'DULLES COMMITTEE' REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-04718A002700120002-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 15, 2001
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: February 9, 1949
• Content Type: MF

No C
nto. ____._______4
%QvtlAf (n Releas
u Declassifie
Class. Changed to;
Next Review_
Auth.?
Rt Director of Central intelligence
25X1A
25X1A
"Dulles Cori ttee" Report
T,S-.2.3 / A S
:t y
R EMC s 1) Extracts from the co3m tttes report (> al #1)
2) 1$1j8 personnel Losses in Senior Grades (Encl #2)
3) CU . Organization and Functions Recoarsmended by
Committee (!ncl #3)
(!c) Current CIA. Organization and Functions (Sol #4)
1, a. Tien the Th211es Committee made its initial visit to CIA
they were briefed by me in one session on the general overall
organization and functions of CIA. Similar briefing was given
to a portion of the staff group shortly 25X1A9A
thereafter. I saw- once or ve minutes anti did not
seems any time.
b. After these briefings I had virtually no contact with
either the committee or its staff, and was at no time queried,
either specifically or generally, about our administrative
a. At no time during the survey did az r member of the com-
mittee or its staff examine any part of our administrative
organization, or make any effort to ascertain what her there m4y
have been at least some reasonable basis for it.
2. Administrative references in the Dulles Committee report are
quoted in Enclosure 11. With. the exception of the favorable crent
on budget arrangements the Viral tenor of the report, insofar as
administration is concerned, is reflected in the quoted comments which
follow, with reply to each.
Me principle defeat of the CIA is that its
istrative organization and performance do not show suf fi cient
a .apreciation of the Agency's assigned functions,"
as The development of our organization and pct
based on a policy of centralization of specific
bilities in single offices and the coordinated work of the offices
as a team, each concentrating in its own field and looking to the
others for support from other fields. Only in this manner can we
avoid the cordon, duplication of effort,, inefficiency, and major
frictions which always attend a situation wherein every component
tries to be self-sufficient and attempts to do the saw things,, at
the same time, in the sae sphere, and in constant competition.
/01/07 : CIA-RDP78-04718A002700120002-9
-MV
 Approved For
DP78-04718A902700120002-9
b, Our organizational policy has resulted in the can
groupings shown below:
(1) Research, evaluation and production, and coordination
in those: fields :
Office of Reports and Estimates (except science)
Office of Scientific Intelligence
(2)
liaison
in then
Collection and liaison control, dissemination,
ervice, and information service, and coordination
Off ice of t-allection and Dissemination
overt field collection:
Office of oporsticns
(4) Covert field collection and counter-espionage:
office of Special operations
Covert field operations:
Office of policy Coordination
c. 'kept for ICAPS and the covert support problem, there
is no apeoi.fic criticism of the administrative and staff organ-
izational structure contained in the committee report.
d, Comparative organizational charts shhowin broad functions
are attached as v3aclosurS3 #3 and 74? It should be apparent that
"chhan a for the sake of change" is reflected in the comsitt e
report, and that the recommended reorganization would result in
considerable duoltcation and operational confusion, with result-
ing; frictions among its components and externally.
e. The several references to policy direction from LAC
agencies contained in the report are contradictory to other
portions of the report, in which a strong; directing hand is
recor nded for the Mrector in his dealings with those agencies.
"'amore is one overall point to be made with respect to the
administration of the CIA, TIv organization is o vw r-ac9rnin-
have
istered in the sense that administrative considerations
t
game EP-1.1m
Monza Proposea
constituted Co
d Operations
Mz3m
I3~NTiA~~P
on occaa on even con
ro n
n. o the latter. Under arrang
a report, t5i needs the newly
tion, '.atimates, Research and Reports,
ions would be included in the immediate
 Approved For Release 2002/01/07: CIA-RD
-VTMV. L,
?oraasr Assistant Directors have indicated personally to
me on various occasions a considerable resentment against any
administrative limitations on their activities. Their stand was
that they should be given a lump sum for their annual operational
requirements and given complete latitude in both administration
and operations within such overall amounts., including numbers and
grades of personnel, travel authorities, new projects, external
contacts and a arraaangeaaaents, etc. That a chaotic condition would
result from such an arrangement in apparent without disc u lion.
d. Rare, is a never-ending argument on the merits of staff
versus ce and t and administration versus operations. The commander
(or operational official) continually insists that the staff (or
to control, or otherwise act adversely on his operations and never
understand or sympathize with his problems. The staff officer
(or administrator), faced-with overall considerations of policy,
availability of funds or other support facilities, ]egaal restric--
coordinat ng responsibility, protection of his official
superiors against justifiable criticism for loose or incompetent
carrying out of their overall management responsibilities, etc.,
etc., is always the unpopular buffer and empire builder who blocks
everyone's progress. Having been both commander and staff offic4W
I can understand both points of view. There really isn't any
answer to this sort of criticism which will altogether satisfy
the operational people except a continual eyes" to everything
they want. I believe,., howevera, that a friendly understanding has
been developed with Assistant Directors which is resulting in
little friction and smooth relationships.
Me powers given to the national Security Council and the
CIA under Section 102 of the Act establish,. in our opinion,
the framework of a sound intelligence service for this
country. Accordingly we do not suggest any amendments to
the Act and be'ieve it would be unwise to tamper with, this
legislation uWW we have had further experience in operating
a. There has been no intention on the part of the Agency to
tamper with" the national ;Security Act of 194T, and no such recom-
mendaatione have been made or are planned. pbwever, the separate
legislation we are proposing is ew senti aaal. to our day-to-day
operating needs, and is badly needed to carry out our commitments
to other agencies to obtain legal authority for certain of our
actions which are not actually supported by laaw.
 02/01/07-:'. CIA-RDP78-04718AO02700120002-9
is Agency and their benefit to the President and' other national
cy makers, and our progress in providing central services for
all intelligence agencies.
n l placing in key positions of a large peercaernta; of nii
tary personnel, many of the-,a on relatively short ' fur of
duty' aasi nt, tends to discourage competent civilian per.
sor el from looking to employment in the CIA as a career.'{
as 'here are very few military personnel in kerj positions
in CIA, and the number is constantly decressi g.
ne of the six Assistant Directors is a military man*
c. Four of the six Det2uty 'ssi tant Directors are military
men, and this is considered reasonabole and justifiable in the
light of our coordinating mission.
d. Except for one OPE Branch Chief (FE) all of our branch
chiefs are civilians.
e. Three of the senior staff positions are held by military
personnel,, but this fact is strictly fortuitous due to lack at
time of their appointments of competent civilians for the positions.
r,ach of these staff officers now has a co tent civilian deputy
who 'will possibly in time succeed to the senior positions.
25X9A2 f. A total ofomilitaary personnel are assigned to GIA in
departmental positions, or of its current depart-
25X9 mental strength. It is anticipated that this will be reda,ced to
approximately l.; per cent as we complete our buildup. in over
half of these cases no civilian positions have been sstaa isTO
or the ee bein-2 pe orn ~ a none be established
anzo cases as they are essential o occu ie
_y if
n
personel
g. As a senior career civilian official of CTA, I have not
found that a military Director is a handicap in any may. On th
other hand, the Agency has been administered fairly and objets.
tively and major emphasis placed on securing Via beet career
conditions for civilians. If there has been any emphasis on
military personnel, it has been in the direction of reducing the
numbers in senior positions*
exist for the aassigmnt of headquarters pars
field, and vice versa, although a comprehsneive
'or rotation of personnel has not yet been aor' l cars
a. A specific program of rotation of personnel to and from
field stations has been prepared since the Executive aw ed
responsibility for all administrative support functions, and is
rea+di? for active impln r Cation.
Hj*se 2002/ -04718
25X1A9A
Acting Executive