STATEMENT W.E.COLBY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BEFORE GOVERMENT INFORMATION AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE HOUSE G

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78B02992A000100020007-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 15, 2006
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: March 5, 1975
• Content Type: STATEMENT

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New Nrie'
Statement
W. E. Colby
Director of Central Intelligence
Before
Government Information
? and Individual Rights Subcommittee
of the
House Government Operations Committee
March 5, 1975
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%se voupo
Madam Chairwoman:
The Privacy Act of 1974 in Section 3(j) exempts
the Central Intelligence Agency from all but certain
of the Act's provisions. This partial exemption of
the Agency followed a series of discussions with
the committees during the consideration and enact-
ment of the Privacy Act. .In these discussions, ,
the Agency pointed out that a full response to cer-
tain of the provisions of the Privacy Act would
jeopardize the sensitive sources and methods used
in our intelligence activities.
In discussions with the staff, some appropriate
language was requested in the Act which would recog-
nize this fact, and I am happy to say that the
committees and the Congress understood this need.
Two alternative ways of accomplishing this were
considered. One was an exemption of the Central
Intelligence Agency from all but certain of the
provisions of the Act. The other was an exemp-
tion of "intelligence sources and methods" from
the provisions of the Act. The Central Intelli-
gence Agency indicated its satisfaction with either
arrangement, and eventually the exemption of the
Agency by name was selected by the Committee as
the best way of accomplishing the end sought.,
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%sr Noe
Madam Chairwoman, the Agency is fully under-
standing of the policy represented in the Privacy
Act of 1974. As urged in this Committee s. report
on the bill which became the Act, we intend to re-
spond to requests under its provisions to the ex-
tent that responses would not jeopardize intelli-
gence sources and methods or otherwise fall within
the appropriate exemptions provided by the Act.
While the Act itself is not effective until Sep- -
teMber of 1975,. and while the CIA does have an
exemption, we will, in response to requests, furnish
to requesters such material as we have to the 'ex-
-tent that it does not reveal intelligence. sources
and methods or is not material subject to determina-
tion by other agencies.
Your concern which led to this hearing, Madam
Chairwoman, arises understandably from extensive'
press allegations that CIA conducted a "massive
illegal domestic intelligence
operation" within the
United States. I'have flatly denied such a charge
before three committees of the Congress, and I am
confident that the Commission appointed by the
President to look into these charges and the Select
Committees of the Senate and of the House, which
undoubtedly will cover this subject in their wider
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Nor
review of U.S. intelligence activities, will sup-
port my position. I do not say. that CIA never made
a mistake. I do say, however, that any such actions
were few and far between and were undertaken in the
belief that they fell within the statutory Intel-
ligence mission or the Director's responsibility
to protect intelligence sources and methods against
unauthorized disclosure.
As have explained elsewhere, the charges in
the press against CIA stem from an inaccurate mix-
ture and magnification of two separate matters.
Pursuant to the National Security Act and National
Security Council directives it was entirely proper
for the Agency to endeavor to ascertain whether,.
any foreign links existed with the domestic dissi-
dent groups which aroused concern starting in mid-
1967. Working with the FBI,.the Agency looked for
such foreign, links abroad and followed up leads
furnished by the FBI as to such possible foreign ,
links. Included in this was an attempt to deter-
mine whether foreign links were established with:
Americans who, traveled or lived abroad, where the
FBI capability to do so did not exist. In the
course of CIA's work abroad also, the names of
certain individual Americans arose in the course.
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f Coverage of foreign conferences and other de--
'velopments, and these were reported to CIA Head--
quarters andthence to the FBI.
In this entire pregrami it was clear that the
responsibility for internal security belonged to
the FBI and the responsibility for foreign counter-
intelligence work abroad belonged to the CTA. In
other words, CIA's operation, Madam Chairwoman,
was neither massive, illegal, nor domestic.
The
stemmed
degree,
of past
second basis for the newspaper charges
from a reporter's learning., to some limited
that CIA in May 1973, conducted a review
adtiVities which might be questionable-
This-material was collected and showed that there
were a few incidents in which CIA may well have
overstepped its bounds, even though the action was
taken in a
authority.
belief that it was within CIA's statutory
Among these were a few cases wherein
CIA developed informants within the anti-war move-
ment in the United States to establish credentials
for travel into areas and among groups abroad
which were of foreign intelligence or counterin-
telligence interest to the United States. In.
other cases, several informants were developed
among certain elements who appeared to pose a.
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Now Nar#
threat to the sedurity of the Agency. Over the
27 years of its history, there were alsO a few in-
dividual instances of surveillance wiretap or
opening Of Mail which have ,been outlined in detail
in my testimony to Senate and House Appropriations
? Subcommittees, and the Senate Aimed Servides Com-
mittee, copies of which I submit herewith for your
record.
These few instances were exaggerated out of
all proportion into a charge that CIA was engaged
in'a massiVe domestic intelligence activity As
I stated, Madam Chairwoman, that is not true', and
CIA essentially conformed to its proper foreign in-
telligence and counterintelligence mission over
the years, complying with the provisions of its '
statute which proscribe it from police, subpoena
or law enforcement powers or internal security
functions.
I have pointed out, in particular ta'the House
Appropriations Subcommittee, the dangers which have
been created for our intelligence operations by
these exaggerations and ill-founded allegations.
I have indicated my full support of responsible
investigations of the typebeing conducted by the
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President's Commission and which I am fully con-
fident, through my discussions with the leaders
thereof, will be conducted by the Senate and House
Select Committees as well. These inquiries will
in my opinion afford a basis for better public
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understanding- of the real nature of intelligence and
place in true proportion the small number of mis-
steps or misdeeds which CIA may have committed
over its 27 years.
In this hearing, Madam Chairwoman, I would hope
to describe for you CIA's files and procedures so
that you may be assured that CIA is fully conscious
of and intends to comply with the spirit of the
Privacy Act of 1974 while recognizing the impor-
tance of protecting intelligence sources and methods
so that our American intelligence activities may
continue to make their contribution to the safety
of the nation and the welfare of its citizens.
A report issued by the Government Operations
Committee in 1973 stated that "... there is an
unquestioned need for Federal agencies to avoid
the release or dissemination to the public of cer-
tain sensitive types of information, the safe-
guarding of which is truly vital to protecting the
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national defense and to maintain necessary con-
fidentiality of dealings between our country and-
foreign nations." (House Report No. 93-221) The
Committee's report on the Privacy Act repeated
this theme in recognizing that "certain areas of
4.
Federal records are of such a highly sensitive
nature that they must be exempted."
On March 5, 1974, the Government Operations
Committee report on the Freedom of Information Act
amendments (H.R. 12471) recognized that certain
types of Governmental information are "born classi-
fied," a result of statutory enactments. The con-
ference report on this legislation specified intel-
ligence sources and methods [50 U.S.C. 403(d)(3) and
(g)] as such an enactment. These enactments and
statements recognize the inherent sensitivity of
information dealing
methods
The essential mission of
with
intelligence
sources and
the Central Intelli-
gence Agency pursuant to. the National Security'Act
of 1947 is to provide our Government with informa-
tion and assessments to assist policy decisions
about developments
States. The system
Agency is designed
abroad affecting the United
of records established in the
to support this mission. The
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files in the Agency!s possession contain informa-
tion on intelligence sources and methods which the
Director of Central Intelligence is charged by.
statute to protect from, unauthorized disclosure._
Clearly, a foreign intelligence service or a
strategically placed individual in a foreign gov-
ernment or a foreign country,_as well as American
citizens, can not be expected to cooperate ,with
this Agency and to provide information jn confi?
-
dence if such information is subject t public
release.
As you know, Madam Chairwoman, there are several
important provisions of the Privacy Act which do
apply to the Central Intelligence Agency. These
would not expose our sensitive intelligence sources
and methods, so the Agency fully'accepts.these
obligations. They include a requirement to pub-
lish in the Federal Register the record systems
of, the Agency. I believe the publication of such
information will provide added,assurances to the;
public that he Agency's systems Of records is.
completely inconsonance taitri the AgendY!s MissiOn.
In addltion, the Privacy Protection Study Com-
mission, established und6rthe Privacy ACt,'iS
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authorized to inspect the Agency's systems of
records and to submit reports to the President
and the Congress. One of the many important func-
tions of the Commission is its authority to deter-
mine if specific categories of information col-
lected violate an individual's right of privacy
and should be prohibited from collection by statute.
Moreover, the President's Commission on CIA .
Activities Within the United States and the Senate
Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations
With Respect to Intelligence Activities and the
House Select Committee on Intelligence, in addi-
tion to the regular CIA oversight committees in
the Congress, are in the process of or about
engage in an intensive review of the mission
the Agency and its activities. These thorough
undertakings can and will establish a better
standing of the intelligence process and the
to
of
under-
role
of the CIA and will reassure our people of the
general propriety and legality of the Agency's
activities over the years.
Since your Subcommittee's concern relates most
specifically to the Privacy Act, I thought you might
be interested in a preview of the information which
will be published about the Agency's systems of
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records in the Federal Register and what the Privacy
Protection Study Commission will find when it makes
its review of the Agency's systems of records after
the Privacy Act becomes effective next September
CIA's records collections which are biggraphic
in nature consist of selected information from both
official reporting and open-source materia3. In
some instances, information from CIA's predecessor
organizations is included in the collections. Our
records, therefore, are the products of some
34 years of intelligence collection.
The main positive intelligence biographic col-
lection contains information on several million
foreign political, military, scientific, economic,
technical, and cultural personalities. Informa-
tion is filed alphabetically by name of individual
within country of citizenship. The names of some
U.S. citizens or permanent resident aliens appear
in this collection -- we do not know how many. Such
names appear in the collection for a variety of .
reasons: they may be associated in some way with
a foreign personality in whom we are interested;
the information contained in a particular document
.may have come from a named source who is -?.S.
citizen or permanent resident alien.; or-We may
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simply have made a mistake and have begun a record
on a person whom we believed to be a foreigner
but who is a U.S. citizen -- nationality or citi-
zenship cannot always be reliably determined. A
number of American names came into this collection
because they were incidentally acquired in the
course of coverage of a foreign intelligence matter,
and reported as one of its aspects or contacts.
A second biographic collection, also consisting
of data collected in the course of foreign intel-
ligence operations,- including data from other federal
agencies and open-source material, serves as the
primary foreign counterintelligence index of the
United States and as a reference to personalities of
intelligence -interest. An adjunct to this collec-
tion-contains information on persons, including U.S.
citizens, involved or suspected of being involved
with foreign espionage or security services. CIA
keeps this material in response to a National Security
Council directive to maintain a central index of
foreign counterintelligence information for the bene-
fit of the Intelligence Community as a whole.
A third system of records is an intelligence
document collection organized by data source or
topic. This system contains either the full text
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14111, ?vie
or extracts of intelligence documents received in
CIA. The system can be searched by any word or
combination of letters -- thereby permitting the
retrieval of records by name (any U.S. citizens
mentioned therein would thus be included). There
is no way of knowing how many names of U.S. citizens
it contains.
In addition to these collections of records, the
Agency also maintains a number of other collections
that include the names of U.S. citizens. Our Office
of Personnel, of course, holds records referring to
our employees, applicants, recruitment prospects, etc.
These include, for example, personnel records
of present, former, and prospective employees;
records maintained by Agency components responsible
for security, training, medical, and financial
activities; records regarding the management of
Agency property; records, of consultant and contrac-
tual relationships with individuals and organiza-
tions; vendor contracts for goods and services -.
acquired from commercial firms; records of indi-
viduals and firms who cooperate with the Agency in
the collection of foreign intelligence; and records
of liaison with personnel of other U.S. Government
agencies. -Some of these collections of records are
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Now' NW.
organized so that the information they contain can
be retrieved by individual name or identifying
number; .others by -subject or topic; and still others
by document number, title, or agency of.origin.
?The _Office of the Assistant to the Director. of
Central Intelligence-maintains a collection con.-
taming information from domestic newspapers and
similar sources. These collections include .articles
by various journalists about or mentioning CIA,'
death notices of present or former employees,.
articles mentioning or written by present or former
employees, and notations-with respect to briefings
and other contacts with journalists or others given
by or related to CIA;
The Office of the Legislative Counsel main-
tains records of the Agency's contacts with members,
congressional committees and their staffs and other
Government agencies, departments, and commissions..
In addition, the, Agency keeps records containing
correspondence and other documents related to the.
receipt, processing, and final disposition of re-.
quests received from the public by the Agency for
.the declassification and release of documents:
In the same vein,. the Office of the General
Counsel also has records collections.containing
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Now" valif
the names of U.S. citizens -- lawyers, etc.
who have been concerned with legal matters involving
the Agency. Similarly, the Office of Medical
Services maintains the names of various U.S. med-
ical personnel with whom the Agency has some con-
tact as consultants or who otherwise provide
assistance to the Agency.
?- The Agency's Office of Security has also main-
tained a number of files in which the names of .
citizens appear. These obviously include security
investigations and clearances of employees, appli-
cants, contractors, sources, and consultants. Some
involve cover clearance for access to sensitive in-
telligence information by employees of other govern-
ment departments, such as the military.
There are situations in which an individual's
name may appear in Agency records without his or
her knowledge, such as in the course of a security
investigation of an applicant in which reference
is made to a third party and the name is recorded
in the investigation records. Similarly, a number
of employees of contractor organizations may not
be aware that their corporation has contracted with
CIA to perform services requiring investigation and
clearance. This was, for example, the situation
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vor
with respect to most of the employees who worked
on the U-2 project for Lockheed, who did not know
that CIA was involved.
Also, the Office of Security kept certain
records as an aspect of its responsibility fpr the
protection of the Agency. These include the normal
type of crank mail that is received by any organi-
zation,
reports of
individuals who? have
or otherwise were believed to be likely
the Agency. (one of our field offices ih
States was bombed on one occasion), and
threatened
to threaten
the United
certain
name lists developed at various times relating to
the suitability of various individuals for paSsible,
collaboration or assistance in CIA's operations.
As a result of the review of questionable.
activitiesundertaken in the summer of 1973,
specific directives were issued in the Agency
that itwould not maintain files on American citi-
zens other than those developed as an incidental
aspect of foreign intelligence or counterintelligence
matters or as an employee, applicant, contact, etc.
Any accumulation of American names for possible Use
in connection with foreign intelligence 'matters
was directed to be conducted in a fashion to clearly
avoid the maintenance of blacklists of any sort.
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Nay
By the.very nature of its activity, CIA must record
certain names of individuals who do not know they
are being recorded. Thus, before it approaches an
American on-a sensitive intelligence matter, it
would be less than prudent if CIA did not determine
individual with respect
the likely, attitude of the
to the proposal of assistance. If the determina-
tion was then made not to approach the individual,
a record of that consideration would undoubtedly
exist, but it would not constitute a blacklist or
"dossier" on-him.
Madam Chairwoman as I have indicated, I be-
lieve that some of the material which was collected
by CIA over the past 27 years may not be appropriate-
today although undertaken then under the belief
that it fell within the charge on the Director of
Central Intelligence to protect intelligence sources
and methods or under the belief that it was included
within our charge to collect foreign intelligence
and counterintelligence. Over the past several
years, CIA's files have been examined with an eye
to eliminating material therein which is not
appropriate. In the course of this, a number of-
files have been destroyed. This process is not
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Now-
complete, however, and of course is suspended at
this time in response to the investigation being
made of CIA's activities by the President's Com-
mission and the two Select Committees. I have
directed, however, that the segregation process
continue in the belief that, after the investiga-
tions are completed, the best disposition of these
materials is destruction. In the interim,. I pro-
pose to respect the privacy of the individuals
'whose names may. be involved in such documentation.
by rejecting requests to make them public. On in-
quiries by individuals with respect to their own
names, I propose to make available to the requester
such material as does not reveal intelligence
sources and methods or which does not fall within
the responsibility of agencies other than CIA.
Madam Chairwoman, the release of CIA informa-
tion is also a matter of some interest in view of
the passage of the effective date of the.FreedoM
.of Information Act amendments on February 19th.
In view of this subcommittee's interest in that
Act as well as the Privacy Act, I thought you would
be interested in-our experience under that law.
.First, our experience under Executive Order 11652
'demonstrates CIA's effort to be as responsive as
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Noe %se
possible while protecting intelligence sources and
methods. Of 362 requests from June 1972 through
December 1974, 195 were granted in full 58 in part,
and 62 denied. In some 47 cases the documents
could not be identified or located, the request was
withdrawn or was referred to another agency, etc.
Some 2,990 documents were released in this process.
In addition, during 1974 CIA reviewed and released
over 500,000 pages of World War II Office
tegic Services records, plus films, maps,
index files. Some 95 percent of what was
was released.
We have received several requests under the new
Amendments to the Freedom, of Information Act. One
requests records regarding "all expenditures" of
the Agency "from the date of inception" of CIA.
The requester asks for the "smallest transactional
amounts" that are recorded, along with all clari-
fying data available.
Another requester sent us five different letters
dated February 19, 1975. One attaches a listing of
44 matters on which the requester wishes documents.
One is for a list of CIA's "ostensibly private,
commercial, and funding operations." Another asks
for copies "of all damage assessments of leaks."
of Stra-
and card
reviewed
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hoir
The requester refers to the unit established
within the "CIA Counterintelligence Office to look
into the possibility Of foreign leaks (sic) to
American dissident elements" .(We assume the re-
quester means "Links.") and requests all 'files of
'this unit.
Another asks for "all CIA -reports on the for-
eign aspects of the anti-war, youth, and similar
movements and their possible links to American
counterparts." Another of this requester's letters
asks for inter alia, "all material relating or :
referring to ... all domestic corporations or asso-
ciations owned ..or controlled or managed in whole
or in part by the CIA which have functioned at any
time and in any capacity as cover organizations
for funds for any CIA intelligence or counterintel-
ligence or. surveillance or other covert activities
in the United States during the period 1950-1974."
Another specific request would cause CIA to
search through and review 900,000 files. All told,
in this requester's letter, there, are at'least? 25
or 30 specific items out of a total of 44 which
ask for "all files of."
In each of the letters from this requester,
he closes by stating "I will expect to receive a
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law *119
reply within 10 working days." Obviously it is
Impossible for us to locate and identify the records
requested within 10 days, much less conduct a serious
review of such records to see what parts could be
released. Copies of these requests and our replies
will be submitted for your record.
We are endeavoring to be responsive to such
portions of these requests as are reasonable. How-
ever, the result is a serious strain on the intelli-
gence apparatus of this Government. Indeed a good-
faith attempt to comply with the spirit of the new
Freedom of Information Act will have serious impact
on this Agency, as well as the Intelligence Com-
munity. It is clear at this early date that one
of the results of the passage of the amendments
to the Freedom of Information Act will be to cause
numerous suits in the Federal courts simply because
of the sheer inability of Government agencies to
comply with the provisions of the law.
Madam Chairwoman, I-hope this description of
CIA's actual activities will indicate the basis for
our request for special consideration in the Privacy
Act for the sensitive intelligence sources and
methods necessary to the operation of an intelli-
gence agency in our free sbciety. We in the
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Intelligence Community
and at CIA have undertaken
the same commitment to support and defend the
Constitution as have the other members of our
Government. We intend to carry out the laws of
the United States and at the same time to help
maintain its security, the welfare of our citizens,
and peace in the world to the degree we can through
our intelligence operations.
In the Central Intelligence Agency, we stand
second to none in our recognition of the paramount
rights of our citizens, but we also believe that
those rights must be protected by an effective in-
telligence service in the world in which we live.
We consequently ask the opportunity to explain our
activities in an atmosphere of serious and respon-
sible inquiry into how to reconcile the activities
of our open society and the necessity that some of
our secrets be respected if this society is to en-
dure in the worlds of today and tomorrow.
This will be a major focus of the inquiries to
be made by the President's Commission and the
Select Committees, and I am sure that in their
findings there will be a vindication of the con-
tribution CIA and intelligence have made and a
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reaffirmation of the need of the Agency for exemp-
tion of intelligence sources and methods from the
workings of the privacy Act and the Freedom of
Information Act.
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