THE FI FUNCTION ON A TASK FORCE

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP78-04314A000100110010-7
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
10
Document Creation Date: 
December 12, 2016
Document Release Date: 
March 19, 2001
Sequence Number: 
10
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
August 25, 1961
Content Type: 
REPORT
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PDF icon CIA-RDP78-04314A000100110010-7.pdf674.19 KB
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Approved For Release 2002/01/23::-PIA-RDP78-0431 4A000100110010-7 DRAFT 25 Aunts TTY l FUNCTION ON A TASK FORCE INTH; WCTIU14 1. A Task Force is an organization established to accomplish a mission of a magnitude beyond the capabilities of existing organization units; or which mast be pursued without undue disruption of day to day operations of such units. Task Forces are established for many purposes. It is possible that intelligence objectives could dominate the need for Task Force action. Often in the instance of ultirate political action or paramilit: y objectives, well-defined intelligence (FI and CI) objectives t first be satisfied by Task Force action. For purposes of this discussion, FI activity will be largely concerned with the collection of intelligence information and will be discussed in terms of a Task Force with a predominately paramilitary objective. 2. Since the size and mission of the Task Force will appreciably affect both the size and organization of the intelligence function, our attention will be devoted in large measure to those activities which support or are pursued in execution of the positive intelligence function, irrespective of organization alignment. There suet be cases where one man served adequately as the Intelligence Officer. Starting on this fundamental, there can be any number of approaches to the design of the intelligence structure in the Task Force. Suffice it to say that the intelligence function is present at each level of Task Force activity although it may lose its specialized identification in the forward ea chelons. Moreover, the FI (positive) aspect of intelligence are inextricably joined with its Cl counterpart. Likewise, the FI function is This decateenf Is part of an 1nte&1Mted-" t.ga; ~ra,~ied froae the Alils it Inaview@ review, Approved For Release 2002/01/23 : CIA7RDP76-04314A000100110010-7 Approved For Release 2002/01/23 :'C 04314A000100110010-7 L hig Task "ores obje r conditions the Positive the activity of each of the isatt - contained in the Task Force. Collective $ the intelligence function supplies that intor Lion, analyses, and. estimation dent ~Woi its Political act and have time against as and conmand orders the blending of functions. on go forward as requiramental the necessary for specific h the e sources presently available to the Task Force; are analyzed then incorporated into the working body of information rom vhich Task lore# officers draw for planning and action purposes. C CT R OF THE 3" 01WTXON R Ulh BI TASK FORCE CC# PON S Since inteni enoe effort is ccncentratesd on the target area, 4?&&U2d o meet the needs of the specializations within "servo stocks built up for future desaands. The accura of the information at hand must be verified and significant changes brought about through the Task Force I ? Ulftumable 1"21U9022 . ParsMlit*ry aperations heavily on saps and charts. Field requirements must be set pro ptly* military or social upheaved, not be identified through Task Force collection a tl j ++ Many operations require prior at ,phe of the target a terrain. Requirements for coverage not be lovieed. Approved For Release 2002/01/23^ QIPe`RDP78 04314A000100110010-7 The requests t liF Approved For Release 2002/01/23 : CIA-RD *41~4A000100110010-7 3. Biographic Intellience. Agency experience has shown that in almost every instance requiring Task Force action, the most perplexing, frustrating and time consuming problem is the identification, description, and assessment of those with or through whom we will direct Task Force action. Likewise needed is an examinstion of the opposition members and their approaches to our prospective indigenous Task Force partners and to the uncommitted neutrals. Indeed, a short-term, concentrated collation and analysis of existing biographic information may be needed prior to formula- tion of Task Force plans. In this collation process the gape become apparent. collection While these requirements are cranked into existing/machinery, the Task Force would be in process of organization. Results of collection action will then flow back to the newly-organised Task Force. From here the intelligence function of the Task Force concentrates in the biographic area on localized objectives which might include among others a. Identification and assessment of uncommitted indigenous individuals who would be susceptible to recruitment for Task Force action. b. Monitoring and continuous assessment of indigenous leaders with whom we have joined to stay informed on motivation,, capacity, ability, relationships, etc. of these individuals. c. Establishing the strengths, vulnerabilities and relationships of the opposition leaders. d. Identification, assessment and access to prospective unilateral agents who can be used to verify information otherwise collected and can be used to penetrate the internal organization of our indigenous counterparts, Approved For Release 2002/01/23 : CIA;-RDP78-04314A000100110010-7 Approved For Release 2002/01/23: CIA- p4314A000100110010-7 %Wrl 4. Tjctic Intej li e3ncea. This information is obtained through day to day, detailed reporting on order of battle (enemy) and deployment of friendly forces. Generally, this information is immediately transferred to order of battle boards and files. 5. Political, & gmIc SId Pevchologica.1. Inte genee. The fluidity of a situation in which a Task Force is employed presents a complex picture in which it is difficult to identify the intentions and sometimes even the political. character of the incumbent government and the opposition groups. Sometimes of equal importance is a similar picture of political events in neighboring countries. The personal and nationalistic objectives of indigenous leaders and their manipulation of international tensions to achieve these ends through political, economic and psychological means further complicates the picture. For Task Force tactical planning purposes and for provision of such economic and psychological support as is needed by the Task Force, on- the-spot collection of information on objectives, intentions, and ambitions of political groups ee needed to supplement that collection taking place within the totalU.S. collection apparatus. In addition to the political action needs, this information is needed by the psychological action operations which are designed to influence the mood, morale and actions of the target peoples in favor of Task Force activity. Yet, within this collection effort care must be taken to limit the collection activity to that which is of specific import=:nce to the Task Force and to that which can be properly processed and utilized within the limited capabilities of the Task Force. SOURCES AND FACILITIES E?4PLOYED intelligence All. Governmental and Agency/facilities must be made available to support Task Force objectives. This coordination would be accomplished within the roved For Release 2002/01/23 : CIA-RDP78704314A000100110010-7 Hquartears structure. Approved For Release 2002/01/23 : CIA-RDP78-04314A000100110010-7 1. Basic Intelligence. Appropriate National intelligence Surveys, maps, charts, intelligence summaries and like reference materials should be as close to the scene of action as the logistical situation permits. 2. S 3 al Intelligence. Much of the most valuable information on the target area, especially if it is, as is usually the case, a denied or semis. denied one, will acme from Special Intelligence. The Task Force All have ties responsibility for the secure handling of Special Intelligence and for seeing to it that maximum usage,, within security limitations, is ensured. 3. Headquarters and other SgMrt. Each step back frca the forward eschelon will have progressively larger bodies of information from which Task Force requirements can be satisfied. The Field Base has more than the Special Action team; the local station has more than the Field Base; Headquarters has more than the field station. The value of the information held by each of these establishments will be largely determined by the communication facilities and by the capacity of the holders of the information to service priority Task Force requests. The Task Force should undertake clandestine collection of information only if existing deadlines or communi- cation facilities negate the servicing of the requirement from such information. 4, The Clandestine Services Collection Mechanism. Task Force requirements which cannot be answered on the scene, e. g., concurrent United Nations action, or third country intervention, must be dispatched to Headquarters with priority designation and be accomplished through the existing (Agency) neec iism. 5. indigenous Qom. Since a Task Force in organised to perform a covert mission, its Agency officers will, of necessity, be severely restricted in their movement and exposure by security and cover restrictions. Intelligence Approved For Release 2002/01/23 CIA- DP78-04314A000100110010-7 Approved For Release 2002/01/23 : CIA-RDP78-04314A000100110010-7 n must be largely achieved through the indigenous groups with whom we have joined to achieve Task Force objectives. The Task Force case officer (who in actuality may be a paramilitary officer) communicates his me to his indigenous counterpart who, in t`acty acts as our principal agent. It is this principal agent who organises the collection net and it he through whom answers are received. The Task Force officer's job not only includes the consolidation and communication of requirements, but the much more difficult job of directing and training this principal agent in the rudiments of tradecraf't, security, agent management,, and reporting, com- plete with source evaluation in rapidly developing situations. The principal agent may be required to contribute to the evaluation of the information itself. Whereas the Paramilitary officer to achieve guerilla or resistance operations objectives can arrange to bring the indigenous action agents into camp for face--to-face training, the nature and procedures for clandestine collection usually leave no choice but that of Irking through a principal ent. 6. Liaison and Penetration Amts. The s llness, unity of purpose, clandestinity, drama, immediacy and action implicit in the Task Force provides a milieu for unilateral clandestine collection through liaison and penetration of the friendly forces with whom we have joined. The satisfaction of out- for standing requirements will often call/the use of each Task Force member who has personal exchange with the officers of Friendly Forces and each should be aware of the requirements he might service and of opportunities within his exchange for satisfaction of outstanding requirements. Liaison may be asked to service positive task force requirements, as well as to verify Approved For Release 2002/01/23 : CIA-RDP78-04314A000100110010-7. Approved For Release 2002/01/23: 'CCA-`I 3 78-04314A000100110010-7 information provided by the principal agents, to service Cl requirements on internal machination and to furnish star-behind assets. INTELLIGENCE TASES Within the Task Force the tasks associated with the intelligence function run the gamut of Headquarters intelligence activity. These would includes 1. The mounting and management of positive collection operations as described above. 2. The mounting and handling of counter-intelligence operations, including defection. (Thin will be spelled out more fully in examination of the CI function.) 3. The translation of Fask Force information needs (PM, CA, C1, Support) into collection requirements suited to collector's capacities and the sub- sequent transmission of the requirements to the specified collectors. This would include provision of requirements for paramilitary assets capable of producing information. !t. The dissemination of information obtained to pertinent Task Force elements. 5. The amassment and collation of existing data on target area and personalities. The nearer the unit to the fr-nt lines the more important this task becomes. The Task Force Yield Base and even more important the Action Teams cap not afford to be weighted down with unorganized paper or infornati,un. 6. The maintenance of :Liaison with Headquarters, otie r Agency units, U. S. Services and foreign services tod tain information in satisfaction of Task Force requirements and to place into appropriate channels information Approved For Release 2002/1,.'- CIA-RDP78-04314A000100110010-7 Approved For Release 2002/01/23,: CIA-RDP78-04314A000100110010-7 d~. be expedient or gratuitous. 7. From . aaalysis of existing data,, the drawing of conclusions and the The maintenance of an in 9. The preparation of Intelligence Annexes and Target Studies for Task A be noted that the Task Force should not response to governmental as opposed to Task Force re- contribution to the .other ctmpanents of Govern nt could be Fore* Hander and other responsible officers as need dicta operational 10. telli Bence. gether with s. .es or special studies as needed. lion of secure hand1ixeg and processing for Special In Here, it mi. lioction of infor -' on. de of Task Forces Watch; like maintenance of rooms, and fi.los; the rieefing of the of information through the be well to consider hoes the intelligenes function differs in the Task Force concept from the normal. >to-rye, country-by-country ns. TV* Task Force is a small organimati cn in which many xts are present and must be served. Only so macx information so much information can be handled by the limited Task Force. Of necessity, Task Force intolli nee+ collection action is limited to that information required to met specific Task Force objectives. It is localized and concentrated n the target area and personali- Approved For Release 2002/01/23 : CIA! 78-04314A000100110010-7 Approved For Release 2002/01/23 : CIA-RDP78-04314A000100110010-7 ties. Positive co to nced by the capacity of the indigenous principal agent. Mu iva F ; In a rapidly developing situation, he ask Force cannot suspend action in the absence of information. It suet act on both the collection and evaluation of the information. The con- of new events through the fesade nartsrs Utelligsnc* not be possible.. The intelli erne function must ce for the action but also for the assumption of political risk. he large 3site d by the sources Likewise,* the col eection is available. The urgency of the went will in- .n the limits of the Task Force Owmanders frame of .on of the intelligence dole by providing so= fore of intelligence analysis as a basis not only ctooras. Those factors over ch we b e no wntrol oe the intelligence function on the Task Force in- The fluid political and military scene which may prevail; the of the Task Force at ea` denied or snarl-denied area; the tired to conceal a Task Force as. eapposed to that required for landestine activities. Approved For Release 2002/01/23 : CIA-RDP78-04314A000100110010-7 ^ SECRET SUBJECT: (Optional) 1100 -0149 119A RE)P;P@ 4 ROUTING AND RECORD Slit TO: (Officer designation, room number, and C/CA Attn: 204+ K OFFICER'S INITIALS 29 August 1961 COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.) USE R VIOUS UNCLASSIFIED I C ~6 O EDITIONS [] SECRET CONE I DEN AL USE ONLY