SENIOR SEMINAR GUEST SPEAKER'S ARTICLE CRITICIZING CIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-06362A000200040003-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 18, 2000
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: December 21, 1971
• Content Type: MFR

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21 December 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Senior Seminar Guest Speaker's Article
Criticizing CIA
1. This Memorandum has been prepared as a result of the
publication in-the New York Review of Books issue of 30 December
1971 of an article by Ric ar J. Barnet referring to the CIA
Senior Seminar. (A copy of the article is contained in Attach-
ment A.) Barnet, Co-director of the Institute for Policy Studies,
Washington, D.C. was a guest speaker in the Seminar on 4 November.
2. The Seminar is discussed in the first two paragraphs of
the article in which Barnet gives a misleading account (a) of
the purpose of the Seminar, (b) of his ro:Le in it; and (c) of his
discussions with Seminar participants. Contrary to Barnet's
assertion, the purpose of the Seminar was definitely not to "con-
sider its (the Agency's) image" except in a. limited sense of having
the Seminar participants reflect on the suh ect briefly. Further,
in a single paragraph Barnet tendentiously connects previous "con-
versations with a number of CIA officials.," who he believes agree
with his views but none of whom are identified, to the Senior
CPYRGHT Seminar -hart;
i
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pants w
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CPYRGHT er another eagerly joined the discussion to assure me at t e
days of the flamboyant covert operations were "
1 indicate agreement with Barnet's, contention that
technical collection has come to overshadow, agent collection, but
the recollections of the Seminar Staff and -record of the discus-
sion preserved by the Senior Seminar rapporttteur for this session
simply do not support Barnet's account. (Further details concern-
ing the Seminar discussions with Barnet are contained in Paragraphs
6 and 7 below, following a resume of the circumstances surrounding
the Seminar's invitation to Barnet.)
3. Barnet was invited to make a presentation on 4 November
to the Senior Seminar as part of the four-day Block of the program
devoted to domestic changes which are directly relevant to the
Agency. This Block corresponded to the fo]Llowing announced objective
of the Seminar:
"To develop greater insight into problems and
pressures facing CIA management, the processes
of change within the Agency and i-m its external
relationship, and developments in. American society
which are relevant to CI:A as an o>anization."
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The overall scope note for the "domestic environment" notes that
the Block "examines contemporary domestic problems and issues
and their impact on national priorities, foreign policy and the
Central Intelligence Agency; and,explores the relationships of the
communications media and public opinion with the executive branch
of the U.S. Government in general and with CIA in particular. In
this Block the Seminar Staff sought to present "critical" as well
as "orthodox" views of problems so that participants would be
challenged intellectually. Separate presentations were scheduled
on "Social and Cultural. Change in American Society -- A Report,"
"Changing Economic Priorities and the Implications for CIA," "A
Youth Viewpoint," "The Drug Culture," "Government and the Media,"
"CIA and the Media," "A Critic Looks at U.S. Foreign Policy,"
and "Social and Cultural Change in American Society -- A Perspec-
tive." The penultimate was the topic proposed to Mr. Barnet (see
Attachment B, copy of topic scope note). Thus in no sense, as
.his article implies, was he invited to discuss the "Agency image."
4. Our selection of Barnet as a speaker was based on several
considerations. He has achieved prominence as an articulate, if
a hairshirt, critic of U.S. foreign policy via his books and
articles (one of the latter, an excerpt from his latest book
Washington Plans a _n_Aggressive War, appeared in Harper's just a
ew days prior to his sc~io ule session with the Seminar.) He is
not totally ignorant of the foreign policy process, as some acade-
mic critics are. Finally, I knew him personally, from our service
in the U.S. Disarmament Administration and its successor ACDA and
believed he would live up to his billing as a "critic."
5. Prior to making any move to invite Barnet, I submitted
his name,'along with that of many other possible guest speakers,
to the Office of Security. Approval to use Barnet on an unclas-
sified basis was granted by Security on 1 September. Contrary
to the usual Seminar practice of writing a formal letter of invita-
tion outlining the nature and objectives of the Seminar, our con-
tact:.was limited to my telephone call inviting him to speak and
a follow-up letter asking for his suggestions concerning perti-
nent reading material and arranging details of his transportation
to and from the Seminar site. (See Attachment C for a copy of the
letter to Barnet.) His name was listed in the Senior Seminar guest
speakers regularly forwarded to the DD/S by the OTR Speaker
Coordinator.
6. The salient points of Barnet's formal presentation and
ensuing discussion period were recorded by Chief,
Personnel Security Division, Office of Security, who acted as
Seminar rapporteur for the Block in which Barnet appeared. (See
Attachment D for Rapporteur's summary of :Barnet's session with
the Seminar.) His presentation consisted of two hours with the
Seminar members which commenced with formal lecture-style'remarks
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for one hour. His comments were critical., in a rather rambling
fashion, of present day U.S. foreign policy. He particularly
emphasized the impact of the Nixon Doctrine on foreign policy,
contending that the Doctrine is a throwback to the Cold War and
the policies of that era. Moreover, he claimed that CIA is an
antiquated instrument of that cold war and its image is that of
a "sinister force."
7. Following Barnet's formal remarks and a coffee break,
the Seminar group reassembled in the Seminar lounge for discus-
sions. Several questions were put to Mr. Barnet, but his detailed
responses left far more questions unanswered than the group would
have liked. Despite an occasional question posed by Barnet, no
specific information was volunteered by the Seminar members.
There was one lively exchange stemming from his claim that CIA
is responsible for training Brazilian police in methods of inter-
rogation with primary reliance upon the use of physical torture.
When considerable skepticism was expressed by the group, the
speaker asserted he had his information on "good authority"
a personal friend. Pressed further to identify his source, Barnet
claimed that the syndicated columnist Jack Anderson had given him
this information. (Incidentally, he did not allude to this con-
tention in the N.Y. Review article.)
8. Near the close of the discussion period, Barnet raised
the charge that CIA has engaged in assassination. I joined several
members of the Seminar in rejecting this claim in, a most positive
manner. Notwithstanding, he concluded his article with a general
reference to the Agency's having developed "brilliant techniques"
for assassination, sabotage and deception.
9. Following the informal session, five of the participants
and I took Barnet to-lunch since he had declined the Seminar's prof-
fered honorarium on the basis that it was against the policy of
his institution to accept government money. The conversation at
lunch, according to the recollections of those of us in attendance,
would certainly not have generated any of the allegations in the
Review article.
10. The Seminar members were not particularly impressed with
Barnet's theses or arguments. Some members expressed astonishment
over the apparent lack of knowledge on the speaker's part as well
as the sources of his information. Most Seminar members did state,
however, in their critiques that they found him provocative and
stimulating. (See Attachment E, copy f,?student ev uations of
Barnet.) I jI ,s
25X1A
Atts: A/S
ie , S-enior Seminar
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 S(1RCI : The Now York Review of Books - 30 December 1971
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The Rope Dancer
by \'ie or `.larehetti.
Gross: t S: Dunlap, 361 pp., $6.95
In late November the Central Intel-
ligence Agency conducted a series of
"senior seminars" so that some of its
important bureaucrats could consider
its Public imate. I was invited to
attend one session and to give my
views on the proper role of the
Agency. I suggested that its legitimate
activities were limited to studying
newspapers and pubtish:d statistics,
listening to the radio, ILinking about
the. world, interpretin_ data of recon-
naissance sztcliites, end occasionally
publishing the names of foreign spies. I
had been led by conversations with a
number of CIA officials to believe that
they were thinking along the same
lines. One CIA man after another
eagerly ;ailed the discussion to assure
me that the days of the flamboyant
covert operations were over, The
tipper-class amateurs of the OSS who
stayed to mastermind operations in
Guatemala, Iran, the Congo, and clse-
where--:;Ilen I)uli s, Kermit Roosevelt,
Ri~:li rd lii.scli, Tracy 13 aracs, Robert
Amory, Desmond Fitz erald-had died
or departed.
In their place, I was assured, was a
small army of professionals devoted to
pren:aring intelli ence "estimates" for
the President and collecting inforrtta-
tion the clean, modern way, mostly
with sensors, computers, and sophis-
ticated reconnaissa ace devices. Even
Gary Pcmcrs, the U-2 pilot, would now
be as mu di a museum piece as Mata
Bari. (There arc about 15.000 em-
ployees in the CIA and 200.000 in the
entire "intelligence conunuoity'' itself.
The cost of maintaining them is sonle-
where. between SS billion and S6
billion annually. The employment
figures do not include foreign agents or
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mercenaries, such as tlicCIA's 100,000-
ntan !tired army in Laos.)
A week after lily visit to the "senior
seminar" Newsweek ran a long story
on "tile new espionage" with a picture
of CIA Director Richard Helms on the
cover. The reporters clearly had spoken
to some of the same people I had. As
Newsweek said, "The. gaudy era of the
adventurer has passed in the American
spy business; the bureaucratic age of
Richard C. Helms and his gray spe-
cialists has settled in." I began to have
an uneasy feeling that Neivswcek's
article was a cover story in more than
i t has always been difficult to
analy..e organizations that enrage in
false advertising about themselves. Part
of t:.e responsibility of the CIA is to
spread confusion about its own work.
The world of Richard helms and his
"specialists" does indeed differ from
that of Allen Dulles. intelligence orl;an-
izations, in spite of their predilection
for what English judges used to call
."frolics of their own," are servants of
policy. When policy changes, they
must eventually change too, although
because of the atmosphere of secrecy
and deception in which they operate,
such changes are exceptionally hard to
control. To understand the "new
espionage" one must see it as part of
the Nixon Doctrine which, in essence,
is a global strategy for maintaining US
power and influcno~e without overtly
involving the nation in another ground
war.
on November 10, for a "Select: Com-
mittee on the Coordination of United
States Activities Abroad to oversee
activities of the Central Intelligence
Agency," Senator Stuart Symington
noted that "tile subcommittee having
oversight of the Central Intelligence
Agency has not nlct once this year."
Symington, a former Secretary of
the Air Force and veteran member of
the Armed Services Committee, has
also said that "there is no federal
agency in our government whose activ-
ities receive less scrutiny and control
than the CIA." Moreover, soon after
Symington spoke, Senator Allen J.
Ellender, chairman of the Intelligence
Operations Subcommittee, admitted on
the floor of the Senate, as the Wash-
ington Post reported, "that he did not
know in advance about the CI :"?.'s
financing of any army in Laos." Sym-
ington was able to get only thirty
votes :.I favor' of a Select Committee.
An attempt to impose a bn:!, glary
ceiling on intelligence acts itie; al?a
failed.
Always intimidated by the mysteries
of intelligence, senators were particu-
kirly unwilling in this case to assert
their constitutional responsibilities
because the. President had just reorgan-
ized intelligence operations. Richard
helms had been given new authority
over the bud,'ct of the Defense Intel-
ligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, the intelligence and Research
Bureau of the State Department, and
the. other intelligence agencies. This
centralization of intelligence, adopted
But we cannot comprehend recent over the protests
developments in the "intelligence com- vices, gives the
munity" without understanding want Agency and its
Mr. Iiclins and his employees actually important powers.
do. In a speech before the National ^'"'
Press Club, the director discouraged tile most striking
of the II7liliary ser-
Central Lucili~ence
director new and
reori'.:Illizat101, is the erlll::Itc 3
journalists from lint:in" the attempt.
role Of
"1'ou'vc just not to trur;t us. We arc Henry Kissinger, who as chairman of
new National Security Council lntel
honorable nhen." The. same speech is
made each year to 1110, small but lit;ence C'oramittee and supervisor of it
growing number of senators who want new Net Assessment Group can now
a closer check on the CIA. In asking, function as a chief of staff to the
President on inicili'vnce matters. fiver
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more than before, his view of the
world is the basis for the President's
decisions. The military services will
now have fewer chances to sell the
President their own version of events.
For more than ten years the CIA has
had one public failure after another-
the Bay of Pigs, the failure of its
counterinsurgency operations in Viet-
nam during the early 1960s, its incom-
petence during the Dominican opera-
tion in 1965, the scandals over its
penetration of the National Student
Association and dozens of other organ-
izations. But the Agency is once again
becoming the most powerful bureau-
cratic force in foreign. affairs. In part,
its new prestige results from the Pen-
tagon Papers.
The record made available thus far
shows that the CIA analyzed South
Vietnamese politics in the late 1950s
with remarkable accuracy. The
Agency's Board of National Estimates,
which prepares the National Intelli-
gence. Estimates for the President, was
perceptive about the weakness of the
Diem regime and, unlike Rusk, Bundy,
and McNamara, the Agency saw that
the Viet Cond.*, was an authentic south-
ern movement, not merely the creature
of Hanoi. The CIA presented a strong
case showing that bombing the north
would not win the war in the south.
Each time a major escalation of the
war was- proposed, its predictions,
though always hedged in the charac-
teristic manner of investment analysts
and other professional prophets, were
duly pessimistic.
The current prestige of the CIA is
also explained by the failure of com-
peting agencies. Robert Me amara's
effort to create tire Defense Intelli-
gence Agency, a little CIA to con-
solidate the intelligence work of the
military services, was not a bureau-
cratic success. A former Air Force man
described it for a A'ewsieeek corres-
pondent as a "giant vacuum cleaner
picking up millions of pieces of lint
that we store in our computers." It did
not help the reputation of Army
intelligence inside the o iv crone iii
when it was caught spying on such
figures as Senator Adlai Stevenson. The
State Department Intelligence and
Research Branch, which also had a
reasonably good record of accuracy in
the Vietnam war, is small, depends
upon other agencies for information,
and shares the generally low esteem in
which the State Department is held by
those in charge of American foreign
policy.
But the most important reason for
the new ascendence of the CIA and its
highly publicized professionals is the
Nixon Doctrine, which is in many
ways a throwback to the policies of -
the Eisenhower era, the CIA's Golden
Age. John Foster Dulles and his
brother used tile CIA as an instrument
of political warfare to extend US
control over the internal politics of
countries throughout the world, with-
out military intervention. During the
Eisenhower years troops were used
only in the brief adventure in Lebanon
and for evacuating some tiny islands
off China. -But CIA agents brought
down governments in Iran and Guate-
mala, attempted to do so in Indonesia,
installed Mobutu in the Congo, and
staged a secret war in Laos.
These were the years in which the
CIA established itself as the principal
aint of US diplomacy in a number of
countries and reduced many ambas-
sadors to embarrassed ceremonial
figures. Sometimes intelligence agents
were openly appointed to strategic
embassies. In 1953, for example,
General "Wild Bit)" Donovan, the
creator of OSS and the senior Amer-
i~an specialist in espionage, v,as
appointed ambassador to Thailand so
that he could set up a variety of covert
operations in Southeast Asia, of which
many still survive. The Eisenhower era
was a period of intense undercover
activity, but under the cover of
Dulles 's belligerent rhetoric Ike deliv-
ered eight years of peace..
Nixon now promises a full genera-
tion of peace. According to the n o-
%ictterniehean vision of Ilenry lKiss-
intper, expounded in State of the World
rnessag es and in the President's major
foreign policy speech last summer at
Kansas City, US troop strength around
the world will be reduced and large-
scale military interventions will be
avoided. Instead, Nixon will take dip-
lomatic steps to reduce confrontations
around the world. When the United
States finds that it has no alternative
to the use of force to protect what are
still deemed our "vital interests" in
other countries, the emphasis will not
be on crude military power. The Nixon
Doctrine calls for increased use of
foreign military assistance, the develop-
ment of an "electronic battlefield" and
other lethal technology that can be
operated at a safe distance, and re-
liance on air power.
When the United States finds it
necessary to use military action
abroad, every. effort will he made to
ensure that the color of the bodies on
the battlefield will render them in-
visible to US newspaper readers. Presi-
dent Nixon has made it "perfectly
clear" that the United States is not
abandoning its traditional view of its
interests in Southeast Asia or Latin
America. We will continue to resist or
harass revolutionary 'movements even
when, as in Chile, they cone to power
by legal means. But a major effort is
being made to find ways t at are
cheaper, more effective, and more
acceptable politically than sending in
the Army or the Marines. Clearly such
a strategy creates irresistible oppor-
tunities for CIA action, the more
"covert" the better.
In recent months much evidence about
how the CIA operates has come to
light. As we have seen, the Pentagon
Papers provide the first public glimpse
of its "estimating" process, but the
papers also show how little such
estimates can matter. On the major
foreign policy crisis of this generation,.
the Victrunin war, they were continu-
ously ignored. When 1 asked one of the
government officials responsible for
war planning how he could have
recomniendcd escalation in the face of
the CIA analyses of the nature of the
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NLF and the impact of air bombard-
ment on North Vietnamese resistance,
he replied testily that nobody pays
much attention to intelligence esti-
mates. Remembering how bored and
confused I was by the reams of red,
yellow, brown, green, and blue docu-
ments from intelligence sources during
my own days in the State Department,
I had to admit he was right.
On really important questions, such
as the political intentions of adversaries
whom for some reason you are afraid
to ask directly, the analyses seldom
rise above the level of sophisticated
gossip. There is always more than you
want to know about personal idiosyn-
cra.!ies, for example the sex habits of
Congolese generals. On military mat-
ters, such as the number of Soviet
aircraft of a certain class, the estimates
often are not attempts at establishing
truth so mach as essential elements in
the bureaucratic conflict over the US
military budget. Whether the Soviets
have fifty or a hundred more or fewer
aircraft has no effect on the "military
balance," but it will determine whether
certain funds will go to the Air Force
or the Navy. For this reason the
military services have signed "treaties"
with one another which are compro-
mises on estimates of enemy forces.
The CIA does not benefit directly
from increased military appropriations
and it is to some extelit insulated from
intersereice rivalries; but while it has
shown it can sometimes be objective
on military questions, its estimates coo
are colored by bureaucratic politics
and self-interest. A real test of the
CIA's objectivity would be the accu-
racy of its reporting on its own
paramilitary operations in Laos, where
the Agency remains in charge of a
full-scale war.
No one in the intelligence business is
naive enough to think that estimates,
particularly on intangible political
questions, can be separates] from
policy reconhnlendations. Policy is in-
fluenced by the picture of the world
on which it is based. Because the CIA
in preparing its estimates does not
normally divulge its sources, the esti-
mators have wide latitude to select and
weii;h facts for their psycholo!teal
impact on policy makers. (One former
CIA official recalls the highly emo-
tional estimate Allen Dulles sent Presi-
dent lii:.enhower the day Castro
marched into Havana. Dulles predicted
a bloodbath and thereby set the tone
for treating Castro as America's num-
ber one obsession and number one
target.) '
Some of the most revealing new
information about the CIA is -to be
found in the excellent investigations of
the Symington subcommittee during its
Laos hearing. There is also a small but
growing group of CIA alumni who are
sufficiently concerned with the threat
that a largely uncontrolled and growing
intelligence organization poses to a free
society to speak candidly about the.
Agency. Most of them are reluctant to
be quoted, but one articulate excep-
tion is Victor. lvtarerletti, who has not
only written a novel, The Rope
Dancer, dealing with the Agency, but
has been willing to talk to writers on
public affairs, including myself.
For three years Marchetti worked as
special assistant to the CIA's executive
director and as executive assistant to
the Agency's deputy director, Rufus L.
Taylor. During these years in the
"executive suite" he. attended daily
meetings with the director and high
Agency officials. While working in the
office of the comptroller he was in a
position to see how the money was
spent and where. In view of the lack
of effective congressional oversight, his
information is unusually important be-
cause it provides a rare view behind
the CIA's cover.
The characters in Ma rchetti's novel
ate wooden and one-dimensional but
his book is useful because it provides
authentic details of life in the Agency.
Marchetti gives a convincing account of
what he calls the "clandestine n;en-
ta]ity," the peculiar mindlessness of
spying. The chief defect of this book as
a work . of literature- may be the most
revealing thing about it. His characters
have no plausible motives. A happily
married flan with a bright future
becomes ? it spy for the Russians in
order to get money which lie does not
need and in which lie shows little
interest. In the end lie is killed, but it
is never clear why lie went to all the
trouble. But in the espionage business
plausible motives are not necessary.
The clandestine mind may not care at
all about the goals for which it plots
or even about which side it is on. The
excitement of spying, the thrill of
being able to invert moral conventions,
is its own reward. Marchetti shows that
the impulse to lie is so strong in the
clandestine world that intelligence
officials ostensibly working on the
same side cannot help deceiving each
other.
in his book, and in interviews,
Marchetti has already disclosed enough
concrete facts to contradict the image
the Agency has been trying to promote
about itself, and particularly its claim
that clandestine operations are a rela-
tively small and dwindling part of its
work, while the really important CIA
activity consists of research and anal-
ysis. When Marchetti left the Agency
in 1970 about one-third of its 18,00
employees worked on "research and
analysis," including "current intel-
ligence," "strategic research," "econ-
omic research," photo interpretation
and broadcast monitoring, and "tech.-
nical research"-the latter including
new or improved bugs, cameras, sear
sors, data processors, methods of
fouling Cuban oil tanks, etc. The
Board of Estimates, the most visible of
the CIA's Washington activities, em-
ployed exactly eighty people, including
secretaries, when Marchetti worked for
it four years ago.
According to blarclhetti, another
third of the agency's employees are
directly carrying out "clandestine
activities." They are assigned to For-
eign Intelligence, which is the covert
collecting of information, e.g., by steal-
ing codes or tapping wires, or to
Covert Action, which includes such
activities as the recent phony broadcast
in Cambodia in which a gig line voice
described as ''Prince Sihanouk" advised
Cambodian women to sleep with the
Viet Conti. They may also carry on
counterespionage, Richard Bis c'I, the
former CIA Deputy Director for Plans
(covert operations) has defined "covert
action" as "altenlpting to influence the
internal affairs of other nations-
somctinles called lintorvent ion'-by
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The renhaining third provide a In contrast the underdeveloped
variety of "support" services such as world presents greater oppor-
transportation, communication, and tunities for covert intelligence col-
logistics. But most of these, as Mar- lection, simply because govern-
chetti points out, help out the clan- mints are much less highly organ-
destine services. Analysts who sit at rzed: there is less security con-
sciousness; and there ?is apt to be
desks at CIA headquarters in Langley, more actual or potential diffusion
Virginia, and read Pruvda need and gat of power among parties, localities,
little such "support." But the covert organizations, and individuals out-
work of contriving "dead-drops," "safe side of the central governments.
houses," "cut-outs," and of paying The primary purpose of espionage
1 b 1 t d i n 1 hers and in these areas is to provide Wash-
t I ho c
le
Bissell recounted how "in the case
of a large underdeveloped country"
money was "put into a party's funds
without the knowledge of that party."
The United States, he said, "should
make increasing use of non-nationals,
who, with effort at indoctrination and
training should be encouraged to de-
velop a second loyalty, more or less
ccntparable to that of the American
staff.
l y
-ugc rl hes o r
disloyal colonels requires the efforts of ~ington with timely knowledge of If the Agency is to be effective, it
thousands of employees. It is also the internal power balance.... will have to make increasing use of
' t t is on an ex
tot
expensive. Marchetti estimates that at As one former CIA official explained
least 65 percent of the Agency's it to me, Europe used to be an under-
annual $700 million budget is spent on developed country from the spy's
clandestine activities. And this figure, point of view. After the war the
he emphasizes, is deceptively low, for continent was in ruins and everyone
the Agency also draws on funds bud- was either on one side or the other in
geted for the Department of Defense. the cold war. Now local authorities
To run the war in Laos, for example, resent it when Soviet and American
the CIA spends S50 million of its own agents chase each other in tl'teir coun-
funds, most of which are concealed in tries. This complicates the game of
the defense budget, and over $400 spying. Besides, diplomats now talk
million of the Defense Department's more freely anyway.
psi ate uls,l ,
parading scale, though those rela-
tions that have been "blown"
cannot be resurrected. We need to
operate under deeper cover, with
increased attention to the use of
"cut-outs" [i.e., middlemen who
protect the professional case
worker or spy supervisor from
direct contact with the agent who
does the actual spy: hg] . . . . The
CIA interface with various private
groups, including business and
funds. The disorganized, highly corruptible student groups, must be remedied.
TX A~ societies of the Third World make
'
'
1
tf Lich of Marchetti
s information is much more inviting targets. The same
confirhnca., by the record of a discus- official pointed out that there is not
Sion of covert operations which was much worth knowing about Chile, for
led by Richard Bissell on January 9, example, that can be discovered by a
1968, as part of a Council on Foreign reconnaissance satellite or other "stand
Relations study of the intelligence off" techniques of intelligence collec-
community. A copy of the minutes of tion. To discover intentions, which is
the meeting fell into the hands of the the essence of political intelligence,
Africa Research Group, which has so-called "close in" methods must be
published it. (The complete text is used. This means penetrating foreign
available for $1 from the Africa Re- governments and societies. Bissell put
search Group, PO Box 213, Cambridge, it this way:
Massachusetts 02138.) Although Mr. Only by knowing the principal
Bissell was dismissed from his job as players well do you have a chance
manager of the nation's spies after the of careful prediction. There is real
Bay of Pigs, Ile is still, according to scope for action in this area; the
former associates, close to the Agency technique is essentially that of
and regularly consults with its top "1%enetration".... Many of the
officials. Thus, in the view of CIA " penetrations" don't ta k e the
form of "hiring" but of estab-
ahlnuni and other sources, his dis lisping a close or friendly relation-
cussioln of covert activities reflects
ship (which may not be furthered
current thinking inside the A;^,cncy. by the provision of money from
Bissell made it clear that the charac- time to tin.e).... In some
ter of espionage is changing. There has countries the, CIA representative
been, the says, a "shift in priorities for has served as a close counselor
classical espionage toward targets in (and in at least one case a drinking
the Underdeveloped world. Partly as a companion) of the chief of state.
result of this change in priorities These are situations of course in
and ... partly because of other level- sti'Iliclh the tasks of intelliPrnce
opments the scale of the cl?lssicad collection and political action
Many of the ideas that emerged from
the Council on Foreign Relations study
group, former CIA insiders say, were
incorporated in a task force report
prepared inside the CIA shortly after
the Nixon Administration took office.
The recent reorganizatian reflects both
the criticism of the intelligence com-
munity by high national security deci-
sion makers and long-stan cling com-
plaints by intelligence professionals
themselves.
The most obvious purpose of the
-eorganization is to reduce "collection
Overkill," i.e., the expensive, mindless
iuplication of information that no-
body reads or that snakes no dif-
ference. The increased supervisory
power of the CIA and the White House
over intelligence operations is primarily
designed to keep the expanding intel-
ligence bureaucracies of the military
services in check. The CIA's ci:an-
destine services have complained about
the military's moving in on secret
operations which, Agency officials be-
lieve, they often perform with extreme
incompetence. The While Ilouse is also
interested in Ill,'intai!nilt,; tighter coll-
espionate effort in Europe has con overlap to the point of being trot aver ill teh igeuce activities in tile
a ti i',Ill uishabe? utcd States is nov;
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more. vulnerable politically than ever
when covert operations backfire. The
Administration is also obviously int.er-
crted in saving money.
-his much of the story is reasonably
clear from public statements. \;'hat is
not clear is the extent and nature of
the use of clandestine services. The
official line promoted in private press
briefings, dinners with the director,
and confidential chats with key nicm-
bcrs of Congress, is that the clan-
destine services, except for the tech-
nical people, have been trimmed and
that the US now makes 'little use of
covert means to manipulate the in-
ternal politics of other countries.
Newsweek correspondents in twenty-
five capitals around the world ap-
parently corroborated this claim when
they reported a cutback of secret
could mean either
that clandestine, operations are in fact
declining or that they are skillfully
being performed by agcnis with the
"deeper cover" that Bissell called for
in 1968. As of 1970, as we have seen,
Marchetti found ttie Agency was still
heavily weighted in its personnel and
budget in favor of clandestine work. In
trying to understand what the Agency
does, he contends, one must Keep in
ri'iind that its managers, including the
director, have made their careers in the
clandestine services. lie recalls that top
officials of the CIA were interested
mainly in secret operations, not in
intelligence analysis. llelm5, he renlenl-
bers, often scented bored by meetings
of the United States Intelligence Board
but was alert and lively when working
with the clandestine services.
Former CIA officials contend that
the Agency is now trying to "profes-
siollaliie" the clandestine servicCs.
M y CIA operations; as 13isscil
at
while separable in theory, "interact
and overlap." Although an effort was
made in the 1950s to separate the two
by placing covert action in a "separate
organ" under Frank G. Wisner, General
"Becdic" Smith, according to Bissell,
ordered the "complete integration of
intelli;g,ence collection and covert ac-
tion functions in each area division."
In practice, this means that an agent
who is trying to find out what is
happening inside a foreign government
or movement may at the salve time try
to influence the very developments he
is reporting on.
i t can also be anticipated that
intelligence agents will be increasingly
recruited from the international under-
world. At the height of the cold war it
was possible to enlist businessmen,
foundations, universities, znd churches
in covert operations. Espionage was
respectable among the intellectual and
business elite. But spying is not in hint
favor among the younger generation,
and it is now much harder to find
well-placed lawyers and professors to
cooperate in performing what Allen
Dulles used to call "dirty tricks."
Thus while the ClA?s rlanagement in
Washington will continue in the hands
of libc:rill, polished, and well-spoken
professionals, operations in the field will,
be more and more entrusted to such
adventurers as the CIA agent v:ho-
according to Fred Branfman, yr o
spent. a year and a half interviewing US
employees in Laos--drops grenades on
villages from airplanes and likes to
send Lao heads to his friends; or the
group of hired killers who run the
Phoenix Program in Indochina which.
according to CIA official
Colby, claims to have ? assassinated
more than 6,000 civilians in a sin? ale
year.
It is of course
operations are so
in Laos where CIA
ambitious that they
Papers contain a July,
orandum by General Lancd.tle
states that "Command control of
operations is exercised by the Cl, i
CIA, Vientiane with the advice o`
Chief, MAAG." ' llz A _ncy has
strategic difference.
pointed out have had their covers eruiiud trained, and financed sever:.'
pointed Bissell pointed out, covert cotlce?- secret armies made up of Meos, Yaos,
"blown." As the CIA applies new flog OX) do n d- a c n c n 1st Chinese, and Nun- ,s.
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teCjliliques, especially in the under-
developed world, these operations are
being quietly phased out. The CIA
used to pour money lavishly into
organizations around the globe as, for
example, the labor unions in British
Goinna which were enlisted in the fight
to overthrow the radical Clieddi Japan.
Now such techniques appear too, risky.
It is more "secure" to cultivate indi-
viduals rather than organizations for
covert operations. At the sane time
;Marchetti believes that the A cncy is;
also anxious to "professionalize" spy-
ing on American radicals, thus re-
moving such politically sensitive opera-
tions from what the CIA experts
regard as the clumsy hands of the FBI
and military intelligence. All the-
alumni of both the FBI and the CIA.
to whom I've talked ~grce that the two.
organizations are e gaged in a bitter
jurisdictional rivalry over such "coun-
terespionage" work.
he intelligence specialists I spoke to
now anticipate two other developments.
in US espionage activities. To obtain the-
deeper cover that Bissell says is es?.sen-
tial, more use will be made of "iilep,al'
agents. These are spies, Americans or,
foreigners, with no discernible connec-.
tion with the Unitecl States who live.
under an assumed identity in a foreign
land. Most US operations have been
carried out by "l gal" agents, i.e.,.
identifiable US employees using a
:
cover. (In Laos, for exarnple, it has
been admitted that CIA agents c.ngaged.
in training Moo tribesmen posed as`,
All) agriculture experts.) Legal agents;
arc obviously easier to recruit since the,
maxihnum risk they face is deporta from
rather than the firing squad. But
suspicions now rull high, and it in
harder to do successful spying out of
the US embassy.
The new emphasis will be on re-
cruiting strategically placed "foreigni
nationals" in Third World governments;,
for the intelligence "requirements" of
the 1970s will increasingly center ocl
the intentions of volatile regimes rather
than on weapons developments, w?liicli,
are. relatively easily discovered by tech-
nical ni'aens and which make littlx1
 .*The 01 A's foreign e ;ion sets tt
- against tribe and nat?gi t i a cre.etly tented. Safes have been stuffed
The Agency is now carrying on similar with purloined information. 1 ut to
activities in Cambodia and parts of what end? the people or huatei ~.+.a
Thailand. The close coordination of
the CIA target spotters on the ground
and the air force may well be the
model for the "low-profile" para-
military operations of the future.
The increasing use of such "low
profile" and paramilitary operations
and the employment of "deeper cover"
penetration by "illegal agents" means
that more and more power over
foreign affairs will be concentrated in
the office of the President. It is hard
enough for Congress to supervise the
Pentagon; legislative review of large-
scale clandestine operations is a vir-
tually hopeless task. The only chance
of ending the increasingly dangerous
role of intelligence organizations in
making- and carrying out foreign policy
is to cut their budgets drastically and
to set up accounting procedures to
make certain that the cuts are in fact
observed. Congress has the power to
do this but it will not act so long as it
accepts the mystique of intelligence.
the short history of American intel-
ligence is a record of tactical virtuosity
and strategic stupidity. Much of the
information obtained by covert means
is either unused or used in connection
with aggressive 2nd ille pl covert opera-
tions which often fail. An honest and
intelligent observer working in the
open or in a library can learn more
that is useful and true about t;:e world
than a clandestine operator aided by
the most Sophisticated spy parapher-
nalia. Information obtained by clan-
destine methods more often than not
has a built-in bias that makes it
suspect, as is to be expected when
people are paid or pressured or black-
mailed to deliver the goods. A careful
reader of Le Monde would have a far
more accurate grasp of the true sig-
nificance of politics and military opera-
tions in Indochina than someone con-
demned to reading every intelli; epee
document publish; d in the Pentagon
Papers.
Brilliant techniques have indeed been
developed by the CIA for assassination,
sabotage, and deception. Governments
in Latin America have been neatly
and Iran arc scarcely better off because
of the CIA coups in their countries.
American oil companies have benefited
but the American people are neither
more secure nor better liked because
of these "intelligence" triumphs. The
old imperial game of dividing and
conquering weak countries serves the
interests only of those who enjoy
engaging in it and of those commercial
interests that derive direct (and often
short-term) benefits from it. It has yet
to be demonstrated what security in-
terest the United States has in manipu-
lating the politics of other countries
other than the perfect security of
world domination, the dream that
destroys great nations. ^
The Atcw
York Review
CPYRGHT
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A CRITIC LOOKS AT US FOPIEIGN
POLICY
The presentation will take a close look at U.S. foreign
policy and will examine those elements and areas of foreign
policy .,Mich have produced opposition and alienation among
many segments of American society. The purpose of tills analysis
is to identify the changes in the attitudes of the American
public -- "the. lessons learned" -- which will influence future
lines of foreign policy. U.S. involvement in Vietnam should be
included in the discussion. The presentation should include
the speaker's viers as to inplicat.ions of the Vietnam involve -
m,tent for the foreign policy agencies of government, including
CIA. The subject matters should not be restricted to Vietnam
and of .er areas of foreign policy and US involvement should
also be ex opined. Suggestions for change in U.S. foreign
policy lines or in the policy-makking structure, might he of-
fered.,
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10 September 1971
Dr. R .char Cl J. Barnett.
Co-director , Institute for I olic?y Studies
1520 NOW Harip shir. o .rtvenuo , N. V1.
lash ington, D. C. 20036
Dear Dr. Barnett:
leis told n.(., about h i s Conversation
you concerninc your willingness to speak to the CIA Senior
Seminar and has asked that I write you about the details of
your appearance.
You I17.Vr~ ' erm scheduled fi)r 9:30 a.~z. , Thursday, 4 ,ovember.
The Senior is
locat'c{.1yor. t;i'c l.Dta.l floor of the Axl:i_ri,,to?a
C~1s'li)? cr of Commerce ,.'~uildin.g, 4600 Fairfax Drive, r incton,
V'.rcrl.ilia; near the intersection of Glee`bo r;rJad and
I L. i.x Drive
I will be X..1 Contact with you later to offer any assistance in
tr 11reli;.1g to t ale,, buil(dinrr which you may et~txl.x'C'...
Regardinc the nature of your prese'F>itation, I. a))1 a.tt. 1c rl'.nc'r
a "scope note" )riiich should su,7gcst the i cn rah. ?.me1:ork "for
your presentation. After your talk of un to an hour or more,
hone e
one to have a discussion. In order to foster. this, your ;iucr-
gesti.ons as to boo ::S and articles , other t h:111 your ~ll.ece 11?i ich
will appear in Harpor's November issue, to which we may refer
the Semin r i),1rv.1.Ci1;)antS in advance will be -101-)roci. ted. In ad-
dition, a bio; ra)hic s1rotch of yourself to pass out to our So-ii iair
participants would be helpful.
Don has told me that the policy of your Institute precludes
your acceptance, of an honorar. ium;1. I bona, Iio=.,?ovcr, your schedule
will be flexible enough to allow; 11s to t lke you to lunch following
your appearance.
if you have any questions or coimiei is please feel free to
call me on number 3S1-2200.
Sia.1tooercly yours ,
AV
Att: A/S
15 IAIINIL
Surnor sr. nar i frC
Off I cite o r
Central I:altelli conce A'?;oncy
Wa ahin!?;`t.c~n, D. C. 20 05
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BLOCK V-B- The Enviroment of CIA: Unofficial Relationships
18 November 1971
Critical Analysis of Foreign Policy
Speaker: Richard J.. Barnet
The speaker expressed the position that the post-World War II
period found the U. S. as a supreme power and it w4s our "Empire"
policy to remain number one. In the Truman doctrine, we took over
from the British, and the policy worked for over 20 years, in spite
of n-mistakes, because we were so strong.
The speaker indicated that the fundamental failure of U. S. policy is
that we are no longer operating in a 19th century concept; we have over-
reacted; and dissipated our resources. There are vast areas of the
world with their own politics. There are no power blocs now. In this
regard, it was stated that the Nixon. approach to peace in Vietnam, through
the USSR and China, is a mistake. The Soviets want peace but cannot deliver.
According to the speaker, CIA exists because of a "bureaucratic history".
The OSS developed an intelligence apparatus and it was unthinkable to let go.
Our capabilities determine the requirements. In the Eisenhower era, it
was part of the "more bangs for a buck" approach - particularly on CIA
activities. We may be returning to this approach under Nixon.
The general image of CIA is that of a "sinister force" - part of a
foreign policy which involves control and domination. There has been some
improvement in the Agency image as a result of disclosures in the Pentagon
papers, but it would be a mistake to get involved in such countries as
Brazil and Chile. Basically, the speaker expressed opposition to all
clandestine operations. The attempt to get involved in Laos type operations
holds great dangers and will defeat our purposes. The Agency will not
be able to "carry it off. "
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In the question and answer period, the speaker indicated that the
great security threat to the U. S. is internal; we should not be involved
in counter-insurgency operations; and our industry has become too
dependent on the U. S. Government. We should be using our financial
resources to increase our efficiency and become more competitive in the
world market. The U. S. should favor the development of a "rational
world economy" while accepting limitations on our power. Although
the speaker considers the Soviets to be more dangerous today than in
the 1950's, we should deal with them as "equals" and cut down on cold
war tensions. There was heavy discussion on the Nixon approach to
Vietnam, with the speaker favoring support to neutralist forces and
Coinnzunist participation in the South Vietnamese Government. There
was also heavy discussion on the,theme that we should encourage Russian
bureaucrats and decrease the power of the Soviet military. The speaker
touched upon CIA involvement in "assassination plans" as mentioned by
newspaperman Jack Anderson.
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11. A CRITIC LOOKS AT U.S. FOREIGN POLICY,
Richard J. Barnet, Co-director, Institute for.
Policy Studies .
1. Scale Rating:
The average Seminar evaluation of Block V-B for "S"
(Style or effectiveness of communication) was 4.06 and
for "C" (Content) was 4.56.
2. Written Comments:
Good! Stimulating presentation by an articulate spokesman.
Keep a critic of CIA coming back. This man or another like him.
This presentation was disappointing - very inferior to his article.
His economic interpretations are generally all wet.
Very unimpressive.
Good as "controversial" speaker - really agitated the group
more than any other speaker.
Disappointing. On the basis of what I had read of his writing,
I thought he would. come on. better.
Disagree with many of Barnet's arguments but enjoyed the session
and consider it valuable to hear these arguments presented well.
Provocative, worthwhile because he was one of the few speakers
who aroused the class; I rate the content high for only that
reason.
Perhaps Mr. Barnet was somewhat overwhelmed by the group, but
he seemed to lose his ability to articulate at times. lIe was
bettor during; coffee break so perhaps in future Seminars he
should be invited to talk to us informally around the coffee table
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Richard J. Barnet (contd.)
Good command of subject,, but pretty poor speaker.
Subject is a or speaker and I had trouble deciding exactly
what he was saying. I respect his views even though I do not
agree with him. His view of the world is unreal in some respects.
However, let's keep it.
Highly provocative. Speaker struck me as quite naive.
.Not enough sparks. Barnet's presentation was too slow and moderate.
I enjoyed the opportunity, but was disappointed by how little
ground was covered.
Provocative but not particularly, impressive.
I felt this was quite useful because the speaker was a "critic"
and he generated a lot of fire in The Seminar. No one fell
asleep. However, the important point related to the ignorance
of the speaker on CIA in particular and aspects of US Gov't.
in general.
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?5X1
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Remarks :
Colonel White:
The attached memorandum and cover sheet
although lengthy and perhaps unnecessarily defensive
responds to your comment on the Barnet appearance at
the Senior Seminar. I can see the wisdom of exposing
students to critics of the Agency and generally endorse tr.
concept. Although a majority of this seminar would
apparently endorse inviting Mr. Barnet again I intend to
tell Hugh not to do so not because of the content of his
presentation or views on the Agency but because he
violated our confidence and attempted to trade on his
seminar appearance.
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ac ca _'.A ____ __ _. T _"_'"7{?'_T~3'_'9??-M hAA.I.A,~ __.. /11 A I.91"11"f -l ff A/~.f /~/~ A AAA/~A~A IAAA.f -1 M
SUBJECT; (Optional)
>E FaS a Ad I e ~', Laa CORD ?~'LLET
Director of Training EXTENSION
1026 Chamber of Commerce 3245
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
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FORWARDED
O1?FICEIt S
".NITIALS
DATE
28 December 1971
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
The attached Memorandum for
the Record sets out the whole story
of Richard Barnet's appearance .at
the Senior Seminar.
Two factors connected with this
episode cause me to wonder whether
we really are "the loser in this
particular case".
a. Beginning his article with
the boast that he had been invited
to appear in our Senior Seminar
seems to me to emphasize the
point that CIA is not afraid to
listen to its critics. The several
paragraphs about the Seminar,
however tendentious and mis-
leading, do detract a good deal
from the points he later goes on
to make.
b. One exchange with the
students during the Seminar
suggests that his article would
have been even more critical
if he had not been talked down on
one of his favorite points. This
waslis allegation that CIA is
engaged in training Brazilian
security forces in the use of
torture. He nude a good deal of
this point to the students; given
his grasping at all other types
of criticism of CIA he would
surely have included this one in
the article if he had not been
25suaded otherwise.
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