PARTISAN ACTIVITIES AT THE HIGHEST PARTY LEVEL
SURELY PASSES OVER THAT LINE.
INDEED, IT APPEARS THAT MR. BUSH'S NOMINATION TO BE
DIRECTOR OF THE CIA MAY EVEN BE REGARDED AT THE WHITE: HOUSE
AS A SPRINGBOARD TO'HIGHER POLITICAL OFFICE, WHEN ASKED AT
A PRESS CONFERENCE IF THE NOMINATION OF MR. BUSH WOULD ELIMINATE
HIM AS A VICE-PRESIDENTIAL RUNNING-MATE POSSIBILITY, PRESIDENT
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FORD REPLIED: "I DON'T THINK[HEIS!ELIMINATED FROM CONSIDERA-
TION BY ANYBODY. THE DELEGATES TO THE CONVENTION OR MYSELF."
MR. BUSH ALSO LEAVES THE DOOR OPEN. WHEN ASKED BY A REPORTER
IN PEKING WHETHER THIS NEW ASSIGNMENT WOULD END A POLITICAL
CAREER THAT COULD LEAD TO A VICE-PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATION, HIS
RESPONSE WAS: "WELL, I'M NOT SURE I'VE ENDED IT FOREVER . . . "
IF CIA ASSESSMENTS SHOULD COLLIDE WITH A FAVORED COURSE
OF ACTION AT THE WHITE HOUSE, WOULD A DEDICATED PARTY-MAN LIKE
MR, BUSH BE ABLE TO STAND UP TO PRESSURES FROM A REPUBLICAN
PRESIDENT IN AN ELECTION YEAR? THE QUESTION ANSWERS ITSELF.
BUSH IS A LIKEABLE MAN, WHO MAY BE WELL-SUITEDFOR POLITICAL
OFFICE. BUT HE IS NOT THE MAN TO HEAD UP THE CIA.
I FIND THE PRESIDENT'S APPOINTMENT ASTONISHING. THE
SENATE AND THE HOUSE COMMITTEES--NOT TO MENTION THE PRESIDENT'S
OWN COMMISSION ON INTELLIGENCE--HAVE LABORED FOR MONTHS REVIEW-
ING THE PROBLEMS OF THE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES, THESE PROBLEMS
HAVE BEEN APLENTIFUL, AND THE AREAS FOR NEW LEGISLATION ARE
MANY, STILL, THE PROSPECTS FOR STARTING AFRESH ARE GOOD, AND
I HAVE VIEWED THE CHANCES TO RESTORE PUBLIC TRUST AND CONFIDENCE
IN THE CIA WITH CONSIDERABLE OPTIMISM,
BUT THIS IS NO WAY TO BEGIN THE RESTORATION. No NEW SET
OF LAWS, NO NEW GUIDING PRINCIPLES--REGARDLESS OF HOW SKILLFULLY
DRAWN--WILL RESTORE THIS TRUST IF THE CREDENTIALS OF THE NEW
DIRECTOR RAISE SERIOUS QUESTIONS OF PROPRIETY.
LET US NOT UNDERMINE THE GOOD WORK OF THE ROCKEFELLER
COMMISSION AND. THE COMMITTEES OF THE HOUSE AND SENATE BY PLAC-
ING A FORMER PARTY CHAIRMAN AT THE HEAD OF A HIGHLY SENSITIVE
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY,
LET US NOT MAKE A TRAVESTY OUT OF OUR EFFORTS TO REFORM
THE CIA, THE SENATE AND THE PEOPLE WE REPRESENT HAVE THE
RIGHT TO INSIST UPON A CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WHICH IS
POLITICALLY NEUTRAL AND TOTALLY PROFESSIONAL.
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I URGE SENATORS TO STAND UP AND OPPOSE THIS NOMINATION,
I CAN CHOOSE NO OTHER COURSE, FOR IF THE CIA IS TO PLAY ITS
INTENDED ROLE IN OUR GOVERNMENT, IT MUST BE.IMPARTIALAND
NON-POLITICAL. ITS ABILITY TO BE SO DEPENDS, IN THE FINAL
ANALYSIS, ON A DIRECTOR WHO POSSESSES THESE SAME QUALITIES,
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