CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78B02992A000100010032-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 15, 2005
• Sequence Number: 32
• Publication Date: January 27, 1975
• Content Type: OPEN

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January 27, 1975 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ?SENATE
least 5 years within tlie 8-year period ending
on the date of the sale. . .. , ..
Taxpayers meeting ;these two requirements
may elect to exclude the entire gain from
gross income if the adjusted- ales price of
their residence is $2q,000 or less. (This elec.,
s
tion can only be m de once during a tax-
payer's lifetime.) If he adjusted sales price
exceeds $20,000, an .election may be made
to exclude part of tile gain based on a ratio
of $20,000 over the a?usteci sales price of the
residence. Form 211 (Sale or Exchange of
Personal Residence) is helpful in determin-
ing what gain, if ay, may be excluded by
an elderly taxpayer when he sells his horne.
Additionally, a taxpayer may elect to defer
reporting the gain ol the sale of his personal
residence if within year before or 1 year
after the sale he buys and occupies another
residence, the cost of /which equals or exceeds
the adjusted safe pripe of the old residence.
Additional time is allowed if (1) you con-
struct the new residence or (2) you were
on active duty in the U.S. Armed Forces.
Publication 523 (TaxlInformation on Selling
Your Home) may. alsq be helpful. -
Retirement Incomq Ore di!.?To qualify for
the retirement inconie credit, you must (a)
be a U.S. citizen or Iregident, (b) have re-
ceived earned incoMe in excess of $600 in
each of any 10 calendar years before 10'14,
and (a) have certain types of qualifying
"retirement income"J.Five types of income--
pensions, annuities, interest, and dividends
included on line 15i Form 1040, and gross
rents from Schedule E, Part II, column (b)-
qualify for the retirement income credit.
- The credit is 15% 'of the lesser of: .
1. A taxpayer's qualifying retirement in-
come, or
- I - ' - .-?
'2. $1,524 ($2,286 for a joint return where
both.' taxpayers are 5 or .older) minus the
total of nontaxable ? ensions (such as Social
Security benefits or: ailroad Retirement an-
nuities) and earned ncome (depending upon
the taxpayer's age - ncl-the? amount of any
earnings he may ha
If ?the taxpayer is nder 62, heinust reduce
the, $1,524 figure 11- the amount of earned
Income in excess. of 000. For persons at least
62 years old but less than 72, this amount is ?
reduced by one-half ? the earned income in
excess of $1,200 up- $1,700, plus the total
amount over $1,700. ersons 72 and over are
not subject to the e ned incorne
Schedule R Is used or taxpayers who claim
the retirement ludo credit.- -
? The Internal Re nue Service Will also
compute the retire nt in-come credit for a
taxpayer if he has r quested that com-
pute his tax and h answers the questions
for columns A and and completes lines 2
and 5 on Schedule relating to the amount
of his Social Securi benefits, Railroad. Re-
tirement annuities earned income and
qualifying retireme t income - (pensions, an-
nuities, interest, di idends, and rents). The
taxpayer should als write "RIC" on line 17,
Form 1040.
was violated. H the Genocide Conven-
tion been in ex tence two decades ago
those who perpe uated atrocities between
1933 and 1939 co Id have been brought to
justice.
This situation displays the same kind
of inaction tha was brought against
those responsibl for the Armenian mas-
sacres even thou h Turkey and her Ger-
man allies were feated in World War I.
There is eviden e on the record that
Hitler duly note this fact when he pre-
pared his prog urn of exterminations.
Documents intr ? uced the Nurem-
berg trials cont in the following state-
ment made by tier in August 1939 just
before the invas on of Poland:
What the weak estern European civiliza-
tion thinks about me does not matter. . .
I have sent to ti e East only my Death's
head units with e order to kill without
pity or mercy all en, women, and children
of the Polish race d language. Only in such
a way will we win the vital space we need.
Who still talks no adays of the extermina-
tion of the Armeni ns?
It is quite app rent from the previous
statement that itler interpreted the
world's inaction n the Armenian mas-
sacres as tacit onsent to do as he
pleased. Why sho Id the world stop him
when they have a ways failed in the past
to .show concern
The Genocide ueaty is the document
that displays the world's outrage and
- concern over acts Genocide. Yet the
refused to sign this
t. In the interest of
1 peace and safety,
minating all future
nity, I urge my col-
in support of the
accords.
United States has
important docume
further internation
In the hopes of el
crimes against hum
leagues to join m
Genocide Conventi
NUREMBERG IALS ONLY REIN-
FORCE NEED OR THE ADOPTION
OF THE GEN CIDE TREATY
Mr. PROXMI E. Mr. President, one of
the worst offend rs of the crime of geno-
cide before the ction.'was outlawed by
the United Nat' ns was the Nazi's ex-
termination of 6 illion Jews, 21/2 million
Poles, hundreds f thousands of Czechs,
Serbs, and Russi ns.
When the Nu mberg trials convened
it was decided t at the Nazis could not
be punished for acts of genocide com-
mitted prior to 1939. The Nuremberg
tribunal which ried war criminals for
crimes against h inanity refused to con-
sider outrages o urring before the war
on the grounds that no international law
1
CONCLUSIOFF MORNING
BU ESS
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time
for the conclusion bf morning business
having arrived, morning business is
closed. - -.---
SELECT COMMTTTEE TO STUDY
GOVERNMENTAL INTELLIGENCE-
GATHERING ACTIVITIES
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the
previous order, the hour of 1 p.m. having
arrived, the Senate will now proceed to
the consideration of Senate Resolution
21, which will be stated by title.
The assistant legislative clerk read as
follows:
A resolution (S. Res. 21) to establish a
Select Committee of the Senate to conduct an
investigation and study with respect to in-
telligence activities carried out by or on be..
half of the Federal Government,
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time
for debate on this resolution is limited to
2 hours, to be equally divided between
and controlled by the majority and
minority leaders or their designees, with
the vote to occur at 3 p.m.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President,
yield my time to the distinguished senior
Senator from Rhode Island (Mr. PAS-
TORE).
I suggest the absence of a quorum, with
the time to be charged against both
sides.
S 967
Mr. GRivi? IN. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield? ?
Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Mr. President, I ask
that the time on this side be yielded to
the control of the Senator from Texas
(Mr. TOWER).
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk
will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk pro-
ceeded to call the roll.
Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the order for the
quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that Miss Pam Tur-
ner, of my staff, have the privilege of
the floor during the consideration of Sen-
ate Resolution 21 and all amendments
thereto.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. GARY
W. HART). Without objection, it is so
ordered.
Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, I suggest
the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. On whose
time? .
Mr. TOWER. To be charged equally to
both sides.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
The clerk will call the roll.
The 'assistant legislative clerk pro-
ceeded to call the roll. ?
? Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, a parli-
amentary inquiry.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator will state it. ?
Mr. PASTORE. What is the pending
business?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
pending business is Senate Resolution
No. 21.
Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President and col-
leagues, I am not going to belabor this
measure this morning by an extended
explanation. As a matter of fact, I did
explain it last week and I think that
what we are trying to achieve is quite
well understood by the Members of the
Senate. -
I do not think we are going to have any
difficulty with this resolution. As a mat-
ter of fact, it is generally conceded, to be
necessary, and I point up the fact that,
by a vote of 45 to 7, it was approved by
the Democratic Conference.
As I understand it, the minority
leader has stated today his selection of
members of the select committee, so I
construe from that that the other side
is more or less amenable to this resolu-
tion.
Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. PASTORE. Unless it was a gesture
of futility.
Mr. TOWER. It was acceptance of the
Inevitable, I think.
Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, I wish
to make it abundantly clear at the out-
set that the FBI, the CIA, and Military
Intelligence are absolutely necessary to
the security and the survival of this
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S 968 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
great Republic. Anyone who questions
for a moment, anyone who should try or
anyone who should even begin to imagine
that the Senator from Rhode Island is
trying to do anything to disrupt . or to
injure -in any way these fine agencies,
should immediately disabuse his mind
of it. .
I have been connected for a long time
with the workings- of these agencies. I
realize why they were instituted in the
first place. We could not survive as a
decent society without the FBI. We could
never survive as a great nation in this
troubled world, this sensitive world, with-
out a CIA or military intelligence. So I
wish to make it abundantly clear, Mr.
President, that what We are trying to
do is find out the abuses of the past and
also of the present, to find out how it
all started, how far it went, to remedy
these abuses and make sure that in the
future they will not happen; and in the
final analysis, ultimately, that the confi-
dence of the people wil be reaffirmed
and strengthened in their appreciation
and their consideration; as to the essen-
tiality of these great- arms of Govern-
ment.
? Mr. President, having said that; I Mast
in all fairness say that there have been
some very serious abuses. I am not going
to debate them this morning: As a matter
of fact, our newspaper headlines have
been replete with-a dissertation of what
they are. There have been- charges and
countercharges. There haVe been those
who- have exaggerated some of the
wrongs; there are those who have mini-
mized some the wrongs. Because the su-
pervision on the part.. of Congress is
spread throughout several committees,
each of which has jurisdiction in-its own
way?the Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions is absolutely interested in inteli-
gence abroad; the, Committee on the
Armed Services is absolutely interested
in military. intelligence; the Joint Com-
mittee on- Atomic Energy is absolutely
interested in where our nuclear weapons
are and how well they are being pro-
tected and, vis-a-vis With our adver-
saries, what they have and what we must
have?there is no question at all about
the essentiality.
. . . .
The important thing here is to restore
public confidence so that these agencies,?
,in the final analysis, will be responsive.
That is what this -is all about. This is
not to challenge the chairman of one
committee or to challenge the chairman
of another committee. We are not here
to rebuke any Member of Congress for
what supervision he gave or did not give.
That is not the question this morning.
What we are trying to do here is create
a select committee consisting of 11 mem-
bers-6 from the majority, 5 from the
- minority. I know it is not going to be
partisan. There is not a Member of the
Senate who does not put his country
before his party, or even, indeed, his own
interest. If it were otherwise, that would
be a blot on this great establishment:
'What do we do by this resolution? We
create a committee of 11 members. The
names have already been suggested by
the minority leader of those on the part
of the minority party. We know who
they are. I am sure they will all render
fine service.
We do not know yet who the members
are on the majority side. I know I am
not one of them; I do not want to be one
of them. I made that pledge at the time
that- I introduced this resolution, that
I was not doing it for any selfish reason;
I was doing it because I thought it needed
to be clone.
Mr. President, having said that, I have
nothing further. I amperfectly willing
to answer any questions. It is a very sim-
ple resolution. It is all spelled out. I
understand there are going to be two
amendments. I am amenable to both
amendments, with the exception that on
the Tower amendment, I hope we can
clarify one statement at the end, where
it says:
The type of security clearance to be re-
quired in. the case of arty such employee or
person shall be commensurate with the sensi-
tivity of the classified information to which
such employee or person will be given access
by the select committee.
I think we ought to nail that down to
be within the determination of the com-
mittee itself.
I should like to add some language in
there, in the last sentence: "within- the
determination made by the committee
Itself." - -
Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, I wonder
if I might visit with the distinguished _
Senator from Rhode Island. '
Mr. PASTORE. When the proper time
comes. I do not think we are too much
in disagreement. I repeat what I said
last week when I was questioned by the
distinguished Senator from Mississippi,
the chairman of the Committee on
Armed Services: The jurisdiction of each
committee as it now stands will continue.
There is nothing in this resolution that
changes that one iota. I suppose that the
authorization bills, when they come up,
will be referred to the Committee on
Armed Services, there is no question at all
about that. I suppose before deciding the
authorization the chairman will conduct
some kind of hearings, not competitive
to the select committee; it could be conr
sonant with it. I am not opposed to that.
' As a matter of fact, let us face it: We
are all here trying to do the right thing.
Let us do it. That is about the size of it.
Now, Mr. President, I have here a
statement by Senator HUDDLESTON who
asked me to have it inserted in the
RECORD, and I ask unanimous consent
that that be done.
The PRESIDING 01,1010ER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
STATEMENT BY SENATOR HUDDLESTON
I am pleased to support Senate Resolution
- 21, which would establish a select committee
on intelligence activities.
I believe the creation of such a committee
is essential at this time.
I believe the committee as proposed in the
resolution before us will meet the needs of
the Senate and our Nation in terms of struc-
ture, representation and mandate.
A committee such as we are about to cre-
ate must touch upon the various ages, views,
geographical areas and philosophies which
are a part of the Senate and our nation-at--
large.
To structure it otherwise would diminish
January 27, 1975
not only the acceptance of any findings and
recommendations but also the possibility of
reconciling contrasting views and theories
Which must be accommodated.
- Ultimately, the report of this select corn-
mittee must be widely accepted by many
elements of the American people. Otherwise,
efforts to correct past improprieties and re-
store confidence in our government's ability
to conduct in an appropriate manner the
very sensitive and important intelligence
function, will falter. ?
To fail to create a broadly based committee
would in the end be a disservice to ourselves,
the Senate, our country and the American
people.? ?
Testimony already taken in the Congress
strongly indicates that there have been,
abuses and misuses of authority within. the
Central Intelligence Agency. Allegations of
other improprieties remain unanswered. A
virtual floodgate of questions and charges
has been opened, engulfing our intelligence
community- in suspicion and uncertainty.
While some of this may haVe been more sen-
sation than substance, the facts remain that
both damaging testimony and allegations of
serious misconduct are before us and that
they have not been rebutted to the satisfac-
tion of most members of Congress or of. the., _
American people.
- The floodgate cannot and should not be
closed; the questions raised must be an-
swered; the faith of the people in this most
sensitive area of their government must, be
restored. ,.
-. If' an agency has overstepped its. author- ,
Ity, if it has violated the- rights of citizens
whom it is supposed to serve, if it has been
involved in illegal activities, if it has been
utilized in derogation of its public trust,
then these matters must be fully investi-
gated. Corrective steps must be taken.
There was an earlier time in this Nation
when the agencies in question?born in a
turbulent area of violent crime half a cen-
tury ago, or in the aftermath of war 25 years '
later?enjoyed a very different image. They
were looked upon as guardians of the Nation
and protectors of law-abiding citizens. But,
like so many of this country's institutions in
recent years, they have fallen in esteem. The
intelligence community has lost its glitter.
The FBI hero of the 1930's has been replaced
In . the public eye by a much more dubious ?
character.- .- ? ' --
Thus, the need for a? full investigation
of the tide of current charges goes beyond
the obvious requirements of discipline within
the government; it goes. to a restoration of
confidence in a segment of government that,
more than any other, must hold the pub-
lic's confidence. .
No nation can gamble with its security.
Indeed, the 'guarantee of that security ? is
perhaps the most fundamental of all govern-
mental' responsibilities. Without it, all else
can quickly fade. ? -
National security arrangements, defense
and foreign policy strategies, and decisions
regarding a host of -other issues rely upon
Intelligence. In fact, there are few who would
argue that we could do without intelligence
gathering activities?especially in what ap-
pears to be an increasingly complex and
uncertain world.
.
Furthermore, ?the- very nature of such ac-
tivitieS requires that they be closely held
and carried out with a certain degree of
secretiveness and confidentiality.
But, the agencies involved in such- activ-
ities, like Caesar's wife, must, be above re-
proach?not just because of their special
status and charge but also because actions
which involve them in suspicion and ques-
tion tend to impair if not destroy their abil-
ity to function.
There are those in this body who have fol-
lowed closely the activities of the CIA and
other agencies with intelligence responsibil-
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ?SENATE S 969
ities--the Defense Intelligence Agency, the
National Security Agency, the Federal Bu-
reau of Investigation, and the Secret Service.
For that reason, we should certainly make
the best use of these persons; we shcfruld
build upon their knowledge- and experience.
At the same time, I believe we could bene-
fit from new and fresh perspectives which
could bring to such review an inquiring ap-
proach which might not only develop mew
ideas but also do much to insure a positive
public response to the ultimate findings and
recommendations.
I do, consequently, support establish-
ment of a special committee to review in-
telligence operations in this country. I also
think, however, that our intent and deter-
mination to insure a broadly representative
committee must be made. clear.
To accommodate the representation of the
various views, I proposed in the Democratic
Conference that we consider an 11-member
body, rather than a smaller one. While this
Is an admittedly rather large committee, in
this particular case, I believe that it is re-
quired, Many Committees have some juris-
dictional claim over intelligence activities.
Interest and concern over this matter goes
far beyond the jurisdictional boundstof com-
mittees, encompassing, I would imagine,
every member of the Senate, Views on the
subject vary widely.
? Furthermore, I believe that the special
committee must have broad authority, as
the resolu.tion contains. It Must be em-
powered not only to investigate possible il-
legal activities and abuses in the intelli-
gence community, but also to review the
mandates of the agencies concerned; to study
the role of intelligence in today's world and
to make recommendations regarding the type
of structure which can best meet the intel-
ligence objectives which are deemed neces-
sary and proper. ? -
Some may perceive the proposal before us
as fraught with implications of sensational-
ism and headline hunting?an approach
which we clearly cannot ? afford and which
we would be Irresponsible to permit. Our de-
termination on that point, too, should be
made clear. But in this year?so soon after
Watergate?we cannot leave in doubt the
operations and activities of agencies involved
in such sensitive and significant endeavors.
We must instead place our important intel-
ligence-gathering activities on a sound and
viable basis. -In this case, skeletons in the
closet are likely to haunt us not only at
home but also abroad, not only on security
issues but also in domestic politics. They
must be laid to rest.
The alternative is to let matters ride, to
permit a series of well-intentioned but over-
lapping investigations proceed, to divide ef-
forts at a time when prompt and comprehen-
sive action is needed. - .
Thus, the preferable course, it seems to me
is the creation of a special committee (1)
broadly representative of the various Con-
gressional concerna on intelligence (2) dedi-
cated to a thorough Investigation of quesz
tioned activities and current intelligence op-
erations and a 'reexamination of the rola of
intelligence operations in our society, and (I)
charged with the responsibility of making
recommendations to the Senate as expediti-
ously as possible regarding both necessary
corrective actions and the future structure,
authority and relationships within the in-
telligence community.
I believe Senate Resolution 21 will ReC0111.-
plish this and that adoption of It would be a
right move in the right direction.
Mr. PASTORE. I now yield to my dis-
tinguished colleagues from California.
Mr. CRANSTON. I thank the Senator
very much for yielding.
I want.first to thank the Senator from
Rhode Island for his magnificent lead-
ership in this matter. Without his help
-we would not have accomplished as much
as we have so swiftly in this very impor-
tant matter. The efforts of the Senator
from Rhode, Island have manifested a
quality of greatness.
I also want to thank the major leader
(Mr. MANSFIELD), Senator MATH/AS on
the minority side, Senator BAKER, Sen-
ator WEICKER, and others who did so
much of the vitally important spade work
which has brought us to this point.
I have been: involved in this matter
since 1971, when I questioned Senator
Ellender, the then chairman of the
Committee on Appropriations, on the
Senate floor about expenditures for in-
telligence operations. I joined in earlier
resolutions prior to the tinie that I helped
in the support that has been brought to-
gether behind the Pastore resolution.
I agree, of course, with the Senator
from Rhode Island that we need an ef-
fective intelligence operation, we need
it operating under clear and wise ground
rules and under firm control by the Ex-
ecutive and Congress. I have been crit-
ical of the CIA and other intelligence
agencies for many of the things they -
have done that they should not have
done. There have been serious abuses.
But there also have been great accom-
plishments. There have been deeds done _
by courageous and dedicated men and
? women, many of whom have risked their
lives, and some of whom have lost their
lives, in service of their country.
I would just make these points for the
legislative history and for consideration
by the -committee. that. will be carrying
on this activity:
First. If anyone needs reminding, there
have been a series of revelations over
the past decade and a half that point
not only to the internal shortcomings of
Intelligence agencies in carrying out. their
assigned tasks, not only the lack of co-
ordination between their operations and
national policy as declared by the Pres-
ident and Congress, not only to the fail-
ure of these agencies to communicate
with one another and with the President
and the standing committees of Con-
gress?but, also, and more alarming?to
their power to subvert the Constitution
and threaten freedom here at home while
damaging?in the majority- leader's
words?"the good name of the United
States" abroad.
Further, it must be admitted, their
power was of ten misused at the direction
of higher authority in the executive
branch?or with the acquiescence of
higher authorities?and with a knowing
wink or willful ignorance on the part of
many members of Congress.
Second. But the problem goes beyond
the CIA, the FBI, and other intelligence
agencies. It goes beyond foreign relations.
It goes beyond civil liberties at home.
Here the great issues of national sec-
urity and individual liberty are inex-
tricably linked. We have to get some
perspective on ourselves, on our origins,
on our immediate past, and on our fu-
ture--as we proceed from the aftermath
of the Cold War to what appears to be
an era of interdependence in a multipo-
lar world.
The fundamental problem?as we ap-
proach the bicentennial?is to restore
constitutional government in the United
States. There has to be accountability
and responsibility. The intelligence agen-
cies must be adapted to the needs of a
constitutional democracy in our time?
or they must be eliminated.
We cannot eliminate them so we have
to do what is necessary to keep them
under control. That is a job for Con-
gress.
Third. Therefore, as the Senate pro-
ceeds to establish the select committee,
it is important to identify three impor-
tant missions of this committee:
First of all, it is charged with finding
the facts in cases of alleged wrongdoing.
Thus, the Pastore resolution empowers
the select committee to "conduct an in-
vestigation . . . of the extent, if any, to
which illegal, improper, or unethical ac-
tivities" have been engaged in by the
intelligence agencies of the U.S. Govern- ?
ment. This will involve identifying in-
dividuals responsible for such activities,
as well as their respective institutions
and I cite paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 10 of sec-
tion 2.
Second, the select committee is
charged with going one step further. It is
to consider the institutional changes
needed in the organization of the execu-
tive branch and changes needed in con-
gressional , oversight mechanisms as
well?so that these abuses of power can-
not occur again I cite section 2, para-
graphs 4,5, 8, 7, 8, 9, and especially
11, 12, and 13, of Senate Resolution 21.
Finally, the select committee is di-
rected to make a complete investigation
and study of the extent and necessity of
overt and covert intelligence activities
in the United States and abroad. I cite
section 2 of paragraph 14. .
Fourth, It- will be difficult for the
select committee to carry out these mis-
sions?no matter how sweeping the man-
date entrusted to it, no matter how great
its.delegated powers, and no matter how
much access to secret documents and
processes is guaranteed in the words of
the Pastore resolution. ?,? -
Just how does it investigate matters
that, in their essence, depend on not
being seen? How will the select commit-
tee know when it is not getting wheat it
needs to know to get at the full facts?
These questions are _without easy
Section 3(a), paragraph 11 of Senate
Resolution 21 is of great importance. It
grants the members and staff of the
select committee 'direct access" to any
data, evidence, information, report,
analysis or documents or papers" rela-
ting to the investiagtion in the possession
of the intelligence agencies.
Despite this clause, it can be predicted
that this information--in some in-
stances?will be given up with great
reluctance and, indeed, some of it already
may have been destroyed.
Further, there will be a tendency for
personnel of the intelligence agencies to
use the classification system as a means
of avoiding full testimony before the se-
lect committee. That is, they may "tell
the truth" or .provide the facts at the
"top secret" or "secret" level, but not
include information available on a given
subject at a higher level of classification.
Or they may cite law and executive or-
ders and precedents and "executive priv-
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S 970 CON
liege"' as shields of justification for not
telling all they know?even, though they
are under oath.
Fifth. This problem could be greatly
alleviated if the Senate through its select
committee was guaranteed- the full and
active support of the Ford- administra-
tion in this inquiry. As Walter Pincus
pointed out in Sunday's Washington
Post. such an investigation must inevita-
bly end up queStioning the past policies
and practices of Presidents and their
staff.
Perhaps a confrontation with the
White House and the bureaucracy is in-
evitable as the investigation proceeds.
From the start, there are some powerful
incentives for a cover up.' The Senate
should understand this reality now.
Already we see a former Director of
the CIA, Mr. Helms pointing the finger
of responsibility at one dead President
and at another who is incapacitated?
and who, so far, has managed to avoid
coming, into court or before a congres-
sional committee. This same man is
known to have destroyed documents
bearing, on his tenure as Director of the
Further, the present Director of the
CIA in his recent report apparently
pointed to his predecessor and previous
administrations as being responsible for
acts of wrongdoing. The Senate should
be reminded that this same man had
spent his entire career on the operations
side of, CIA before he became executive
director and later director. Mr. Colby at
one time directed the controversial and
perhaps dubious Phoenix program in
Vietnam, and at one time he was deputy
director 'for operations, DDO, in the
CIA?with, responsibility for counterin-
telligence and domestic operations
among others. ' - -
This , investigation z cannot ? succeed
without determining the individuals re-
sponsible for illegal and improper acts--
be they in the Oval Office, the National
Security Council?and the 40 Committee
within it?the President's Foreign Intel-
ligence Advisory Board, the U.S. Intelli-
gence Board, or in the individual agen- ,
cies. A number of the persons involved in
past actions still serve in high positions
in the Government.
So while the select committees' inves-
- tigation must not degenerate into a witch
hunt, it cannot be a picnic, either. For
here are bound to be a lot of skeletons
In a lot of closets. Individuals and agen-
cies involved in wrongdoing or ques-
tionable practices must be identified. Or
else the American people will be ill served
by another coverup.
Some have stated that this investiga-
tion must not be a "TV spectacular." But
It must not be conducted behind closed
doors, either. "Protecting the national
security" arguments must not stand in
the way of the American people's full
Understanding of this problem, and they
must not stand in the way of publicly
assigning responsibility for past actions.
Again, the fundamental issue is account-
ability and responsibility under a consti-
tutional system of government.
There is no good reason why questions
of policy in the intelligence community
cannot be discussed in open hearings, and
all facts bared?except for the most sen-
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GRESSIONAL REC013,D ?SENATE ? January 27, 1975
sitive?that bear upon the matters and
questions posed in Senate Resolution 21.
In this regard, any classification?de-
classification system employed should be
devised by the select committee?in co-
operation with the executive branch, if
possible. After all, one of the issues at
stake is secrecy itself. The emphasis
throughout should be on sharing the
maximum amount of information with
the public.
. Seventh. In conclusion, several ele-
ments are required for a successful in-
vestigation and study: A continuation of
aggressive investigative reporting on the
part of the press, and I know that will
occur; a select committee with members
and staff interested in getting all the
facts and sharing them with the Ameri-
can people to the extent possible; the
full cooperation of the executive agen-
cies involved; sources and witnesses who
are assured of proper protection along
the way. ,
Again I thank the Senator from
Rhode Island, the majority leader, and
the many others for the magnificent
work that has brought us to this point
on this day. ? .
Mr.. TOWER. Mr. President; I yield
myself such time as I may require.
Mr. President, I will be very candid
with the Senate. It was my original feel-
ing that this matter should have been
contained within the Committee on
Armed Services which does have over-
sight jurisdiction over the CIA. But in
the spirit that this resolution has been
offered by the distinguished Senator
from Rhode Island, I am certainly pre-
pared to accept it, because I think that
the Senator from Rhode Island has set
the right tone for the conduct of this in-
vestigation and the subsequent conclu-
sions to be drawn from it. ?
I think that some examination of the
domestic activities of our intelligence-
gathering organizations should be in-
vestigated and I think perhaps such an
Investigation is overdue. .
I think it is essential that agencies in-
volved in this kind of work be proscribed
from activities that either violate their
charter, their congressional authoriza-
tions, or militate against the individual
freedom of the American people.
I think, to that end, this is the most
important thing that our committee can
do- or that the select committee when it
is chosen can do.
It is my view that we can develop con-
structive legislation that affords such
proscriptions and such protections. I
would express the hope that has already
been expressed by the distinguished Sen-
ator from Rhode Island that we can con-
duct our work in a responsible way, so
as to preserve the confidentiality of mat-
ters that impact on the national security
of the United States of America.
We must recognize that our adver-
saries and our potential adversaries have
had a sophisticated intelligence-gather-
ing organization, that they have an ad-
vantage over us in that they operate in
this country in a free society, and in most
respects in our operations abroad we op-
erate in closed societies, making the
gathering of significant intelligence a
much more difficult proposition.
I think we do have to afford adequate
safeguards for our legitimate operations
abroad.
I am hopeful that we can observe the
need to conduct many of our delibera-
tions in private. I think that although
the objective set forth by the distin-
guished Senator from California is de- _
sirable, that as much as possible they be..
open to the public, there are going to be
times, I think, when we can elicit more
information and more significant and
more penetrating and in-depth infor-
mation, if we go into executive session.
So I think that what we roust do is
have a balanced approach here, recognize
that we have to correct abuses, recognize
that we must compel our intelligence-
gathering operations to conduct them-
selves within the purview of the law that
- authorizes them, and at the same time
recognize the vital interest of the United
States from the geographic, strategic, po-
litical, tactical, economic situation that
, we find ourselves in and make sure we -
do not hobble ourselves and render our-
selves at such a disadvantage that we
cannot maintain the kind of internation-
al posture we need.
-. I might mention one other thing, Mr.
President, and that is not only the neces-
sity to protect some of our agents or some
of our covert operations abroad, but also
the confidence placed in us by foreign
governments. We must, think, be care-
ful not to embarrass foreign govern-
ments, not just friendly governments, but
perhaps some mutual governments and
some that may not appear to be so
friendly that may have supplied us some
cooperation; and I would hope we would
take care not to embarrass governments
of these countries. this -
With the proper care, I think it is per-
fectly correct that we embark on is
course today.
I am delighted to yield to the Senator
from California.
Mr. CRANSTON. I thank the Senator
for yielding. -
On one point he mentioned, I recog-
nize that there will have to be closed
door sessions, first, in order to get such
information, that would not otherwise be
made available, and that the committee
will need. I recognize the reason for his .
amendment.. I think it is quite appro-
priate.
I would like to ask one question and
make one point about it.
First, I think, as I said in my earlier
remarks just now, that the committee
must control the classification and de-
classification process, hopefully in coor-
dination and cooperation with the ad-
ministration, but It cannot get itself into
a situation where it is unable to do 'cer-
tain work that it feels it must do.
In regard to the speeific amendment
that the Senator has offered, under his
amendment how do we prevent the exec-
utive from abusing this authority? a
For example, suppose they did not
cooperate?
Mr. TOWER. If the Senator from Cali-
fornia will withhold on his question, I
was going to engage in colloquy with the
Senator from Rhode Island on this mat-
ter.
Mr. CRANSTON. Fine.
Mr. TOWER. And we will bring all
this out.
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January 27, 1975
Mr. CRANSTON. Fine.
Mr. TOWER. So that we will make it
clear what everyone means and intends;
but :I think the distinguished Senator
from Mississippi has been seeking the
floor and has been very patient, so I
would like to yield to him, and then we
will take this matter up subsequently.
Mr. CR.ANSTON. Certainly. I thank
the Senator. ?
Mr. TOWER. I yield to the Senator
from Mississippi such time as the Sena-
tor requires.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I thank
the Senator from Texas.
At this point, at least, I certainly will
not require over 20 minutes, so we can
just limit it to that. -
Mr. President, after a conference with
the Senator from Rhode Island and the
Senator from Texas; I send to the desk
an amendment to the proposed resolu-
tion and ask that it be considered now,
The PRESIDING OFFICER. . The
amendment will be stated. .
The assistant legislative clerk read as
follows:
The Senator from Mississippi proposes an
amendment, at the end of the resolution, to
add a new section as follows?
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that further reading
of the amendment be dispensed with,
Mr. MANSFIELD. Why not let him
read it? -
Mr. STENNIS. All .-right, I withdraw
that.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk
will read it in full.
The sasistant legislative, clerk read
as follows:
At the end of the resolution add a new
section as follows: ? - -
Sc. 7.. The select committee- shall insti-
tute and carry out such rules and procedures
as it may deem necessary to prevent (1) the
disclosure, outside the select committee, of
any information relating to the activities
of the Central Intelligence Agency or any
other department or agency of the Federal,
Government engaged in intelligence activi-
ties, obtained- by the seleot committee dur-
ing the course of its study and investiga-
tion, not specifically authorized by the se-
loot committee to be disclosed, and (2) the
disclosure, outside the select committee, oi'
any information which would adversely af-
fect -the intelligence activities of the Central
Intelligence-Agency in foreign countries m'
the intelligence activities in foreign countries
of any other department or agency of the
Federal Government.
Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
? Mr. STENNIS, Yes, I am glad to yield
to the Senator from Rhode Island. I want
to state very briefly what the purpose is,
but I yield now.
Mr. PASTORE. For the purposes of the
Racoae, would the Senator in explain-
ing his amendment, which I am going
to accept, explain what he means by "not
specifically authorized"?
Mr. STENNIS. Yes,
That is on the second part, is it not?
Mr. PASTORE. Yes.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. .President, this
amendment relates to what we ordinarily
call "leaks." It does not put any :thrifty.-
tion on the committee whatsoever.
The first part relates to matters that
are not expressly authorized or given
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD?SENATE
out by the committee itself or its mem?
bers. It just requires that such reason-
able rules and regulations as the com-
mittee may see fit be established by the
committee regarding disclosures of in-
formation that might, in the second part,
affect intelligence abroad.
But going back to the fast one for just
a moment, this relates to disclosures by
those other than the committee, staff
members or anyone else that might come
in contact with this information.
In other words, the committee itself
is called on by the Senate to make these
rules and regulations.
Now, with reference to foreign intel-
ligence or intelligence activities abroad?
and that is what my plea is for here to-
day, the protection of this foreign in-
telligence?there we are trusting the
committee to write rules and procedures
to set out for themselves and staff mem-
bers regarding this foreign intelligence.
Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield briefly for a question?
Mr. STENNIS. I am responding to a
question of the Senator from Rhode Is-
land.
Will the Senator restate his question
with respect to paragraph 2?
Mr. PASTORE. I was wondering if the
word "specifically" was not rather redun-
dant. If it just said "not authorized by
select committee," that would not lead
to any chntroversial confusion.
Naturally, the authorization would
have to be explicit. The word "specifical-
ly" for the time being, without knowing
within what context it was inserted in
the amendment, disturbs me for the mo-
ment, unless it is more explicitly ex-
plained. I thought if we just said "not
authorized by the Select Committee" it
would be enough.
In other words, I do not want the com-
mittee to sit down and begin to write a
bill of particulars every time they are
going to authorize some disclosure.
Mr. STENNIS. What line is the Senator
referring to? I see it. That is before the
second paragraph.
That relates to staff members.
Mr. PASTORE. I know that. This whole
amendment relates to staff members. I
quite agree with the Senator from Mis-
sissippi. I hope that the staff does not
begin to hold news conferences. That al-
ways happens. They just take this whole
thing over. I think if there are going to
be any news conferences, they should be
by the Chairman or the members of the
committee themselves. But in the past we
have had the sorrowful situation that
staff members fall over one another to
see who can tell it to the press first. I
think everything should be told to the
press that needs to be told to the public,
I think the public understands that.
Mr. STENNIS. This is not to prohibit
that kind of information.
Mr. PASTORE. I know that. But I was
wondering if the word "specifically" is
not a little too tight for the committee.
If we said "not authorized by the com-
mittee," I think we accomplish the
objective.
Mr. STENNIS. What we were trying
to get at was to cover the situation where
a staff member or some other person had
this information and, since it was riot
S 971
covered in any way very plainly, that
there was no prohibition on it. I do not
think this puts too much of a burden.
The Senator is opening up all of these
files.
Mr. PASTORE. No.
Mr. STENNIS. The resolution does. I
do not mean the amendment does but
the resolution opens up the files. We just
have to have a safeguard.
Mr. PASTORE. I do not think we are
meeting on our intent here. I am not op-
posed to the Senator's suggestion that
the matter of leaks should be prevented,
and that the, staff should not disclose
anything without authorization by the
committee. The only thing that bothers
me is that he is tightening up the obli-
gation and responsibility of the commit-
tee a little bit too much by using the --
word "specifically." If he left the word
"specifically" out, I think he would ac-
complish his purpose and not open it
up to debate every time there is the
question of disclosure.
Mr. STENNIS. The main point here is
to have something explicit in writing by -
the committee as to rules and proce-
dures. When we nail that down explic-
itly, how it should be done, then we
cover the waterfront.
We can strike out the word "specif-
ically." -
Mr. PASTORE. Will the Senator strike
it out? - , , ,
Mr. STENNIS. Yes.
- Mr. PASTORE. If he strikes it out, I s
would accept the amendment.
Mr. STENNIS. With the understand-
ing that this still carries with It? -
Mr. PASTORE. With the understand-
ing that the committee and only the
committee has the authority to disclose.
I will admit that.
Mr. STENNIS. It is better to be care- ?
ful here than to be sorry later.. This is .
not directed at the committee.
Mr. PASTORE.! know that.
Mr. STENNIS. This is putting the
Senate in a proper position. I think it
will help the committee to have the Sen-
ate go on record here in making this one _
of the ground rules, so to speak.
? Mr. PASTORE. Is the Senator willing
to delete the word "specifically."
Mr. STENNIS. Yes. ''--
Mr. PASTORE. With the modification.
I will accept the amendment. -
Mr. YOUNG. Will the Senator yield
for 3 minutes? I support the amendment.
Mr. STENNIS. I do not have control
of the time. The Senator from Texas
has control of the time.
Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, I ask the
Senator from Mississippi if he will yield
for a question on his amendment.
Mr. STENNIS. All right, and then I
will yield 3 minutes to the Senator from
North Dakota out of my time. I yield
for a question.
Mr. BAKER. This is a question of
clarification. This amendment, of course,
Is an antileak amendment. I think that
is fine. I hope we succeed. We failed
miserably in the Watergate Committee.
Our former colleague and I tried in every
way we could. It did not work.
There are some matters of sensitivity
that have not been leaked, but are still
In the Atomic Energy Committee, many
of them, in safe storage.
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S 972 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD?SENATE January 27, 1975
Paragraph 2 concerns me. It says:
And, number 2, disclosure outside the
committee of any information which ad-
versely affects the intelligence activities of
the United States.
It would appear on its surface to say
that if we stumbled into a matter such
as the Chilean situation, the Bay of Pigs,
or the Lebanon incursion, notwithstand-
ing that it might appear to the Commit-
tee to be something that ought to be
dealt with in the Congress, we should
not disclose it.
Will the Senator from Mississippi re-
assure me that that is not the purpose
of paragraph 2?
Mr. STENNIS. No. that is not the pur-
pose of paragraph No. 2. We tried to
wrap it up in such a way as require
rules of procedure in the committee
which I understand to be the feeling of
the Senator from Tennessee.
Mr. BAKER. If there appears to be
conduct by any agency of the U.S. Gov-
ernment that appears to be improper or
exceeds its jurisdiction, that would not
be limited by paragraph 2 of this
amendment?
Mr. STENNIS. This does not put a
limitation on the committee. It requires
the committee to proceed under rules,
regulations, and procedures. But these
things are still left in the hands of the
committee.
Mr. BAKER. I thank the Senator.
Mr. STENNIS. It is a rule of the Sen-
ate by a guideline.
Mr. PASTORE. With the modifica-
tion, I am willing to accept the amend-
ment .
Mr. STENNIS. If no one else wants the
floor, can we have a vote on the amend-
ment? Will the Chair put the question?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the
Senator from Mississippi modify his
amendment?
Mr. STENNIS. Yes; by striking out the
word "specifically" in the sixth line from
the bottom. ? ,
The PRESIDING 0101010ER. The ques-
tion is on agreeing to the amendment
as modified.
Mr. CURTIS. Reserving the right to
object and 1, of course, will not object.
I would like to ask a question.
Is there any penalty or enforcement
means to compel staff members of this
committee to not disclose information
that their committee directs should not
be disclosed?
Mr. STENNIS. It is a sad state of the
law, Mr. President, but I am quite doubt-
ful that we have a law that really is
drawn to cover situations of this kind.
We have the old Espionage Act of 1918,
which specifically requires there must be
an intent to do harm to the United
States. It is a kind of wide-open proposi-
tion which is, in itself, a very strong
argument here for the adoption of this
amendment. It puts in some kind of an
obstacle. A staff member, if he violated
the rule, would violate a Senate rule. It
would not have any criminal penalty at-
tached to it, but it would be a rule to
that extent.
I hope the committee will get a prom-
ise in advance that no one is going to
write a book?that no staff member is
going to write a book, or a journal arti-
ole, or anything else?about things that
were disclosed to them in these proceed-
ings. I think that is a matter we have to
trust to the discretion of the commit-
tee. Under present law we have to. I be-
lieve the Senator raised a good point.
Mr. CURTIS. I certainly am for the
amendment of the distinguished Senator,
but I believe we have to rethink our posi-
tion on some of these things. Here in this
country if someone discloses a tax return,
he has violated a criminal law and can be
punished. If he discloses secrets vital to
the security of the United States, he is
apt to defend it as the right of the people
to know. We have, certainly, a right to
not only make it a law violation to dis-
close, but there ought to be a penalty to
it.
I thank the Senator.
. Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator.
... If there is no further discussion, could
we have a vote on the amendment?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The ques-
tion is on agreeing to the amendment, as
modified, of the Senator from Mississippi.
The amendment, as modified, was
agreed to. .
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent to yield 3 minutes to
the Senator from North Dakota without
losing my right to the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
,objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. YOUNG. Mr. President, I see no
objection to a thorough examination of
the operations of the CIA, the to.13I, or any
other intelligence-gathering agency, but
I believe it can only be done effectively,
and without great injury to the agencies,
by a relatively small committee and a
small staff. A big investigating committee
with a sizable staff?no matter how well
intentioned?cannot avoid much of the
information that develops at the hearings
being leaked to the public, thereby be-
coming easily available to the intelligence
agencies of Russia and every country in
the world. . ?
If the pending resolution involved a
much smaller committee with only a very
minimal staff, I believe the security of
this Nation could be safeguarded and the
Investigation could be very helpful. I
would hope that the meetings of the com-
mittee would be open to the public. If this
were the procedure, then the public would
get firsthand information rather than
from leaks highly distorting the facts dis-
closed in the hearings.
Mr. President, I cannot help but be
deeply concerned about the future effec-
tiveness of the Central Intelligence Agen-
cy. No intelligence operation?particu-
larly involving clandestine operations in
foreign countries or involving some of
our most advanced technology, especially
in defense areas?can be publicly dis-
closed without endangering our sources
of information, the lives of those involved
In this type of intelligence operations,
and the very effectiveness of an intelli-
gence-gathering organization. Russian
intelligence agents, for example, would
only have to read our publications to
obtain information highly valuable to
them.
About 12 years ago when we had the
missile crisis in Cuba a Russian intel-
ligence agent, a high-ranking member of
the GRU, disclosed to Great Britain and
the United States a great deal of inside
information regarding how far Russia
would go in this missile crisis. He also
prqvided us with much other information
regarding the entire operations of the
GRU and KGB?their two major intel-
ligence-gathering agencies. A book was
published regarding the Penkovsky pa-
pers and information which has been in
circulation for several years.
The point I am trying to make, Mr.
President, is that Penkovsky expected to
be caught and was caught. There was a 2-
day trial and he was killed. Here in the
United States there is not much of a pen-
alty for even the highest ranking intel-
ligence officer, a Member of Congress, or
anyone else for disclosing our most highly
classified intelligence.
Mr. President, the Washington Star-
News of Sunday, January 26, 1975, pub-
lished a very good editorial on the sub-
ject of intelligence and the forthcoming
investigations entitled "The Great Intel-
ligence Exam." I ask unanimous consent
that it be printed in the RECORD.
There being Tic objection, the editorial
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
THE GREAT INTELLIGENCE EXAM ?
This is the era of bosom-baring and the
country's numerous intelligence-gathering
organizations are not immune. As things
stand now, various committees of the House
and Senate are gearing up for investigations
of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigation, the Defense In-
telligence Agency and the National Security
Agency. We hope that these investigations
will be boiled down to; at most, one select
committee in the House and Senate. We also .
hope that the investigations will be skepti-
cal, thorough and responsible. A witch-hunt
born of the peculiar sensitivities left over
fromWatergate would not be helpful. A
careftil analysis of this country's intelligence
problems and legislation to remedy the mis-
takes and deficiencies of the past are very
surely in order. A bipartisan congressional
investigation is especially desirable in view
of the conservative complexion of the blue-
ribbon executive panel headed by Vice Presi-
dent Rockefeller which is also looking into
CIA activities.
The difficulty, of course, is that, when it
comes to intelligence-gathering operations,
bosom-baring Is a tricky procedure. The risk
is that too much public exposure of a highly
sensitive area of government will put the
whole operation out Of business, and imperil
the reputations?and even the lives?of peo-
ple involved, to say nothing of the nation's
security. In the past, the congressional com-
mittees with intelligence oversight responsi-
bilities have been squeamish about inquiring
too deeply Into these clandestine affairs. The
present danger is that post-Watergate zeal-
otry, inspired by news stories of a "massive,
illegal dotnestic intelligence operation"
mounted by the CIA a few years back, will
lead 'to excesses of revelation.
For our part, we remain unconvinced that
the charges have much real foundation.
From what has been revealed so far?mostly
by CIA Director William R Colby to a House
Appropriations subcommittee?it appears
that the agency was involved in a program of
Internal surveillance of certain domestic dis-
sident groups suspected of having connec-
tions with foreign agents. CIA agents were
"Inserted" in ? some of these organizations,
some mail between American citizens and
Communist correspondents was read, and
flies?largely furnished by the FBI?were
established on some 10,000 people. In addi-
tion, Colby said, the program involved physi-
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ifranuary 27; 1975
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ?SENATE
cal surveillance, wiretaps and break-ins di-
rected at CIA personnel suspected of security
leaks and, in a few cases, those who were
thought to be receiving the information.
In Colby's opinion and that of his immedi-
ate, predecessor, Defense Secretary James R.
Schlesinger, the CIA, in this period, may
have overstepped the strict limits of its
charter. The various acts have been labelled
as '"reE,,T,ettable" or "inappropriate" or?In
the case of Colby?the result of "a miscon-
ception of the extent of -the CIA's authority."
Richard Helms, who was CIA director during
most of the period of anti-war fervor, stoutly
denies any impropriety on his part. The dif-
ference in judgment reflects more than any-
thing else the change in climate in the last
two years.
But surely a large part of .the problem lies
In the ambiguity of the charter of the CIA,
written by Congress in 1947. In setting up
the agency, Congress ruled that it should
have no "police, subpoena, law enforcement
powers or internal security functions" with-
in the United States?this area being strictly
reserved to the long-established FBI.
How realistic and workable this prohibi-
tion was is sharply illustrated by the events
under investigation. Despite the prohibition
against domestic spying, the director of the
CIA was also made "responsible for protect-
ing intelligence sources and methods from
unauthorized disclosure." He was also in-
structed by Congress to "perform such other
functions and duties relating to intelligence
affecting the national security as the Na-
tional Security Council may from time to
time direct." Between them, it can be argued
that these directives provide ample justifica-
tion for the activities being denounced as
"illegal." And the evidence Is reasonably
clear that a number of former directors be-
lieved this was indeed the case. -
Clearly, the first objective of the current
investigations must be to spell out more
? clearly the rules under which the CIA?and
other intelligence agencies as well?are sup-
posed to function. It aU domestic counter- ,
espionage is to be more severely restricted--
as seems to be the mood of the liberal major-
ity?Congress will also have to figure out how
the CIA is to protect its "sources and meth-
ods from unauthorised disclosure." One ob-
vious way, of course, would be pass a law
making it a'crime for former CIA agents -to
write books. But this would not solve the
larger problem of trying to separate domestic
and foreign intelligence into neatly separate
operations. -
Mr. STENNIS, Mr. President, how
much time do I have remaining out of
my 20 minutes?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. (Mr.
Doeteence) . The Senator has 2 minutes
remaining.
Mr. TOWER, Mr. PreSident, I yield 10
additional minutes to the Senator from
Mississippi.
Mr. STENNIS. As I understand, that
will leave me 12 minutes,
Mr. President, may we have order?
The PRESIDING OFFICeat. The Sen-
ate will be in order.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, my main
plea today is for the protection of for-
eign intelligence said intelligenee sources.
I think all other matters do not add up,
in the? range of importance with the
CIA's operations, to compare with this
collection of foreign intelligence,
appreciate very much the sentiments
expressed on the floor of the Senate as
to the necessity for CIA and other intel-
ligence agencies, but that view is not
shared by all the people and is not under-
stood, either, by all the people. There is a
great deal of sentiment, even under-
standing sentiment, that would question
the necessity for the CIA, or the pro-
priety of having it.
Another thing, Mr. President, is that
this is not a political issue, and CIA is
not a political agency of any kind. It
serves one President after another, as
they come. It makes no difference which
party that President belongs to and has
nothing to do, with political matters.
Primarily, CIA is a Government agency
collecting foreign intelligence of the most
highly sensitive nature.
To be effective, it must be secret. If
intelligence facts are disclosed, they often
lose all of their value. If an adversary
merely infers that we have certain in-
telligence, often it is no longer of value.
An illustration would be work on a
code.
The purpose of gathering intelligence
is to learn intentions and capabilities.
The first extensive foreign intelligence
act ever passed by the Congress was in
1947. Called the CIA, it has come a long,
long way in the past 26 years. For il-
lustration, we no longer argue about a
missile gap, or a bomber gap.
In the broad and essential fields, the
CIA has done an extensive and effective
job in dealing with enemy capabilities
and intentfons.
As we go through investigations, let us
keep in mind the dangers from expo-
sures. Exposures can be a matter of life
and death to Americans abroad as well as
friendly foreigners. This ?Pinion is
strongly shared by many highly respected
persons, including Director Colby, who
have been a part of the operations and
know the facts first-hand. Friendly gov-
ernments and friendly foreigners will
greatly reduce, if not terminate their co-
operation and assistance. They already
have. The information flow has been
greatly reduced. Our relations with other
nations have 'been strained. Exposure of
sensitive facts through hearings, through
pressures, through staff members, or
through other sources, regardless of the
good intentions of the actors, comes at a
price we cannot bear. ?
In a time of nuclear weapons, with the
power to deliver warheads on target from
continent to continent, we must have re-
sponsible information from many foreign
sources. Further, our ships at sea, our
military manpower scattered throughout
the world in support of many commit-
ments voluntarily made, are all in need
of the fruit of intelligence 'gathered
around the world.
The President, all Presidents, have to
have this worldwide intelligence in for-
mulating foreign policies, including trade
and other economic policies formulated
with nations around the world. ,
Intelligence comes from several
sources, but much of it comes from our
CIA agents abroad. In ray travels, I have
found them to be excellent men, capable
and loyal, with a steady stream of highly
valuable and responsible information.
They seldom get credit for anything.
They often get blamed?but by and
large, they continue to carry on.
One purpose of my remarks today is to
say a word of encouragement to those
S 973
men; to tell them they are appreciated,
and to ask them to carry on under highly
adverse conditions.
From some of this intelligence, we
make decisions in the Congress as to
military weaponry. We often save great
sums of money, because this intelligence
lets us know what weapons to avoid
building as well as what weapons are
most probably needed. Without the in-
telligence gained under the CIA direc-
tion, we would not have known of the
missiles in Cuba until they were actually
fully installed and we were directly un-
der the gun.
Indeed, U.S. intelligence, on which the
CIA sits at the top, has come a long way
over the past two decades. We have
reached the point where the SALT agree-
ment is possible, because we can now
verify what they have in being. A num-
ber of other treaties have also been pos-
sible, because of our vertification process.
Under Director Colby, I feel that the
CIA is now operating in a fine way, en-
tirely within the law. I shall do my part
in keeping it that way. -
The organic act creating the CIA needs
some amendments which tighten up the
present law. Our committee has given
some major amendments which I intro-
duced in late 1973, special attention in
1974. I assisted Senator PROXMIRE with a
similar major amendment offered by him
to the military authorization bill. It
passed the Senate with my active sup-
port and we made a strong effort at
the conference in behalf of the amend-
ment. It finally lost at conference be-
cause it was not germane, but the con-
ferees for the House supported the idea
of hearings which the House has started.
We shall continue our efforts on that
amendment and others.'.
We
We may have certain intelligence of
great value to us. But hit is known to
our adversaries that we have At, or if
they suspect that we have it, then it
turns to ashes in our hands and is' of
no value whatsoever. - -
Illustration: Hundreds of millions of
dollars invested in electronic devices can
become valueless overnight if it be-
comes known we have such devices. -
Our committee shall continue to exer-
cise committee jurisdiction on legisla-
tion regarding the CIA,- and also exer-
cise surveillance over its operations, and
such other activities connected therewith
as may be necessary.
We shall continue to have the Senator
from Montana (Mr. MANSFIELD), and the
Senator froth Pennsylvania (Mr. SCOTT),
the Democratic and Republican floor
leaders and hence representing all of
the Senators, invited to all of our meet-
ings regarding the surveillance of the
CIA. I have discussed this with the Sena-
tor from Montana on last Thursday and
lie expects to- attend. The Senator from
Pennsylvania attended our session last
Thursday.
The CIA, of course must operate within
the law, but I want to emphasize to all
of my colleagues and to the American
people that foreign intelligence supplied
by the CIA is absolutely necessary for our
President and his close advisers, includ-
ing the top officials of all of our military
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S 974 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ?SENATE
services, both those in civilian and mill-.
s
tory positions. In modern times this in-
formation is not merely needed, it is es-
sential.- .
Therefore, someone has to stand up for
the CIA through foul as well as fair
weather; and make hard decisions and
take firm stands, whether popular at
the time or not. I have done that and I
Propose to do just that in the future. I
shall not shirk this duty.
This does not at all mean that I pro-
pose to operate a duplicate or rival in-
vestigation with any select comm1ttee,
will make no attempt to do that, but I
will carry out the purpose,. as I have
briefly outlined it here. .
I thank the Senator from Texas for
yielding this time to me.
The PRESIDING OEVICER. Who
yields time?
Mr. TOWER, Mr. President, I thank
the distinguished Senator from Mis-
sissippi for his cogent remarks.
I think it would be appropriate for
me to thank him at this time for the
splendid leadership he has shown in the
Committee on Armed Services. In fact,
on numerous occasions, we have looked
In depth at some activities of ,the CIA
and it has not been generally known
that we have. I think the Senator from
Mississippi has always measured up to
his .responsibility in the highest tradi-
tion of the Senate.
? Mr, President, may I inquire how
much time I have left?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator has 15 minutes remaining.
Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, I send to
the desk an amendment and ask that it
he stated.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk
will state the amendment.
Mr. TOWER. May I call to the at-
tention of my friend from Rhode Island
that I have now offered the amendment.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
At the end of the resolution add a new
section as follows:- ?
"No employee of the select committee or
any person engaged by contract or other-
wise to perform services for, the select com-
mittee shall be given access to any clas-
sified information by the select committee
unless such employee or person. has received
an appropriate security clearance. The type
of security clearance to be required in the
case of any such employee or person shall
be commensurate with the sensitivity of the
classified information to which such em-
ployee or person will be given access by the
select committee."
Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, the
amendment is somewhat self-explana-
tory. However, I think we -should make
some legislative history on it. What is
contemplated here is the type of Q clear-
ance which is administered by the
Atomic Energy Commission and which
the Senator from Rhode Island is so well
familiar with. I should like the Senator
from Rhode Island to comment on it at
this time if he would.
Mr. PASTORE. I have no objection to
the amendment provided I get a fur-
ther explanation of the last sentence:
The type of security clearance to be re-
quired in tho case of any such employee or
person shall be commensurate with the sen-
sitivity of the classified Information to which
such employee or person will be given access
by the select committee.
As determined by the committee.
After all, who is going to make this
determination? We are not going to have
a debate by the members of the commit-
tee every time we get to a point where
this would apply. I am all for preserving.
the classification; the Senator from
Texas knows that I am all for his amend-
ment, the spirit of it, the intention, the
objective of it. But I think we should
make clear that the determination ought
to be on the part of the committee.
When it says "sensitivity of the classi-
fied information," who is going to deter-
mine whether it is sensitive or not? We
have to say here "the type of security
clearance to be required in the case of
any such employee or person shall, with-
in the determination of' the committee,
be commensurate with the sensitivity,"
and so on.
Mr. TOWER. I should be glad to ac-
cept that as a modification by the Sena-
tor from Rhode Island.
Mr. PASTORE. That is what I want. I
want the determination to be made by
the committee, if we can work out that
language. ?
Mr. TOWER. That suits me splendidly.
As a matter of fact, if the Senator will
read that language again, I think that
would be a suitable modification.
Mr. PASTORE. The type of security
clearance to be required in the case of
?any such employee or person shall, with-
in the discretion of the committee itself,
be commensurate with the sensitivity of
the classified information to which such
employee or person will be given access
to the select committee. .
Mr. TOWER. I will accept that lan-
guage as a modification by the Senator
from Rhode Island.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
amendment will be so modified. Will the
Senator send the modification to the
desk?
The amendment, as modified, is as
follows:
No employee of the select committee or
person engaged by contract or otherwise to
perform services for the select committee
shall be given access to any classified infor-
mation by the select committee unless such
employee or person has received an appro-
priate security clearance as determined by
the Select Committee. The type of security
clearance to be required in the case of any
such employee or person shall within, the
determination of the Select Committee be
commensurate with the sensitivity of the
classified .Information to which such em-
ployee or person will be given access by the
select committee.
Mr. TOWER. What is contemplated
here is a simple type of Q clearance
which is ordinarily required of Senate
employees.
Mr. PASTORE. I realize that. Every
member of the staff of the Joint Com-
mittee on Atomic Energy has Q clear-
ance and has to have it. I think in this
particular case, where we are dealing
with classified information, covert ac-
tivities abroad and domestically, I think
we have to have reliable people. We just
cannot afford to take a chance.
Now, I am all for this study and this
investigation. I repeat, I do not want to
January 27, 1975
be misunderstood. There have been a lot
of mistakes and they have to be cor-
rected. But we are not out to destroy
intelligence-gathering.
? I remember one time when I was sent
by President Kennedy to Moscow to wit-
ness the signing of the Nuclear Test Ban
Treaty. I was sitting on the porch of the
Embassy, together with Dean Rusk, at
the time, and we were talking about a
lot of measures. Finally, the Ambassador
came out and said, "I suggest you two
gentlemen take a walk and do your talk-
ing because this place is bugged."
"This place is bugged." Now, that is
what the Russians are doing to us. As a
matter of fact, they did it right down
there at the United Nations. They had a
bug, I think, under the American seal.
We all remember that.
Let us face it: We are in a critical
world where we are being spied upon
and, in order to know what they are
doing, we have to spy on them. There is
no question about that. But that has
nothing to do with many of these charges
that have been made.
Nobody is out to destroy the CIA. Let
uS get an understanding on this. No one
Is out to destroy military intelligence. No
one is out to destroy the FBI. Let us make
it all clear.
On the other hand, this is an open
society. All we are saying is that there
are some things that have been wrong,
and under the pretext of either national
security or secrecy, private rights are be-
ing violated unnecessarily. That is all we
are trying to eliminate. That is all we are
trying to do. It is as simple as all that.
am perfectly willing- to accept this
amendment with that modification.
? Mr. TOWER. The modification has
been accepted. The amendment has been
so modified.
I might say one other thing. I think
this is partially for the committee's pro-
tection. If we did not require clearance
of some sort, it is not impossible that an
alien intelligence organization could
penetrate the committee by inserting one
of its people on the committee staff. So I
think we would want that kind of protec-
? tion, because I do not think the commit-
tee would ever want to be embarrassed
by finding, having failed to require any
kind of clearance, that their staff had
been penetrated.
Mr. BAKER. Will the Senator yield?
Mr. TOWER. I yield to the Senator
from Tennessee.
Mr. BAKER. Will the Senator from
Texas reassure me that by setting up
these requirements for classification, we
are not setting up within the committee
layers of access and levels of access to in-
formation that will be available to the
committee? What I have in mind is the
possibility that the committee may de-
cide that there is a requirement for secu-
rity beyond even the requirements for Q
clearance, a kind of "eyes only" classi-
fication, and have someone say to Ho-
ward Baker, that he can read those 8,-
000 pages, but his staff man does not
have that clearance.
Now, can the Senator assure me that
nothing that is contained in this amend-
ment will in any way deprive any Mem-
ber of access, and his staff, if otherwise
properly cleared?
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Mr. TOWER. I do not perceive that it
would. In other words, for the protection
of the staff?
Mr. BAKER. What does the Senator
mean, he does not perceive that it would?
Is it his opinion that it would or would'
not?
Mr. TOWER. It is my opinion that it
would not.
Mr. BAKER. Does the Senator wish
that to be included as part of the legis--
lative history?
Mr. TOWER. As a matter of fact, the
committee itself will determine.
Mr. BAKER. Does he wish it to be a
part of the legislative history of this
amendment that it is not his under-
standing or intention as the author of
this amendment to create that situation?
Mr. TOWER. It is not my intention
to create that situation.
Mr. BAKER. And h , is not his belief
that that will occur?
Mr. TOWER. It is not my belief that
it will occur. But it is my intention that
we should .not have people on the staff
who would be security risks.
Mr. BAKER. We all share that con-
cern. Let us very much hope we succeed
in keeping leaks from occurring alto-
gether. I assure the Senator that this
will be the ,case as far as this Senator is
concerned. But as far as I am concerned,
I cannot in good conscience see the
adoption of an amendment that will
make part of this committee privy to
highly sensitive material while other
parts of the committee, though legally,
as a practical matter might be deprived
of that information.
Mr. PASTORE. Will the Senator ex-
plain that again?. , ?
Mr. BAKER. Yes. Assume for a mo-
ment that the committee, in its dis-
cretion, according to the amendment
that the Senator from Rhode Island pro-
posed and Senator TOWER accepted,
adopts some classification beyond, say,
a Q clearance. We all know there are
some classifications beyond a Q clear-
ance. Suppose the Senator's personal
staff or select committee staff comes to
him and says, "I cannot gain access to
that last communication Director Colby
sent to us because' the committee says
we have to have an XQI clearance as
well as a Q clearance." I want to be sure
that!, as a member of the committee, or
anyone else as a member of the cora-
rnittee, will not be thus deprived of ae-
cess to any information that comes be-
fore that committee.
Mr. PASTORE. His amendment only
has to do with staff members. The Sena-
tor is saying he does not want to be
deprived. If a member of his staff or
anyone on that staff that he maybe re-
sponsible for the committee engaging
does not get the clearance from the com-
mittee that he must have, he cannot get
the information.
There is nothing wrong with that, be-
cause he is the one who determined that
he could not get it.
Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, as long
as I am assured, which is the only thing
I sought, that the concern that I ex-
pressed was not the intention of the
author of the amendment, I will be sat-
isfied I do not want to be deprived, legally
or effectively, of any information that
comes before this committee. If there
are 10,000 pages of classified material, I
cannot read it, and the Senator cannot
either, or It is unlikely that he is going
to be able to.
I think I have that assurance. If the
Senator from Texas will-express his un-
derstanding that, this will not be used as
a device to deprive any of us of informa-
tion, then I am perfectly pleased with it.
Mr. TOWER. It was the intention of
the Senator from Texas to establish what
he thinks is the minimum requirement
that we can establish; that is, some sort
of clearance for people. I noted a moment
ago that it is conceivable that if we re-
quired nothing, the committee staff
could be penetrated by an alien intelli-
gence-gathering organization. I think
this would be particularly true of clerical
help.
I think that the professional staff that
Is likely to be engaged will probably be
people who will have no difficulty getting
any kind of clearance they need. It is not
my intention to proscribe or to hobble
the action of any Senator on the com-
mittee.
Mr. BAKER. Whose authority will be
required to gain the clearance, that of
the full committee or the chairman and
vice chairman?
Mr. PASTORE. By vote of the com-
mittee.
Mr. TOWER. I should say the commit-
tee has to meet and make its ground
rules pursuant to the guidelines laid down
here.
Mr. BAKER. Is that the Senator's
intention?
Mr. TOWER. That is my intention.
Mr. PASTORE. May we have the
amendment read again?
Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, one fur-
ther question, if I may: It has been neces-
sary, in my experience, to enlist one's
personal staff, legislative assistant, or
anyone else, to help in a compilation or
ordering of the information at hand. I
fully agree that then they should be re-
quired to have whatever clearance is
required, and be fully investigated. But
I hope there is nothing in this amend-
ment that would prevent an application
for clearance of personal staff, and that
on obtaining that clearance, they would,
In fact, be subject to the same rules as
committee staff,
Mr. PASTORE. That is correct. We do
that on the joint committee now. The
Senator from Missouri has had members
of his staff who have Q clearance look
at some of our classified information.
They are entitled to do it, with the per-
mission of the committee itself.
Every person who looks at classified
information has to be cleared. We should
be clear about that.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. TOWER. I yield to the Senator
from Missouri.
Mr. SYMINGTON. I thank my able
friend from Texas.
As I understand it, whoever is cleared,
whether lie be on the staff or off the
staff, is cleared for the information. He
is cleared for the Information on the
basis of the nature of the clearance that
S 975
he receives. It would be up to the Senator
In question to decide whether he was
violating the rules of the Senate if he
was on the committee and at, the same
time discussed any matter with somebody
who did not have the proper clearance.
'Am I correct in that?
Mr. BAKER. Absolutely.
Mr. PASTORE. That is right. No one
disputes that.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, will the ,
Senator yield for a question?
Mr. PASTORE. Yes.
Mr: STENNIS. I believe the Senator
from Missouri was talking about some-
one who was not on the committee staff.
I would not think that anyone who was
not responsible to the committee would
have access to this information.
Mr. PASTORE. Oh, no?
Mr. SYMINGTON. May I say In an-
swer to my able friend, the Senator from
Mississippi, I was discussing this matter
with the distinguished senior Senator
from Tennessee on the basis of his staff;
and the Senator is entirely correct, and
if he is on the committee?and I read he
was on the committee?then it would be
his problem to see that the people on his
staff were cleared to receive the informa-
tion on the basis of their clearance, and
did not receive it if they did not have
adequate clearance. -
Mr. PASTORE. Provided they got the
permission of the committee.
Mr. STENNIS. It would be a commit-
tee responsibility.
Mr. PASTORE. That is why I am writ-
ing there "by the determination of the
committee." -
Mr. BAKER. I entirely agree with that.
Does the Senator from Texas?
Mr. TOWER. The determination is to
be made by the committee, that is the
difference.
Mr. BAKErt. And it can be made foi-?-
security classification for personal staff
as well as staff?
Mr. TOWER. Not for personal staff. I
think for any information that the Sen-
ator gives to his personal staff, he has
the personal responsibility to determine
whether that staff member has an ade-
quate clearance. My oWn personal policy -
is that nobody handles classified docu-
ments on my staff unless they have
clearance.
Mr. BAKER. That is the essence of my
question. The answer to the question to
the Senator from Texas is?
Mr. PASTORE. We are confusing a
very simple thing. Let us get it plain. No
one can look at classified information
unless they have clearance.
Mr. TOWER. Right.
Mr. PASTORE. If a personal staff
member of any member of the commit-
tee has that clearance, he or she can be
entitled to that classified information
only if the committee gives permission.
Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, that is my
understanding.
Mr. PASTORE. That is the rule of the
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy now.
I cannot say in-nore clearly than that.
Mr. BAKER. Is that correct?
Mr. TOWER. That is correct, and the
policy will be set by the committee. I see
no reason why a majority of the com-
mittee cannot work it out satisfactorily.
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S 976 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ?SENATE
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time
of the Senator from Texas has expired.
The Senator. from Rhode Island has 32
minutes.
Mr. PASTORE. I think we ought
to get this amendment clarified further.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr: PASTORE. I yield.
Mr. MANSFIELD. I understand, Mr.
President, after listening to this debate,
that it is the Senate select committee, if
there is one approved by the Senate,
which has the final determination as to
who shall have access to what informa-
tion; is that correct?
Mr. PASTORE. That is correct.
Mr. MANSFIELD; No executive agency
shall determine directly or indirectly who
shall. have access to information.
Mr. PASTORE. That is correct. And I
cannot- be more explicit than that. I
would like to have the amendment read.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk
will read the amendment..
The legislative clerk read as follows:
At the end of the resolution add a new sec-
tion as follows:
"No employee of the select committee or
any person engaged by contract or otherwise
to perform services for the select committee
shall be given access to any classified in-
formation by the select-. committee unless
such employee or person has received an
appropriate security clearance as determiLned
by the select committee The type? of secu-
rity clearance to be required in the case of
any such employee or person shall within the
de termination of the select committee be
commensurate with the sensitivity of the
classified information to which such em-
ployee or person will be given access by the
select committee." ?
? The PRESIDING OrsaCER. The Sen-
ator from Rhode Island has 30 minutes
remaining. ?
Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. PASTORE. I yield.
. Mr. CRANSTON. The Senator from
Rhode Island, I think, has performed a
very useful service in making plain that
the second part of this amendment is
finally in hand for decisionmaking pur-
poses of the committee.
Mr. PASTORE.. That is- correct. ,
Mr. CRANSTON:, But the first part
creates a similar problem. '
Mr. PASTORE. No, he added the words
for the first part, too; right at the end
of the first sentence he added the words
"within the determination of the select
committee." .
Mr. CRANSTON. I have a somewhat
similar question to ask; it is similar in
its implication, and I perhaps need the
help of the Senator in figuring out what
to do about it.
With respect to the words "unless such
employee or person has received an ap-
propriate security clearance," who gives
security clearance? -
Mr. PASTORE. Usually by the FBI
and all other sensitive agencies of Gov-
ernment. That is the way they do it now.
Mr. CRANSTON. The question I ask
Is, how do you prevent, and just make
certain, that there is no abuse of this
by the executive branch? They would
not, I assume, try to hold down the staff
to zero, but they might improperly with-
hold or delay security clearances. '
Mr. PASTORE. The Senator from
Montana just asked the question arid I
answered it. It is not up to any agency
executive; it is up to the committee.
Mr. CRANSTON. Who is going to give
clearances, the committee or the execu-
tive?
Mr. PASTORE. The committee is going
to determine whether the clearance is
adequate and sufficient.
Mr. CRANSTON. If a staff person that
the committee wishes to use is denied
clearance by the executive branch can
the cOmmittee override and decide they
are going to hire that person?
Mr. PASTORE. Well, in an extreme
case, I would have to answer the Senator
in the affirmative, but I mean, after all,
I do not anticipate that. I do not antici-
pate that trouble.
Mr. CRANSTON. I did not anticipate
it generally. I think we might anticipate
it in regard to certain individuals who
might render invaluable service to the
committee but who might be preferred
not to be on that committee staff by one
or another of the agencies we are talking
about.
Mr. PASTORE. Is the Senator saying
to me if for some capricious motive some
executive department refused to grant
a clearance, the question would arise,
would that put that individual out of
commission? ?
Mr. CRANSTON. Yes.
Mr. PASTORE. The answer is no. The
answer is it is up to the committee to
make the determination.
Mr. CRANSTON. That is fine. I thank
the Senator.
Mr. PASTORE. OK. Does any other
Senator wish to, speak before we-vote?
, Mr. BAKER. Mr. President; I am
happy to have this-opportunity to express
my support for Senate Resolution .21,
legislation establishing a Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence Oversight.
As an original cosponsor of the resolu-
tion offered by Senators MANSFIELD and
Mamma, and as? a strong supporter of
this legislation offered by Senator PAS-
TORE, I believe this resolution to set in
motion a responsible study of the intelli-
gence activities, carried out by or for the
United States is of tremendous impor-
tance. -
In supporting the creation of a select
committee, as in sponsoring legislation
to establish a permanent Joint Commit-
tee on Intelligence Oversight, let me em-
phasize that it is not my intention to
criticize the distinguished chairmen of
the Armed Services Committee or the Ap-
propriations Committee, or the ranking
minority members of those committees.
They have done. an admirable job in
carrying out the diverse duties and re-
sponsibilities of leadership on those com-
mittees., In my view, however, the. far-
reaching operations of the some 60 Gov-
ernment agencies which conduct an in-
telligence or law enforcement function
demand the careful scrutiny of a select
committee created for that purpose and
charged with that responsibility.
Some have argued that Congress can-
not be trusted to participate in the crit-
January 27, 1975
ical and terribly secret operations, of the
Intelligence community. They cite the
fact that Washington has become known
as a city of leaks.. I suggest, though, that
critics are losing sight of the explicit-con-
fidence-in which Congress has dealt with
national security agencies of the highest
order in the-past.
In our past national conflicts, during
World- War I, World War -II, the Korean
war, and the war in Vietnam, the rule
has been confidentiality where required.
I am proud to serve on the Joint Com-
mittee on Atomic Energy, a committee
which is so ably chaired by the sponsor
of Senate Resolution 21, Senator PAS-
TORE. I believe I.., am correct in saying
that, in more than a quarter century,
there has never been a security leak from
the Joint Committee, which daily deals
With what are perhaps the most sensi-
tive materials in the entire annals of
the defense establishment. It is evident,
then, that ample precedent exists for
congressional participation in such a
sensitive area. I am not impressed by
those who contend that Congress is not
to be trusted. with the truth.
A balance must always be made be-
tween the requirements of a democracy
for public knowledge, and the require-
ments of its security and defense. When
a doubt, arises, the people's branch of
Government must be- privy to those re-
quirements and, the pertinent informa-
tion required to make a balancing judg-
ment.
The outcome of the select committee
inquiry, obviously, cannot be foreseen.
I pledge my personal efforts, just as I
know the other members of -the select
committee will dedicate their efforts, to
seeing that our job is done thoroughly
and that we follow the facts wherever
they lead without fear or favor. This res-
olutipn charters neither a whitewash nor
a witch hunt;. it does establish a select
committee to carry out a sensitive mis-
sion as fairly, and as. even handedly as
possible.
It is not may intention to carry out a
vendetta against the Central Intelligence
agency, or against any established intel-
ligence agency of our Government. I be-
lieve that the CIA, the FBI, and other
agencies are necessary to the security of
our national institutions when they per-
form their proper functions.
Serious allegations have been made,
however, and it is the responsibility of the
Congress to .weigh the charges, find the
facts, and determine what remedial ac-
tion, if any, is necessary to make sure
that an effective intelligence program is
maintained without endangering the
rights of our citizens.
Mr. President, I shall not detain the
Senate long. Everything has been said
which should be said, I believe. I am
pleased and I am gratified and enthusi-
astic about the action that I believe the
Senate is about to take. I think that it
signifies diligence and sensitivity and the
recognition of a necessary national pur-
pose. It speaks well of the viability of
this group as a great deliberative body
in support of the executive branch of
Government.
I have no quarrel with the CIA. I per-
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD --SENATE S 977
tainly have no quarrel with the Senate
Armed Services Committee or its distin-
guished chairman. This resolution, how-
ever, is drafted so that It extends far be-
yond the CIA, to the entire intelligence
apparatus of this country. Some of rny
colleagues may be interested to know
there are 60 agencies of the U.S. Gov-
ernment ;that conduct some sort of intel-
ligence or law enforcement responsibility.
There are 16 agencies of the Government
conducting intelligence operations other
than the CIA and the DIA, Defense In-
telligence Agency, and the FBI, which
have a combined budget of over a billion
dollars a year. The intelligence of the
Federal Government is an enormous
business.
I became concerned about this. matter
in the course of Watergate. The stories
which have appeared in the press and
been related by others to me since that
time have done nothing to allay that
concern. It is important, I _believe, that
we have a thoroughgoing investigation to
determine whether or not the agencies
involved in the intelligence activities of
the Government are complying with the
requirements of the law.
But maybe?just maybe, Mr. Presi-
dent?there is one ether thing that we
need to do to reassure not only Congress
but the people of this country, and that
is to make sure that the intelligence coin-
mimity and, of course, to some extent
the law enforcement community, is un-
der somebody's control. They are not au-
tonomous entities within a representa-
tive democracy, as I am sometimes
tempted to suspect.
We are not talking about a Republican
national administration or a Democratic.
I rather suspect that some of the prac-
tices that we see discussed in the public
forum began a long time ago, and maybe
included activities going all the way back,
possibly, to the Eisenhower administra-.
tion, the Kennedy administration, and
the Johnson administration. I think, Mr.
President, one of the major undertakings
of this committee ought to be to talk to
the last surviving ex-President we have
and to examine the records that are
available to us to determine whether or
not the President of the United States
knows what is going on in the CIA, ,the
DIA, and the FBI..
I want to be reassured in that respect,
and I confess I am not now. I suppose we
would run into the questions of our
friendly adversaries on executive privi-
lege and executive powers with respect
to those Presidential powers. I know for-.
mer President Harry Truman declined to
grant certain information after he left
office, but I think we ought to try. We
ought to find out not whether the CIA,
for instance, was engaged in domestic
surveillance, but whether somebody was
running the show. I know Congress was
not running the show; and I want to be
relieved of that shuddering fear I have
that the White House was not, either.
So I pledge, if I am a member of this
committee, that I will conduct it as dis-
creetly and privately as I can commen-
surate with my responsibility.
I pledge that we will be careful to
preserve our legitimate intelligence in-
tens Is.
,
I pledge, as well, that the public's right
to know is second only to national sur-
vival, and that when we are finished with
the private portion of . these hearings
there will be a public disclosure, a public
declaration including the good and bad,.
recent and in the past.
It is a terrible time we are in. We have
not had a President who has completed
his term, in a sense, since President Ei-
senhower. These are turbulent times
when we have set about the business of
investigating ourselves to the point where
sometimes I think we are devouring our
public officials, our leaders.
When I permit myself the luxury of
thinking that, sometimes it also dawns
on me that the investigation has been
pretty productive, and we have got to do
.this one, too, not because we are bent on
political cannibalism, but because it has
to be done.
I believe, Mr. President, that it will be
clone, and done effectively.
I Pledge my efforts in that respect
and I serve notice, as well, that I will de-
vote every ounce of my energy to seeing
that we find all the facts and pursife
them, wherever they lead us.
It is far too late in my political career
to worry about whom I might hurt or
who might be injured. ?
Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. PASTORE. Have we voted on the
amendment?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The ques-
tion is on agreeing to the amendment of
the Senator from Texas, as modified by
the Senator from Rhode Island.
The amendment was agreed to.
Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, will the
Senator from Rhode Island yield to me?
Mr. PASTORE. How much time will
the Senator require?
Mr. TOWER. A couple of minutes.
Mr. PASTORE. All right.
Mr. TOWER. Since I have run out of
time.
Mr. PASTORE. OK;
Mr. TOWER. I have an amendment
here which I will either offerer not offer.
It is copied directly out of the resolution
that authorized the select committee for
the Watergate investigation. ?
It simply says:
The minority members of the selept com-
mittee shall have one-third of - the profes-
sional stair of the select committee (includ-
ing a Minority counsel) and such part of the
clerical staff as may be adequate.
Mr. PASTORE:- Why not leave that to
the committee?
I think?
Mr. TOWER. The Senate resolution re-
quires 30 percent, I believe.
Mr. PASTORE. Yes.
Mr. TOWER. If the Senator from
Rhode Island will simply assure me the
minority will get adequate staffing?
Mr. PASTORE. It will be up to the'
committee itself. I will not have any au-
thority over the committee.
Mr. TOWER. I think an undertaking
by this side of the aisle would be honored
by the majority on the committee.
Mr. PASTORE. All right, so I under-
take it.
Mt-. TOWER. I thank my friend from
Rhode Island.
Mr. HATe iELD. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. PASTORE. I yield to the Senator.
Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, I send
an amendment to the desk and ask for its
immediate consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
amendment will be stated.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
At the end of the resolution add a new sec-
tion as follows:
Sec. 7. As a condition for employment as
described in Section 3 of this Resolution,
each person shall agree not to accept any
honorariutn, royalty or other payment for a
speaking engagement, magaalne article, book,
or other endeavor connected with the investi-
gation and study undertaken by this Com-
mittee.
Mr. PASTORE. I will accept this
amendment, Mr. President.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The ques-
tion is on agreeing to the amendment of
the Senator from Oregon.
The amendment was agreed to.
Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, I send
up another amendment for the purpose
of colloquy. -
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
amendment will be stated.
The assistant legislative clerk read as
follows: . - -
On Page 4, line 4, insert after the word
"agency" the following: "or any Committee
or Subcommittee of the Congress."
On Page 5, line 13, insert after the word
"agencies" the following: "or any Commit-
tees or Subcommittees of the Congress"
Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, I
would like to ask the Senator from Rhode
Island a question because I may with-
draw the amendment after I have the
record made on the problem that con- ?
cerns me so greatly.
As a member of the Rules Commit-
tee, I am aware that we have brought
before us the requests from various com-
mittees and subcommittees in the Senate
for the budget to operate that committees
_ The Internal Security Subcommittee
of the Committee on the Judiciary, dur-
ing the presentation of their budget re--
quest on February 27, 1974, indicated
that they kept records on various people
in this country which they gathered
through intelligence activity. They had
files, names of people that could be con-
sidered as suspicious, and other such
characteristics as they indicated to our
committee.
My Only point is that I realize that this
Is not a matter of one Senate committee
investigating other subcommittees or
committees where we have the word
"investigation" on page 2 of our resolu-
tion today, however, we have some vari-
ous generalities as to what this commit-
tee's authority may include.
A prime responsibility is that it can
look into, of course, any agency which is
carrying out intelligence or surveillance
activities on behalf of any agency of
the Federal Government.
I would like to ask the Senator from
Rhode Island if he considers that the
language is broad enough, on page 2,
lines 8 and 9, to include the reviewing of
the activities of the Internal Security
Subcommittee of the Committee on the
Judiciary of the U.S. Senate, as it might
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S 978 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD?SENATE
relate to surveillance activities or gather-
ing of intelligence.
Mr. PASTORE. Well, I mean, if they
so determine. I do not see how that is
apt to happen. The House already dis-
banded that committee. I hope we do it
here in the Senate, as well. But this is
a far-reaching authority.
If they so choose to do it, I would say
that they could, but I would not want to
amend the present resolution as it now
' stands.
Mr. HATFIELD. Would the Senator
have any objections to the latitude and
scope of this committee being interpreted
to include, some review or investigation
of activities of the-Internal Security Sub-
committee, to see how it is collecting
data?
Mr. PASTORE. Well, if they have done
things as bad as the CIA or FBI, If it is
so determined, I do not see why any
Senate committee should be immune.
I mean, we have got to treat ourselves
as we expect to treat everybody else.,
Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, I am
'very happy to hear the Senator say this,
because it would seem to me- if we are
basically concerned about the abridge-
ment of civil rights of our citizens
through the action of gathering intel-
ligence, and so forth, of executive agen-
cies, we should be doubly concerned
about the procedures used by one of our
own subcommittees of the U.S. Senate.
I, for one, am not satisfied with the
answers I receiVed from the chief clerk
of that subcommittee as he appeared
before our Rules Committee.
I would like to think it i& understood
that the resolution certainly carries with
it enough authority for that committee
under this resolution to look into these
activities of the Internal Security Sub-
committee, if someone brings that issue
up before the committee.
Mr. PASTORE. Or any other com-
mittee. - ? -
Mr. HATFIELD. Or any other com-
mittee, but this one committee is already
involved.
Mr. PASTORE. But that is not the
-thrust, I want' to make it clear, not the
thrust of: this resolution, but it woUld be
encompassed in it because it is broad in,
scope.
Mr. HATriELD. I understand, but I
would not want to exclude one of our
own subcommittees, if we are so anxious
to investigate the executive agency. That
is why I am raising the question. Con-
gress should look at its own intelligence
gathering and file keeping also.
Mr. PASTORE. That is right.?
Mr. HATFIELD, Mr. President, I with-,
draw my amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
amendment is withdrawn.
Mr. BARTLETT. Mr. President, will
the Senator from Rhode- Island yield to
me 2 minutes?
Mn PASTORE. I yield 2 minutes to
the Senator.
Mr. BARTLETT. Mr. President, I call
up my amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
amendment will be stated.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
To Section 2 add a new subsection a,s
?
"(16) Whether new legislation or an
amendment to, any existing legislation should
be enacted to strengthen the national secu-
rity, intelligence or surveillance activities of
the United States."
Mr. BARTLETT, Mr. President, the
amendment adds to section 2, beginning
on page 3, one more paragraph, to insure
that the Senate further expressly auth-
orizes and directs the select committee to
make a complete investigation with re-
spect to the following matters, or ques-
tions. It adds the question of whether
there needs to be any bill introduced or
any amendment to strengthen the na-
tional security, intelligence or surveil-
lance activities of the United States.
I am aware, as the Senator from Rhode
Island knows, that section 4 on page 10
of the bill authorizes the select commit-
tee to recommend the enactment of any
new legislation or the amendment of any
existing statute which it considers neces-
sary for these purposes.
But I want to be assured that the ques-
tion will be answered by the committee,
and to know that in case there was no
forthcoming legislation that there would
be a definite and definitive answer as to
whether this question, had been reviewed
and answered by the committee in its
re'commendation.
Mr. PASTORE. I would 8uppose so,
otherwise this whole investigation would
be a nullity.
In other words, if nothing was found
and nothing was wrong, and naturally,
of course, they had given a bill of en-
dorsement, we would have to change
nothing by legislation.
On the other hand, if certain authority
was exceeded or the agencies went be,-
yond the parameters of the present char-
ter and got tia mixed up in Laos, got us
mixed up in Chile, got us mixed up in
Cambodia and other parts of the world,
where they had no authority without
the consent of Congress, in that particu-
lar case, the committee would come back
and make a recommendation, if they
would find it necessary to do so.
I would hope, without encumbering
this with duplicate language, that we
would understand that these are legisla-
tive words of art when It says the select
committee shall have authority to recom-
mend the enactment at any new legis-
lation. They have the authority. I would
hope that they would exercise it.
Mn BARTLETT. Will the Senator
yield?
Mr. PASTORE. What the Senator
wants to do is to say that they have to
make a recommendation one way or the
other.
Mr. BARTLETT. I am saying, if I may
say to the Senator from Rhode Island,
that they shall make a determination of
whether or not there is legislation needed
to strengthen the national security, in-
telligence or surveillance activities, that
they shall make that determination. Is
the Senator assuring me that they will
make that determination in deciding
whether or not they will avail themselves
of the authority of section 4?
Mr. PASTORE. I would hope so. I
would hope so.
Mr. BARTLETT. With that assurance
from the Senator from Rhode Island, I
withdraw my amendment.
January'27, .1975
The PRESIDING 0 toriCER. The
amendment is withdrawn.
"Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield? I would like to ask
one question. of the Senator from Texas-
regarding his amendment.
I assume that it was not his intention
that the amendment would be used to
deny a member of the select committee
staff of the knowledge of the existence -
of a classification designation or a classi-
fied program. I ask that in light of the
fact that many documents and pro-
grams bear a classification that is actu-
ally higher than the secret which, itself,
Is classified.
Mr. TOWER. May I say to the Senator
from California I believe we have already
answered that question. It would be up
to the committee to determine what kind
of clearance is required. That will be an
internal housekeeping matter for the
committee. But the guidelines should be
laid down. I believe the committee would
want to be protected. I mentioned as a
worst case theory awhile ago that per-
haps a foreign intelligence-gathering
organization, in the absence of any in-
telligence clearing on our part, could-
- insert one of its people into our commit-
tee staff and actually penetrate the com-
mittee. That would be of considerable'
embarrassment to the committee mem-
ber under whose sponsorship that per-
son was. I think we should have that
protection.
In addition to that fact, the country
should have that protection. I believe we
have a public responsibility to make sure
that the people that we put in these staff -
positions are going to be people whose
sense of discretion and loyalty are be-
yond question.
Mr. CRANSTON. I admire the Sen-
ator's efforts to cut off such dangers.
Since there is no law that gives the Exec-
utive the power of clearance or denial of
clearance, since that is done by Execu-
tive order, whatever rules the committee,
writes will govern what happens in this-
area.
Mr. TOWER. This- is correct. It is the
committee's baby.
Mr. CRANSTON. I thank the Senator....
Mr. PASTORE. Well, let us see if we
cannot put the baby to, sleep.. I suggest
the absence of a quorum.
Mr. TOWER. Will the Senator-with-
hold that for a minute and yields to me?-
Mr. PASTORE. I yield.
Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, in the Fri-
day, January 24, issue of the Arizona Re-
public, William P. Maloney, Jr., a farmer
ambassador to Ghana and a good Dem-
ocrat who insists that CIA regulation is
long overdue, he states that:
In the approaching investigations, it is-im-
portant to keep two things in mind: That a
competent intelligence branch is essential
to our survival and that the CIA, with all its
faults, is one of the best, if not the very best,
organizations of its kind around. So let us
not throw the baby out with the bath.
I ask unanimous consent that his letter
In the Arizona Republic be printed at this
Point in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the letter
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
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January 27, 1975 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD?SENATE
CIA REGULATION LONG. OVERDUE
As a former diplomat, / have followed re-
cent news on alleged involvement of the CIA
in domestic affairs with special concern.
Clearly, congressional oversight and appro-
priate regulation of the agency are long over
due. A recent best seller on the subject, The
CIA and the Cult of Intelligence" by Mar-
chetti & Marks, the accuracy, of which is
generally recognized, makes a compelling
case in this regard.
There is enough blame to taint all in-
volved, not only the agency itself but recent
administrations and especially a pliant and.
gullible Congress. Additionally, the agency
operates under a vague grant of powers
which fails to define what is "domestic" and
what is "foreign," let alone providing guid-
ance for what falls in either category when
It involves legitimate intelligence operations.
But in the approaching investigations, it
is important to keep two things in mind:
that a competent intelligence branch is es-
sential to our survival, and that the CIA,
with all of its faults, is one of the best, if
not the very best, organizations of its kind
around.
So, let's not throw.the baby out with the
bath. Hopefully, in the coming months both
our domestic freedom as well as the struc-
ture and role of this excellent organization
will be strengthened.
Mr. SCHWEICKER. Mr. President., I
would like to commend the distinguished
majority and minority leaders for their
decisive action in moving to establish a
select Senate committee to investigate
the recent charges involving various or-
ganizations within the U.S. intelligence
community. I had introduced my own
legislation in this area, Senate Resold-
tion 6, cosponsored by my colleague from
Wisconsin (Mr. PROxIVIIRE), and I am
pleased that the Senate has decided to
move forward with a similar proposal.
I think it is appropriate to empha-"
size four points in connection with this.
First, this Nation vitally needs an effec-
tive intelligence service. No one disputes
that, and I am confident no one in this
body would support any action which
would undermine the effectiveness of
Government organizations performing
legitimate, necessary, intelligence func-
tions. In the 14 years I have served in
the House and Senate, I spent 10 years
as a member of the Armed Services Com-
mittee, both in the House and here in the
Senate, and that experience convinced
me of the necessity for an effective in-
telligence organization.
But second, and equally important, it
Is the responsibility of -the Congress to
define legitimate intelligence activities,
and to establish guidelines which the ex-
ecutive branch must -follow in conduct-
ing intelligence activities?and then to
see that these guidelines are enforced.
The intelligence community, like every
other sector of our free society, must
be subject to the rule of law?and in
fact, because of the unique nature of
intelligence activities, it is fundamental
to the integrity of our free institutions
that the intelligence community respect
the rule of law.
Unfortunately, the Congress has not
been as vigilant in this area as it should
have been. Despite nearly 200 legisla-
tive proposals, no major legislation re-
gaveling, our intelligence community has
been passed since 1949, when the original
CIA charter was amended. In the inter-
vening years, the statutory authority of
the CIA has apparently been modified
and expanded by a series of secret ad-
ministrative actions, Executive orders,
and National Security Council actions.
As a result, the CIA now has a "secret
charter" which may be vastly different
from the original statute passed by Con-
gress?and even those Members of Con-
gress with oversight responsibilities for
CIA cannot say with confidence what
is in the secret charter. I hope the select
committee will focus a major inquiry in
this area, and will untangle the various
provisions of the secret charter and in-
sure that our basic intelligence author-
ity is embodied in a new statute, passed
by Congress, rather than in a series of
secret documents. In a free society, the
entire concept of a "secret charter" is an
intolerable contradiction in terms and
must not be permitted.
Third, there are numerous indications
that the intelligence community?and
particularly the CIA?has expanded its
functions. into nonintelligence areas,
creating a shadow government, dupli-
cating and even superseding the activi-
ties of other Govermnent agencies. I re-
cently disclosed an unclassified, CIA con-
tract proposal, asking American firms to
conduct industrial espionage against our
NATO allies and others, to determine
their future plans in the area of ground
transportation. Certainly we have a legi-
timate Government interest in this area,
but it should be pursued openly, by the
Department of Transportation or Com-
merce, rather than covertly by the CIA.
And in response to my disclosure, our
NATO allies said they would be happy
to share information of this nature with
our Government and in fact, are now
doing so, thus eliminationg any need for
CIA activity. I hope the select commit-
tee will explore intelligence community
activities in this area, to determine to
what extent a shadow government
has in fact been created, pursuing nor-
mal Government functions in secret,
simply to avoid congressional oversight
and accountability.
Finally, I think it should be empha-
sized that the CIA represents only about
15 percent of the entire U.S. intelligence
effort. Recently, this has been the most
visible 15 percent, in view of press dis-
closures, but certainly no responsible
congressional evaluation in this area can
take Place without inquiry into all facets
of the U.S. intelligence community. My-
bill specifically authorized inquiry into
all U.S. intelligence agencies, and I would
hope the select committee bill adopted
today will have similar broad authority.
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, the reso-
lution before the Senate is the product
of long and thoughtful concern over the
role of intelligence agencies in a demo-
cratic society. Nearly 20 years ago, the
distinguished majority leader urged the
Senate to adopt a related measure to
exercise its responsibility for the activi-
ties of our Nation's intelligence com-
munity.
Since the adoption of the National Se-
curity Act, there have been more than
200 attempts to establish separate and
broadly based intelligence oversight
committees for the Congress.
S 97O
Today, with the leadership of the dis-
tinguished senior Senator from Rhode
Island and the esteemed majority leader,
and the many other Members of this
body who have labored for this change,
we can take a vitally significant step by
the creation of a Senate Select Commit-
tee to Study. Government Operations
with Respect to Intelligence Activities.
This select committee is similar in
many respects to a proposal offered by
Senators MANSFIELD and IVIerunis which
was referred to the Committee on Gov-
ernment Operations. The Subcommittee
on Intergovernmental Relations, which I
chair, held hearings on December 9 and
10 on that and other proposals to
strengthen congressional oversight of-in-
telligence activities.
While we will continue to explore the
long-range congressional needs for a
more permanent oversight mechanism, it
is essential that we have a select corn-
inittee study what has gone before us and
to measure past activities of our intelli-
gence agencies against the laws which
authorized them.
For many years now we have been
given constant assurances by the Central
Intelligence Agency and other intelli-
gence agencies that they have been
forthcoming to the Congress through the
appropriate Channels such as the present
oversight committees. Unfortunately,
events of the past few years, and more
particularly of the past few weeks, ap-
pear to suggest that there is an instinct
on' the part of these agencies to withhold
information from the Congress to protect
themselves.
In the past, proposals from the Con-
gress, from scholars and from Presiden-
tial task forces have been met with little
more than indifference. Certainly public
opinion and opinion in the Congress have
changed.
In recent years we have seen alarming
evidence that the FBI has spied on Con-
gressmen and on domestic political
groups. The President has acknowledged
that the CIA mistakenly became involved
in domestic surveillance. We have had
evidence of military agents spying on
civilians on behalf of an agency treated
by Department of Defense directive. The
list gees on. '
The creation of a select committee to
explore these allegations and activities
as well as the overall activities and re-
sponsibilities of the entire intelligence
community represents an objective re-
sponse by the Senate to difficult and
complex circumstances. It is not a call
for a witch hunt. It is an assumption of
responsibility.
This is an undertaking of the greatest
importance. It is one which has the
strong support of most of the Members
of this body.
It is essential that this select commit-
tee begin now to obtain answers to the
many questions which have been raised
Iii the short run about the recent dis-
closures and allegations and in the long
run about the authority and functions
of all of our intelligence gathering
agencies.
The committze should address the
question of how we can balance vital
national security needs with the public's
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S 980 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ?SENATE
right to know what its 'Government is
doing and why.
If the events of the past 2 years are to
provide the momentum to help fashion
any changes in the way we conduct our
Government, they should at, the very
least underscore the necessity for public
accountability?in this case, account-
ability to the Congress for the proper
.and judicious administration of intelli-
gence gathering agencies and the assur-
ance that those activities are subject to
the restraint of law as they impinge upon
the free exercise of our constitutional
rights.
If the select committee is to carry out
this mandate, it must not be impeded in
any way in its investigations.
The committee should explore still un-
answered questions about the use of in-
telligence agencies in the Watergate
incident and any ?thee instances where
agencies exceeded their a.utherity.
The committee should examine the
existing laws and procedures for review
of their implementation and recommend
necessary changes.
Finally, the work of the committee
should serve as a basis for restoring pub-
lic confidence in the integrity and quality
of our intelligence agencies.-
In the December hearings before the
Intergovernmental Relations Subcom-
mittee, Senator BAKER testified that as a
member of the Senate Select Committee
on Presidential Campaign Activities he
was told at one point in his-investigation
that the CIA would supply no further in-
formation to the Watergate committee
but instead would supply all of the in-
formation to their regular oversight
committees. Senator 13axelt went on to
say:
That effectively ended the Watergate Com-
mittee's inquiry into CIA involvement.
Based on the explanation by Senator
MANSFIELD and Senator PASTORE On the
day Senate Resolution 21 was introduced,
there should be no question about the
right and the -authority of this commit-
tee and its staff to obtain any informa-
tion which in any way affects or relates
to the intelligence activities of the Gov-
ernment. _
As the able majority leader stated so
well:
. . . it should be made. clear that this
committee-will only be able to perform its
function effectively if the provisions of this
resolution are liberally construed by com-
mittees and by the agencies which are the
subjects of its investigation.
Nothing should be able to be used as
a bar to a thorough investigation?
neither the system for classifying na-
tional secrets xior the provisions of the
National Security Act itself.
I am confident that the members of
this committee will use this authority
judiciously with the utmost concern for
preserving and improving the institutions
they are charged to examine.
It has taken us a long time to reach
this important point but the effort prom-
ises to bring forth fruitful and construc-
tive change.
Mr. PACKWOOD, Mr. President, early
last week the Senate determined to take
an active role in the investigation of al-
leged misconduct by the CIA and the
FBI. Legislation was offered to establish
a Watergate-like select committee to
thoroughly examine these allegations
and determine their validity. We are go-
ing -to vote on that legislation this after-
noon and I intend to support it.
In addition to the CIA and the FBI,
the select committee will also review the
activities of the other Federal intelli-
gence gathering agencies, including the
National Security Council and the De-
fense Intelligence Agency. However, the
main focus will be on the heretofore
largely unknown activitiee of the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency and the Federal
Bureau of Investigation.
For the last 2 months, the newspapers
have been replete with stories of CIA
Involvement in Watergate-related in-
trigue in violation of the CIA's legisla-
tive mandate to restriet all intelligence
gathering activities to foreign countries.
Further, we have been informed that the
1,1:SI was actively and illegally wiretap-
ping civil rights leaders and other poli-
ticians at the 1964 Democratic Conven-
tion. Who, ,Mr. President, sanctioned
these wiretaps? Who suggested to the
CIA that they assist E. Howard Hunt
with his masquerade for the purpose of
clandestinely breaking into the office of
Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist--a pat-
ently illegal act? Who put together the
Huston- plan to infiltrate dissident
groups for the purpose of gathering in-
formation on them? These are questions
that need to be answered and I trust that
in the course of the select committee's
investigation they will be.
Mr. President, the collection and cata-
loging of information on individuals?
without their knowledge or consent?has
always been abhorrent to the American
people. It is, at a minimum, a violation of
the constitutional right to privacy as
guaranteed by the fourth -amendment
and, at maximum, a threat to one's lib-
erty and freedom of expression. In the
? context of these recent revelations, we
hear the phrase "police state" bandied
About and I am disturbed -by it. A de-
mocracy is founded on the principle that
the Government is for the people, not
against them. Consequently, as the
elected Representatives, of the American
people and their interests, it is incum-
bent upon the Congress to act quickly
to insure that this unwarranted intru-
sion into the private lives of U.S. citizens
has stopped and will not recur. The re-
sponsibility is ours and the response
must be ours as well.
Mr. President, included within the pur-
view of the select committee's inquiry is
"The extent and necessity of overt and
covert intelligence activities in the
United States and abroad." I have al-
ready expressed my deep concern for
unmonitored intelligence gathering op-
erations within the United States, par-
ticularly those conducted by the CIA, but
I would also like to remark briefly on the
need for some congressional knowledge of
and input into the foreign intelligence
activities.
Up to this time, the Congress has gen-
erally had very little knowledge of CIA
operations in a foreign country unless
something goes wrong and a great deal
January 27, 1975
of adverse publicity results. Witness the
Bay of Pigs fiasco and the toppling of
the. Allende government in Chile. While
I dO not dispute the need for secrecy in
their overseas intelligence operations, I
would be interested to know if the CIA
operates solely under the direction of the
National Security Council and/or the
President. Correspondingly, have the
members of the current congressional
subcommittees on intelligence oversight
more often than not simply been pre-
sented with a fait accompli rather than
consulted during the initial decision-
making process? I do not think this is at
all clear and it should be.
I have indicated my support for a
permanent Joint Congressional Commit-
tee on Intelligence Oversight which
should, in theory, enjoy a more compre-
hensive oversight capability than has
been the case with the current subcom-
mittees in the House and Senate. Given
that reality, however, exactly what will
that oversight capability include? And,
more importantly, given the congres-
sional track record on sensitive informa-
tion leaks, can the security of intelligence
information imparted to the oversight_
committee be guaranteed? These are very
serious questions in my mind and I hope
that the select committee will include
them in its inquiry.
Mr. President, I believe that the need
for the creation of a select committee to
Investigate the Federal intelligence com-
munity has been amply documented. I
strongly endorse its enactment.
Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, I
rise in support of Senate Resolution 21
creating a Select Committee to Investi-
gate Intelligence Activities.
At the outset, I want to state that the
intelligence community has served the
Nation loyally and ably. Moreover, I
want to take this opportunity to salute
the dedicated, hard working men and
women of the intelligence community
whose work goes largely unheralded be-
cause of the climate in which they must
work. .
Production of useful intelligence to
guide the Nation's policy makers in mak-
ing decisions relies upon the efforts of
thousands of persons who do their work
in a painstaking and careful way.
While agent operations are important
to the Nation, they constitute a very
small proportion of the total intelligence
effort. Agent operations have been
glamorized in novels and movies. Most
of us enjoy this kind of entertainment,
but the image that emerges is very far
from reality.
The truth of the matter is that the
production of intelligence requires the
painstaking work of many specialists
who carefully analyze information from
many sources. Most of the work is far
from glamorous and very far from James
Bond.
Under the political climate now pre-
vailing, I guppose a select committee was
inevitable. I would have preferred that
the Senate inquire into intelligence ac-
tivities through the existing committees
and subcommittees that have responsi-
bilities for intelligence.
In supporting Senate Resolution 21,
I want to make it clear that in no way
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE S 981
do I agree to the criticism that has been
made concerning Our existing commit-
tees. I know that our colleagues on these
committees have done their utmost to
carry out the -trust of the Senate.
Because the.attacks on the intelligence
community persist, and because part of
that attack is directed to the existing
committees, I am supporting Senate Res-
olution 21 as a way to clear the air and
set the record.
When the .distinguished senior Sena-
tor from Arkansas was chairman of the
Permanent Investigations Subcommittee,
I believe he established the procedure of
having closed hearings before open hear-
ings were held. If I remember correctly,
the distinguished Senator from Arkansas
established this procedure to protect both
his subcommittee and witnesses from
unnecessary embarrassment. ?
It is my hope that the Senate select
committee will proceed in a careful and
deliberate manner. I believe the com-
mittee's work, at least initially, should be
in camera. ?
Most of the Senators and staff, who
are going to serve on the committee, are
not thoroughly familiar with the orga-
nization and functions of the intelli-
gence community. Before any decision
on open hearings is made, I would hope
the members and staff would have ample
opportunity to do some homework.
The Senators and staff who serve on
the select committee are going to have
knowledge of a lot of matters which, If
improperly handled, can cause our Na-
tion harm,
It is important that the select com-
mittee establish sensible rules in dealing
with the intelligence community. In
other words, let us get the information
we need to do the job but no more.
There is a reason over and above se-
curity considerations for the select corn-.
rnittee to hold its meetings in camera:
The basic American idea of protecting
professional and. personal reputations
unless unlawful or unethical acts are in-
volved.
Although Senate Resolution 21 does
not specifically make this point, I believe
the work of the select committee should
have as its focus the National Security
Act of 1947. rt is that act and the direc-
tives issued under its provisions which
have created the intelligence community
as we know it today.
Using the act of 1947 as a frame of
reference, I-believe the select committee
should have two prime objectives:
First, to determine whether or not the
act of 1947 needs revision.
Second, to determine whether or not
there have been illegal activities within
the intelligence community.
If there have been illegal activities,
then I believe the committee must de-
termine whether these illegal activities
constitute a pattern or are merely aber-
rations. -
Sometimes what may appear to be an
illegal activity may turn out to be some-
thing quite different.
Ultimately, the select committee will
make its findings and recommendations
known to the Senate. It would he a trag-
edy for the Nation should this document
reflect anything but the best of the Sen-
ate.
If surgery is required, let it be per-
formed only after the most careful diag-
nosis. And, if there is surgery, let us use
a very sharp scalpel?not a meat ax. -
Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, the
Central Intelligence Agency is charged
with conducting the kinds of intelligence
activities that are absolutely essential to
preserve our free and open democratic
society in the real world in which we live.
I say this because example after exam-
ple has shown that our Nation must re-
main ever-vigilant against the publicly
stated desires of other governments to
destroy our free existence.
The charter establishing the CIA lim-
ited it to foreign intelligence gathering.
Allegations have been made that the
charter has been exceeded on occasion.
If correct, then much of the blame for
these excesses lies with the Congress for
failure to discharge its duty of congres-
sional oversight. Recognizing that our
Nation must have an intelligence gath-
ering capacity that Congress has failed
in its oversight responsibility, the ques-
tion becomes: Is the creation of a select
committee to investigate our, intelligence
operations, with all its extensive press
coverage and certain leaks, the wisest
method to explore and correct past
wrongs and prevent future abuses? I
have grave doubts.
There are many possible alternatives
to such a suggested select committee.
One alternative that comes immediately
to mind is the creation of a permanent
joint committee to oversee intelligence
gathering by our Nation's agencies. Such
an alternative has been offered in the
form of S. 327, which I have cosponsored
and intend to support.
However, the realities of our current
situation dictate my reluctant support
of Senate Resoultion 21, with the strong
reservations mentioned previously and
an admonition to my colleagues that we
must not breach our national security by
revealing matters of truly critical impor-
tance. These hearings must not be char-
acterized by a veritable flood of leaks
and publicity stunts that will perma-
nently jeopardize the effectiveness of
our intelligence operations which serve a
very legitimate purpose. We must be on
our guard that such legislation with a
commendable purpose is not allowed,
through error or excess, to undermine
our country's security.
Mr. PACKWOOD. Mr. President, yes-
terday's Washington Post included an
editorial by Walter Pincus entitled
"'Spies' and Presidents." In speaking of
the investigation before a select commit-
tee to study the Federal intelligence
community, Mr. Pincus declares that:
No select Senate committee?not even a
joint congressional committee?will get to
the bottom of the U.S. intelligence commu-
nity's problems without the full and active
support of President Ford and his staff." This
Is because, he goes on to say, "The inquiry
into intelligence activities must inevitably
find out what past Presidenta authorized the
agencies to do.
?
Because of its particular relevance to
the bill we will vote on today, I am bring-
ing this article to the attention of my
colleagues. Mr. President, I ask unani-
mous consent that the text of Mr. Pin-.
cus' editorial be printed at this point in
the Rreorto.
There being no objection, the editorial
was ordered to be printed in the REcoao,
as follows:
"SPIES" AND PRESIDENTS
(By Walter Pincus)
No select Senate committee?not even a
joint congressional committee?will get to
the bottom of the U.S. Intelligence com-
munity's problems without the full and ac-
tive support of President Ford and his staff,
The reason is simple: such an inquiry must
inevitably end up trying to and out what past
Presidents and their staffs authorized these
agencies to do; what formal groups, such as
the 40 Committee, approved; and what steps,
if any, the White House ever took to stop
abuses of authority or projects that were il-
legal on their face.
Current newspaper allegations about the
Central Intelligence Agency's domestic ac-
tivities and the CIA partial confirmation plus
admission that the Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation has collected files on members of
Congress illustrate the point.
Former C/A Director Richard Helms tied
the start of that agency's domestic activities
in the late 1960.s to "the express concern of
the President" (Lyndon Johnson), although
he did not detail how this "concern" was
transmitted to him. The present CIA Direc-
tor, William Colby, told a Senate subcom-
mittee that, under Helms, the agency on Aug.
15, 1967 established a unit within its coun-
terintelligence department -"to look into the
possibility of foreign links to American dis-
sident elements." Two weeks later, Colby
went on, the executive director of the Presi-
dent's National Advisory Commission on
Civil Disorder asked how the CIA might assist
that inquiry. .
In setting up thi commission, President
Johnson's executive order had called upon all
government agencies to cooperate. Colby
never stated, in his prepared text, why or
under what authority Helms had established
the unit prior to receipt of the commission's
request for assistance. Colby did add, how-
ever, that later the same year "the CIA ac-
tivity became part of an interagency program,
In support of the national commission (on
disorder), among others."
What that program was and who the "oth-
ers" were who received its output were not
spelled out. The only known group estab-
lished at that time was one Intended to work
out a plan for handling disorders in Wash-
ington. Former participants on that inter-
agency panel from the Pentagon and Justice
Department don't remember CIA having been
a party. Colby's later disclosure?that at this
time the agency's Office of Security "inserted
10 agents into dissident organizations operat-
ing in the Washington, D.C. area . . to
gather information relating to plans for
demonstrations . . . that might endanger
CIA personnel, facilities and information"?
parallels what this interagency group did.
Whatever the facts were, only information
from the White House tracing establishment
of such a group could shed light on how the
CIA became a participant.
In 1969, the CIA was asked by the White
House to undertake surveillance of the Presi-
dent's brother, Donald Nixon, who, accord-
ing to documents from the House impeach-
ment inquiry, was moving to Las Vegas where
It was feared he "would come into contact
with criminal elements." The agency refused,
but the Secret Service Act, which requires
government agencies to cooperate in the pro-
tection of the President and his family, may
have been the source of other such requestS.
Only the WlIile House can disclose what role
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S 982
the CIA has been asked to play ,under that
law.
In 1970 and 1971, White House aides asked
CIA to participate in what was known as the
Huston domestic intelligence plan and to
provide assistance to a former agency official,
E, Howard Hunt, who at the time worked for
the President. Again, the question must be
raised as to what White House. authorization
the agency was given to undertake the re-
quested activities. Hunt's aid was cut off
only when, in the words of the man who was
then chief assistant to the deputy director,
It appeared the agency was becoming involved
in a "domestic clandestine operation."
In 1971 and 1972, according to Colby, the
CIA undertook Physical surveillances of five
Americans including, apparently, newsman
Jack Anderson, "to identify the sources of
(news) leaks." This appears to complement
the so-called "national security" wiretaps
conducted by the FBI at the direction of the
Nixon White House from 1969 to 1971. Again,
the agency and the White House must make
clear the authority under which the CIA
conducted such operations.
In March 1974, Colby "terminated the do-
mestic intelligence collection program (be-
gun 7 years earlier) and issued specific guide-
lines that any collection of counterintelli-
gence information on-Americans would only
take place abroad and would be initiated only
in response to requests from the FBI. . ."
Was this at White House direction? And if
not, could, a future President reverse such a
policy? ,
The FBI situation is -slightly different
There is no information as to how or why
former FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover began
collecting politically-tantalizing material
about congressmen and other public figures.
One point is clear, however?he frequently
used the information to titillate Presidents,
and apparently no Chief Executive or White
House aide ever told him to stop. When the
so-called "national security" FBI wiretaps
were operating, Hoover regularly sent social
and political gossip picked up from over-
heard conversations to Nixon chief of staff,
II. R. Haldeman. No objection or order to
stop ever came back from the Oval Office.
One other presidential role in these areas
needs exploration. Were agency directors
ordered by the White House to cover up
certain activities when called before con-
gressional ccimmittees? Former CIA Director
Helms, for example, when questioned by the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee in
February 1973, was asked directly about CIA
participation in a White House plan in 1969
or 1970 to coordinate domestic intelligence
activities: Helms said he could not recall?
though he knew full well of his activities in
1970 Huston plan discussions. Last week he-
told senators he misunderstood the question.
At a May 1973 hearing, Helms told senators
he had no idea that Hunt, prior td public
mention of the Eilsberg break in, "was going
to be involved in any domestic activity."
Of course, he did?that was why aid to Runt
stopped. Former President Nixon and his
aides kept a close watch over any congres-
sional testimony that could implicate them
or their assistants in Watergate. Was Helms
told to mislead?
If current congressional efforts to harness
the intelligence community break up as a
result of lack of White House cooperation,
additional allegations of past wrongdoings
are bound to be made because the climate
both inside and outside the secret security
services has changed. Strong internal agency
leadership has gone. And on Capitol Hill, the
old staunch defenders of intelligence ac-
tivities are either gone or powerless.
For those interes bed in protecting the legit-
imate functions of the intelligence commu-
nity, the future looks grim?indeed black if
the Ford White House fails to see that, far
snore is needed than a narrow blue-ribbon
commission studying a very narrow set of
allegations.
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD?SENATE
Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, I sug-
gest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER, The clerk
will call the roll.
The second assistant legislative clerk
proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, rask
unanimous consent that the order for the
quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING 0.PPICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield for 2 minutes?
Mr. PASTORE. I yield.
JOINT REFERRALI OF CERTAIN
COMMUNIC TIONS
? Mr. MANSFIELD. % President, I ask
unanimous consent t t a communica-
tion from, the Federal Energy Adminis-
tration transmitting a study under Pub-
lic Law 93-391, be ref 'red jointly to the
Committees on Interi r and Insular Af-
fairs, Public Works, ommerce and Fi-
nance, and that a sec( nd communication
received this day from the Council on En-
vironmental Quality n Land Use, pre-
pared as a part of it annual report, be
referred jointly to t e Committees on
Interior and Insulcr Affairs, Public
Works, Commerce, A riculture and For-
estry.
The PRESIDING FeiCER. Without
objection, it is so ord ed.
AUTHORIZATION F R COMMITTEE
ON COMMERCE T b FILE REPORTS
UNTIL MEDNIGH I TONIGHT
Mr. MANSFIhLD. r. President, I ask
unanimous consent t at the Committee
on Commerce be au orized to file re-
ports until midnight ? night.
The PRESIDING 10FICER. Without
objection, it is so orde ed.
QUORUIV CALL
Mr. 1VTANSFi1fLD. J Mr. President,
suggest the absence 4f a quorum.
The PRESIDING 0 CER. The clerk
will call the roll.
The assistant legi lative clerk pro-
.
ceeded to call the roll.
Mr. PASTORE. M4. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the order fat
the quorum call be re cinded.
The PRESIDING PFICER. Without
objection, it is so orde ed.
SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY
GOVERNMENTAL INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES
The Senate continued with the con-
sideration of the resolution (S. Res. 21)
to establish a Select Committee of the
Senate to conduct an investigation and
study of governmental operations with
respect to intelligence activities.
Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, I ask for
the yeas and nays on passage.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, I sug-
gest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk
will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk pro-
ceeded to call the roll.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
January 27, 1975
unanimous consent that the order for the
quorum be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered. -
Pursuant to the previous order, the
Senate will now proceed to vote on the
resolution, as amended. On this question
the yeas and nays have been ordered, and
clerk will call the roll. ?
The assistant legislative clerk called
the roll.
Mr. YOUNG (after having voted in the
negative), On this vote I have a pair with
the junior Senator from Washington
(Mr. JACKSON). If he were present, he
would vote "Yea." If I were permitted to
vote, I would vote "Nay." I therefore
withdraw my vote.
Mr. GRIFFIN (after having voted in
the affirmative). On this vote I have a
pair with the Senator from Ohio (Mr.
TAFT) . If he were present, he would vote
"nay." If I were permitted to vote, I
would vote "yea." I therefore withdraw
ray vote.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I announce
that the Senator from Washington (Mr.
JACKSON); the Senator from Rhode Island
(Mr. PEW , the Senator from California '
(Mr. TUNNEY) , and the Senator from
Indiana (Mr. IlAarKE) are necessarily
absent.
I further announce that the Senator
from Kentucky (Mr. HUDDLESTON) , and
the Senator from Hawaii (Mn INouYE)
are absent on official business.
I further announce that, if present and
voting, the Senator from Rhode Island
(Mr. PELL) , and the Senator from Cali-
fornia (Mr. TaNNEY) would each vote
yea."
Mr. GRIFFIN. I announce that the
Senator from New York (Mr. JAvrxs) is
necessarily absent. -
I also announce that the Senator from
Maryland (Mr. MArmAs) , the Senator
from Idaho (Mr. McCLuac) , and the Sen-
ator from Vermont (Mr. STAFFORD) are
absent on official business.
I further announce that the Senator
from Ohio (Mr. TAFT) is absent to attend
a funeral.
? I further announce that, if present and
voting, the Senator from New York (Mr.
JAviTs) , and the Senator from Maryland
(Mr. MATHIAS) would each vote "yea."
The result was announced?yeas 82,
nays 4, as follows:
[Rolicall Vote No. 1 Leg.]
YEAS-82
Eastland Metcalf
Fannin Mondale
Fong Montoya
Ford Morgan
Garn Moss
Glenn Muskie
Goldwater Nelson
Gravel Nunn
Hansen Pack wood
Abourezk
Allen
Baker
Bartlett
Bayh
Beall
13 ellmon
Bentsen.
Bideri
Brock
Brooke
Buckley '
Bumpers
Burdick
Byrd,
Harry F., Jr.
Byrd, Robert C.
Cannon
Case
Chiles
Church
Clark
Cranston
Culver
Curtis
Dole
Dom enicl
Eagle ton
Hart, Gary W. Pastore
Hart, Philip A. Pearson
HaskellPercy
Hatfield Proxmire
Hathaway
Hollings
Hruska
Humphrey
Johnston
Kennedy
Laxalt
Leahy
Long
Mae-nuson
Tvlansfield
McClellan
McGee
l'Govern
McIntyre
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Randolph
Ribicoff
Roth
Schweiker
Scott, Hugh
Sparkman
Stennis
Stevens
Stevenson
Stone
Symington
Tower
Welcker
Williams
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trwitcary 27, 1975
NAYS-4
helms Talmadge
Scott, Thurmond
William L.
PRESENT AND GIVING LIVE PAIRS, As
PREVIOUSLY RECORDED-2
Young, against -
Griffin, for
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD?SENATE. S 983
Hartke
Huddleston
Inouye
Jackson
NOT VOTING-11
Javits Stafford
Mathias Taft
McClure Tunney
Pell
So the resolution (S. Res. 21) was
agreed to, as follows:
S. RES. 21
Resolved, To establish a select committee
of the Senate to conduct an investigation
and study of governmental operations with
respect to intelligence activities and of the
extent, if any, to which illegal, improper, or
unethical activities were engaged in by any
agency of the Federal Government or by any
persons, acting individually or in combina-
tion with others, with respect to any intel-
ligence activity carried out by or on behalf
of the Federal Government; be it further
Resolved, That (a) there is hereby estab-
lished a select committee of the Senate which
may be called, for convenience of expression,
the Select Committee To Study Governmen-
tal Operations With Respect to Intelligence
Activities to conduct an investigation and
study of the extent, if any, to which illegal,
improper, or unethical activities were en-
gaged in by any agency or by any persons,
acting either Individually or in combination
with others, in.. carryingout any intelligence
or surveillance activities by or on behalf of
any agency of the Federal Government.
? (b) The select committee created by this
resolution shall consist of eleven members of
the Senate, six to be appointed by the Presi-
dent of the Senate from the majority mem-
bers of the Senate upon the recommendations
of the majority leader of the Senate, and five
minority members of . the ? Senate to be ap-
p inted by the President of the Senate upon
the recommendation of the minority leader
of the Senate. For the purposes of para.-
graph 6 of rule XXV of the Standing Rules of
the Senate, service of a Senator as a mem-
ber, chairman, or vice chairman of the select
committee shall not be taken into account.
(c) The majority members of the com-
mittee shall select a chairman and the minor-
ity members shall select a vice chairman and
the committee shall adopt rules and proce-
dures to govern its proceedings. The vice
chairman shall preside over meetings of the
select committee during the absence of the
chairman, and discharge such other respon-
sibilities as may be assigned to him by the
select committee or the chairman. Vacancies
in the membership of the select committee
shall not affect the authority of the remain-
ing members to execute the functions of the
select committee and shall be filled in the
same manner as original appointments to it
are made. ?
(d) A majority of the members of the se-
lect committee shall constitute a quorum for
the transaction of business, but the select
committee may affix a lesser number as a
quorum for the purpose of taking testimony
or depositions.
Sec. 2. The select committee is authorized
and directed to do everything necessary or
appropriate to make the investigations and
study specified in subsection (a) of the first
section. Without abridging in any way the
authority conferred upon the select com-
mittee by the preceding sentence, the Sen-
ate further expressly authorizes and directs
the select committee to make a complete
investigation and study of the activities of
any agency or of any and all persons or
groups of persons or organizations of any
kind which have an tendency to reveal the
full facts with respect to the following mat-
ters or questions:
(1) Whether the Central Intelligence
Agency has conducted an illegal domestic
Intelligence operation in the United States._
(2) The conduct of domestic intelligence
, or counterintelligence operations against
United States citizens by the Federal Bureau
of Investigation or any other Federal agency.
(3) The origin and disposition of the so-
called Huston Plan to apply United States in-
telligence agency capabilities against indi-
viduals or organizations within the United
States.
? (4) The extent to which the Federal Bu-
reau of Investigation, the Central Intelli-
gence Agency, and other Federal law enforce-
ment or intelligence agencies coordinate their
respective activities, any agreements which
govern that coordination, and the extent
to which a lack of coordination has contrib-
uted to activities or actions which are ille-
gal, improper, inefficient, unethical, or con-
trary 'to the intent of Congress.
(5) The extent to which the operation of
domestic intelligence or counterintelligence
activities and the operation of any other ac-
tivities within the United States by the Cen-
tral Intelligency Agency conforms to the leg-
islative charter of that Agency arid the intent
of the Congress.
(6) The past and present interpretation
by the Director of Central Intelligence of the
responsibility to protect intelligence sources
and methods as it relates to the provision in
section 102(d) (3) of the National Security
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403(d) (3) ) that ".
that the agency shall have no police, subpena,
law enforcement powers, or internal security
functions. . . ."
(7) Nature and extent of executive branch
oversight of all United States intelligence
activities.
(8) The need for specific legislative au-
thority to govern the operations of any intel-
ligence agencies 'of the Federal Govern-
ment noW existing without that explicit stat-
utory authority, including but not limited to
agencies such as the Defense Intelligence
Agency and the National Security Agency.
The nature and extent to which Federal
agencies cooperate and exchange intelligence
information and the adequacy of any regula-
tions or statutes which govern such coopera-
tion and exchange of intelligence informa-
tion.
(9) The extent to which United States in-
telligence agencies are governed by Executive
orders, rules, or regulations either published
or secret and the extent -to which those Exec-
utive orders, rules, or regulations interpret,
expand, or are in conflict with specific legis-
lative authority.
(-10) The violation or suspected violation
of any State or Federal statute by any in-
telligence agency or by any person by or on
behalf of any intelligence agency of the Fed-
eral Government including but not limited
to surreptitious entries, surveillance, wire-
taps, or eavesdropping, illegal opening of the
United States mall, or the monitoring of the
United States mail.
(11) The need for irnproved, strengthened,
or consolidated oversight of United States in-
telligence activities by the Congress.
(12) Whether any of the existing laws of
the United States are inadequate, either in
their provisions or manner of enforcement, to
safeguard the rights of American citizens,
to improve executive and legislative control
or intelligence and related activities, and to
resolve uncertainties as to the authority of
United States intelligence and related agen-
cies.
(13) Whether there is unnecessary dupli-
cation of expenditure and effort in the col-
lection and processing of intelligence infor-
mation by United States agencies,
(14) The extent and necessity of overt and
covert intelligence activities in the. United
States and abroad.
(15) Such other related matters as the
committee deems necessary in order to carry
out its responsibilities under section (a).
. SEC. 3. (a) To enable the select commit-
tee to make the investigation and study au-
thorized and directed by this resolution, the
Senate hereby empowers the select com-
mittee as an agency of the Senate (1) to
employ and fix the compensation of such
clerical, investigatory, legal, technical, and
other assistants as it deems necessary or
appropriate, but it may not exceed the nor-
mal Senate salary schedules; (2) to sit and
act at any time or place during sessions, re-
cesses, and adjournment periods of the Sen-
ate; (3) to hold hearings for taking
testimony on oath or to receive documentary
or physical evidence relating to the matters
and questions It is authorized to investigate
or study; (4) to require by subpena or
otherwise the attendance as witnesses of
any persons who the select committee be-
lieves have knowledge or information con-
cerning any of the matters or questions it
is authorized to inveetigate and study; (5)
to require by subpena or order any depart-
ment, agency, officer, or employee of the
executive branch of the United States Gov-
ernment, or any private person, firm, or cor-
poration, to produce for its consideration or
for use as evidence in its investigation and
study any books, checks, canceled checks,
correspondence, communications, docuinent,
papers, physical evidence, records, record-
ings, tapes, or materials relating to any of
the matters or questions it is authorized to
investigate and study which they or any of
them may have in their custody or under
their control; (6) to make to the Senate
any recommendations it deems appropriate
in respect to the willful failure or refusal
of any person to answer questions or give
testimony in his character as a witness dur-
ing his appearance before it or in respect to
the willful failure or refusal of any officer, or
employee of the executive branch of the
United States Government or any person,
firm, or corporation to produce before the
committee any books, checks, canceled
checks, correspondence, communications,
document, financial records, papers, physical
evidence, records, recordings, tapes, or
materials in obedience to any subpena or
order; (7) to take depositions and other
testimony on oath anywhere within the
United States or in any other country; (8)
to procure the temporary or intermittent
services of individual consultants, or orga-
nizations thereof, in the same manner and
under the same conditions as a standing
committee of the Senate may procure such
services under section 202(I) of the Legis-
lative Reorganization Act of 1946; (9) to use
on a reimbursable basis, with the prior con-
sent of the Committee on Rules and Ad-
ministration, the services of personnel of
any such department or agency; (10) to use
on a reimbursable basis or otherwise with
the prior consent of the chairman of any
subcommittee of any committee of the Sen-
ate the facilities or services of any members
of the staffs of such other Senate commit-
tees or any subcommittees of such other
Senate committees whenever the select
committee or its chairman deems that such
action is necessary or appropriate to enable
the select committee to make the investi-
gation and study authorized and directed
by this resolution; (11) to have direct access
through the agency of any members of the
select committee or any of its investigatory
or legal assistants designated by it or its
chairman or the ranking minority member
to any data, evidence, information, report,
analysis, or document or papers, relating to
any of the matters or questions which It is
authorized and directed to investigate and
study in the custody or under the control
of any department, agency, officer, or era-
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S 984 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ?SENATE
ployee of the executive branch of the United
States Government, including any depart-
ment, agency, officer, or employee of the
United States Government having the power
under the laws of the United States to inves-
tigate any' alleged criminal activities or to
prosecute persons charged with crimes
against the United States and any depart-
in.ent, agency, officer, or employee of the
United States Government having the au-
thority to conduct intelligence or surveil-
lance within or outside the United. States, -
without regard to the jurisdiction or au-
thority of any -other Senate committee,
which will aid: the select committee to pre-
pare for or conduct the investigation- and
study authorized and directed by this reso-
lution; and (12) to expend to the extent it
determines necessary or appropriate - any
moneys made available to it by the Senate
to perform the duties and exercise the
powers conferred upon it by this resolution
and to make the investigation and study it
Is authorized by this resolution to make.
(b) Subpenas may be issued by the select
committee acting through the chairman or
any other member designated by him, and
may be served by any person designated by
such chairman or other member anywhere
within the borders of the United States. The
chairman of the select committee, or any
other member thereof, is hereby authorized
to administer oaths to any witnesses appear-
ing- before the committee. .
(c) In preparing for or conducting the
investigation and study authorized and die-
rected ery this resolution, the select com?
mittee shall be empowered to exercise the,
powers conferred upon' committees .of the
Senate by section 8003 of title 18,.? United
States Code, or. any other Act of Congress
regulating the granting of immunity to
witnesses. - ? - ?
SEC. 4. The select committee shall have au-
thority to recommend the enactment of any
new legislation or the amendment of a:ay
existing statute which it considers neces-
sary or desirable to strengthen or clarify the
national security, intelligence,' or surveil-
lance activities of the United States and to
protect the rights of United States citizens -
with regard to. those activities:
SEC. 5. The select committee shall make a
final report of the results of the investiga-
tion. and study conducted by it pursuant to
this resolution, together with its findings,
and- its recommendations as to new congres- .
sional legislation it deems necessary or de-.
slrable? to the-Senate at the earliest practica-
ble date, but no later than September _1,
1975. The select committee may also submit
to the Senate such interim reports as it con-
siders appropriate.- After submission of its
final report, the select. committee shall have
'three calendar months to close its affairs, and.
on the expiration of such three calendar
months shall cease to exist. ,
Sec. 8. The expenses of the select commit-
tee through September 1, 1975, under this
resolution shall not exceed $750,000 of which
amount not to. exceed $100,000 shall be avail-
able for the procurement of the services ct
individual consultants or Organizations
thereof. Such expenses shall be paid from the
contingent fund of the Senate upon-vouchers
approved by the chairman of the select com-
mittee.
Sec. 7. The select committee shall institute
and carry out such rules and procedures as
it may deem necessary to prevent (1) the dis-
closure, outside the select committee, or any
Information relation 'to the activities of the
Central Intelligence Agency or any other
department or agency of the Federal Govern-
ment engaged in intelligence activities, ob-
tained by the select committee during the
course of its study and investigation, not
authorized by the select committee to be
disclosed; and (2) the disclosure, outside the
select committee, of any information which
would adversely affect the intelligence activi-
tier of the Central Intelligence Agency in
foreign countries or the intelligence activi-
ties in foreign countries of any other de-
partment or agency of the Federal Govern-
ment.
Sec. 8. As a condition for employment as
described In section 3 of this resolution, each
person shall agree not to accept any honor-
arium, royalty or other payment for a speak-
ing engagement, magazine article, book, or-
other endeavor connected with the investiga-
tion and study undertaken by this commit-
tee.
SEC. O. No employee of the select committee
or any person engaged by contract or other-
wise to perform services for the select com-
mittee shall be given access to any classified
Information by the select committee unless
such employee or person has received an ap-
propriate security clearance as determined
by the select committee. The type of security'
clearance to be required in the case of any
such employee or person shall, within the
determination of the select committee, be
commensurate with the sensitivity of the
classified information to which such em-
ployee or person will be given access by the
select committee.
Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, I move
to. reconsider the vote by which the reso-
lution was agreed to.
Mr. MANSFIELD. I move to lay that
motion on the table.
,The mo.tion to lay on the table was
agreed to.
SENATOR FRO
CRE
The PRESIDD
NEW HAMPSHIRE?
OPVICEle. Under the
previous order, t e Senate will now pro-
ceed to the consi eration of the motion
by the Senator from Montana (Mr.
MANSFIELD) to r er all credentials and
papers dealing w h the New Hampshire
election dispute to the Committee on
Rules and As nistration, which the
clerk will state. e time on this debate
Is limited to 1 our, to be_ equally di-
vided and contro led by the Senator from
Montana. (Mr. ANSFIELD) and the Sen-
-ator from Michi an (Mr. GRIFFIN).
The Senate wi be in order.
The clerk will state the motion.
The legislativ clerk read as follows:
The Senator Ir m Montana (Mr. MANS-
FIELD) moves tha the credentials of Louis
C. Wyman. and Jo n A. Durkin and all papers
now on file with he Senate relating to the
same be referred o the Committee on Rules
and Administrat n for recommendations
thereon.
Mr. MANSF
unanimous con
business be lai
that I may corn
olution providin
tee, on which
pressed its appr
The PRESID
objection, it is s
Mr. MANSE
we have order?
The PRESID
ator from Mon
have order in th
D. Mr. President, I ask
ent that the pending
aside temporarily, so
ete the work on the res-
' for the select commit-
Senate has just ex-
val.
G Orlol.CER. Without
ordered.
LD, Mr. President, may
G OrVICER,. The Sen-
a has the floor. May we
Senate?
SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY
GOVERNMENT INTELLIGENCE AC-
TIVITIES
The Senate continued with the con-
sideration of the resolution (S. Res. 21)
January 27, 1975
to establish a select committee of the
Senate to conduct an investigation and
study of governmental operations with
respect to intelligence activities.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I wish
to state, before proceeding with the (Us-
- cussions and consideration of this resolu-
tion, that insofar as the majority leader
Is concerned, the chairman of the Com-
mittee on Armed Services, our colleague
from Mississippi (Mr. STENNIS) is owed 'a.
vote of thanks because throughout the
years he has scrupulously endeavored, to
the best of his ability and in line with
his other responsibilities, to scrutinize all
activities of intelligence agencies related
to the defense community. He need not
yield to any Member of this body his
stance as the preeminent "watchdog" of
the Congress in performing this critical
oversight function. I commend JOHN
STENNIS. The Senate commends JOHN
?STENNIS for his assiduous and conscien-
tious work in this endeavor. "
Mr_ President, now that the select
committee has been approved by the Sen-
ate, the minority leader and'I have di-
rected a letter to the heads of agencies
and departments of Government most ?
preeminently concerned with- intelli-
gence endeavors. The letter reads as
follows:
As you may be-aware, the Senate is to Con-
duct an investigation and study of govern-
ment operations with respect to intelligence
activities. The scope of the investigation is
set out in S. Res. 21, a copy of which has been
enclosed for your information.
We are writing to request that you not
destroy, remove from your possession or con- -
trol, or otherwise dispose or permit the dis-
posal of any records or documents which
might have a bearing on the subjects under
investigation, including but not limited to all
records or documents pertaining in any way
to the matters set out in section. 2 of S. Res.
21.
Sincerely yours,
This letter is being directed,to heads of
19 separate governmental units as listed
here:
_ - JANUARY 21, 1975.
Honorable William E. Colby, Director, Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency, and as Coordinator
of Intelligence Activities, Washington, D.C.
20505, ?
Lt. Gen. Daniel 0. Graham, Director,. De-
fense Intelligence Agency, The Pentagon,,
Washington, D.C. 20301.
Honorable William B. Saxbe, Attorney.
General, Dept. of Justice, 9th and Constitu-
tion N.W.. Washington, D.C. 20530.
Mr. John C. Keeney, Acting Asst. Attorney
General, Criminal Div., 9th and Constitution
N.W., Washington, D.C. 20530.
Mr. John R. Bartels Jr., Administrator,
Drug Enforcement Administration, 1405 Eye
St. N.W.,-Washington, D.C. 20537.
Honorable James R. Schlesinger, Secretary
of Defense, Room 3B 880, The Pentagon,
Washington, D.C. 20301.
Honorable Howard H. Callaway, Secretary
of the Army. Room. 3E 718, The Pentagon,
Washington. D.C. 20310.
Hon. J. W. Middendorf, Secretary of the
Navy, Roone-4E. 710, The Pentagon, Waehing-
ton, D.C. 20350.
Hon. John L. McLucas, Secretary of the
Air Force, Room 4E 871, The Pentagon, Wash-
ington, D.C. 20330.
Lt. Gen. Lew Allen Jr., Director, National
Security Agency, Fort George G. Meade,
Maryland 20755.
I add that the administration about
the preservation of records, documents,
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January 27, 1975 ..
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD?SENATE , S 9G5
et cetera, applies as well to all agencies
and subagen.cies concerned but not spe-
cifically singled out.
The task faced by the select commit-
tee which the Senate has just established
is to examine into the intelligence ac-
tivities of the U.S. Government. No more
important responsibility to the people of
the Nation can be assumed by Senators
than membership on this committee.
What is asked of them, in the name of
the Senate, is to probe fully and to as-
sess completely, to understand thorough.-
ly and to evaluate judiciously. To the ex-
tent that the intelligence agencies have
acted correctly and within the law, that
must be made known. If there have been
abuses, they, too, must be set forth, There
can be no whitewash in this inquiry; nor
is there room for a vendetta. In the end,
the Senate must know what has tran-
spired so that it may seek to close legal
loopholes if there are any. In the end, we
must know so that together with the
House and the President, we may move
to foreclose any demeaning of the basic
premises of a free society.
What is at stake in the work of this
committee is a resolution of doubts. What
is at stake is a restoration of confidence
in a large and costly and little known
segment of the Federal Government. The
Senate must be satisfied that the intelli-
gence community is doing the people's
business, to the end that the Nation may
be with assurance so advised. The Sen-
ate must be persuaded that what is be-
ing done in the name of security under
a cloak of obscurity is the people's busi-
ness, as defined, not by employees of a
Government agency, but the people's
business as defined by the Constitution
and the laws duly enacted thereunder.
The committee is called on, further-
more, to elucidate for the Senate the
relevance of the intelligence commu-
nity as it now operates to the Nation's
contemporary needs. We need to know
what may be required, today, not what
might have seemed necessary yesterday.
The fact that a commission is looking
into the CIA is all to the good; the re-
sponsibility of that group is to the Presi-
dent who created it. Its existence in no
way relieves us of our responsibilities. It
is appropriate and proper at any time
that the Senate so determines, to inquire
into any agency and, as necessary, to
seek to clarify and redefine its functions
and the scope of its activities.
One aspect of the impending inquiry
concerns covert activities. Thsee activ-
ities have been acquiesced in, to say the
least, by the Congress for a long time. No
one should be surprised or appalled,
therefore, to discover their existence a
quarter of a century later. In recent
years, however, the extent and necessity
for them have come under question. Who
sets the policy and why? What obtuse
intrusions may there have been by these
activities into the President's conduct of
iforeig-n affairs? What indifference, if
any, to the laws passed by the Congress?
What damage, if any, to the demeanor of
the Nation? What interference in the
personal lives of Americans and by whose
authority and under what guidelines?
What public funds have been committed
and to what end? What proliferation of
activities and how much overlap , and
duplication?
It used to be fashionable, Mr. Presi-
dent, for members of Congress to say
that insofar as the intelligence agencies
were concerned, the less they knew about
such questions, the better. Well, in my
judgment, it is about time that that at-
titude went out of fashion. It is time for
the Senate to take the trouble and, yes,
the risks of knowing more rather than
less. We have a duty, individually, and
collectively, to know what legislation en-
acted by Congress and paid for by ap-
propriations of the people's money has
spawned in practice in the name of the
United States. The Congress needs to
recognize, to accept and to discharge with
care its coequal responsibility with the
Presidency in these matters.
The Senate has begun to address itself
to these questions by approving the cre-
ation of this select committee. There is
a need to understand not only the pres-
ent intelligence requirements of the
United States but also what systems or
procedures for oversight and account-
ability may be required to keep them
within bounds set by the Constitution.
the President and the elected Repre-
sentatives of the people in Congress.
Wisely, I believe, a special committee
for handling the investigation has been
established by this action today: The
scope of inquiry is far larger than can
come within the purview of any single
committee. Hopefully, within the select
committee, the pieces?all of the pieces?
can be fitted together. May I say that in-
sofar as the Senate is concerned, I think
this action expresses the expectation
that the matter will be concentrated in
this one committee. In my judgment, it
would be most inappropriate for a bevy
of studies of ? intelligence to proceed
simultaneously in several others.
May I say, Mr. President, that this in
no -way conflicts with the legislative
jurisdiction of the legislative committees
so charged.
The select committee is equipped with
a bipartisan membership. The Senators
who will be selected for service on this
committee are no different than the rest
of us. They are not tied with a blue rib-
bon or a white or pink ribbon. There is no
higher or lower order of patriotism in
the Senate. There are no first- and sec-
ond-class Senators. Those who will serve
are men of competence, understanding,
and decency. They will do the job which
-the circumstances and the Senate re-
quire of them.
The committee has been equipped
with full authority to study, to hold
hearings and to investigate all ,activi-
ties?f ?reign and domestic?of the intel-
ligence agencies of the Federal Govern-
ment. In the pursuit of that mandate, I
have every confidence that the commit-
tee will act with discretion, with re-
straint and with a high sense of na-
tional responsibility. There is no cause
and inclination to pursue this matter as
a Roman circus or a TV spectacular.
There is only the need to see to the sober
discharge of very sober responsibilities.
How the committee proceeds is largely
up to the members of the committee.
They have the authority to make their
rules and to define their procedures, and
that would include the question of when
to close or open the door to the use of
television. As I have indicated, I would
not anticipate any great requirements
for the latter at this time. Most emphat-
ically, I would express the hope, too, that
committee staff would be selected with
as much concern for discretion as for
other qualifications. What comes to the -
public from this committee and when,
ought to be solely?I stress the word
"solely"---determined by the members of
the committee.
The Senate is entrusting this commit-
tee with its deepest confidence. I know
that that trust is secure and that the re-
sults of the inquiry will reflect the high-
est credit on this institution. I submit to
the Chair the names Of those assigned to
the Senate Select Committee To Study
Governmental Operations With Respect
to Intelligence Activities and ask that
they be read and I do so on behalf of the
distinguished Republican leader and
myself.
The PRESIDING OvriCER. The clerk
will read the nominations;
The assistant legislative clerk read as
follows:
Senators Church, Hart of Michigan, Mon-
dale, Huddles ton, Morgan, and Hart of
Colorado.
Mr. MANSFIELD. The Republicans
also.
The assistant legislative clerk read as
follows:
Senators Tower, Baker, Goldwater,
Mathias, and Schweiber.
SENATOR FROM NEW HAMPSEal-tE---
CREDENTIALS ?
The Senate 'continued with the con-
S.
sideration of ti credentials of the claim-
ants to be U. Senator from the State
of New Hamps ' re.
The PRESI ING Oreactlis Who
yields time?
Mr. MANSFIIrLD. Mr. President, are
we back'on the regular order of business?
The PRESID G OlevICER. We are
back on the Ma.4sfield motion.
The Senator frr Illinois is recognized.
RESOLUTION LLA.TIVE? TO THE
DEATH OF REPRESENTATIVE
JOHN C. LIJ1CZYNSKI, OF ILLI-
NOIS
' Mr. PERCY. M. President, I ask the
Chair to laY befor ;the Senate a message
from the House on H.R. 97.
The PRESIDINGt OlenCER. The clerk
will read the message from the House.
The assistant legislative clerk read as
follows: i
Resolved, That the 6ouse has heard with,
profound sorrow of the death of the Honor-
able John C. Kluczy ski, a Representative
? from the State?. of Elit.ois.
Resolved, That a committee of 65 Members
of the House, with such Members of the Sen-
ate as may be joined, be appointed to attend
the funeral.
Resolved, That the Srgeant at Arms of the
House be authorized .nd -directed to take
such steps as may be ecessary for carrying
out the provisions of ese resolutions and
that the necessary expenses in connection
\
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El UNCLASSIFIED luNSTEERM 0 CONFIDENTIAL El SECRET
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET ____, ........_.... ..
SUBJECT: (Optional)
FROM:
EXTENSION
NO.
George L. Cary
Legislative Counsel
DATE STAT
28 January 1975
TO: (Officer designation, roam number, and
building)
DATE
OFFICER'S
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
RECEIVED
FORWARDED
INITIALS
to whom. Drow a line across column after each comment.)
1 .
Mr. Carver
Attached for your information
2. 7 E 62
Headquarters
is the floor debate on the Senate
Select Committee to study
governmental intelligence
3.STAT
activities and the full text of the
resolution establishing it.
,
4.
5.
4GEQ1cGE L. CARV
Legislative Counsel
6.
7.
ri, .5t t Po
.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
-
Attachment
FORM610 USE PREVIOUS I?I crrDeT El INTERNAL
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